ORDER : Shri Prashant Sharma, counsel for the applicants. Shri Vivek Jain, counsel for the respondent. With the consent of the parties, heard finally. 2. This application under section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code has been filed against the order dated 1-9-2010 passed by JMFC, Gwalior in Criminal Case No. 13081/2010, by which the Magistrate has taken cognizance against the applicants for offence punishable under section 406 of Indian Penal Code. 3. A preliminary objection has been raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the order dated 1-9-2010 is a revisable order and instead of filing Criminal Revision before the Sessions Court, the applicants have directly filed the application under section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code. The objection raised by the Counsel for the respondent has some substance. The order taking cognizance is a revisable order, however, this application under section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code was filed in the year 2012 and since it has been entertained, therefore, it would not be appropriate to dismiss the present application on the ground of availability of alternative remedy. Hence, the matter is heard finally. 4. The necessary facts for the disposal of the present application in short are that the respondent filed a criminal complaint against the respondents for offences punishable under section 406 and 420 of Indian Penal Code. The case of the respondent is that an agreement was entered into between the applicant no.1 and the M.P. State Electricity Board for the repairing of transformers. 12 transformers of 63 K.V.A. Capacity, 17 transformers of 100 K.V.A., 02 transformers of 200 K.V.A. and 01 transformer of 1.6 M.V.A. Capacity were handed over to the applicants for repairing purposes. However, the same have not been returned back. Similarly 01 transformer of 25 K.V.A. capacity, 25 transformers of 63 K.V.A. capacity, 27 transformers of 100 K.V.A. capacity, 08 transformers of 200 K.V.A. capacity, 02 transformers of 1.6 M.V.A. capacity, 01 transformer of 63 K.V.A. capacity and 07 transformers of 100 K.V.A. capacity are still lying in the godown of the applicants but the applicants have not repaired those transformers although they are within the guarantee period. Written information was given to the applicants on several occasions, but neither the applicants have returned the transformers after repairing the same, nor they have repaired transformers which are lying in the godown of the respondent, as a result of which the respondent has suffered huge financial loss. It was further alleged that the applicants are in possession of the transformers in the capacity of a trustee and by not returning the same, they have committed the offence of criminal breach of trust. It was further alleged that the respondent has come to know that the applicants, after repairing the transformers of the respondent have given to some other Company. Thus, a criminal complaint for offences under section 406 and 420 of Indian Penal Code was filed. 5. The statement of the complainant’s witness was recorded and thereafter, the Trial Magistrate by order dated 1-9-2010, framed charge under section 406 of Indian Penal Code. 6. Being aggrieved by the order dated 1-9-2010 passed by the Magistrate, the present application under section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code. It is submitted by the Counsel for the applicants that along with the complaint, an authority letter has not been filed to show that Add. Superintending Engineer was authorized by the Company to file the complaint. It is further submitted that it is no where mentioned in the Complaint that on what date the transformers were entrusted to the applicants. The allegations as made in the complaint make out a case of civil in nature. It is further submitted that the contract was entered into between the applicants and the MPEB and there was no privity of Contract between the applicants and the complainant. 7. Per Contra, it is submitted by the Counsel for the respondent that in the complaint it is specifically mentioned that the Add. Superintending Engineer has been authorized to file the complaint and even assuming that the authority letter has not been filed, the complaint cannot be dismissed at the threshold as the complainant can always prove the fact of authorization during evidence. It is further submitted that merely because the case involves civil dispute also, by itself would not mean that the applicants cannot be prosecuted. It is further submitted that merely because the case involves civil dispute also, by itself would not mean that the applicants cannot be prosecuted. It is further submitted that after the constitution of the complainant, all civil and criminal liabilities were taken over and therefore, it cannot be said that there was no privity of Contract between the applicants and the complainant. It was further submitted that under the contract, several transformers were handed over to the applicants and they were under obligation to return the same after repairs, but they have not returned the same, therefore, it is a clear case of criminal breach of trust as the applicants are in possession of the transformers in the capacity of trustees. 8. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties. 9. According to the applicants, an agreement was entered into between the applicants and the M.P.E.B. and not with the complainant. 10. Section 131 of Electricity Act, 2003 reads as under : “131. Vesting of property of Board in State Government.