JUDGMENT : Mohammad Yaqoob Mir, J. This appeal under clause 12 of the Letters Patent is directed against the judgment dated 09.12.2015, passed by learned Single Judge while disposing of OWP No.692/2014. 2. Precise factual matrix of the case is as under: (I) The construction of school building in pursuance to tender notice No.85 of 2007-08 was allotted to the appellant. The claim on various counts raised by the appellant was disputed, as a result whereof, in terms of Arbitration clause in the agreement, notice for appointment of Arbitrator was served upon the Chief Engineer. When no action was taken, the appellant filed application bearing A.A No.06 of 2009 which was disposed of vide order dated 2nd March, 2010, in terms whereof Chief Engineer, PWD, Kashmir, was appointed as Arbitrator who had to submit the award within three months but the Chief Engineer did not enter upon the reference which compelled the appellant to file another application bearing CMP No.03/2011 in A.A. No.06/2009 which stand disposed of vide order dated 22.09.2011, in terms whereof Mr. Gh. Mohi-ud-Din Dar, retired District & Sessions Judge, was appointed as Arbitrator. (II) The appointed Arbitrator submitted the award dated 17.11.2012. Against the award, Executive Engineer filed objections along with an application seeking condonation of delay. The objections were registered as IA No.6/2013. Same was disposed of vide order dated 16.08.2013. In the said order it has been observed that in view of provisions of J&K Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1997 and J&K Arbitration and Conciliation Rules, 1998, objections, if any, to the award have to be filed under Section 34 by filing an independent application as per requirement of Rules 5 and 6, same is required to be registered under Rule 7 and placed before the court of competent jurisdiction. In the said order it has been further observed that the power of Chief Justice under Section 11 to appoint an independent Arbitrator since stand exhausted, no further proceedings on the application could be undertaken. The Executive Engineer may take steps in accordance with law by filing a separate application. (III) The Executive Engineer, accordingly, filed an application under Section 34 of the Act of 1997 for setting aside the award, before the Court of learned Principal District Judge, Srinagar. The said application was accompanied by an application seeking condonation of delay. Learned Principal District Judge dismissed the application seeking condonation of delay. (III) The Executive Engineer, accordingly, filed an application under Section 34 of the Act of 1997 for setting aside the award, before the Court of learned Principal District Judge, Srinagar. The said application was accompanied by an application seeking condonation of delay. Learned Principal District Judge dismissed the application seeking condonation of delay. Aggrieved thereof, Executive Engineer filed writ petition bearing OWP No.692/2014 which has been disposed of vide detailed judgment dated 09.12.2015. In terms of the said judgment, writ petition has been treated as an appeal. Same has been allowed. Delay in filing the application has been condoned and the learned District Judge has been directed to decide the application under Section 34 of the Act of 1997 on merits after hearing both the parties. (IV) Aggrieved by the said judgment dated 09.12.2015, instant Letters Patent Appeal has been filed. 3. Maintainability of the Letters Patent Appeal is questioned by the counsel for the respondents on the ground that the learned Writ Court while converting writ petition into an appeal has, in essence, decided the appeal, therefore, Letters Patent Appeal is not maintainable in view of clear bar envisaged by Section 37 of the Act of 1997. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the writ petition could not be converted as an appeal because appeal against the order rejecting the application for condonation of delay is not prescribed under Section 37 of the Act of 1997. 5. Section 37 of the Act of 1997 is relevant to be quoted:— “37. Appealable orders.—(1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders (and no others) to the Court authorized by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the Court passing the order, namely— (a) granting or refusing to grant any measure under Section 9; (b) setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award under Section 34. (2) an appeal shall also lie from an order granting or refusing to grant an interim measure under Section 17 to a Court. (3) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under this section, but nothing in this section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court”. 6. Plain reading of Section 37 clearly suggests that an appeal against the order rejecting application seeking condonation of delay is not prescribed. (3) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under this section, but nothing in this section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court”. 6. Plain reading of Section 37 clearly suggests that an appeal against the order rejecting application seeking condonation of delay is not prescribed. When it is so, writ petition could not be converted into an appeal. 7. Learned counsel for the respondents in support of his submissions relied on the judgment rendered in the case of “Haleema Bano and Anr. Vs. Mst. Hajira and Ors.” reported in 2014(III) S.L.J. 845. In the reported judgment reliance has been placed on para 48 of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of “Nawab Shaqafath Ali Khan & ors Vs. Nawab Imad Jah Bahadur & ors” reported in (2009) 5 SCC 162 . Same is relevant to be quoted here-under: “48. If the High Court had the jurisdiction to entertain an appeal or a revision application or a writ petition under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, in a given case it, subject to fulfilment of other conditions, could even convert a revision application or a writ petition into an appeal or vice versa in exercise of its inherent power. Indisputably, however, for the said purpose, an appropriate case for exercise of such jurisdiction must be made out”. 