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2017 DIGILAW 3355 (MAD)

J. Alamelu v. R. Bakkiyam

2017-10-13

A.SELVAM, P.KALAIYARASAN

body2017
JUDGMENT: P.KALAIYARASAN, J. Challenging the common Judgment and Decree, decreeing the suit for specific performance in O.S.No.11 of 2006 and dismissing the suit for partition with respect to Item No.1 of the property, defendants 2 to 4 in O.S.No.11 of 2006 and the plaintiff in O.S.No.18 of 2009 filed A.S.No.437 of 2011 and A.S.No.480 of 2011 respectively. 2. O.S.No.11 of 2006 has been filed for specific performance by Bakkiyam against T.L.Jagadeesan, his wife J.Alamelu and children T.J.Raghupathi, J.Pasupathi and Jaya Vidhya. After the demise of T.L.Jagadeesan, his daughter Jaya Vidhya filed O.S.No.18 of 2009 against his brothers, mother and the agreement holder for partition with respect to the properties including the property covered under the sale agreement in the above mentioned suit. 3. The plaint averments in O.S.No.11 of 2006 is as follows: (i) The suit property comprising of 34 3/4 cents in S.F.No.159/2A of Kailasampalayam Thiruchengode Taluk belongs to the first defendant T.L.Jagadeesan. He purchased this property along with his brother Manickam in the year 1961 and then partitioned among themselves in 1987 and therefore, it is a self-acquired property. T.L.Jagadeesan, his wife and their children namely defendants executed a sale agreement in favour of the plaintiff Bakkiyam on 03.10.2005, agreeing to sell the suit property for a sum of Rs.43,76,750/- and the first defendant T.L.Jagadeesan paid advance of Rs.15,00,000/-. Only for binding nature, heirs of Jagadeesan were added in the agreement and except the fifth defendant, namely Jaya Vidhya, others signed the agreement. It was agreed that within two months from the date of sale agreement, the first defendant is to execute the sale deed without any encumbrance and the plaintiff is to pay the balance sale price. The plaintiff has always been ready and willing to pay the balance sale consideration and get the sale deed executed. Though there was tiled shed to an extent of 2500 sq.ft wherein the power loom was running, the same was not mentioned in the agreement as the defendants agreed to hand over vacant possession after clearing the above sheds. Since the fifth defendant was away at the time of the execution of the sale agreement, other defendants informed that they would get her signature in the sale agreement, dated 03.10.2005 afterwards. (ii) The plaintiff came to know after obtaining the encumbrance certificate that the property has already been mortgaged with the Salem Central Co-operative Bank, Thiruchengode for Rs.10,00,000/-. Since the fifth defendant was away at the time of the execution of the sale agreement, other defendants informed that they would get her signature in the sale agreement, dated 03.10.2005 afterwards. (ii) The plaintiff came to know after obtaining the encumbrance certificate that the property has already been mortgaged with the Salem Central Co-operative Bank, Thiruchengode for Rs.10,00,000/-. When the defendants were asked about the same, they informed that they would clear the mortgage and requested time. As informed the defendants did not come forward to clear the mortgage and execute the sale deed before the end of Tamil month Thai. In spite of repeated request, the defendants failed to perform their part of contract and therefore, the plaintiff was constrained to issue legal notice on 10.02.2006. The fourth defendant received the notice and a reply was sent by all the defendants through their Advocate alleging as if the plaintiff orally agreed to clear the mortgage debt of Rs.12 lakhs. But the plaintiff never agreed to clear the encumbrance. Hence the plaintiff has filed the suit for specific performance of contract. The first defendant died on 26.10.2007 and the fifth defendant has been impleaded as per the order in I.A.No.153 of 2008. 4. In the written statement filed by the fourth defendant and adopted by other defendants, it is averred that the suit property was purchased by the first defendant with joint family nucleus and it is not the self-acquired property. The first defendant has got only 1/4th share and defendants 3 and 4 are each entitled to 1/4th share and the first defendant's Daughter D5 is entitled to the remaining 1/4th share. In the sale agreement, dated 03.10.2005 D5 has not signed. It is true that defendants 1 to 4 signed the alleged suit agreement and received Rs.15 lakhs as advance. Since D5 has not signed the agreement, the agreement dated 03.10.2005 is not a complete one and cannot be enforced. The plaintiff further agreed orally to pay a sum of Rs.12 lakhs to discharge the bank loan and get back the title deeds and complete the sale deed within two months. But the plaintiff failed to pay the amount and therefore the defendants were not able to discharge the loan and execute the sale deed. Time is the essence of the contract. But the plaintiff failed to pay the amount and therefore the defendants were not able to discharge the loan and execute the sale deed. Time is the essence of the contract. Since the plaintiff violated the oral agreement and failed to get the sale deed executed within two months, the advance amount is to be fortified. The plaintiff stated that she had no money and she agreed to get back the advance money also. The defendants also agreed to return the advance amount. Without doing so the present suit has been filed that too on the basis of the invalid agreement. Therefore the suit is to be dismissed. 