— (1) With effect from the date on which a transfer scheme, prepared by the State Government to give effect to the objects and purposes of this Act, is published or such further date as may be stipulated by the State Government (hereafter in this Part referred to as the effective date), any property, interest in property, rights and liabilities which immediately before the effective date belonged to the State Electricity Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board) shall vest in the State Government on such terms as may be agreed between the State Government and the Board. (2) Any property, interest in property, rights and liabilities vested in the State Government under sub-section (1) shall be re-vested by the State Government in a Government company or in a company or companies, in accordance with the transfer scheme so published along with such other property, interest in property, rights and liabilities of the State Government as may be stipulated in such scheme, on such terms and conditions as may be agreed between the State Government and such company or companies being State Transmission Utility or generating company or transmission licensee or distribution licensee, as the case may be : Provided that the transfer value of any assets transferred hereunder shall be determined as far as may be, based on the revenue potential of such assets at such terms and conditions as may be agreed between the State Government and the State Transmission Utility or generating company or transmission licensee or distribution license, as the case may be. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, where, — (a) the transfer scheme involves the transfer of any property or rights to any person or undertaking not wholly owned by the State Government, the scheme shall give effect to the transfer only for fair value to be paid by the transferee to the State Government; (b) a transaction of any description is effected in pursuance of a transfer scheme, it shall be binding on all persons including third parties and even if such persons or third parties have not consented to it. (4) The State Government may, after consulting the Government company or company or companies being State Transmission Utility or generating company or transmission licensee or distribution licensee, referred to in sub-section (2) (hereinafter referred to as the transferor), require such transferor to draw up a transfer scheme to vest in a transferee being any other generating company or transmission licensee or distribution licensee, the property, interest in property, rights and liabilities which have been vested in the transferor under this section, and publish such scheme as statutory transfer scheme under this Act. (5) A transfer scheme under this section may — (a) provide for the formation of subsidiaries, joint venture companies or other schemes of division, amalgamation, merger, reconstruction or arrangements which shall promote the profitability and viability of the resulting entity, ensure economic efficiency, encourage competition and protect consumer interests; (b) define the property, interest in property, rights and liabilities to be allocated — (i) by specifying or describing the property, rights and liabilities in question; or (ii) by referring to all the property, interest in property, rights and liabilities comprised in a described part of the transferor’s undertaking; or (iii) partly in one way and partly in the other; (c) provide that any rights or liabilities or stipulated described in the scheme shall be enforceable by or against the transferor or the transferee; (d) impose on the transferor an obligation to enter into such written agreements with or execute such other instruments in favour of any other subsequent transferee as may be stipulated in the scheme. (e) mention the functions and duties of the transferee; (f) make such supplemental, incidental and consequential provisions as the transferor appropriate including provision stipulating the order as taking effect; and (g) provide that the transfer shall be provisional for a stipulated period. (6) All debts and obligations incurred, all contracts entered into and all matters and things engaged to be done by the Board, with the Board or for the Board, or the State Transmission Utility or generating company or transmission licensee or distribution licensee, before a transfer scheme becomes effective shall, to the extent specified in the relevant transfer scheme, be deemed to have been incurred, entered into or done by the Board, with the Board or for the State Government or the transferee and all suits or other legal proceedings instituted by or against the Board or transferor, as the case may be, may be continued or instituted by or against the State Government or concerned transferee, as the case may be. (7) The Board shall cease to be charged with and shall not perform the functions and duties with regard to transfers made on and after the effective date. (7) The Board shall cease to be charged with and shall not perform the functions and duties with regard to transfers made on and after the effective date. Explanation.— For the purposes of this Part, — (a) “Government company” means a Government company formed and registered the Companies Act, 1956; (b) “company” means a company to be formed and registered under the Companies Act, 1956 to undertake generation or transmission or distribution in accordance with the scheme under this Part. 11. Section 131(6) of Electricity Act, 2003 specifically deals with the contracts, debts and obligations incurred by the Board, with the Board and for the Board. 12. It is submitted that in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-sections (1), (2), (5), (6) and (7) of section 131 and section 133 of the Electricity Act, 2003, Madhya Pradesh Electricity Reforms First Transfer Scheme Rules, 2003 have been framed. 