8. The said judgment favours the appellant not the respondents because it has been categorically held that if the High Court had the jurisdiction to entertain either an appeal or revision application or a writ petition under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India subject to fulfilment of other conditions, could even convert a revision application or a writ petition into an appeal or vice versa in exercise of its inherent powers. It has also been clearly held that an appropriate case for exercise of such jurisdiction must be made out. 9. The first condition i.e. the High Court has no jurisdiction in terms of Section 37 of the Act of 1997 to entertain an appeal against the order rejecting application for condonation of delay, is not satisfied. When it is so, the writ petition could not be converted into an appeal. 10. 9. The first condition i.e. the High Court has no jurisdiction in terms of Section 37 of the Act of 1997 to entertain an appeal against the order rejecting application for condonation of delay, is not satisfied. When it is so, the writ petition could not be converted into an appeal. 10. During the course of hearing of the writ petition before learned Single Judge, counsel for the respondents (writ petitioner) had made a submission for treating the writ petition as an appeal in terms of Section 37 of the Act of 1997, as is reflected in para 11 of the judgment impugned but in para 12 of the judgment impugned learned Single Judge has recorded as under: “(12) Subsequently, with the consensus of learned counsel for parties, the writ petition was finally heard”. 11. While considering the submissions, learned Single Judge in para 17 of the judgment impugned has treated the writ petition as an appeal. Para 17 is relevant to be quoted: “(17) Court while dealing with the issue having bearing on the public exchequer cannot remain a silent spectator in ignoring the decision on merits. True that the writ petition is not the remedy available to the petitioner, but a remedy of appeal is very much available to the petitioner to challenge to the impugned order. Therefore, keeping in view the interest of public exchequer this court has no hesitation in treating the writ petition as Appeal and is treated as such”. 12. After treating the writ petition as an appeal, learned Single Judge has opined that Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act and applying the same has condoned the delay. 13. True it is that in case a competent appeal would have been filed, then definitely remedy was not Letters Patent Appeal. Every case has to be judged in view of its own peculiar facts. In essence, writ petition has been filed which has been converted into an appeal. As already observed hereinabove, same could not be converted as an appeal because appeal against the order rejecting application for condonation of delay is not prescribed, therefore, for all practical purposes writ petition has been decided. When a writ petition has been decided, then against the judgment remedy of Letters Patent Appeal is available. 14. As already observed hereinabove, same could not be converted as an appeal because appeal against the order rejecting application for condonation of delay is not prescribed, therefore, for all practical purposes writ petition has been decided. When a writ petition has been decided, then against the judgment remedy of Letters Patent Appeal is available. 14. Next it was projected by learned counsel for the respondents that petition under Section 104 of the Constitution of J&K read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been decided. Against such order, remedy of Letters Patent Appeal is not available. Perusal of the records reveal that the respondent (writ petitioner) had filed a petition under Sections 103, 104 of the Constitution of J&K read with Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, as is clear from the caption of the writ petition as well as para 23 of the writ petition. The relief sought includes issue of Writ of Certiorari so as to set aside arbitral award dated 17.11.2012 and also the order dated 3012.2013 passed by District Judge, Srinagar in an application filed under Order 21 Rule 11 CPC i.e. the order passed in execution proceedings. 15. It is settled that when an order is passed by the High Court in exercise of supervisory powers under Section 104 of the Constitution of J&K State which corresponds to Article 227 of the Constitution of India, then Letters Patent Appeal will not lie but when a petition is filed under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India read with Sections 103 and 104 of the J&K Constitution, when it is not expressly stated that the petition is allowed only under Section 104 read with Article 227, then the aggrieved party has a right to prefer a Letters Patent Appeal before the Division Bench. In my view I am fortified by the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment rendered in the case of “Lokmat Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Shankarprasad” reported in (1999) 6 SCC 275 . It shall be relevant to quote para 16 of the said judgment: “16. In my view I am fortified by the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment rendered in the case of “Lokmat Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Shankarprasad” reported in (1999) 6 SCC 275 . It shall be relevant to quote para 16 of the said judgment: “16. It is, therefore, obvious that the Writ Petition invoking jurisdiction of the High Court both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution had tried to make out a case for High Court’s interference seeking issuance of an appropriate Writ of Certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Basic averments for invoking such jurisdiction were already pleaded in the Writ Petition for High Court’s consideration. It is true, as submitted by learned counsel for the appellant, that the order of the learned Single Judge nowhere stated that the Court was considering the Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is equally true that the learned Single Judge dismissed the Writ Petition by observing that the Courts below had appreciated the contentions and rejected the complaint. But the said