ORDER : 1. These Criminal Original Petitions have been filed to set aside the order of Discharge, dated 01.03.2010, passed in Crl.R.C.Nos.36 and 37 of 2003 by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Pudukottai, confirming the order dated 13.05.2002, passed in C.M.P.Nos.903 of 2001 and 424 of 2002, by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Pudukottai. 2. The respondent/Accused No.1 was working as a Secretary at 174, Keeranur Agricultural Products Producers Co-operative Sale Society from 01.06.1978 to 08.11.1995. While the respondent was working as Secretary of the abovesaid Society, by using his official capacity, he misappropriated Rs.2,65,380.50 and Rs.54,050/- worth of Government properties entrusted to him. After noticing the said misappropriation, the competent authority filed a complaint before the petitioner/police for taking appropriate action against the accused persons. Accordingly, the petitioner registered the complaint against the accused persons. After conducting investigation, the petitioner filed charge sheets before the Judicial Magistrate Court, Pudukottai, which were taken on file in C.C.Nos.755 and 756 of 2000, against which, on 09.03.2001, the respondent filed Discharge Petitions in C.M.P.Nos.903 of 2001 and 424 of 2002. After elaborate discussions, the trial Court allowed the said petitions filed under Section 239 Cr.P.C., on 13.05.2002 and discharged the respondent/accused from the charges punishable under Sections 409 and 477(A) I.P.C. 3. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner filed Revision Petitions in Crl.R.C.Nos.36 and 37 of 2003 before the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Pudukottai. The learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Pudukottai, allowed the said Revision Petitions on 20.06.2005, against which, the respondent filed Revision Petitions in Crl.R.C.Nos.125 and 124 of 2006 before this Court. This Court, vide order dated 26.09.2007, allowed the Criminal Revision Petitions filed by the respondent and set aside the order passed by the learned appellate Judge in Crl.R.C.Nos.36 and 37 of 2003 and remanded the Revisions to the lower appellate Court with a direction to the lower appellate Court to consider the materials available on record and pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. Thereafter, on 01.03.2010, the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Pudukottai, confirmed the order dated 13.05.2002, passed in C.M.P.Nos.903 of 2001 and 424 of 2002 in C.C.Nos.755 and 756 of 2000 by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Pudukottai and allowed the discharge petitions filed by the respondent. 4. Thereafter, on 01.03.2010, the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Pudukottai, confirmed the order dated 13.05.2002, passed in C.M.P.Nos.903 of 2001 and 424 of 2002 in C.C.Nos.755 and 756 of 2000 by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Pudukottai and allowed the discharge petitions filed by the respondent. 4. Aggrieved over the same, the petitioner has come out with the present Criminal Original Petitions invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. 5. The learned Government Advocate (Criminal side) appearing for the petitioner/Police submitted that the trial Court ought not to have discharged the respondent/accused, who has committed criminal breach of trust and misappropriated Rs.2,65,380.50 and Rs.54,050/-, being public monies of the Keeranur Agricultural Products Producers Co-operative Sales Society. The learned Government Advocate (Criminal side) submitted that the trial Court failed to note the enquiry report filed by the Enquiry Officer in Page Nos.5 and 7 that the respondent/accused is having the key of the Godown and he is having responsibilities jointly and severally along with the Godown Keeper for the stock deficit. He submitted that the trial Court failed to take into consideration that the respondent/accused had signed in the Stock Register and Cash Book as though it has been verified and found to be correct, which itself automatically prove that the respondent/accused had knowledge over the commission of the offence. He further submitted that the trial Court highlighted only the statements of P.W.4 and P.W.6, which were recorded under Section 161(3) Cr.P.C., but, it has failed to note that Witness No.3, who had spoken about the duties and responsibilities of the Secretary and also 45 documents and 14 witnesses' statements, minute books, bye-laws, stock and cash registers, which are all materials to prove the entrustment and domain of the Secretary and he is the public servant of the Society. He further submitted that the trial Court failed to consider that not only the entrustment, but also the Secretary has got a liability to account for the goods of the Society and his failure to do so, constituted the offences under Sections 409 and 477(A) I.P.C. He also submitted that in view of the above said facts, prima facie case has been made out against the respondent/accused and there are materials available to frame charges under Sections 409 and 477(A) I.P.C. against the respondent/accused. Hence, the State is invoking inherent jurisdiction available under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and requesting this Court to interfere with the order passed by the Courts below and prayed for allowing the Criminal Original Petitions. 6. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the charges levelled against the respondent is baseless and the ingredients of Sections 409 and 477(A) I.P.C. are not made out against the respondent and there is no specific overt act has been attributed against him. He submitted that Witness No.4, who is a Special Officer of the Society, is responsible for the liability and he has not stated that the respondent is having personal liability or joint liability of the Government property with regard to entrustment. He further submitted that the Special Officers are the 'Kartha' of the Society and there is no prima facie case has been made out for entrustment of the property to the respondent. He further submitted that the respondent is the Secretary of the Society and he is duty bound to arrange the lorry for PDS and supervision of the work and he is not liable for other omissions and commissions and there is no presumptive evidence against the respondent/accused and there is no evidence to show that the Government property is entrusted to the respondent and he has converted the same for his own use. He also submitted that the second revision by invoking inherent jurisdiction available under Section 482 Cr.P.C., is bad in law in view of the judgments rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court as well as by this Court. 7. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel for the respondent relied on the following Judgments: (a) Rajan Kumar Machananda Vs. State of Karnataka reported in 1990 SCC (Cri) 537, wherein at paragraph 2, it has been held as follows: ''2. Heard learned Counsel for the parties. The respondent- State had challenged the order before the Court of Sessions when the learned Magistrate before whom the matter was proceeding directed release of the truck in favour of the appellant. The Revisional Court dismissed the petition of the State. Heard learned Counsel for the parties. The respondent- State had challenged the order before the Court of Sessions when the learned Magistrate before whom the matter was proceeding directed release of the truck in favour of the appellant. The Revisional Court dismissed the petition of the State. A second Revision did not lie at the instance of the State to the High Court in view of the provisions of Section 397(3) of Cr.P.C. Obviously, to avoid this bar, the application moved by the State before the High Court was stated to be under Section 482 Cr.P.C. asking for exercise of inherent powers. In exercise of that power, the High Court has reversed the order of the Magistrate as affirmed by the Sessions Judge. The question for consideration is as to whether the bar under Section 397(3) Cr.P.C. should have been taken note of to reject the revision at the instance of the State Government or action taken by the High Court in exercise of its inherent power has to be sustained. It is not disputed by counsel appearing for the State that the move before the High Court was really on application for revision of the order of the Magistrate releasing the truck. That is exactly what is prohibited under Section 397(3) Cr.P.C. Merely by saying that the jurisdiction of the High Court for exercise of its inherent power was being invoked the statutory bar could not have been overcome. If that was to be permitted every revision application facing the bar of Section 397(3) of the Code could be labelled as one under Section 482. We are satisfied that this is a case where the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the revision. The appeal is allowed and we set aside the order of the High Court. The Order of the Magistrate as affirmed by the Session Judge is upheld.'' (b) Rajathi Vs. C.Ganesan reported in 1999 SCC (Cri) 1118, wherein at paragraphs 9 to 13, it has been held as follows: ''9.We are not going into the question if the High Court on examining the case on merit was correct in coming to the conclusion that the wife was possessed of sufficient means and was able to maintain herself. C.Ganesan reported in 1999 SCC (Cri) 1118, wherein at paragraphs 9 to 13, it has been held as follows: ''9.We are not going into the question if the High Court on examining the case on merit was correct in coming to the conclusion that the wife was possessed of sufficient means and was able to maintain herself. In the present appeal, we are only concerned to see if the High Court was justified in invoking its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code and we do not think the High Court was right. 10. In Krishnan & Anr. vs. Krishnaveni & Anr. [ (1997) 4 SCC 241 ] this Court explained the scope and power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code. The question before the Court was if in view of the bar of second revision under sub-section (3) of Section 397 of the Code was prohibited, inherent power of the High Court is still available under Section 482 of the Code. This Court said as under [SCC P.248, Para 10]: "10.Ordinarily, when revision has been barred by Section 397(3) of the Code, a person - accused/complainant - cannot be allowed to take recourse to the revision to the High Court under Section 397(1) or under inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code since it may amount to circumvention of the provisions of Section 397(3) or Section 397(2) of the Code. It is seen that the High Court has suo motu power under Section 401 and continuous supervisory jurisdiction under Section 483 of the Code. So, when the High Court on examination of the record finds that there is grave miscarriage of justice or abuse of the process of the courts or the required statutory procedure has not been complied with or there is failure of justice or order passed or sentence imposed by the Magistrate requires correction, it is but the duty of the High Court to have it corrected at the inception lest grave miscarriage of justice would ensue. It is, therefore, to meet the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process that the High Court is preserved with inherent power and would be justified, under such circumstances, to exercise the inherent power and in an appropriate case even revisional power under Section 397(1) read with Section 401 of the Code. It is, therefore, to meet the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process that the High Court is preserved with inherent power and would be justified, under such circumstances, to exercise the inherent power and in an appropriate case even revisional power under Section 397(1) read with Section 401 of the Code. As stated earlier, it may be exercised sparingly so as to avoid needless multiplicity of procedure, unnecessary delay in trial and protraction of proceedings. The object of criminal trial is to render public justice, to punish the criminal and to see that the trial is concluded expeditiously before the memory of the witness fades out. The recent trend is to delay the trial and threaten the witness or to win over the witness by promise or inducement. These malpractices need to be curbed and public justice can be ensured only when trial is conducted expeditiously." 11. In the present case, the High Court minutely examined the evidence and came to the conclusion that the wife was living separately without any reasonable cause and that she was able to maintain herself. All this High Court did in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the Code which powers are not a substitute for a second revision under sub-section (3) of Section 397 of the Code. The very fact that the inherent powers conferred on the High Court are vast would mean that these are circumscribed and could be invoked only on certain set principles. 12. It was not necessary for the High Court to examine the whole evidence threadbare to exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code. Rather in a case under Section 125 of the Code the trial court is to take a prima facie view of the matter and it is not necessary for the court to go into the matrimonial disputes between the parties in detail. The section provides maintenance at the rate of Rs.500/- per month. There is an outcry that this amount is too small. In the present case, however, we are quite surprised that the court granted paltry amount of Rs.200/- per month as maintenance which was confirmed in the revision by the Sessions Court and the High Court thought it fit to interfere under Section 482 of the Code in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. 13. In the present case, however, we are quite surprised that the court granted paltry amount of Rs.200/- per month as maintenance which was confirmed in the revision by the Sessions Court and the High Court thought it fit to interfere under Section 482 of the Code in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. 13. Whatever may be the merit of the case, the High Court wrongly exercised its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code in passing the impugned order. The appeal is allowed and the impugned order dated 04.12.1997 of the High Court is set aside.'' (c) Kailash Verma Vs. Punjab State Civil Supplies Corporation and another reported in 2005 SCC (Cri) 538, wherein at paragraphs 5 to 7, it has been held as follows: ''5. It may also be noticed that this Court in Rajathi v. C. Ganesan [ 1999 (6) SCC 326 ] said that the power under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code has to be exercised sparingly and such power shall not be utilized as a substitute for second Revision. Ordinarily, when a Revision has been barred under Section 397(3) of the Code, the complainant or the accused cannot be allowed to take recourse to Revision before the High Court under Section 397(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code as it is prohibited under Section 397(3) thereof. However, the High Court can entertain a petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code when there is serious miscarriage of justice and abuse of the process of the court or when mandatory provisions of law are not complied with and when the High Court feels that the inherent jurisdiction is to be exercised to correct the mistake committed by the revisional court. 6. In State Vs. Navjot Sandhu [ 2003 (6) SCC 641 ], the power of the High Court under Section 482 came up for consideration and it was held as under:[SCC P.657, Para 29] "29.Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code starts with the words 'Nothing in this Code.' Thus the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code can be exercised even when there is a bar under Section 397 or some other provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. However, as is set out in Satya Narayan Sharma's case [ 2001 (8) SCC 607 ]; this power cannot be exercised if there is a statutory bar in some other enactment. If the order assailed is purely of an interlocutory character, which could be corrected in exercise of revisional powers or appellate powers the High Court must refuse to exercise its inherent power. The inherent power is to be used only in cases where there is an abuse of the process of the court or where interference is absolutely necessary for securing the ends of justice." 7. In the present case, the appellant was discharged by the Chief Judicial Magistrate and the revisional court confirmed that order after elaborately considering the facts and circumstances of the case. It may also be noted that in Bai Kishan Das v. P.C. Nayar [1991 Supp. (2) SCC 412], under similar facts and circumstances, this Court held that no offences were made out under Section 406 IPC as it was a matter of civil nature. The respondent- corporation had also initiated steps for arbitration proceedings on the basis of the arbitration clause in the agreement. In our view, the High Court was not justified in exercising its inherent power under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code in this case. It cannot be said either that there was miscarriage of justice warranting interference by the High Court. Hence, we allow these appeals and set aside the judgment of the High Court. The order of discharge passed by the learned Magistrate in favour of the appellant is affirmed.'' 8. The learned counsel for the respondent citing the decisions as stated above submitted that apart from the above decisions, the trial Court after discussing the cases elaborately based on the materials available on record, allowed discharge petitions filed by the respondent herein and the same was also confirmed by the lower appellate Court. Challenging the concurrent findings of the Courts below, the petitioner has approached this Court invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C., which is bad in law. Hence, he prayed for dismissal of both the Criminal Original Petitions. 9. I have considered the decisions cited supra and the rival submissions made by the learned counsel on either side and perused the materials available on record. 10. Hence, he prayed for dismissal of both the Criminal Original Petitions. 9. I have considered the decisions cited supra and the rival submissions made by the learned counsel on either side and perused the materials available on record. 10. The issue involved in these cases is whether the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., is maintainable in view of bar under Section 397(3) Cr.P.C. 11. As per Section 397(3) Cr.P.C., if an application under this Section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them. In this context, it is relevant to extract below Section 397 (1) and (3) Cr.P.C. ''397.Calling for records to exercise powers of revision.- (1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding. Sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement, that he be released on bail or on his own bond pending the examination of the record. Explanation.- All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this sub-section and of section 398. (3) If an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them.'' 12. Accordingly, the petitioner filed revisions before the Additional District and Sessions Court, Pudukottai and the same were taken on file and the lower appellate Court confirmed the order of discharge passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Pudukottai. In view of bar under Section 397(3) Cr.P.C., further revision is not permissible and the same cannot be entertained by any forum. The said position was also discussed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Krishnan Vs. In view of bar under Section 397(3) Cr.P.C., further revision is not permissible and the same cannot be entertained by any forum. The said position was also discussed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Krishnan Vs. Krishnaveni reported in 1997 (4) SCC 241 , wherein the Apex Court has clearly held that in view of the prohibition under Section 397(3) Cr.P.C., the complainant or the accused cannot be allowed to take recourse to a second revision, but the High Court can entertain a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. when there is serious miscarriage of justice and abuse of process of the Court or when mandatory provisions of law are not complied with and when the High Court feels that the inherent jurisdiction is to be exercised to correct the mistake committed by the revisional Court. 13. In one of the earlier cases in R.P.Kapur Vs. State of Punjab [ AIR 1960 SC 866 ], the Hon'ble Apex Court had summarised some of the categories of cases where the inherent power under Section 482 of the Code could be exercised by the High Court to quash criminal proceedings against the accused. These are: [AIR P.869, Para 6] (i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the proceedings e.g. want of sanction; (ii) where the allegations in the first information report or the complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged; (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. 14. In Dinesh Dutt Joshi Vs. State of Rajasthan and Another [ 2001 (8) SCC 570 ], while dealing with the inherent powers of the High Court, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed thus: (SCC p. 573, para 6) "6. ... The principle embodied in the section is based upon the maxim: quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo Respondent ipsae esse non potest i.e. when the law gives anything to anyone, it gives also all those things without which the thing itself would be unavailable. The section does not confer any new power, but only declares that the High Court possesses inherent powers for the purposes specified in the section. The section does not confer any new power, but only declares that the High Court possesses inherent powers for the purposes specified in the section. As lacunae are sometimes found in procedural law, the section has been embodied to cover such lacunae wherever they are discovered. The use of extraordinary powers conferred upon the High Court under this section are however required to be reserved, as far as possible, for extraordinary cases.'' 15. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that second revision before the High Court is not maintainable and the further revision against the dismissal order passed by the revisional Court is barred under Section 397(3) Cr.P.C. By invoking inherent power available under Section 482 Cr.P.C., this Court cannot be converted as second revisional Court. 16. Per contra, the learned Government Advocate (Criminal side) appearing for the petitioner submitted that though there is a bar under Section 397(3) Cr.P.C., for entertaining second revision, if the revisional Court commits a serious error or miscarriage of justice, this Court has power to interfere with the order of the trial Court as well as the order of the lower appellate Court by invoking inherent jurisdiction available under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and he relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Krishnan Vs. Krishnaveni [cited supra]. 17. It is true that in the abovesaid decision, the Hon'ble Apex Court has clearly held that in view of the prohibition under Section 397(3) Cr.P.C., the complainant or the accused cannot be allowed to take recourse to a second revision, however, this Court holds that the said provision is not absolute bar, the High Court can entertain a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. when there is serious miscarriage of justice and abuse of process of the Court or when mandatory provisions of law are not complied with. If the High Court feels that the inherent jurisdiction is to be exercised there is grave miscarriage of justice, abuse of process of the Court or the order of the trial Court as well as the lower appellate Court is a perverse or incorrigible one. 18. However, in the present cases on hand, the petitioner did not show that there is serious miscarriage of justice and abuse of process of the Court or mandatory provisions of law are not complied with. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be allowed to take recourse to second revision. 18. However, in the present cases on hand, the petitioner did not show that there is serious miscarriage of justice and abuse of process of the Court or mandatory provisions of law are not complied with. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be allowed to take recourse to second revision. 19. In view of the above discussions and decisions cited supra, this Court does not find any error or infirmity to interfere with the order passed by the Courts below. Accordingly, both the Criminal Original Petitions filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C., are dismissed and the orders of Discharge, dated 01.03.2010, passed in Crl.R.C.Nos.36 and 37 of 2003 by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Pudukottai, confirming the order dated 13.05.2002, passed in C.M.P.Nos.903 of 2001 and 424 of 2002, by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Pudukottai, are confirmed. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.