ORDER : VIJAY KUMA SHUKLA, J. 1. This second appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 has been filed by defendant/appellant challenging the judgment and decree dated 27/07/2016 passed in civil appeal No. 54-A/2014 by the Additional Judge to the Court of 1st Additional District Judge, Harda arising out of the judgment and decree dated 29/04/2014 passed in civil suit No. 18- A/2013 by IInd Additional Judge to the Court of First Civil Judge Class-II, Harda whereby the decree for eviction, possession and arrears of rent has been passed against the appellant. The said judgment and decree has been affirmed by the appellate court by the impugned judgment and decree. 2. The facts, necessary for adjudication of the present appeal are that the respondent/plaintiff filed a civil suit for eviction, arrears of rent and damages against the defendant on the ground that he is the owner of the suit shop. He is presently doing business in the rented premises belonging to his uncle Yatindra Kumar. It is pleaded that the shop in his occupation is not suitable for the business besides that there is no other his shop and further the rented present room is required by his aunty for running a coaching classes thus, he requires the suit premises for his own business bona fide. The suit was filed for eviction under sections 12(1)(c) and (f) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter shall be referred as 'the Act' in short). Combating the averments of the plaintiff and his case, the defendant submitted that the plaintiff does not require the shop in question bona fide and denied his title over the suit shop. It is also pleaded that there is no partition amongst the plaintiff's father and his brothers therefore, he could not claim ownership over the suit shop and some of the shops in the building are vacant. The trial Court decreed the suit on the ground of bona fide need under section 12(1)(f) of the Act but it has been held that no ground under section 12(1)(c) of the Act is made out. Being aggrieved with the aforesaid judgment and decree, the appellant filed an appeal and the same was also dismissed by the impugned judgment and decree. 3. Being aggrieved with the aforesaid judgment and decree, the appellant filed an appeal and the same was also dismissed by the impugned judgment and decree. 3. Counsel for the appellant submits that both the courts below failed to appreciate the provisions of section 12 (1) (f) of the Act and had wrongly proceeded to decide the ownership of the plaintiff over the suit shop on the assumption that the defendant had admitted the fact of his ownership. It is also contended that the courts below did not render any specific finding on the question of ownership of the plaintiff over the suit shop. Counsel for the appellant submits that the findings regarding 'ownership and bona fide need' are perverse as the courts below have failed to take into consideration the deposition of PW-1 in para 10 of the cross examination. It is also contended that the courts below had wrongly shifted the onus on the defendant to prove 'bona fide need' as the plaintiff had failed to discharge initial burden in that regard. 4. To buttress his submissions counsel for the appellant relied on the judgment passed by the Apex Court in the case of Hasmat Rai and another v. Raghunath Prasad, (1981) 3 SCC 103 para 10, Rangammal v. Kuppuswami and another, (2011) 12 SCC 220 paras 33 and 34 and submitted that in a suit for eviction burden lies on the plaintiff/landlord to make specific pleadings and to establish that essential statutory requirements under section 12(1)(f) of the Act are satisfied. The trial Court has to decide the issue carefully in that regard and then only a decree for eviction can be passed under section 12(1)(f) or (b) of the Act. On the basis of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Rangammal (supra) he submits that in the cases