observation of the learned Single Judge did not necessarily mean that the learned Judge did not inclined to interfere under article 227 of the Constitution of India only. The said observation equally supports the conclusion that the learned Judge was not inclined to interfere under Articles 226 and 227. As seen earlier, that he was considering the aforesaid Writ Petition moved under Articles 226 as well as 227 of the Constitution of India. Under these circumstances, it is not possible to agree with the contention of learned counsel for the appellant that the learned Single Judge had refused to interfere only under Article 227 of the Constitution of India when he dismissed the Writ Petition of the respondent. In this connection, it is profitable to have a look at the decision of this Court in the case of Umaji Keshao Meshram and Others vs. Radhikabai, widow of Anandrao Banapurkar and Anr., [(1986) Supp SCC 401]. In that case O.Chinnappa Reddy and D.P.Madon, JJ., considered the very same question in the light of clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the Bombay High Court. Madon J., speaking for the Court in para 107 of the Report at page 473, made the following pertinent observations: “107. In that case O.Chinnappa Reddy and D.P.Madon, JJ., considered the very same question in the light of clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the Bombay High Court. Madon J., speaking for the Court in para 107 of the Report at page 473, made the following pertinent observations: “107. Petitions are at times filed both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The case of Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque before this Court was of such a type. Rule 18 provides that where such petitions are filed against orders of the tribunals or authorities specified in Rule 18 of Chapter XVII of the Appellate Side Rules or against decrees or orders of courts specified in that rule, they shall be heard and finally disposed of by a Single Judge. The question is whether an appeal would lie from the decision of the Single Judge in such a case. In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution, and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226, and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Such was the view taken by the Allahabad High court in Aidal Singh v. Karan Singh and by the Punjab High Court in Raj Kishan Jain v. Tulsi Dass and Barham Dutt v. Peoples’ Co-operative Transport Society Ltd., New Delhi and we are in agreement with it.” The aforesaid decision squarely gets attracted on the facts of the present case. It was open to the respondent to invoke jurisdiction of the High Court both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. Once such jurisdiction was invoked and when his Writ Petition was dismissed on merits, it cannot be said that the learned Single Judge had exercised his jurisdiction only under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It was open to the respondent to invoke jurisdiction of the High Court both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. Once such jurisdiction was invoked and when his Writ Petition was dismissed on merits, it cannot be said that the learned Single Judge had exercised his jurisdiction only under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. This conclusion directly flows from the relevant averments made in the Writ Petition and the nature of jurisdiction invoked by the respondent as noted by the learned Single Judge in his Judgment, as seen earlier. Consequently, it could not be said that Clause 15 of the Letters Patent was not attracted for preferring appeal against the judgment of learned Single Judge. It is also necessary to note that the appellant being respondent in Letters Patent Appeal joined issues on merits and did not take up the contention that Letters Patent Appeal was not maintainable. For all these reasons, therefore, the primary objection to the maintainability of the Letters Patent Appeal as canvassed by learned counsel for the appellant, has to be repelled. Point no.1 is, therefore, answered in affirmative against the appellant and in favour of the respondent. It takes us to the consideration of points arising for our decision on merits. 16. Viewed thus, the LPA on such count is maintainable. 17. Learned counsel for the appellant again contended that the writ petition was not maintainable because it was field by the State through Executive Engineer which contention has been repelled by the learned Single Judge by referring to the submissions of the counsel for the writ petitioner to the effect that the NIT has been issued by the Executive Engineer, contract was allotted by him, award is against him, the application in the earlier round is filed on his behalf, so the technicalities cannot be preferred over substantial justice. 18. If the plea of the learned counsel for the appellant is acceptable, same will equally apply against the appellant because all the applications were filed by the Executive Engineer. This Court while disposing of application vide order dated 16.08.2013 has observed that “the Executive Engineer may take steps in accordance with law by filing a separate application”. On that basis, Executive Engineer filed application seeking condonation of delay in filing application under Section 34 of the Act of 1997 before the Court of learned District Judge, Srinagar. This Court while disposing of application vide order dated 16.08.2013 has observed that “the Executive Engineer may take steps in accordance with law by filing a separate application”. On that basis, Executive Engineer filed application seeking condonation of delay in filing application under Section 34 of the Act of 1997 before the Court of learned District Judge, Srinagar. In case he was not competent to file application, then his application should have been dismissed on that count alone. Learned District Judge has entertained the application but dismissed the same only on the ground that no cause emerges for delay in filing the said application. Then that order is not also sustainable. 