5. In O.S.No.18 of 2009, the fifth defendant in the above mentioned suit is the plaintiff. In the plaint it is averred that the suit properties Item 1 and 2 are the joint family properties of the plaintiff and defendants 1 and 2 and their father T.L. Jagadeesan. T.L. Jagadeesan died on 26.10.2007 intestate leaving behind him the plaintiff and the defendants 1 to 3. The plaintiff is the daughter of T.L. Jagadeesan. The third defendant is the wife of T.L. Jagadeesan. The fourth defendant is the agreement holder in respect of the first item of the suit property. The plaintiff is entitled to an undivided 1/4th share in the suit property. Without the consent of the plaintiff, other sharers executed the sale agreement with the fourth defendant, namely Bakkiyam on 03.10.2005. The sale agreement is incomplete and invalid document. After the demise of Jagadeesan, the plaintiff is entitled to get 1/4th share in the 1/4th share of her father and therefore, she is entitled to 5/16th share. Hence, the present suit has been filed. 6. In the written statement filed by the fourth defendant, it is averred that the relationship between the parties is true and the property under the sale agreement, dated 03.10.2005 is only self-acquired property of T.L.Jagadeesan. The plaintiff is not entitled to any share in the said property. The property covered under the sale agreement originally belonged to and purchased by T.L.Jagadeesan and his brother Manickam. In 1987, the above two brothers partitioned the property orally among themselves. In the sale agreement property, the plaintiff is not having any share much less 5/16th share. The plaintiff is not entitled to any share in the said property. The property covered under the sale agreement originally belonged to and purchased by T.L.Jagadeesan and his brother Manickam. In 1987, the above two brothers partitioned the property orally among themselves. In the sale agreement property, the plaintiff is not having any share much less 5/16th share. T.L.Jagadeesan entered into an agreement to sell the property with the fourth defendant for a sum of Rs.43,76,750/- and received an advance amount of Rs.15,00,000/-. T.L.Jagadeesan, his wife and two sons signed the agreement and promised to get the signature of the plaintiff herein in the agreement. Therefore, the suit for partition is to be dismissed. 7. The learned Principal District Judge, Namakkal framed necessary issues in both the suits and after analysing both oral and documentary evidence, decreed the suit for specific performance and dismissed the suit for partition with respect to Item No.1 of the suit property. 8. In this Judgment, for the sake of convenience, we will advert to the rank of the parties as assigned to them before the trial Court in O.S.No.11 of 2006. 9. In A.S.No.437 of 2011, wherein the Judgment and Decree for specific performance has been challenged both the appellants as well as the respondent filed two separate petitions in C.M.P.Nos.16086 of 2017 and 16366 of 2017 under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC, seeking to receive additional documents in the appeal. 10. The appellants filed certain documents including the Judgment and Decree in O.S.No.59 of 2012, dated 17.08.2012 of the Principal District Munsif Court, Thiruchengode. The respondent filed the bank statement of the respondent. 11. This Court is of the considered view that the documents now sought to be filed by both the parties are very much necessary for the just decision of the issues involved in this appeal. For the reasons stated in the petitions, the petitions filed by both sides to receive the documents are allowed. Therefore, the document, namely, Statement of Bank Account in the name of the plaintiff is marked as Ex.A.10. The documents, namely (i) Certified copy of Transfer Certificate, dated 09.06.1959; (ii) Medical Certificate, dated 30.03.2002; (iii) Judgment in O.S.No.59 of 2012, dated 17.08.2012; (iv) Decree in O.S.No.59 of 2012, dated 17.08.2012; and (v) Photos. are marked as Ex.B.8 to Ex.B.12. 12. Therefore, the document, namely, Statement of Bank Account in the name of the plaintiff is marked as Ex.A.10. The documents, namely (i) Certified copy of Transfer Certificate, dated 09.06.1959; (ii) Medical Certificate, dated 30.03.2002; (iii) Judgment in O.S.No.59 of 2012, dated 17.08.2012; (iv) Decree in O.S.No.59 of 2012, dated 17.08.2012; and (v) Photos. are marked as Ex.B.8 to Ex.B.12. 12. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants argued that the plaintiff is not ready and willing to perform his part of contract; that though the plaintiff orally agreed to discharge the mortgage debt of Rs.12,00,000/-, she failed to do as she was not having the amount; that the conduct of the plaintiff is to be looked into for granting of discretionary relief of specific performance. It is also argued that the property under the sale agreement is only a joint family property acquired from joint nucleus and the finding of the trial Court as to the nature of property is not correct. 