of Hindu Joint Family in a suit for partition it is the plaintiff who will have to first of all discharge the burden of proof for establishing that the disputed property belongs to the joint family which should be partitioned. It is further submitted that plaintiff has to prove positively his case on the basis of the material and the evidence adduced by him. He cannot rely on the weakness or of absence of defence to discharge the onus. It is further submitted that plaintiff has to prove positively his case on the basis of the material and the evidence adduced by him. He cannot rely on the weakness or of absence of defence to discharge the onus. Counsel for the appellant relying on the judgment passed in the case of Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, (1999) 6 SCC 222 submits that in the present case there was no objective determination of bona fide requirements/need of landlord by the courts below. It is further contended that once the court is satisfied of the bona fide need of the landlord for the premises or additional premises by applying objective standards then in the matter of choosing out by more than one accommodation available to the landlord's subjective choice shall be respected by the court. Lastly he submits that findings recorded by the courts below are perverse and, therefore, in the light of the judgment passed by the Apex Court in the case of Hero Vinoth (minor) v. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545 where the Apex Court has laid down the principles regarding scope of interference under section 100 of CPC. He relied on the para 24 (iii) and submits that the general rule is that High Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the courts below but it is not an absolute rule, where the courts have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence, the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously and where the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof, he submits that only in such cases, there can be inference in the cases of concurrent findings. 5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent supported the judgment and decree passed by the courts below. He relied on the judgment passed by the Apex Court in the case of Ragavendra Kumar v. Firm Prem Machinery and Company, AIR 2000 SC 534 and also relied the judgment passed by this Court in the case of Prem Narayan Barchhiha v. Hakimuddin Saifi, 1999 (2) JLJ 260 (Supreme Court), Ram Vishal v. Dwarka Prasad Jaiswal, 2010 (1) MPLJ 214 , Kaushalya (Smt.) v. Padam Kumar Jain passed in Second Appeal No. 592/2012 decided on 19/11/2013 reported in 2013 (3) MPWN 125 and Narendra Gole v. Ram Krishna Sharma, 2014 (1) JLJ 39 . In the backdrop of aforesaid authoritative legal principles laid down by the Apex Court and this Court, he submits that in the present case the appellant has discharged his burden of proof regarding his ownership, bona fide need and also that no alternative suitable nonresidential accommodation is available, and, therefore, concurrent findings of both the courts below are not perverse and they are based on appreciation of evidence. Hence, no interference is called for. 6. After having heard both the parties, in order to appreciate the rival submissions of the parties, it is apt to first refer the relevant provisions of section 12(1)(f) of the Act as under:- "12. Restriction on eviction of tenants -(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no suit shall be filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds only, namely:- (a)........ (b)........ (c)........ (d)........ (e)......... (f) that the accommodation let for nonresidential purposes is required bona fide by the landlord for the purpose of continuing or starting his business or that of any of his major sons or unmarried daughters if he is the owner thereof or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned." 7. From the plain reading of the aforesaid provisions, it is clear that the section 12 starts with a non-obstinate clause thereby curtailing the right of the landlord to seek eviction of the tenant which he might have under any other law and the right of eviction is made subject to overriding provisions of section 12. It is thus an enabling section. In order to avail of the benefit conferred by section 12 to seek eviction of the tenant, the landlord must satisfy the essential ingredients of the section which are (i) that he requires bona fide possession of a building let for non-residential purpose for continuing or starting his business and (ii) that he has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned. The burden to establish both the requirements of section 12 (1)(f) is undisputely on the landlord. 8. The burden to establish both the requirements of section 12 (1)(f) is undisputely on the landlord. 8. At this stage, it is apposite to refer the facts of the present case to examine that whether the burden by the plaintiff in regard to these two ingredients have been discharged or not and also whether the findings recorded by the courts below in this regard are perverse. 9. The trial Court framed the first issue regarding the bona fide need of the plaintiff regarding continuation of Mobile & Ancillary business and whether he has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in the Harda city. To appreciate the said issue, the trial Court considered the pleadings in paras 3-A, 3-B and 3-C of the plaint and also the ocular and documentary evidence in this regard adduced by the plaintiff. In para 6 of the order of trial Court, the Court had considered the evidence of PW-1 Hitendra Kumar, Exhibit P-2 registration certificate, Exhibit P-3 Distributor Certificate of Micromax Company and Exhibit P-4 Documentary Certificate of Wincom Company. Receipts of the rent (Exhibits P-5 to P-10) were also taken into consideration. The statement of PW-2 Yatindra Jain, uncle of the plaintiff was also appreciated by the trial Court. The court found that prima facie the plaintiff had discharged his burden to establish that there is a bona fide need of continuation of Mobile & Ancillary business and the present accommodation and the alternative accommodation as suggested by the defendant is not reasonably suitable accommodation for the business. After evaluation of the evidence of the plaintiff, there is no evidence adduced by the defendant regarding the availability of any reasonably suitable alternative accommodation. So far as the onus on the part of the plaintiff is concerned, he had discharged his burden of proof but the defendant failed to discharge his onus as held by the trial Court in paras 8 and 9. 10. The counsel for the appellant/defendant vehemently argued that the distance of the shop at present place from the main road is hardly 25 ft. and it is visible from the main road. The said argument cannot be accepted as the visibility of any shop from the main road itself would not establish that the said accommodation is also a "reasonably suitable accommodation" for the business. and it is visible from the main road. The said argument cannot be accepted as the visibility of any shop from the main road itself would not establish that the said accommodation is also a "reasonably suitable accommodation" for the business. The paras 6, 7 and 11 of the trial Court where the Court had considered the ocular and documentary evidence are reproduced as under:- **6- bl laca/k esa oknh fgrsUnz ok0lk0 1 us vius vfHkopuksa dk leFkZu djrs gq, dFkuksa esa crk;k gS fd og y{eh V~SMlZ ds uke ls ekbdzksesDl rFkk foudkWe daiuh ds eksckby dk Fkksd ,oa QqVdj fodz; dk O;olk; djrk gS ftldk leFkZu oklk0 2 ;rhUnz us Hkh vius dFkuksa esa fd;k gSA oklk0 1 fgrsunz ds dFkuksa dh iqf"V mlds }kjk izLrqr LFkkiuk iath;u izek.ki= iz0ih0 2] ekbdzksesDl daiuh dk fMLVhC;wVj lfVZfQdsV iz0ih0 3 rFkk foudkWe daiuh