19. Again an important position is that as to whether Order 27 Rules 1 and 2 CPC has application to the arbitration proceedings. Order 27 Rules 1 and 2 provide as to who shall be competent to file plaint, written statement on behalf of the government. Same provision also provides that the government may appoint any person who shall be acquainted with facts of the case and authorized him to sign the pleadings. This aspect of the case has neither been looked into by the learned District Judge nor by the learned Single Judge. Even it has not been looked into as to whether Executive Engineer was authorized to sign the pleadings or as to whether he was required to be authorized to sign the pleadings in the arbitration proceedings. 20. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that the period of limitation has to be reckoned from the date signed copy of the award is delivered to the party by the Arbitrator. What has been done is that the Arbitrator has submitted the award in the Court in arbitration application No.6/2009 which in terms of the Act of 1997 was not required and it is in the same background this Court while disposing of IA No.6/2013 in A.A. No.6/2009 vide order dated 16.08.2013 has opined that “the power of Chief Justice under Section 11 to appoint an independent Arbitrator since stand exhausted, no further proceedings on the objections could be undertaken in the instant application. The Executive Engineer may take steps in accordance with law by filing a separate application”. 21. The Executive Engineer may take steps in accordance with law by filing a separate application”. 21. From the perusal of the records it nowhere emerges that the copy of the signed award was delivered to the respondents as is a requirement in terms of sub-section (5) of Section 31 of the Act of 1997, which is quoted here-under: “31. Form and contents of arbitral award. (1) ……… (2) ……… (3) ……… (4) ……… (5) After the arbitral award is made, a signed copy shall be delivered to each party”. 22. Sub-Section (3) of Section 34 of the Act of 1997 is also relevant to be quoted: “34. Form and contents of arbitral award. (1) ……… (2) ……… (3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under Section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal: Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months, it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter”. 23. From the perusal of above provision, it is clear that a party has to file an application setting aside award within three months after receiving the arbitral award. The Proviso provides that the period is extendable by 30 days more subject to sufficient cause shown by the seeker thereof. 24. It is now clear that the time will start running from the date copy of the signed award is delivered to the party by the arbitrator. From the records it is not discernible anywhere that the copy of the signed award has been delivered to the respondents. This aspect of the matter has not been looked into. If the period is to be reckoned from 16.08.2013 i.e. the date when IA No.6/2013 in A.A. No.6/2009 was disposed of by this Court, then three months’ time would expire on 16.11.2013. application has been filed before the learned District Judge on 19.11.2013, means there can be a delay of three days which in terms of Proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 34 can be condoned. application has been filed before the learned District Judge on 19.11.2013, means there can be a delay of three days which in terms of Proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 34 can be condoned. Even otherwise the period spent in the proceedings in IA No.6/2013 in A.A. No.6/2009 has to be excluded in terms of Section 14 of the Limitation act which is applicable to the arbitral proceedings. The said legal position about applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation act is settled. In this behalf reliance can safely be placed on the judgment rendered in the case of “State of Goa Vs. Western Builders”, (2006) 6 SCC 239 . Para 26 of the said judgment is relevant to be quoted: “26. As a result of the above discussion we are of the opinion that the view taken by the court below excluding the applicability of Section 14 in this proceeding is not correct. We hold that Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable in (sic to) the Arbitration and Conciliation act, 1996. We set aside all the judgments/orders and remand all these cases back to the trial court/District Court for deciding the application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act on merit after hearing both the parties and in case the delay is condoned then the case should be decided on merits after hearing all the parties concerned. All the appeals are allowed. Nor order as to costs”. 25. In terms of Section 37 of the Act of 1997, when appeal is not prescribed against an order rejecting the application for condonation of delay, the party cannot be remedy-less, that is why writ petition had been filed. The legal issue pertaining to the non-availability of remedy of appeal, then the period of limitation from which date to reckon and the cause shown for filing application for the delay of three days, has escaped the attention of the learned District Judge. The application has been rejected by the District Judge in an arbitrary manner. 26. For the reasons stated hereinabove, both the orders impugned dated 09.12.2015 passed by learned Single Judge and order dated 30.12.2013 passed by learned District Judge, Srinagar, are set aside. Delay of three days in filing the application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act is condoned. 26. For the reasons stated hereinabove, both the orders impugned dated 09.12.2015 passed by learned Single Judge and order dated 30.12.2013 passed by learned District Judge, Srinagar, are set aside. Delay of three days in filing the application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act is condoned. Learned District Judge shall deal with the application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act after hearing both the parties. The parties shall appear before the learned District Judge, Srinagar, on 24.07.2017. 27. Appeal succeeds, shall stand disposed of as above 28. Copy of the order be sent to the Court District Judge, Srinagar, for information.