13. The learned Senior counsel appearing for the first respondent per contra contends that the trial Court has rightly concluded that the property is self-acquired property of T.L.Jagadeesan. As per the terms of the agreement, the first defendant, namely, T.L.Jagadeesan has to clear the encumbrance and the question of oral agreement as to the discharge of mortgage on the same day when the agreement in writing was executed does not arise at all in the light of Sections 91 and 92 of Indian Evidence Act. 14. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant cited the Hon'ble Supreme Court Judgment His Holiness Acharya Swami Ganesh Dassji v. Sita Ram Thapar, reported in (1996) 4 SCC 526 , wherein it has been held as follows : "2. There is a distinction between readiness to perform the contract and willingness to perform the contract. By readiness may be meant the capacity of the plaintiff to perform the contract which includes his financial position to pay the purchase price. For determining his willingness to perform his part of the contract, the conduct has to be property scrutinised. There is no documentary proof that the plaintiff had ever funds to pay the balance of consideration. Assuming that he had the funds, he has to prove his willingness to perform his part of the contract..." 15. For determining his willingness to perform his part of the contract, the conduct has to be property scrutinised. There is no documentary proof that the plaintiff had ever funds to pay the balance of consideration. Assuming that he had the funds, he has to prove his willingness to perform his part of the contract..." 15. As per Section 16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act, readiness and willingness is to be pleaded and proved in a suit for specific performance. No doubt as per the above ruling of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, willingness is different from readiness and the conduct of the party is to be looked into to assess the same. 16. In this case, in paragraph 4 and 6 of the plaint, the plaintiff has specifically pleaded that she has always been ready and willing to perform her part of contract from the date of the agreement. Admittedly the plaintiff paid Rs.15,00,000/- as advance on the date of sale agreement. There is no dispute as to the execution of the sale agreement in favour of the plaintiff by D1 to D4 and receipt of the advance amount of Rs.15,00,000/- on 03.10.2005. The plaintiff examined as P.W.1 and one of the attesting witness examined as P.W.2 also spoke about the execution of the sale agreement and receipt of the advance amount by the first defendant. The statement of bank account of the plaintiff has been filed as Ex.A.10. The Bank statement depicts the account of the plaintiff from February 2006. The sale agreement is dated 03.10.2005. The payment of Rs.15,00,000/- on 03.10.2005 and subsequent bank balance as shown in Ex.A.10 are suffice to show that the plaintiff was having sufficient fund to perform her part of the contract. 17. The main contention of the appellants/defendants are that property under the sale agreement is joint family property of the appellants/defendants. The first respondent/plaintiff contends that the property is self-acquired property of T.L.Jagadeesan. Ex.A.5, dated 20.05.1961 is the sale deed of the property which includes the sale agreement property executed by Appavu Chettiar in favour of the first defendant Jagadeesan and his brother Manickam. In 1987, there was partition under Ex.A.6 among the mother and brothers including the above said Jagadeesan. In Ex.A.6, the property covered under the suit sale agreement has not been subjected to partition. In Ex.A.6, "B" schedule has been allotted to Jagadeesan. In 1987, there was partition under Ex.A.6 among the mother and brothers including the above said Jagadeesan. In Ex.A.6, the property covered under the suit sale agreement has not been subjected to partition. In Ex.A.6, "B" schedule has been allotted to Jagadeesan. Even while mentioning the four boundaries of one property the suit agreement property has been mentioned as one of the boundaries by saying that the property purchased by Jagadeesan, which reads thus : "xxx xxx" 18. D4 examined as D.W.1 has also admitted the above fact during his cross-examination as follows : "xxx xxx " 19. Therefore it is clear that the suit sale agreement property purchased in 1961 by the first defendant T.L.Jagadeesan along with his brother Manickam has not been subjected to partition made in 1987 among Papathi Ammal and her sons including T.L.Jagadeesan. Had it been treated as ancestral property or purchased from joint nucleus or put in hatch pot the same would have been brought under partition deed, Ex.A.6, dated 27.02.1987. Therefore the trial Court has rightly held that the suit agreement property is self-acquired property of T.L.Jagadeesan. 