JUDGMENT : Mr. Kanwaljit Singh Ahluwalia, J. 1. Mst. Mamta @ Shobhagya on 27.04.2008 was married with present appellant - Lokesh Singh @ Sannu. On 30.04.2008 she committed suicide in her parental home by pouring kerosene oil upon herself and by igniting the fire. On 30.04.2008 present appellant had gone to the house of the in-laws to bring back Mst. Mamta @ Shobhagya, his wife to the matrimonial home. 2. Believing the demand of dowry raised by the appellant, ld. trial Judge, vide its impugned judgment dated 19.10.2010, convicted the appellant for commission of offence punishable under Section 304-B of Indian Penal Code. 3. Having convicted the appellant for the above said offence, the trial Judge, vide a separate order of even date, sentenced the appellant to undergo life imprisonment. 4. Aggrieved against the conviction and sentence, the present appellant has instituted instant appeal under Section 374 Cr.P.C. 5. A peculiar features of the present case is that the deceased - Mamta @ Shobhagya made a dying declaration in the form of parchabayan/statement (Exhibit-P/25) before A.S.I. Nandsingh (PW- 23). She also got recorded another dying declaration (Exhibit-P/23) before Pradeep Kumar Verma (PW-18), who was then posted as Civil Judge (Junior Division) No.6, Ajmer. 6. The relatives of the deceased in the Court turned hostile to the prosecution, but in the present case, conviction has been recorded on the basis of dying declaration made by the deceased Mamta @ Shobhagya. 7. The statement of Mst. Mamta @ Shobhagya (Exhibit-P/25) on the basis of which a formal First Information Report (Exhibit-P/26) bearing No.97/2008 was registered at Police Station Bhinay District Ajmer for offence punishable under Section 498-A I.P.C., when translated into English reads as under :- “The parchabayan/statement of Smt. Mamta @ Shobhagya wife of Lokesh Singh daughter of Shri Bheru Singh, by caste Ravna Rajput, resident of Devliya-kalan, Police Station Bhinay District Ajmer, presently admitted at Female Surgical Ward No.3, Bed No.11 at J.L.N. Hospital, Ajmer. In pursuance of the wireless message received from Station House Officer, Police Station, Bhinay District Ajmer dated 01.05.2008 Police Station Sadar Kotwali, Ajmer Stated that I am a resident of Devliya-kalan. I failed in 8th Class. My marriage on 27.04.2008 was solemnized with Lokesh Singh. Yesterday on 30.04.2008 my husband Lokesh Singh came from Ajmer to Devliya-kalan. He told me to ask my father to give Rs.five lakhs and motorcycle. I failed in 8th Class. My marriage on 27.04.2008 was solemnized with Lokesh Singh. Yesterday on 30.04.2008 my husband Lokesh Singh came from Ajmer to Devliya-kalan. He told me to ask my father to give Rs.five lakhs and motorcycle. I had replied that he should have told me earlier for such demand of dowry so that my family members would not have performed the marriage. My husband - Lokesh Singh in Ajmer on 28.04.2008 at about 03:00-04:00 P.M. when I was sleeping, had slapped me. He also had given me three-four kicks blow. He gagged my mouth and told me that his father is a heart patient, his family members will hear. Yesterday evening I was at my Village Devliya-kalan. He told me that he has come to take me back. He further told me to bring Rs.five lakhs in cash & motorcycle from the father, then only we will go back to the house. I became angry and bolted the room from inside where kerosene was lying. I poured the same on my body and ignited the fire with the matchstick. I was feeling harassed, therefore, I poured kerosene oil and had burnt myself. Lokesh Singh had told me that he is in love with somebody else. Above said parchabayan/statement was read, same is accepted, but due to burns received on both hands, I cannot append my signatures. Nand Singh, A.S.I. Police Station Kotwali Ajmer Time 02:20 A.M. Dated 01.05.2008 Above said statement has been recorded in my presence. Sd/” 8. After the above said parchabayan/statement of deceased (Exhibit-P/25) leading to registration of First Information Report, was recorded, services of Pradeep Kumar Verma (PW-18), Civil Judge (Junior Division) No.6, Ajmer were pressed into service. On 03.05.2008 Judicial Magistrate - Pradeep Kumar Verma (PW-18) recorded Exhibit- P/23 dying declaration of deceased. Before recording the statement of Mst. Mamta @ Shobhagya, deceased, Judicial Magistrate - Pradeep Kumar Verma (PW-18) had obtained opinion of the Doctor regarding the fitness of the deceased. 9. In the dying declaration (Exhibit-P/23) made before the Judicial Magistrate - Pradeep Kumar Verma (PW-18), deceased -Mst. Mamta @ Shobhagya had almost stated identical facts. She stated that on demand raised by the accused in a fit of anger, she poured kerosene oil upon herself and had committed suicide. Mst. 9. In the dying declaration (Exhibit-P/23) made before the Judicial Magistrate - Pradeep Kumar Verma (PW-18), deceased -Mst. Mamta @ Shobhagya had almost stated identical facts. She stated that on demand raised by the accused in a fit of anger, she poured kerosene oil upon herself and had committed suicide. Mst. Mamta @ Shobhagya was medico-legally examined and as per Post Mortem Report (Exhibit- P/19), 100% burns were found on her person. Later-on, on 14.05.2008 at 06:30 A.M. Mst. Mamta @ Shobhagya died, as a result of burn injuries. Her autopsy on 14.05.2008 was conducted at 03:00 P.M. by a Board of Doctors consisting of Dr. Ashok Meghawal (PW-16) and R.K. Boyal (PW-19). As per the opinion of the Medical Board, the cause of death was septicemia, as result of ante-mortem burn injuries, which were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. 