13. By referring to Rule 3(i), it is submitted by the counsel for the respondent that ‘Discom 2’ has been defined as under :— “(i) “Discom 2” means Madhya Pradesh Madhya Khestra Vidhut Vitaran Company Limited, a company incorporated with the main object of undertaking electricity distribution and retail supply in the area of jurisdiction of Commissioneries of Bhopal, Hoshangabad, Chambal and Gwalior of the State of Madhya Pradesh;” Rule 4 deals with Classification of Undertakings of the Board, which reads as under :— “4. Classification of Undertakings of the Board. — (1) The undertaking of the Board are classified in the following schedules; (a) Generation Undertakings as set out in Schedule – ‘A’; (b) Transmission Undertakings as set out in Schedule -’B’; (c) For DISCOM 1 the distribution Undertakings as set out in Schedule – ‘C’; (d) For DISCOM 2 the distribution Undertakings as set out in Schedule – ‘D’; (e) For DISCOM 3 the distribution Undertakings as set out in Schedule – ‘E’; and (f) The Undertakings as set out in Schedule – ‘F’. (2) If the assets of the Undertaking under sub-rule (1) are subject to security documents or arrangements in favour of third parties for any financial assistance or obligation taken by the Board and the liabilities in respect thereof are to be classified in different undertakings, the State Government, may by order to be issued for the purpose, provide for the apportionment of the liabilities secured by such properties, assets and rights between the different Undertakings and upon such apportionment, the security shall be applicable to the extent of apportioned liability.” 14. From the plain reading of Rule 4, it is clear that the Distribution Undertakings of Discom 2 have been mentioned in Schedule ‘D’. The general assets mentioned in the Schedule ‘D’ of Distribution Undertakings of Discom 2 includes machinery and equipment sent for repairs. According to Schedule ‘D’, contracts, agreements, interest and arrangements to the extent they are associated with or related to transmission activities or referred to para 1 and 2 have been included. 15. Thus, it is clear that after the constitution of the complainant, all assets and liabilities stood transferred to the complainant, therefore, by force of law, the complainant stepped into the shoes of the M.P.E.B. And therefore, the submission made by the applicants that there was no privity of contract between them and the complainant cannot be accepted and hence, it is rejected. 16. It is next contended by the Counsel for the applicants, that no document has been filed along with the complaint to show that the Add. Superintending Engineer was authorized by the complainant to file the complaint. 17. In para 2 of the complaint, it is specifically stated that the Add. Superintending Engineer has been authorized by the Company. The non-filing of the copy of the resolution cannot be said to be an illegality which may warrant dismissal of complaint at the threshold. The complainant during the evidence can file a copy of the resolution to prove that the Add. Superintending Engineer was authorized to file the complaint. This Court in the case of 18. Thus, as necessary averments have been made in the complaint with regard to the authority of the Add. Superintending Engineer to file the complaint, it is held that the complainant can always prove the authorization of the Add. Superintending Engineer. Thus, this contention made by the applicants cannot be accepted and hence, liable to be rejected. Thus, as necessary averments have been made in the complaint with regard to the authority of the Add. Superintending Engineer to file the complaint, it is held that the complainant can always prove the authorization of the Add. Superintending Engineer. Thus, this contention made by the applicants cannot be accepted and hence, liable to be rejected. 19. It is next contended by the Counsel for the applicants, that even if the entire allegations are accepted, it would be a case of civil in nature and an attempt has been made to give the colour of criminal in nature. 20. The Supreme Court in the case of Amit Kapoor vs. Ramesh Chander reported in (2012) 9 SCC 460 has held as under :— “27. Having discussed the scope of jurisdiction under these two provisions i.e. section 397 and section 482 of the Code and the fine line of jurisdictional distinction, now it will be appropriate for us to enlist the principles with reference to which the Courts should exercise such jurisdiction. However, it is not only difficult but is inherently impossible to state with precision such principles. At best and upon objective analysis of various judgments of this Court, we are able to cull out some of the principles to be considered for proper exercise of jurisdiction, particularly, with regard to quashing of charge either in exercise of jurisdiction under section 397 or section 482 of the Code or together, as the case may be : 27.1. Though there are no limits of the powers of the Court under section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. 27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere. 27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere. 27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge. 27.4. Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate Courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loath to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in exercise of its inherent powers. 27.5. Where there is an express legal bar enacted in any of the provisions of the Code or any specific law in force to the very initiation or institution and continuance of such criminal proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide specific protection to an accused. 