20. Another contention of the appellants is that on the date of agreement itself, it was orally agreed between the parties that the plaintiff should pay Rs.12,00,000/- to discharge the mortgage executed in favour of Salem Central Co-operative Bank, Thiruchengode. 21. The learned Senior counsel appearing for the first respondent/plaintiff contends that there was no such oral agreement and only on obtaining the encumbrance certificate the first respondent/plaintiff came to know about the mortgage and the first defendant is bound to clear the encumbrance as per the terms of the agreement. The recital of the agreement is very specific that the defendants are bound to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff or the person named by the plaintiff without any encumbrance on the property. 22. The learned Senior counsel appearing for the first respondent/plaintiff cited the Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhandari Construction Co., v. N.G.Upadhye, reported in (2007) 3 MLJ 467 (SC) and contended that the alleged oral agreement contrary to the terms of the contract in writing is not acceptable in view of Section 91 of the Indian Evidence Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above Judgment has held as follows : "15. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above Judgment has held as follows : "15. When the terms of the transaction are reduced to writing, it is impossible to lead evidence to contradict in terms in view of Section 91 of the Evidence Act. There is no case that any of the provisios to Section 91 of the Act are attracted in this case. Why the case that was sought to be spoken to by the respondent was not set up by him in the complaint was not explained. The case set up in evidence was completely at variance with the case in the complaint..." 23. When there is specific term that the defendants have to execute the sale deed without any encumbrance, the alleged oral agreement that plaintiff has agreed to pay Rs.12,00,000/- to discharge the mortgage is contradictory to the terms in the written agreement and is not acceptable. Therefore the contention of the appellants/defendants that the plaintiff orally agreed to pay Rs.12,00,000/- to discharge the mortgage is not acceptable. 24. The contention of the first respondent/plaintiff that superstructures where power loom was being run has not been mentioned in the sale agreement as the defendants agreed to clear of the super-structures at the time of execution of the sale deed. When the property is mentioned with four boundaries and extent, non-mentioning of the superstructure does not disentitle the first respondent/plaintiff to get the decree for specific performance and therefore, the first respondent/plaintiff is entitled to the relief of specific performance. 25. In the partition suit, the plaintiff therein challenges the dismissal of the suit with respect to the first item of the suit property. The first item of the suit property in O.S.No.18 of 2009 comprises 51 1/4 cents. This includes the property to the extent of 34 3/4 cents under sale agreement in O.S.No.11 of 2006. Remaining 16 1/2 cents in the first item is the property alleged to have been sold to one Somasundaram on 28.02.2002. The sale deed, dated 28.02.2002 is marked as Ex.A.8. The Judgment and Decree in O.S.No.59 of 2012, dated 17.08.2012 on the file of the Principal District Munsif, Thiruchengode is marked as Ex.B.10 and Ex.B.11. As per this Judgment and Decree, the sale deed executed in favour of Somasundaram on 28.02.2002 has been declared as null and void. The sale deed, dated 28.02.2002 is marked as Ex.A.8. The Judgment and Decree in O.S.No.59 of 2012, dated 17.08.2012 on the file of the Principal District Munsif, Thiruchengode is marked as Ex.B.10 and Ex.B.11. As per this Judgment and Decree, the sale deed executed in favour of Somasundaram on 28.02.2002 has been declared as null and void. Therefore, 16 1/2 cents in Item No.1 is now with the family of Jagadeesan. Therefore the plaintiff in O.S.No.18 of 2009 Jayavidya is entitled to get 5/16th share in that property also. Therefore the relief given by the trial Court in O.S.No.18 of 2009 is to be modified so that the plaintiff in O.S.No.18 of 2009 is to get 5/16th share in 16 1/2 cents of land in Item No.1 of the property. 26. In the result, A.S.No.437 of 2011 is dismissed confirming the Judgment and Decree, dated 28.03.2011 made in O.S.No.11 of 2006 on the file of the Principal District Judge, Namakkal. The C.M.P.No.16086 of 2017 and C.M.P.No.16366 of 2017 are allowed as indicated above. Consequently, connected M.P.No.1 of 2011 and M.P.No.1 of 2012 are closed. A.S.No.480 of 2011 is partly allowed whereby the appellant/plaintiff is entitled to get 5/16th share in 16 1/2 cents in Item No.1 of the suit property (property described in Ex.A.8 and Exs.B.10 and B.11). With the respect to the remaining portion of the Item No.1 of the suit property, the appeal is dismissed confirming the Judgment and Decree, dated 28.03.2011 made in O.S.No.18 of 2009 on the file of the Principal District Judge, Namakkal. The parties shall bear their own costs in both the appeals.