JUDGMENT & ORDER : T. Vaiphei, J. The sole question which for consideration in this appeal is whether the learned Single Judge is correct in holding that the respondent is entitled to compassionate appointment even though the wife of his elder brother is a Government employee under the State Government? 2. The facts materials for disposal of the writ appeal are hardly in dispute. The late Rebati Mohan Das died on 18-10-2012 when he was serving as a Peon (SCW) under the Department of Welfare for Scheduled Castes, Government of Tripura and is survived by his wife, his mother and his two sons. According to the respondent, to mitigate the financial hardships caused by the sudden demise of the sole bread earner in the family, he applied for compassionate appointment in the prescribed form with supporting documents including the NOC from other surviving members of his family on 24-12-2012. The respondent has the qualification of the Madhyamik passed from Tripura Board of Secondary Education, which is the minimum eligibility for any Grade IV post. However, much to his consternation, the Finance Department in its communication dated 19-7-2013, which was never communicated to him, rejected his application on the ground that there was already a Government employee in his family. The Government employee referred to therein is none other than the wife of the elder brother of the writ petitioner. According to the respondent, the wife of his elder brother, for the purpose of Die-in-harness scheme, is not included in the definition of “family member” as would appear from the Memorandum dated 19-11-1997. Aggrieved by the rejection, the respondent filed the writ petition, which was allowed by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment. Dissatisfied with the impugned judgment, this appeal has been filed by the State-appellants. 3. Before proceeding further, we straightaway proceed to reproduce below the crucial parts of the findings of the learned Single Judge: “6. In the Memo dated 08.01.1992 ‘family’ has been defined thus:- “'Family' means a Government servant – Wife and Husband, as the case may be and legitimate children. Note:- (a) The term 'Children' includes sons and unmarried Daughters (b) Married sons even if they live separately, should be treated as member of the family.” 7. In the subsequent Memo dated 24.09.2011 in paragraph 2 ‘family’ has been defined thus:- 2. Note:- (a) The term 'Children' includes sons and unmarried Daughters (b) Married sons even if they live separately, should be treated as member of the family.” 7. In the subsequent Memo dated 24.09.2011 in paragraph 2 ‘family’ has been defined thus:- 2. Now, the definition of the term “family” for the purpose of providing employment/financial assistance both in die-in-harness and extremist/ethnic violence schemes has been reviewed by the Government and it is proposed to amend the definition of “family” as in the following manner:- (i) his wife or her husband, as the case may be; (ii) legitimate children excluding a married son or married daughter or daughter-in-law, if he/she lives separately from other members of the family; (iii) Step Children, (iv) adopted children. (v) dependent daughter-in-law; (vi) dependent parents; (vii) dependent unmarried brothers and unmarried sisters and (viii) dependent widow daughters.” 8. The survivorship certificate which was issued on 28.11.2012 shows that only mother, wife and two sons were left by the deceased. There is no mention in the survivorship certificate about the daughter-in-law. Family ration card has not been produced to see whether elder son’s daughter was a member of family or not. However, as per the definition of ‘family’ contained in the latest Memo dated 24.09.2011, a daughter-in-law is not ordinarily included in the definition of family. Therefore, refusal of job to the petitioner on the ground that one of the sons wife is a Government employee does not hold good. Since as per Memorandum dated 24th September 2011 a daughter-in-law is excluded from the member of a family of a deceased Government employee, the rejection of job of the petitioner on that ground was altogether wrong. 9. Therefore, I am of the considered opinion that the respondents illegally and wrongly refused employment to the petitioner under the die-in-harness scheme, which is a benevolent scheme to provide job to a member of the family of the deceased employee and hence, I think it is a fit case where the respondents should be directed to provide job under the scheme to the petitioner. 10. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. The respondents are directed to provide a suitable job to the writ petitioner under the die-in-harness scheme for the death of his father within 60(sixty) days from today.” 4. 10. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. The respondents are directed to provide a suitable job to the writ petitioner under the die-in-harness scheme for the death of his father within 60(sixty) days from today.” 4. At the outset, it may be noted that no affidavit-in-opposition was filed by the State-appellants before the learned Single Judge though they were granted adequate time to do so. Therefore, the writ petition had to be disposed of without having the benefit of the affidavit of the State-appellants. Consequently, the learned Single Judge committed no wrong in disposing of the writ petition on the basis of the available materials on record. A desperate attempt was, however, made by the learned counsel for the State-appellants at this appellate stage to salvage the case of the appellants by raising new pleas in the memo of appeal, which should have been made in their affidavit-in-opposition. When we refused to hear him on these new pleas, one last-ditch effort was made by him to seek leave to file new documents. By our order dated 18-7-2017 in IA No.2/17, we refused to grant them the leave. Be that as it may, we can still examine the case of the appellants on the basis of the admitted facts on record, particularly, on the question of law, after all, relief cannot be granted when law does not permit to grant the same. 5. Mr. Nepal Majumdar, the learned State counsel appearing for the State-appellants, contends that the elder brother and his wife were living with the deceased and other members of the