27.6. The Court has a duty to balance the freedom of a person and the right of the complainant or prosecution to investigate and prosecute the offender. 27.7. The process of the Court cannot be permitted to be used for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior purpose. 27.8. Where the allegations made and as they appeared from the record and documents annexed therewith to predominantly give rise and constitute a “civil wrong” with no “element of criminality” and does not satisfy the basic ingredients of a criminal offence, the Court may be justified in quashing the charge. Even in such cases, the Court would not embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence. 27.9. Another very significant caution that the Courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the Court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of Court leading to injustice. 27.10. It is neither necessary nor is the Court called upon to hold a full-fledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction. 27.10. It is neither necessary nor is the Court called upon to hold a full-fledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction. 27.11. Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot be maintained. 27.12. In exercise of its jurisdiction under section 228 and/or under section 482, the Court cannot take into consideration external materials given by an accused for reaching the conclusion that no offence was disclosed or that there was possibility of his acquittal. The Court has to consider the record and documents annexed therewith by the prosecution. 27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie. 27.14. Where the charge-sheet, report under section 173(2) of the Code, suffers from fundamental legal defects, the Court may be well within its jurisdiction to frame a charge. 27.15. Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court finds that it would amount to abuse of process of the Code or that the interest of justice favours, otherwise it may quash the charge. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae i.e. to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone, the Courts exist. 27.16. These are the principles which individually and preferably cumulatively (one or more) be taken into consideration as precepts to exercise of extraordinary and wide plenitude and jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code by the High Court. Where the factual foundation for an offence has been laid down, the Courts should be reluctant and should not hasten to quash the proceedings even on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if there is substantial compliance with the requirements of the offence.” 21. Where the factual foundation for an offence has been laid down, the Courts should be reluctant and should not hasten to quash the proceedings even on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if there is substantial compliance with the requirements of the offence.” 21. Thus, it is clear that where the allegations are predominently of civil in nature with no element of criminality, then nobody can be allowed to adopt the shortcut method of redressing his grievance by giving the colour of criminal case. However, where the claim gives rise to civil claim as well as also amount to criminality, then the criminal prosecution cannot be quashed. To buttress his contentions, the Counsel for the applicants relied upon the judgment of Supreme Court passed in the case of Binod Kumar vs. State of Bihar reported in (2014) 10 SCC 663 . 22. If the allegations made in the complaint are considered, then it would be clear that they are in two parts : Firstly, under the contract, certain transformers were handed over to the applicants for repairing work, which they have not returned and Secondly, that they have not repaired certain transformers which are still lying in the godowns of the respondent/complainant. 23. So far as the second allegation with regard to non-repairing of certain transformers is concerned, suffice it to say that it would amount to breach of contract and therefore, it cannot be said that by not fulfilling their part of contract, the applicants have committed any offence. Therefore, no offence is made out on the allegation of non-repairing of transformers as required under the contract and therefore, the Magistrate has rightly not taken cognizance of offence on the basis of second allegation. However, so far as the first allegation is concerned, it is clear that the transformers were handed over to the applicants for the purposes of repairing. Thus, it is clear that the applicants are not the owner of the said transformers and their position is that of a trustee who were required to return the transformers after carrying out the repair works. However, when the applicants did not return the transformers after carrying out repair works, then prima facie the allegation would prima facie make out a case under section 406 of Indian Penal Code. However, when the applicants did not return the transformers after carrying out repair works, then prima facie the allegation would prima facie make out a case under section 406 of Indian Penal Code. Section 405 of Indian Penal Code reads as under : “405. Criminal breach of trust. — Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract, express or implied, which he has made touching the discharge of such trust, or wilfully suffers any other person so to do, commits “criminal breach of trust”. Explanation 1. — A person, being an employer of an establishment whether exempted under section 17 of the Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (19 of 1952), or not who deducts