10. We may notice here that vide Exhibit-P/20 on 03.05.2008 Doctor had opined that the patient is fit to give statement as vitals are normal. As per opinion of the Doctor, pulse was 110 per minute and the blood pressure was 110/70. 11. A perusal of the dying declaration (Exhibit-P/23) reveals that the deceased was married with the present appellant - Lokesh Singh @ Sannu. The present appellant in his matrimonial home at Ajmer had demanded Rs.five lakhs and motorcycle. Mst. Mamta @ Shobhagya was sent to her parental home on 30.04.2008. When appellant went there to bring her back to the matrimonial home, then Mst. Mamta @ Shobhagya committed suicide by pouring kerosene oil upon herself. 12. Chandrakanta (PW-1) is a bhabhi of deceased - Mst. Mamta @ Shobhagya. This witness stated that on 28.04.2008 she, along with her husband, Devar and Devrani had gone to Ajmer. They attended the reception. On 29.04.2008 they had gone to bring Mamta to her parental house. In the evening of 29.04.2008 Mamta was brought to her parental house. Later-on, this witness turned hostile to the prosecution. She also resiled from her previous statement made to the Police. 13. Sapna Kanwar (PW-3) is another bhabhi of deceased. She is wife of Vijay Singh, brother of deceased. This witness has also turned hostile to the prosecution. 14. Vijay Singh (PW-4) and Vikram Singh (PW-2), both the brothers of deceased, Bheru Singh (PW-5), father and other relatives of the deceased, have also not supported the prosecution case. 13. Sapna Kanwar (PW-3) is another bhabhi of deceased. She is wife of Vijay Singh, brother of deceased. This witness has also turned hostile to the prosecution. 14. Vijay Singh (PW-4) and Vikram Singh (PW-2), both the brothers of deceased, Bheru Singh (PW-5), father and other relatives of the deceased, have also not supported the prosecution case. They have stated that deceased was not harassed by the present appellant. 15. Mr. Deepak Soni, learned counsel appearing for the accused/appellant, has submitted that Mst. Mamta @ Shobhagya was tutored by her relatives and this fact stands admitted by the witnesses. Counsel has further submitted that the witnesses have specifically stated that no dowry was demanded and deceased was not compelled to bring Rs. five lakhs & motorcycle. It has been contended by learned counsel that none of the relatives of the witnesses have deposed before the Court that the accused had demanded dowry. 16. Counsel appearing for the accused-appellant has contended that relying upon the testimony of the witnesses, we should hold that no demand in respect of dowry was raised and, hence, prima-facie, no offence under Section 304-B I.P.C. is made out. 17. On the observations made by us that the dying declarations of deceased - Mst. Mamta @ Shobhagya (Exhibit-P/25) recorded by A.S.I. Nandsingh (PW-23) and Exhibit-P/23 recorded by Pradeep Kumar Verma (PW-18), Civil Judge (Junior Division) No.6, Ajmer inspire confidence of the Court. Counsel appearing for the accused-appellant without further joining any issue, at once, has made a prayer that since sentence awarded by the ld. trial Court is highly excessive, same may be reduced. It has been contended by learned counsel that it is not a case where maximum imprisonment prescribed under Section 304-B I.P.C. ought to have been awarded upon the appellant. It has been further contended by the learned counsel that the deceased was not happy with the marriage with the present appellant. She had not accepted marriage. She intended to perform marriage with another person and, therefore, present appellant has been falsely implicated. 18. In the present case, the marriage of deceased - Mst. Mamta @ Shobhagya was solemnized with the present appellant on 27.04.2008 and she committed suicide in her parental house on 30.04.2008. Though, suicide committed by the deceased within four-days of the marriage is an aggravating circumstance. 18. In the present case, the marriage of deceased - Mst. Mamta @ Shobhagya was solemnized with the present appellant on 27.04.2008 and she committed suicide in her parental house on 30.04.2008. Though, suicide committed by the deceased within four-days of the marriage is an aggravating circumstance. We cannot become oblivious of the fact that all the relatives of the deceased, including her brothers and father have turned hostile to the prosecution. They have specifically stated that no demand of dowry was raised by the present appellant. However, we cannot ignore the dying declaration wherein the deceased has specifically stated that the accused-appellant was demanding Rs. five lakhs and the motorcycle. 