family including the respondent under one roof in a joint family before the death of the deceased and after the death of the deceased. In the absence of any plea to this effect in the proceedings before the learned Single Judge, there is no basis for examining this issue since this is purely a question of fact. We proceed on the assumption that the wife of the elder brother of the respondent is a Government employee as found by the learned Single Judge. It is not the case of the respondent in his pleading that the elder brother of the respondent and his wife have been living with them under one roof before or after the death of the deceased. It is not the case of the respondent in his pleading that the elder brother of the respondent and his wife have been living with them under one roof before or after the death of the deceased. His case is that she is not included in the definition of the term “family” as per the Memorandum dated 19-11-1997. It is also the findings of the learned Single Judge that there is no mention in the survivorship certificate about the daughter-in-law; that the family ration card has not been produced to see whether elder son’s daughter was a member of family or not and that as per the definition of ‘family’ contained in the latest Memo dated 24.09.2011, a daughter-in-law is not ordinarily included in the definition of family. 6. Reading and re-reading of sub-Clause (ii) and sub-Clause (v) of Clause 2 of the Memorandum dated 24-9-2011 will indicate that the expression “legitimate children” are naturally included within the term “Family” and the term “legitimate children” excludes there from a married son, a married daughter or daughter-in-law, if he/she lives separately from other members of the family and that a dependent daughter-in-law also comes within the purview of the term “family”, but excludes a daughter-in-law if she lives separately from other members of the family. The question is what is the purpose of defining the term “family” in the die-in-harness scheme in the original die-in-harness scheme and what is the purpose of expanding the term “family” in the Memorandum dated 24-9-2011? What is now crystal clear is that a dependent daughter is included in the definition of the term “family” and is thus eligible for compassionate appointment in the absence of better claimant from amongst the family members of the deceased employee. However, if the daughter-in-law lives separately from other members of the family, she cannot apply for compassionate appointment. In our opinion, the term “family” as defined in Clause 2 of the Memorandum dated 24-9-2011 is simply engrafted for the purpose of extending the benefits under the die-in-harness and extremist/ethnic violence schemes and not for the purpose of disqualification of an applicant for availing of such benefits. In our opinion, the term “family” as defined in Clause 2 of the Memorandum dated 24-9-2011 is simply engrafted for the purpose of extending the benefits under the die-in-harness and extremist/ethnic violence schemes and not for the purpose of disqualification of an applicant for availing of such benefits. The view taken by us is reinforced by the Memorandum itself when it said in the beginning; “The undersigned is directed to state that it has been observed that the existing definition of “family” for the purpose of extending benefits under both die-in-harness and extremist/ethnic violence schemes has been depriving some families who lost their near and dear ones in harness, because of non-availabilities of eligible family member, even if dependent widow daughter is there is the family of the deceased Govt. Employee/person.” 2. Now, the definition of the term “family” for the purpose of providing employment/financial assistance both in die-in-harness and extremist/ethnic violence schemes has been reviewed by the Government and it is proposed to amend the definition of “family: as in the following manner:- * * * (Underlined for emphasis) 7. The question to be determined now is whether the son of the deceased, who is otherwise eligible for compassionate appointment, can be denied of such an appointment if the daughter-in-law of the deceased, who is also the wife of the elder brother of the petitioner, happens to be a Government employee? In our opinion, the Memorandum does not say anything about disqualifying an applicant if the wife of his elder brother (daughter-in-law of the deceased) is a Government employee. All that the Memorandum said is that if daughter-in-law lives separately from the other members of the family, then she cannot be considered to be a member of the family and cannot also, ipso facto, be eligible for compassionate appointment. However, if the daughter-in-law is a dependent, she is deemed to be a member of the family and will be eligible for compassionate appointment. Consequently, the petitioner cannot be denied of compassionate appointment simply because the wife of his elder brother happens to be a Government employee. However, if the daughter-in-law is a dependent, she is deemed to be a member of the family and will be eligible for compassionate appointment. Consequently, the petitioner cannot be denied of compassionate appointment simply because the wife of his elder brother happens to be a Government employee. To define the term “family” for the purpose of extending the benefit of compassionate appointment is one thing and to define, in the absence of anything to the contrary, the same term for the purpose of disqualifying a person from availing of such benefit is an entirely different proposition, and they cannot be equated. In our judgment, the definition of the term “family” in the said Memorandum for extending the benefit of die-in-harness scheme cannot be adopted by the State-appellants for denying compassionate appointment to the respondent. In the view that we have taken, the impugned judgment does not call for our interference, albeit, for a different reason. 8. The off-shoot of the foregoing discussion is that the writ appeal is devoid of merit and is, accordingly, dismissed. The State-appellants are, therefore, directed to carry out the directions of the learned Single Judge within two months from the date of receipt of this judgment. However, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.