dk fMLV~hC;wVj lfVZfQdsV iz0ih0 4 ls Hkh gksrh gSA oklk0 1 fgrsUnz us ;g Hkh crk;k gS fd og lkFk esa 'ksj ,oa ok;nk cktkj dh nykyh dk O;olk; Hkh djrk gSA og mijksDr O;olk; vius dkdk ;rhUnz dh nqdku fdjk, ls ysdj dj jgk gSA bldk leFkZu Lo;a dkdk ;rhUnz ok0lk0 2 us vius dFkuksa esa fd;k gS ftldh iqf"V mlds }kjk tkjh fdjk;k jlhnksa iz0ih0 5 yxk;r 10 ls Hkh gksrh gSA 7- lk{kh fgrsUnz oklk0 1 dk vkxs dFku ;g gS fd og dkdk dh ftl nqdku esa O;olkl djrk gS og nky fey ifjlj esa eq[; ekxZ ls 25 QhV vanj fLFkr gksus ls rFkk ifjlj esa cMk yksgs dk xsV yxk gksus ls nqdku rd vke ukxfjd ugha igqap ikrs gS ftlls mldk O;olk; izfrdwy :i ls izHkkfor gks jgk gSA blds vfrfjDr mlds dkdk dh ifRu ehuk oaMj xzks Ldwy esa f'k{kd gS vkSj blh nqdku esa dksfpax Dykl pykuk pkgrh gS vkSj bl dkj.k dkdk us mlls nqdku [kkyh djus dk dg fn;k gSA bu nks dkj.kksa ls mls fookfnr nqdku dh okLrfod vko';drk gS D;ksafd fookfnr nqdku eq[; ekxZ ij cktkj {ks= esa fLFkr gS tks mlds O;olk; dh n`f"V ls vfr mi;qDr gS vkSj mlds ikl gjnk uxj esa ,slk vU; dksbZ mi;qDr LFkku miyC/k ugha gSA lk{kh ds bu dFkuksa dk leFkZu ok0lk0 2 ;rhUnz us Hkh fd;k gSA 11- izdj.k esa mijksDr lk{; foospuk ds vk/kkj ij ;g izekf.kr ik;k tkrk gS fd oknh dks fookfnr nqdku dh vius O;kikj gsrq okLrfod vko';drk gS vkSj blds fy, mlds ikl gjnk 'kgj mfpr LFkku miyC/k ugha gSA** 11. The aforesaid evidence has clearly supported the pleadings made in para 3-A, 3-B and 3-C of the plaint to establish the bona fide need and the ingredients under section 12(1)(f) of the Act that the landlord has proved that he has no reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in the City Harda. 12. At this stage, it is condign to refer the judgment passed by the Apex Court in regard to the bona fide need and its requirements under section 12(1)(f) of the Act. In the cases of Ragavendra Kumar v. Firm Prem Machinary and Company (supra) and Dinesh Kumar v. Yusuf Ali, AIR 2010 SC 2679 it has been held that the landlord is the best judge of his need but the need should be real and genuine and may not be pretext to evict the tenant only for increasing the rent. In the cases of Anil Bajaj and another v. Vinod Ahuja, (2014) 15 SCC 610 it has been held that it is perfectly open to the landlord to choose a most suitable premises for carrying out the business and the tenant cannot dictate the landlord as to which shop would be more suitable for him to start the business. The same has been followed by the Apex Court in the case of Bhupinder Singh Bawa v. Asha Devi, (2016) 10 SCC 209 . Thus, so far the contention of the appellant that appellant could not discharge his burden to prove the ingredients of section 12 (1)(f) of the Act regarding bona fide need and that he has no reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in the City Harda is rejected by both the courts recording the findings based on evaluation of oral and documentary evidence that the plaintiff needs suit premises bona fide to confine his mobile business and the present accommodation occupied by him is required by her aunty for her own coaching classes. The contention of the appellant that the present rented accommodation is more suitable for the plaintiff for his his business is required in view of the settled legal proposition of law as discussed. The findings of the trial Court have been affirmed by the lower appellate court after re-appreciating the evidence available on record and affirmed the findings regarding this in para 21 of the judgment. 13. The findings of the trial Court have been affirmed by the lower appellate court after re-appreciating the evidence available on record and affirmed the findings regarding this in para 21 of the judgment. 