JUDGMENT : Ajay Mohan Goel, J. These three writ petitions are being disposed of by a common judgment as legal issue involved in all of them is the same, that is, maintainability of a eviction petition filed under the provisions of Public Premises Act qua those occupants who are in occupation of premises prior to 16.09.1958 i.e. prior to the Public Premises Act becoming applicable. 2. All these writ petitions have been filed by Union of India against the judgments passed by Appellate Authority in appeals under Section 9 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971, vide which, Appellate Court has dismissed the appeals filed by the present petitioners against the judgments/orders of Estate Officer, who had closed the proceedings initiated under Section 4 of the said Act, for eviction on the basis of statement as was made before it by the present petitioners. 3. In CWP No. 169 of 2003 titled Union of India Vs. M/S Krishna Coal Company, in an application filed under Sections 4 and 7 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971, on behalf of Union of India, for eviction and recovery of damages on account of unauthorized use and occupation of Railway land situated in Shimla, Estate Officer, Northern Railway, Ambala Cantt., in Case No. 31-W/PPEA/UMB, directed the respondent therein i.e. M/S Krishna Coal Company, to pay Rs.35678.50 as arrears of licence fee including 10% as token damages for the period from 01/03/1986 to 31/12/1991 and thereafter pay Rs.5563.49 per annum as licence fee and it also directed the respondent to execute a fresh agreement to this effect which was to be renewed every three years. 4. In appeal, this order was sustained by the Appellate Authority vide decision dated 06.09.2002. 5. In CWP No. 319 of 2003 titled Union of India Vs. 4. In appeal, this order was sustained by the Appellate Authority vide decision dated 06.09.2002. 5. In CWP No. 319 of 2003 titled Union of India Vs. M/S Graphite Coal Company, in an application filed under Sections 4 and 7 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971, on behalf of Union of India, for eviction and recovery of damages on account of unauthorized use and occupation of Railway land situated in Shimla, Estate Officer, Northern Railway, Ambala Cantt., in Case No. 29-W/PPEA/UMB, directed the respondent therein i.e. M/S Graphite Coal Company, to pay Rs.34533.27 as arrears of licence fee including 10% as token damages for the period from 01/03/1986 to 31/12/1991 and thereafter pay Rs.5385.51 per annum as licence fee and it also directed the respondent to execute a fresh agreement to this effect which was to be renewed every three years. 6. In appeal, this order was sustained by the Appellate Authority vide decision dated 06.09.2002. 7. In CWP No. 336 of 2003 titled Union of India Vs. M/S Punjab Coal Company, in an application filed under Sections 4 and 7 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971, on behalf of Union of India, for eviction and recovery of damages on account of unauthorized use and occupation of Railway land situated in Shimla, Estate Officer, Northern Railway, Ambala Cantt., in Case No. 26-W/PPEA/UMB, directed the respondent therein i.e. M/S Punjab Coal Company, to pay Rs.26979/- as arrears of licence fee including 10% as token damages for the period from 01/08/1986 to 31/12/1991 and thereafter pay Rs.4530.77 per annum as licence fee and it also directed the respondent to execute a fresh agreement to this effect which was to be renewed every three years. 8. In appeal, this order was sustained by the Appellate Authority vide decision dated 06.09.2002. 9. When these cases were taken up for hearing on 17.03.2017, Mr. B.C. Negi, learned Senior Cousnel appearing for respondent No. 1 in CWP No. 319 of 2003, submitted that before this Court ventures to adjudicate on the merits of the matter, there is another issue which has to be decided by this Court which pertains not only to maintainability of present writ petitions but also with regard to maintainability of the proceedings initiated against the respondents under the Public Premises Act from which these writ petitions arise. The contention of Mr. The contention of Mr. Negi is that as admittedly all the private respondents in these cases were in possession of the properties subject matter of the writ petitions, before the Public Premises Act came into force/became applicable w.e.f. 16.09.1958, no proceedings against them could have been initiated under the 1971 Act. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon the following judgment:- SUHAS H. POPHALE Vs. ORIENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED AND ITS ESTATE OFFICER, (2014) 4 SCC 657 . 10. On the basis of above submissions of Mr. Negi, on 17.03.2017, this Court passed the following order:- “When these cases were taken up for arguments today, Mr. B.C. Negi learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondent No.1 has drawn the attention of this Court towards the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Suhas H. Pophale Vs. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. and its Estate Officer (2014) 4 SCC 657 , and M/s Band Box Private Limited Vs. Estate Officer, Punjab and Sind Bank and another, 2014 (2) Shim. LC 1097, in which the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that in cases where an occupant was in possession of premises before coming into force of Public Premises Act, the provisions of the Act shall not be applicable. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that taking into consideration the fact that in the present cases licences were created in favour of the respondents well before coming into force of the Public Premises Act, therefore, the proceedings initiated against them under the Public Premises Act per se were illegal and thus not maintainable. Faced with this situation, Mr. Kashyap learned counsel for the petitioner prays that he may be granted some time to have appropriate instructions in these cases. List on 30.3.2017, as prayed for.” 11. Arguments were heard on 30.03.2017 and after hearing learned counsel for the parties, judgment was reserved on the issue of maintainability of the proceedings as well as writ petitions in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Suhas H. Pophale (supra). 12. List on 30.3.2017, as prayed for.” 11. Arguments were heard on 30.03.2017 and after hearing learned counsel for the parties, judgment was reserved on the issue of maintainability of the proceedings as well as writ petitions in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Suhas H. Pophale (supra). 12. Learned counsel for the respondents have submitted that in these three writ petitions private respondents in fact are in possession of the premises in their capacities as licencees much before the Public Premises Act (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971, hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act, came into force in the year 1971 and rather are in possession of the said land even before the above mentioned Act became applicable w.e.f. 16.09.1958. Mr. B.C. Negi, learned Senior Counsel, who has made leading arguments on behalf of the private respondents, has submitted that as the private respondents in all these three cases were in possession of the land, subject matter of the applications filed under the Public Premises Act, much before 16.09.1958 in their capacities as licencees, no eviction proceedings could have been initiated against them under the provisions of the 1971 Act. Mr. Negi has argued that as the 1971 Act was applicable w.e.f. 16.09.1958, this Act can be applied prospectively to these premises which were public premises as on 16.09.1958 and eviction petitions can be filed only against those persons who entered into occupation of the said public premises after 16.09.1958. In other words, Mr. Negi submitted that 1971 Act has no retrospective effect and the provisions of the same cannot be invoked to effect those occupants who were in occupation of the said premises prior to 16.09.1958. 13. On the other hand, Mr. J.L. Kashyap, learned counsel appearing for Union of India had submitted that the private respondents cannot be allowed to raise this objection about the maintainability of the eviction petitions filed under the Public Premises Act, 1971 at this stage. Accordingly, Mr. Kashyap argued that the proceedings under the Public Premises Act were initiated against the private respondents more than 30 years ago and at this belated stage, private respondents cannot be permitted to come up with this plea to frustrate the claim of the petitioners. It has further been argued by Mr. Accordingly, Mr. Kashyap argued that the proceedings under the Public Premises Act were initiated against the private respondents more than 30 years ago and at this belated stage, private respondents cannot be permitted to come up with this plea to frustrate the claim of the petitioners. It has further been argued by Mr. Kashyap that even otherwise this Court cannot go into this issue as all these three petitions stand remanded back by the Hon’ble Division Bench in LPA No. 43 of 2008 and other connected matters and as now there is a “Reference” to be answered by this Court as has been sent by the Division Bench in LPA, therefore, this Court has to answer that Reference only and it cannot adjudicate on any other issue. Mr. Kashyap has further argued that the judgment referred above has no applicability in the facts of this case and he reiterated that in fact this Court is precluded from considering this issue as the matter has been remanded back to it by way of Reference by the Hon’ble Division Bench in LPA No. 43 of 2008 and other connected matters. 14. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. 15. The factum of the private respondents being in occupation of the land subject matter of the writ petitions much before coming into force of the 1971 Act and even before 16.09.1958 i.e. the day from which the said Act was deemed to have come into force is not disputed, therefore, the moot issue which is to be answered by this Court as to whether the eviction petition under the 1971 Act could have been filed against the private respondents? 16. The Public Premises Act (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 was enacted by the Parliament to provide for the eviction of unauthorized occupants from public premises and for certain incidental matters. As per sub-section (3) of Section 1, the said Act was deemed to have come into force on 16.09.1958, except Sections 11, 19 and 20, which came into force i.e. w.e.f. 23.08.1971. Public premises have been defined in Section 2(e) of the Act. This Act in fact repealed after the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1958. 17. In Suhas H. Pophale Vs. Public premises have been defined in Section 2(e) of the Act. This Act in fact repealed after the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1958. 17. In Suhas H. Pophale Vs. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court has, inter alia, held that for any premises to become public premises, the relevant day will be 16.09.1958 or which ever is later date on which day the premises concerned become public premises. Hon’ble Supreme Court has further held in this case that as far as the eviction of unauthorized occupation from public premises is concerned undoubtedly it is covered under the Public Premises Act but it is so covered from 16.09.1958 or from the later date when premises concerned become public premises. 18. In my considered view, it is evident from the said decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court that an occupant of a public premises who occupies the same before 16.09.1958 is not covered under the Public Premises Act. In other words, the provisions of Public Premises Act cannot be invoked to evict such occupant who is in occupation of premises before 16.09.1958. This Court is not oblivious to the fact that in the above mentioned case the Hon’ble Supreme Court was dealing with the applicability of Public Premises Act vis-a-vis the State Rent Act but the fact still remains that the law as has been declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said judgment is to the effect that an occupant of public premises before 16.09.1958 cannot be evicted for unauthorized occupation of public premises under the Public Premises Act. 19. In this background, when we come to the facts of the present three writ petitions, it has not been disputed that the private respondents therein were in possession of the public premises before 16.09.1958, therefore, in my considered view, as per the law declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Suhas H. Pophale’s case supra, the eviction proceedings against the said private respondents could not have been initiated under the provisions of the 1971 Act. Thus, the proceedings so initiated against them are non est and adjudication upon the same by the Estate Officer as well as by the Appellate Authority are also, therefore, without jurisdiction. Held accordingly. However, it is clarified that it is not as if the petitioner - Union of India has no remedy to evict private respondents. Thus, the proceedings so initiated against them are non est and adjudication upon the same by the Estate Officer as well as by the Appellate Authority are also, therefore, without jurisdiction. Held accordingly. However, it is clarified that it is not as if the petitioner - Union of India has no remedy to evict private respondents. The petitioner is at liberty to proceed against them in accordance with law by availing those remedies which otherwise are available to it for eviction of the said private respondents. 20. As far as other contentions raised by Mr. Kashyap are concerned, a perusal of the judgment passed by Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 43 of 2008 and other connected matters, decided on 26.11.2014, demonstrates that vide said judgment Hon’ble Division Bench was pleased to allow the appeals so filed and while setting aside the judgment passed by learned Single Judge, the cases were remanded back to the writ Court for decision afresh. The judgment passed by the Hon’ble Division Bench in LPA No. 43 of 2008 and other connected matters, has no where sent back any “Reference” to be decided by the writ Court. The contention of Mr. Kashyap that the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court referred to above has no applicability in the facts of this case, is also without merit because I have already discussed that the said judgment lays down very clearly and categorically that eviction proceedings under the 1971 Act cannot be filed against the occupants of public premises who were in possession of the same before 16.09.1958. As far as the submission of Mr. Kashyap that this Court should not go into the said issue at such a belated stage as the private respondents have not raised this issue earlier, in my considered view, this plea also sans merit because there cannot be any estoppel against illegality and as the eviction proceedings which were initiated by the present petitioners against the private respondents under the provisions of the 1971 Act were non est being not maintainable at all, this Court cannot be precluded from going into this issue at this stage on the pretext that the private respondents are estopped from raising this plea. This Court reiterates that there cannot be any estoppel against illegality. 21. This Court reiterates that there cannot be any estoppel against illegality. 21. Accordingly, these writ petitions are disposed of by holding that as the private respondents are in occupation of the public premises before coming into force of the Public Premises Act, which is deemed to have come into force w.e.f. 16.09.1958, therefore, proceedings could not have been initiated against them under the Public Premises Act, 1971 for the purpose of their evictions and the orders on the said eviction petitions passed both by the Estate Officer as well as Appellate Officer are without jurisdiction and non est. The orders so passed by both the said authorities are neither binding on the petitioners nor on the private respondents. The petitioners are at liberty to otherwise proceed against the private respondents for possession of their land in accordance with law. 22. With said directions, these writ petitions are disposed of. No order as to costs. Miscellaneous Applications pending, if any, also stand disposed of.