the employee’s contribution from the wages payable to the employee for credit to a Provident Fund or Family Pension Fund established by any law for the time being in force, shall be deemed to have been entrusted with the amount of the contribution so deducted by him and if he makes default in the payment of such contribution to the said fund in violation of the said law, shall be deemed to have dishonestly used the amount of the said contribution in violation of a direction of law as aforesaid. Explanation 2. — A person, being an employer, who deducts the employees’ contribution from the wages payable to the employee for credit to the Employees’ State Insurance Fund held and administered by the Employees’ State Insurance Corporation established under the Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 (34 of 1948), shall be deemed to have been entrusted with the amount of the contribution so deducted by him and if he makes default in the payment of such contribution to the said Fund in violation of the said Act, shall be deemed to have dishonestly used the amount of the said contribution in violation of a direction of law as aforesaid.” 24. In a commercial transaction or a contractual dispute there may be the ingredients of criminal offence. In a commercial transaction or a contractual dispute there may be the ingredients of criminal offence. In a case which is a predominantly is a civil nature, the criminal proceedings may not be warranted but where in a set of facts which discloses the civil wrong as well as criminal offence then the mere fact that the complaint relates to commercial transaction or a breach of contract, for which a civil remedy is also available or has been availed of, that by itself would not be a ground to quash the criminal proceedings. 25. The Supreme Court in the case of Indian Oil Corporation vs. NEPC India Limited and others reported in (2006) 6 SCC 736 has held as under :— “12. The principles relating to exercise of jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash complaints and criminal proceedings have been stated and reiterated by this Court in several decisions. To mention a few - Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia vs. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre [ (1988) 1 SCC 692 ], State of Haryana vs. Bhajanlal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335], Rupan Deol Bajaj vs. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill [ (1995) 6 SCC 194 ], Central Bureau of Investigation vs. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd., [ (1996) 5 SCC 591 ], State of Bihar vs. Rajendra Agrawalla [ (1996) 8 SCC 164 ], Rajesh Bajaj vs. State NCT of Delhi, [ (1999) 3 SCC 259 ], Medchl Chemicals and Pharma (P) Ltd. vs. Biological E. Ltd. [ (2000) 3 SCC 269 ], Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma vs. State of Bihar [ (2000) 4 SCC 168 ], M. Krishnan vs Vijay Singh [ (2001) 8 SCC 645 ], and Zandu Phamaceutical Works Ltd. vs. Mohd. Sharaful Haque [ (2005) 1 SCC 122 ]. The principles, relevant to our purpose are : (i) A complaint can be quashed where the allegations made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out the case alleged against the accused. For this purpose, the complaint has to be examined as a whole, but without examining the merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the material nor an assessment of the reliability or genuineness of the allegations in the complaint, is warranted while examining prayer for quashing of a complaint. For this purpose, the complaint has to be examined as a whole, but without examining the merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the material nor an assessment of the reliability or genuineness of the allegations in the complaint, is warranted while examining prayer for quashing of a complaint. (ii) A complaint may also be quashed where it is a clear abuse of the process of the Court, as when the criminal proceeding is found to have been initiated with mala fides/malice for wreaking vengeance or to cause harm, or where the allegations are absurd and inherently improbable. (iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power should be used sparingly and with abundant caution. (iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence alleged. If the necessary factual foundation is laid in the complaint, merely on the ground that a few ingredients have not been stated in detail, the proceedings should not be quashed. Quashing of the complaint is warranted only where the complaint is so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence. (v) A given set of facts may make out : (a) purely a civil wrong; or (b) purely a criminal offence; or (c) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A commercial transaction or a contractual dispute, apart from furnishing a cause of action for seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve a criminal offence. As the nature and scope of a civil proceedings are different from a criminal proceeding, the mere fact that the complaint relates to a commercial transaction or breach of contract, for which a civil remedy is available or has been availed, is not by itself a ground to quash the criminal proceedings. The test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose a criminal offence or not. 13. While on this issue, it is necessary to take notice of a growing tendency in business circles to convert purely civil disputes into criminal cases. This is obviously on account of a prevalent impression that civil law remedies are time consuming and do not adequately protect the interests of lenders/creditors. Such a tendency is seen in several family disputes also, leading to irretrievable break down