13. The next contention of the appellant that the findings are perverse also sans merit, as from the above discussion, it cannot be held that the findings recorded by both the courts below are perverse on the anvil of the judgment passed by the Apex Court in the case of Hero Vinoth (minor) v. Seshammal (supra) as these findings are neither recorded ignoring any material evidence nor acted on no evidence. It can also not be held that the courts below have drawn wrong inference by complying the law erroneously or have wrongly shifted the burden. From the discussion of facts and evidence in the earlier paragraph, the court is of the considered view that the plaintiff had discharged his burden to prove the ingredients of section 12(1)(f) of the Act and the defendant failed to bring any contrary evidence by discharging his onus. 14. In regard to another contention of the appellant that the plaintiff could not prove that he is the owner of the shop as required under section 12(1)(f) of the Act is also be tested on the anvil of the pleadings, evidence and findings of the courts below. The plaintiff has pleaded his title in para 1 of the plaint in para 2 about the tenancy. In the written statement, it is stated that para 1 is not required to be answered as it is a matter of documentary evidence. The contents of the para 2 of the plaint were partially admitted and the tenancy was admitted. The courts below have taken into consideration the pleadings and the evidence lead by both the parties. The paras 1 to 4 of statement of DW-1 Rajendra Gupta was considered by the trial court wherein he has submitted that father of the plaintiff Heeralal was owner of the property and he had taken the accommodation on rent from Laxmi Bai, mother of the plaintiff and wife of Heeralal. It is also stated that by notice dated 7/01/2011 the plaintiff had informed the appellant that such accommodation had been given to him by Laxmi Bai her mother by executing a 'will' dated 5/01/2010. It is also stated that by notice dated 7/01/2011 the plaintiff had informed the appellant that such accommodation had been given to him by Laxmi Bai her mother by executing a 'will' dated 5/01/2010. It is also pleaded by the defendant that his father Mahendra Jain had asked him to make the payment of rent to the plaintiff. In reply to the notice/intimation dated 17/01/2011 the appellant accepted the ownership of the plaintiff and started paying rent to him. It is also pleaded by the defendant that his father Mahendra Jain had asked him to make the payment of rent to the plaintiff. In reply to the notice/intimation dated 17/01/2011 the appellant accepted the ownership of the plaintiff and started paying rent to him. In para 10 of the order of the trial Court the same has been considered which is reproduced as under:- **10- izfroknh us vius lk{; esa eq[; :i ls tks izfrj{kk yh gS og ;g gS fd oknh fookfnr nqdku dk Lokeh ugh gS blfy, og izfroknh dks fu"dkflr djkus dk vf/kdkjh ugha gSA blds leFkZu esa izfroknh us mlds }kjk izLrqr oknh dk lwpuk i= fnuakd 17-01-2011 iz0ih0 1 rFkk izfroknh }kjk izsf"kr mDr lwpuk i= dk tokc fnuakd 22-01-2011 iz0Mh0 2 dh vkSj /;ku vkdf"kZr djkrs gq, rdZ esa crk;k gS fd izfroknh us oknh dks HkwfeLokeh ekuus ls badkj dj fn;k FkkA ;gka loZizFke ;g /;krO; gS fd izfroknh us bl laca/k esa vius tokcnkos esa dksbZ vfHkopu ugha fd;s gS vkSj vfHkopu ds vHkko esa lk{; dk dksbZ egRo ugh jg tkrkA vU;Fkk Hkh Lo;a izfroknh us vius dFkuksa esa crk;k gS fd mlus oknh dks ekg Qjojh 2013 dk fdjk;k pSd ls Hkstk Fkk tks oknh }kjk ysus ls euk djus ds dkj.k can fyQkQk iz0Mh0 5 ewyr% izfroknh dks okil izkIr gks x;k FkkA blds vfrfjDr tSlk fd fu.kZ; ds iSjk 2 esa crk, vuqlkj izdj.k esa ;g vfookfnr rF; gS fd oknh ,oa izfroknh ds e/; HkwfeLokeh vkSj HkkMsnkj ds laca/k LFkkfir jgs] izfroknh dks 165@& ekgokj fdjk;k nsrk jgk vkSj oknh mls jlhn nsrk jgkA bl izdkj izfroknh dk ;g i'pkrorhZ vkpj.k n'kkZrk gS fd Hkys gh mlus iz0Mh0 2 ds tckch lwpuk i= esa oknh dks HkwfeLokeh ekuus ls badkj dj fn;k Fkk ijarq ckn esa oknh dks fujarj vnk dj mlus oknh dks viuk HkwfeLokeh Lohdkjdj fy;k Fkk ftls izlk0 1 jktsanz us vius izfrijh{k.k esa Hkh Lohdkj fd;k gS vkSj tgka HkkMsnkj ,d ckj fdlh O;fDr dks viuk HkwfeLokeh gksuk Lohdkj dj ysrk gS ogka Hkkjrh; lk{; vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 116 izHkko esa vk tkrh gS vkSj HkkMsnkj HkwfeLokeh ds LoRo dks badkj djus ls focaf/kr gks tkrk gSA ,slh n'kk esa HkwfeLokeh dks viuk LokfeRo fl) djus dh vko';drk ugha jg tkrhA** 15. The aforesaid finding has been further affirmed by the lower appellate court in para 13 of the judgment which reads as under:- 13- vihykFkhZ jktsUnz izlkn xqIrk iz0lk0 1 ds eq[; ijh{k.k ds dFkuksa ls ;g fofnr gksrk gS fd mlus oknxzLr nqdku y{ehckbZ ls fdjk;s ij yh FkhA blh vk/kkj ij ml nqdku esa fdjk;snkj ds :i esa O;olk; djrk vk jgk gSA mlus izR;FkhZ }kjk izsf"kr lwpuk i= fnuakd 17-01-2011 ds vk/kkj ij mls tokc lwpuk i= fnuakd 22-01-2011 iz0Mh0 2 bl vk'k; dk Hkstk Fkk fd y{ehckbZ }kjk fgrsUnz dqekj ds i{k esa fyf[kr olh;rukek fnuakd 05-01-2010 ls vLohd`fr gSA fdarq mlus izfrijh{k.k iSjk 6 o 7 esa ;g Lohdkj fd;k gS fd mlds ,oa izR;FkhZ ds e/; HkkMsnzkj ,oa Hkou Lokeh ds laca/k gSA y{ehckbZ dk fnuakd 22-12-2010 dks LoxZokl gks x;k gSA ckn esa izR;FkhZ fgrsUnz dqekj tSu nqdku dk ekfyd gks x;k vkSj og mls fdjk;k nsrk vk jgk gSA bl izdkj vihykFkhZ us oknxzLr nqdku dk izR;FkhZ ekfyd gks x;k gksuk Lohdkj dj fy;k gSA mDr LohdkjksfDr ml ij /kkjk 58 lk{; vf/kfu;e ds varxZr ca/kudkjh gSA 16. The contention of the appellant that the plaintiff ought to have proved his title has no merit in the touchstone of settled law by the Apex Court in the case of Sheela and others v. Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash, AIR 2002 SC 1264 . Following the said judgment, this Court held in the cases of Naresh Chandra v. Vinod Kumar and others, 2003 (3) MPHT 104 and Ram Pukar Singh v. Bhimsen and another, 2006 (1) MPLJ 381 that in a tenancy suit, one is not required to prove the ownership like a title suit however, in the present case the plaintiff had pleaded and proved his title successfully. No flaw can be found in the findings in that regard. It is also relevant to be noted that the decree has already been executed. 17. It is well settled law that the concurrent findings of fact of the trial Court and first appellate Court cannot be interfered with by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under section 100 of the CPC, unless findings are perverse. It is also relevant to be noted that the decree has already been executed. 17. It is well settled law that the concurrent findings of fact of the trial Court and first appellate Court cannot be interfered with by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under section 100 of the CPC, unless findings are perverse. Relying on the judgments passed by the Apex Court in the cases of Deity Pattabhiramaswamy v. S.Hanymayya and Others, AIR 1959 SCC 57 (Para 13); The Dollar Company, Madras v. Collector of Madras, (1975) 2 SCC 730 (Para 4); Dudhnath Pandey v. Suresh Chandra Bhattasali (1986) 3 SCC 360 ; Jahejo Devi v. Moharam Ali, (1988) 1 SCC 372 ; Kamladevi Budhia v. Hem Prabha Ganguli; (1989) 3 SCC 145 ; P. Velayudhan v. Kurungot Imbichia Moidu's, (1990) Supp. SCC 9; and Ramanuja Naidu v. V. Kanniah Naidu and another, (1996) 3 SCC 392 , and the judgment of this Court rendered in the case of Rajesh v. Rajkunwar, (2016) 1 MPLJ 132 , this Court is of considered opinion, that as the judgment of the trial Court is based upon purely finding of facts which have been affirmed by the first appellate Court. 18. In view of aforesaid facts and considering the material on record, in the opinion of this Court, the arguments advanced by the appellant cannot be countenanced in exercise of jurisdiction under section 100 of CPC. Entire gamut of matter is in the realm of facts. Findings recorded by the courts below are impregnable in nature. No question of law much less substantial questions of law arising warranting interference under section 100 of CPC. 19. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs.