JUDGMENT : M.M. SUNDRESH, J. 1. Taking note of the fact that the respondent/plaintiff in all these cases is the same with the similarity of the issues though the appellants are different, these cases are taken up together and disposed of by a common judgment. For the sake of brevity, A.S.No.39 of 2005 is taken up as the lead case along with the documents marked. 2. Suits have been filed for declaration and possession among other reliefs by the plaintiff, which is a temple, represented by the Executive Officer. All the suits were decreed. However, one suit viz., O.S.No.139 of 1989 filed on the file of Sub Court, Karur, was although decreed, the relief of possession was declined. The plaintiff filed an appeal, which was ultimately allowed. 3. It is the case of the respondent/plaintiff that it is the absolute owner of the suit properties. The suit properties were auctioned for lease, which was accordingly taken for a period of 99 years. The conditions of the auction are to the effect that the lessees will have to put up construction within a period of one year, failing which, the auction held would stand cancelled and possession would be taken. However, contrary to the terms and conditions of the auction, the erstwhile lessee sold the suit properties in favour of various third parties. The appellants herein, being the defendants in the suits, were the purchasers either from the original lessee or the persons claiming through them. The appellant in Transfer A.S.No. 54 of 2007 claims right on a deed of partition. 4. Before the trial Court, written statements have been filed claiming adverse possession. It is also the case of the appellants/ defendants that the suits are barred by limitation. They are entitled for the protection under the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act, 1921. The plaintiff does not have title over the suit properties. The suit properties are Inam properties. The protection under the Tamil Nadu Inam Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1963 (Act 26 of 1948), will have to be given in favour of the defendant since they are the patta holders. For the aforesaid reasons, the suits are not maintainable. However, the question of benefit under Act 26 of 1948 has not been raised in some of the appeals, which have been transferred from the lower Court to be tried along with other appeals. 5. For the aforesaid reasons, the suits are not maintainable. However, the question of benefit under Act 26 of 1948 has not been raised in some of the appeals, which have been transferred from the lower Court to be tried along with other appeals. 5. All the suits were decreed for declaration and possession, except O.S.No.139 of 1989, which was decreed only in part with respect to the declaration of title, which however was reversed in A.S.No.14 of 2000 by decreeing for possession as well. The trial Court recorded a finding on fact that the suit property, which was, in fact, divided into very many parts and in possession of the appellants belonged to the respondent/ plaintiff absolutely. Ex.A7- the copy of the Survey Register in respect of Karur Municipality-survey No.369, was taken into consideration for the aforesaid finding. In Ex.A7, it has been mentioned that the suit property was the Government land, which was sold in favour of the plaintiff. It also refers to the title. The said document was not disputed by the appellants. Reliance was made on Ex.A11-Book in respect of documents relating to the temple printed by the plaintiff, which also stipulates that the suit property was originally belonged to the Government, being an agricultural land covered with coconut trees and thereafter, it was changed into the temple. Accordingly, the trial Court held that the suit property was purchased by the respondent/plaintiff for a sale consideration of Rs.1000/- from the Government. Ex.A7 was also signed by the Tahsildar. This document also speaks about the possession having been handed over by the revenue authorities in favour of the plaintiff temple. The trial Court, thus, held the title in favour of the respondent/plaintiff. 6. Further more, even as per Ex.B1, which is a sale deed marked in O.S.No.95 of 2004, against which, one of the appeals viz., A.S.No.39 of 2005 was filed, also states about the auction. In other words, absolutely, there is no semblance of title to the appellants or their predecessors or their being in possession in pursuant to the auction held by the respondent/plaintiff. In fact, the right of the appellants itself is based on the lease preceded by auction. Thus, the contention regarding title and adverse possession was rejected. As the title was questioned, the trial Court held that the plea of tenancy also cannot be raised. In fact, the right of the appellants itself is based on the lease preceded by auction. Thus, the contention regarding title and adverse possession was rejected. As the title was questioned, the trial Court held that the plea of tenancy also cannot be raised. In all the cases except Transfer A.S.No.54 of 2007, the sale deeds relied upon by the appellants in respect of the properties mentioned therein were shown as documents cited. Therefore, it was accordingly held that those documents having been entered into much longer after the expiry of the period mentioned in the auction notice and the conditions stipulated therein, the plaintiff is entitled for a decree as nowhere there is any reference to the construction made as per the terms and conditions. In fact, what was sold was only vacant sites. Accordingly, on the question of limitation and the suit being premature, the contentions were rejected, being one of contravention of terms of the lease. 7. Insofar as the plea under Act 26 of 1948 is concerned, the trial Court rejected it by holding that in no case patta was produced and there is no reference to any notice having been issued to the respondent/plaintiff by the Settlement Officer. 8. In O.S.No.139 of 1989, the trial Court found fault with the notice issued under Section 106 of the Transfer of property Act, 1882. Accordingly, it merely granted a decree for declaration alone as against possession. The lower appellate Court allowed the appeal filed by the respondent-temple, once again holding that the appellants/defendants have not established the patta granted under Act 26 of 1948. There is violation of the conditions of the lease. As the appellants/defendants admitted the title of the respondent/plaintiff, the suit is not barred by limitation and is not premature and the appellants/defendants are not entitled for the protection under the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act. Even without challenging the same, Second Appeal No.746 of 2002 has been filed. 9. The following issues were raised for consideration in these first appeals: (i) Are the suits maintainable in law in view of the Tamil Nadu Inam Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1963 i.e., Act 26 of 1948? (ii) Are the appellants, tenants of the respondent temple? (iii) Are the appellants entitled to take contrary plea? (iv) Are the appellants not entitled to the benefit of Act 26 of 1948? (ii) Are the appellants, tenants of the respondent temple? (iii) Are the appellants entitled to take contrary plea? (iv) Are the appellants not entitled to the benefit of Act 26 of 1948? (v) Are the suit properties actually belong to the plaintiff being natham lands? 10. At the time of admitting the second appeal, the following substantial questions of law have been framed. 1. Whether in law is the lower appellate Court right in holding that the lease deed Ex.A1 is not valid and opposed to current laws? 2. Whether in law has not lower appellate Court failed to see that the suit is based on lease deed and the plaintiff is estopped from contending that it is not binding? 3. Whether in law has not the lower appellate Court erred in overlooking that the suit is premature as the lease period expires only in 2015? 11. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the documents and written submissions. 12. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants would contend that the appellants are in possession and enjoyment of the respective properties. There is no clear title in favour of the plaintiff. Act 26 of 1948 would be applicable to the case on hand and hence, the suits are not maintainable. As per Section 19 read with 18(4) of the Act 26 of 1948, a person, who has put up construction and residing, is entitled for the patta. The documents filed would show that the proceedings have been initiated for the aforesaid purposes. It is not in dispute that the entire Karur Town has been taken over by the Government under the Tamil Nadu Inam Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1963 (Act 26 of 1948). To buttress the submissions and claiming right under Act 26 of 1948, the following decisions have been relied upon. 1. SRI KALLALAGAR DEVASTHANAM THROUGH ITS MANAGER R.KRISHNASWAMI AIYANGAR V. ANTHONY MOOPAN (VOL.XLVIII The Madras Law Journal Reports page 147); 2. SRINIVASALU NAIDU V. S.K.THANGAVELU CHETTIAR ( 1959 (II) MLJ 235 ); 3. M.C.PERUMAL CHETTIAR AND OTHERS V. THE ESTATES ABOLITION TRIBUNAL (District Judge), CHENGLEPUT AND OTHERS (1968 (II)MLJ 157); 4. SILAMBANI SRI CHIDAMBARA VINAYAGAR SWAMI DEVASTHANAM, DEVAKOTTAI, THROUGH ITS TRUSTEES S.T.M.V.R. MURUGAPPA CHETTIAR AND OTHERS V. DURAISWAMI NADAR AND OTHERS ( 1982 (1) MLJ 257 ) and 5. SRINIVASALU NAIDU V. S.K.THANGAVELU CHETTIAR ( 1959 (II) MLJ 235 ); 3. M.C.PERUMAL CHETTIAR AND OTHERS V. THE ESTATES ABOLITION TRIBUNAL (District Judge), CHENGLEPUT AND OTHERS (1968 (II)MLJ 157); 4. SILAMBANI SRI CHIDAMBARA VINAYAGAR SWAMI DEVASTHANAM, DEVAKOTTAI, THROUGH ITS TRUSTEES S.T.M.V.R. MURUGAPPA CHETTIAR AND OTHERS V. DURAISWAMI NADAR AND OTHERS ( 1982 (1) MLJ 257 ) and 5. VEDARANYESWARASWAMI DEVASTHANAM BY ITS EXECUTIVE OFFICER, VEDARANYAM, NAGAI Q.M. DISTRICT V. A.C.DHARMA DEVI AND OTHERS (2003(1) Law Weekly 663). 13. The learned Senior counsel appearing for the respondent would submit that the findings, as rightly rendered by the trial Court, would clearly indicate their title. It is not the question of Inam but one of title. The respondents have purchased the suit property for a valuable consideration from the Government. Having put in possession as the lessee, it is not open for them to claim title over the same, contending contrary. In any case, there cannot be any sale deed in favour of the appellants. The appellants cannot be permitted to approbate or reprobate. There is no limitation involved nor the suit can be stated to be not maintainable, as the same is filed for violation of conditions. No application has been made seeking benefit under the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act. The appellants are not the tenants. There is no question of adverse possession involved. A lease cannot be converted into a sale. The suit notices have been issued determining the lease, if any, and seeking possession. In support of his contention, the learned Senior Counsel has made reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court in K.M.SENGODA GOUNDER AND OTHERS VS. STATE OF MADRAS AND ANOTHER (AIR 1973 SUPREME COURT 2441). 14. Considering the submissions made, we intend to take all the issues together and answer them accordingly. 15. As rightly submitted by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent, even in the written statements filed by the appellants herein, it has been stated that the suit properties came into their possession through lease. Ex.A10 clearly speaks about the title. The condition clearly stipulates the construction of building in the vacant site. All the subsequent sale deeds would show no such compliance. Even otherwise, the appellants have not proved that the constructions have been made as per the condition imposed. Ex.A10 clearly speaks about the title. The condition clearly stipulates the construction of building in the vacant site. All the subsequent sale deeds would show no such compliance. Even otherwise, the appellants have not proved that the constructions have been made as per the condition imposed. Even the document relied upon by the appellant under Ex.B1-sale deed in O.S.No.95 of 2004 as in the case of others, the factum of title, auction and sale deed are very clear. Findings have been rendered that constructions have not been put up as agreed. 