19. Counsel appearing for the accused-appellant - Lokesh Singh @ Sannu, has submitted that he shall limit his prayer and confine the same to urge that the trial Court has committed a grave error in awarding life imprisonment, qua offence under Section 304-B I.P.C. The learned counsel has restricted his arguments to pray for reduction of the sentence. 20. Counsel appearing for the accused-appellant has relied upon a judgment rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Puran v. State of Rajasthan, (D.B. Criminal Appeal No.1445/2007), decided on January 29, 2015, to which one of us (Kanwaljit Singh Ahluwalia, J.) was a Member. 21. In the said judgment, considering the submissions of the learned counsel in that case and relying upon various judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court, qua quantum of the sentence, this Court had observed as under :- “Considering the forceful and truthful testimonies given by the prosecution witnesses, Mr. Suresh Sahni, the learned counsel for the appellant, has frankly conceded that he is not in a position to argue this case on merits. Therefore, he has confined his arguments only to the quantum of punishment which should be meted out to the appellant. Relying on the case of Deen Mohammad @ Murli v. State of Rajasthan [D.B. Criminal Appeal No.13/2005, decided on 25.11.2014], a case decided by us, the learned counsel has pleaded that sentencing cannot be left to the whims and capries of the trial court. Relying on the case of Deen Mohammad @ Murli v. State of Rajasthan [D.B. Criminal Appeal No.13/2005, decided on 25.11.2014], a case decided by us, the learned counsel has pleaded that sentencing cannot be left to the whims and capries of the trial court. Although in catena of cases the Hon’ble Supreme Court has dealt with the principles governing sentencing, although these principles generally relate to the cases of death penalty, but in the case of Sunil Dutt Sharma v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) [ (2014) 4 SCC 375 ], the Hon’ble Supreme Court has expressed its opinion that the principles governing sentencing in death penalty cases would equally apply to the offences of lesser punishment. Therefore, the maximum sentence prescribed by law for a given offence can be inflicted only in rarest of rare case. Thus while imposing punishment for an offence under Section 304B IPC, the court would have to consider the mitigating and aggravating circumstances before inflicting the maximum sentence of life imprisonment. Moreover, the court would have to give reasons for inflicting the maximum sentence of life imprisonment upon an accused while convicting him for offence under Section 304B IPC. In the present case, the learned Judge has not given any cogent reason for sentencing the appellant to life imprisonment. Moreover, there are hardly any aggravating circumstances for imposing life imprisonment upon the appellant. Instead, Kaila Devi had died of strangulation. She had committed suicide as she was unhappy with her married life. Further, the appellant has suffered the pains and agony of a trial and incarceration for about ten years. Thus, the sentence should be reduced from life imprisonment to ten years.” Mr. Aladeen Khan, the learned Public Prosecutor, has emphasized only upon the fact that the case falls under Section 304B IPC, but has not been able to raise any arguments against reduction of sentence. Heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the record and examined the impugned judgment. In the case of Deen Mohammad @ Murli (supra), while relying on the case of Sunil Dutt Sharma (supra), we have held as under:- “Having affirmed the conviction of the appellants, we have been called upon to answer whether sentence of life imprisonment awarded by the learned Trial Court, in the facts and circumstances, is adequate and justified? In the case of Deen Mohammad @ Murli (supra), while relying on the case of Sunil Dutt Sharma (supra), we have held as under:- “Having affirmed the conviction of the appellants, we have been called upon to answer whether sentence of life imprisonment awarded by the learned Trial Court, in the facts and circumstances, is adequate and justified? Counsel for the appellant had relied upon case of Sunil Dutt Sharma (supra) wherein Their Lordships referring to case law, had culled out the principles which till now had been applied for awarding death as sentence and thereafter had observed that application of same principles while determining sentence in the case of dowry death also make better sense. In a very erudite judgment by culling out the principles laid in Jagmohan Singh v. The State of U.P., (1973) 1 SCC 20 , and Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684 , it was held that since sentencing is an onerous exercise to be undertaken by the court, court should take note of aggravating and in mitigating circumstances. Their lordships in case of Sunil Dutt Sharma (supra) had also taken note of principles laid in a recent pronouncement by Hon’ble Apex Court