of marriages/families. This is obviously on account of a prevalent impression that civil law remedies are time consuming and do not adequately protect the interests of lenders/creditors. Such a tendency is seen in several family disputes also, leading to irretrievable break down of marriages/families. There is also an impression that if a person could somehow be entangled in a criminal prosecution, there is a likelihood of imminent settlement. Any effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do not involve any criminal offence, by applying pressure through criminal prosecution should be deprecated and discouraged. In G. Sagar Suri vs. State of UP [ (2000) 2 SCC 636 ], this Court observed : “It is to be seen if a matter, which is essentially of a civil nature, has been given a cloak of criminal offence. Criminal proceedings are not a short cut of other remedies available in law. Before issuing process a criminal Court has to exercise a great deal of caution. For the accused it is a serious matter. This Court has laid certain principles on the basis of which the High Court is to exercise its jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code. Jurisdiction under this section has to be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.” 14. While no one with a legitimate cause or grievance should be prevented from seeking remedies available in criminal law, a complainant who initiates or persists with a prosecution, being fully aware that the criminal proceedings are unwarranted and his remedy lies only in civil law, should himself be made accountable, at the end of such misconceived criminal proceedings, in accordance with law. One positive step that can be taken by the Courts, to curb unnecessary prosecutions and harassment of innocent parties, is to exercise their power under section 250, Criminal Procedure Code more frequently, where they discern malice or frivolousness or ulterior motives on the part of the complainant. Be that as it may.” 26. Thus, it is clear that the applicants were entrusted with certain transformers for repairing purposes and therefore the position of the applicants was that of a trustee and they were required to return the transformers after carrying out repair works. Be that as it may.” 26. Thus, it is clear that the applicants were entrusted with certain transformers for repairing purposes and therefore the position of the applicants was that of a trustee and they were required to return the transformers after carrying out repair works. Had it been a case where the transformers were returned by the applicants without repairing them, then it would have been a case of breach of contract but where the transformers were not returned then it would be certainly a case of breach of trust and accordingly, the submission made by the Counsel for the applicants that the allegations do not disclose commission of offence and the claim is of civil in nature is rejected. 27. There is some substance in the contention of the applicants that there is no specific averment in the complaint to the effect that when the transformers were handed over to the applicants? The Magistrate has taken cognizance for offence under section 406 of Indian Penal Code. The maximum imprisonment provided for offence under section 406 of Indian Penal Code is three years therefore, provisions of section 468 of Criminal Procedure Code would apply. Section 468 of Criminal Procedure Code reads as under : “468. Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation. — (1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation. (2) The period of limitation shall be — (a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only; (b) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year; (c) three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years. (3) For the purposes of this section, the period of limitation, in relation to offences which may be tried together, shall be determined with reference to the offence which is punishable with the more severe punishment or, as the case may be, the most severe punishment.” 28. However, in certain cases, the trial Court can extend the period of limitation. Section 473 of Criminal Procedure Code reads as under : “473. Extension of period of limitation in certain cases. However, in certain cases, the trial Court can extend the period of limitation. Section 473 of Criminal Procedure Code reads as under : “473. Extension of period of limitation in certain cases. — Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this Chapter, any Court may take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of limitation, if it is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that the delay has been properly explained or that it is necessary so to do in the interests of justice.” 29. In the complaint, although it is mentioned that on 3-4-2010 a notice was given to the applicants, which was replied by the applicants on 24-6-2010, but it is nowhere mentioned that on what date, the transformers were handed over to the applicants for repairs. Thus, at this stage it cannot be adjudicated that whether the complaint was within the period of limitation or whether there was sufficient cause for extension of time. 30. The cognizance was taken in the year 2010 and more than 6 years have passed. Therefore, instead of setting aside the order dated 1-9-2010 and remanding the matter back to reconsider the case in the light of provisions of section 468 and 473 of Criminal Procedure Code, it is directed that the Magistrate while deciding the Trial on merits shall also consider the effect of section 468 and 473 of Criminal Procedure Code. 31. With the aforesaid observations, the present application is disposed off.