16. At best, the appellants can claim the right as tenants. Being a tenant, no one can claim title as narrated, based upon adverse possession. Contrary to the tenancy, sale deeds have been executed. Exs.A7 and A10 clearly state that the suit property was originally a Government land covered by coconut trees. It was thereafter purchased by the plaintiff for a sale consideration of Rs.1,000/-. Possession was accordingly handed over by the Tahsildar. Ex.A11 also confirms that. Therefore, there is no dispute on the title of the respondent/plaintiff. Once a right is claimed on the basis of original tenancy, then, it is for that party to prove a better right blossoming into a title. 17. Substantial submissions have been made on the scope and ambit of Act 26 of 1948. It is submitted that pattas have been issued in favour of the appellants by treating the suit properties as Inam lands. The said submission, as rightly submitted by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent, cannot be countenanced for more than one reason. In none of these cases, any patta has been filed to substantiate the case. Merely because notices have been issued, there cannot be any inference that pattas have been issued in favour of the appellants. The rights and entitlement of the appellants over the properties ought to have been adjudicated before the settlement officer under Act 26 of 1948. They cannot make such a claim in the suits filed for possession and declaration based upon title. Inasmuch as the title of the respondent/plaintiff having been proved, it is for the appellants to establish the contrary, which they have not done to the satisfaction of the Court. 18. Alienations have taken place over the years. It is the case of the respondent/plaintiff that there is a clear violation of the condition imposed. Inasmuch as the title of the respondent/plaintiff having been proved, it is for the appellants to establish the contrary, which they have not done to the satisfaction of the Court. 18. Alienations have taken place over the years. It is the case of the respondent/plaintiff that there is a clear violation of the condition imposed. Therefore, there is no question of bar of the suit that would arise. Even assuming that the subsequent transactions are lease in nature, as rightly held by the trial Court, the respondent/plaintiff is entitled to possession for violation of the conditions imposed. 19. The Court below has rightly held that the suits are not barred by limitation having been filed for recovery of properties by placing reliance upon Section 10 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 20. The appellants have not produced any evidence to show that the suit property is an Inam land. Merely because Karur Town comes under the Act, it cannot be stated that automatically, the suit property also would come within the purview of Act 26 of 1948. Ex.A7 and its contents were not seriously disputed. Since the appellants have denied the title, the suits have been filed and therefore, even on that score, the bar of limitation would not arise. None of the appellants has filed any application seeking protection under the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act. Therefore, they cannot claim any relief based upon it. Further more, the tenancy, if any, was duly determined and thereafter, suits have been filed. 21. In the light of the above said discussion, the contentions raised by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants seeking benefit under the Act 26 of 1948, apart from the suit being not maintainable, cannot be accepted. In this connection, the following paragraphs of the Apex Court's decision cited supra (K.M.SENGODA GOUNDER AND OTHERS VS. STATE OF MADRAS AND ANOTHER (AIR 1973 SUPREME COURT 2441)) would be relevant. “3. We think that the original grant was made in consideration of the payment of the sum by the grantees and the grant was not therefore an inam grant. 4. The circumstance that the grant was treated as an inam at the time of inam settlement proceedings and that title deeds were issued on that basis, cannot affect the original character of the grant. 4. The circumstance that the grant was treated as an inam at the time of inam settlement proceedings and that title deeds were issued on that basis, cannot affect the original character of the grant. An inam title deed does not operate to enlarge or abridge the rights of the inamdars under the original grant.” 22. In such view of the matter, the various judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants are not applicable to the case on hand. Similarly, the contention sought to be raised for the first time on the nature of the properties that they are natham lands also cannot be accepted. There is no specific pleading in this regard and in any case, it is not open for the appellants now to raise such a plea, when they themselves claim their right only through the auction conducted by the respondent/plaintiff and only after failing to prove that they are the patta holders under Act 26 of 1948. Accordingly, all the issues are answered against the appellants and in favour of the respondent. Consequently, the substantial questions of law are answered in favour of the respondent except the first one. 23. We also feel that the lower appellate Court ought not to have gone into the issue as to whether Ex.A1 is against the public policy or not. The fact that Ex.A1 restricts the lease to upper caste communities alone, does not have any bearing on the issue sought to be raised by the parties. Rather the question is with respect to the contravention of the term. Hence, the above said finding rendered by the lower appellate Court is not a necessary one. Even otherwise, in view of the other findings rendered, the appellants do not have a case. In view of the findings rendered, there is no need to answer substantial question of law No.1. 24. For the foregoing reasons, all the appeals are dismissed. No costs.