in Sangeet and Another v. State of Haryana, (2013) 2 SCC 452 . It was held that evolution of principles of sentencing policy are to be distinguished from judge centric to fair amount of certainty. It will be appropriate for us to extensively quote from the judgment rendered by Apex Court in Sunil Dutt Sharma’s case (supra):- “10. Are we to understand that the quest and search for a sound jurisprudential basis for imposing a particular sentence on an offender is destined to remain elusive and the sentencing parameters in this country are bound to remain judge centric? The issue though predominantly dealt with in the context of cases involving the death penalty has tremendous significance to the Criminal Jurisprudence of the country inasmuch as in addition to the numerous offences under various special laws in force, hundreds of offences are enumerated in the Penal Code, punishment for which could extend from a single day to 10 years or even for life, a situation made possible by the use of the seemingly same expressions in different provisions of the Penal Code as noticed in the opening part of this order. 11. 11. As noticed, the “net value” of the huge number of in depth exercises performed since Jagmohan Singh (supra) has been effectively and systematically culled out in Sangeet and Sankar Kisanrao Khade (supra). The identified principles could provide a sound objective basis for sentencing thereby minimising individualised and judge centric perspectives. Such principles bear a fair amount of affinity to the principles applied in foreign jurisdictions, a resume of which is available in the decision of this Court in State of Punjab v. Prem Sagar and Others, (2008) 7 SCC 550 . The difference is not in the identity of the principles; it lies in the realm of application thereof to individual situations. While in India application of the principles is left to the judge hearing the case, in certain foreign jurisdictions such principles are formulated under the authority of the statute and are applied on principles of categorisation of offences which approach, however, has been found by the Constitution Bench in Bachan Singh (supra) to be inappropriate to our system. The principles being clearly evolved and securely entrenched, perhaps, the answer lies in consistency in approach. 12. To revert to the main stream of the case, we see no reason as to why the principles of sentencing evolved by this Court over the years through largely in the context of the death penalty will not be applicable to all lesser sentences so long as the sentencing judge is vested with the discretion to award a lesser or a higher sentence resembling the swing of the pendulum from the minimum to the maximum. In fact, we are reminded of the age old infallible logic that what is good to one situation would hold to be equally good to another like situation. Beside paragraph 163 (underlined portion) of Bachan Singh (supra), reproduced earlier, bears testimony to the above fact. 13. Would the above principles apply to sentencing of an accused found guilty of the offence under Section 304-B inasmuch as the said offence is held to be proved against the accused on basis of a legal presumption? This is the next question that has to be dealt with. 13. Would the above principles apply to sentencing of an accused found guilty of the offence under Section 304-B inasmuch as the said offence is held to be proved against the accused on basis of a legal presumption? This is the next question that has to be dealt with. So long there is credible evidence of cruelty occasioned by demands for dowry, any unnatural death of a woman within seven years of her marriage makes the husband or a relative of the husband of such woman liable for the offence of “dowry death” under Section 304-B though there may not be any direct involvement of the husband or such relative with the death in question. In a situation where commission of an offence is held to be proved by means of a legal presumption the circumstances surrounding the crime to determine the presence of aggravating circumstances (crime test) may not be readily forthcoming unlike a case where there is evidence of overt criminal acts establishing the direct involvement of the accused with the crime to enable the Court to come to specific conclusions with regard to the barbarous or depraved nature of the crime committed. The necessity to combat the menace of demand for dowry or to prevent atrocities on women and like social evils as well as the necessity to maintain the purity of social conscience cannot be determinative of the quantum of sentence inasmuch as the said parameters would be common to all offences under Section 304-B of the Penal Code. The above, therefore, cannot be elevated to the status of acceptable jurisprudential principles to act as a rational basis for awarding varying degrees of punishment on a case to case basis. The search for principles to satisfy the crime test in an offence under Section 304-B of the Penal Code must, therefore, lie elsewhere. Perhaps, the time spent between marriage and the death of the woman; the attitude and conduct of the accused towards the victim before her death; the extent to which the demand for dowry was persisted with and the manner and circumstances of commission of the cruelty would be a surer basis for determination of the crime test. Perhaps, the time spent between marriage and the death of the woman; the attitude and conduct of the accused towards the victim before her death; the extent to which the demand for dowry was persisted with and the manner and circumstances of commission of the cruelty would be a surer basis for determination of the crime test. Coupled with the above, the fact whether the accused was also charged with the offence under Section 302 of the Penal Code and the basis of his acquittal of the said charge would be another very relevant circumstance. As against this the extenuating/mitigating circumstances which would determine the “criminal test” must be allowed to have a full play. The aforesaid two sets of circumstances being mutually irreconcilable cannot be arranged in the form of a balance sheet as observed in Sangeet (supra) but it is the cumulative effect of the two sets of different circumstances that has to be kept in mind while rendering the sentencing decision. This, according to us, would be the correct approach while dealing with the question of sentence so far as the offence under Section 304-B of the Penal Code is concerned.” We may also notice that in the case of Sunil Dutt Sharma (supra), while reducing the sentence, it was noted that wife of Sunil Dutt Sharma died due to asphyxia, resulting from strangulation. Furthermore, in the case of Hari Om v. State of Haryana and Another [Cr. Appeal No.1167/2011 decided on 31.10.2014], the Hon’ble Apex Court considering question of sentence for offence under Section 304-B IPC, took note of case law on this question, and after considering various judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court, held as under:- “22. In the case of Hem Chand v. State of Haryana, (1994) 6 SCC 727 , the courts below had awarded life term to the accused under Section 304-B read with Section 498- A but this Court reduced it to 10 years. This was also a case where the accused was a police officer who had suffered life imprisonment. This Court held as under: “7........ the accused-appellant was a police employee and instead of checking the crime, he himself indulged therein and precipitated in it and that bride-killing cases are on the increase and therefore a serious view has to be taken. This was also a case where the accused was a police officer who had suffered life imprisonment. This Court held as under: “7........ the accused-appellant was a police employee and instead of checking the crime, he himself indulged therein and precipitated in it and that bride-killing cases are on the increase and therefore a serious view has to be taken. As mentioned above, Section 304-B IPC only raises presumption and lays down that minimum sentence should be seven years but it may extend to imprisonment for life. Therefore awarding extreme punishment of imprisonment for life should be in rare cases and not in every case. 8. Hence, we are of the view that a sentence of 10 years’ RI would meet the ends of justice. We, accordingly while confirming the conviction of the appellant under Section 304-B IPC, reduce the sentence of imprisonment for life to 10 years’ RI. ...” 23. xxx xxx xxx xxx 24. xxx xxx xxx xxx 25. Applying the principle of law laid down in the aforementioned cases and having regard to the totality of facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the considered opinion that the ends of justice would meet, if we reduce the sentence of the appellant from life imprisonment to that of 10 years. In our view, this case does not fall in the category of a “rare case” as envisaged by this Court so as to award to the appellant the life imprisonment. That apart, we also notice that while awarding life imprisonment, the courts below did not assign any reasons.” Having noted the principles of law governing sentencing, Their Lordships held that since in the case of Sunil Dutt Sharma (supra) death was due to strangulation, it was appropriate to award sentence of ten years to the appellant in that case under Section 304-B IPC as same shall serve ends of justice.” 22. We find no reason to deviate from the reasonings propounded in the case of Puran (supra). 23. We find no reason to deviate from the reasonings propounded in the case of Puran (supra). 23. Consequently, borrowing the dictum of law laid down in the case of Puran (supra), wherein reliance was placed upon the judgments of the Apex Court rendered in Sunil Dutt Sharma v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi), reported in 2014 4 S.C.C. 375 and Hariom v. State of Haryana and another, (Criminal Appeal No.1167/2011), decided on 31.10.2014, we set aside the sentence of life imprisonment awarded upon appellant, Lokesh Singh @ Sannu, under Section 304-B I.P.C. and reduce the same to ten-years’ rigorous imprisonment. With the above modification, the present appeal stands disposed of.