JUDGMENT 1. Called in revised. None appeared to press this writ petition. Smt. Suniti Sachan, Advocate, is present for respondents. In the circumstances, we ourselves have perused the record. 2. The writ petition is directed against the judgement dated 20.12.2013 passed by Central Administrative Tribunal, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow (hereinafter referred to as "Tribunal") in Original Application No. 341 of 2008 dismissing claim of petitioner for seeking compassionate appointment to his son on the ground of medical disability. 3. There are several obstructions in the matter. Petitioner sought compassionate appointment to his son on the ground of medical sickness/disability in 1997 and attained the age of superannuation immediately thereafter but did not rake up the issue before appropriate Forum till 2007. It appears from record that in 2007 he came to Tribunal for seeking a direction that his case should be finalized whereupon Tribunal directed competent authority to decide his representation, but that will not explain ten years' laches on his part. Further before us, petitioner has come after almost three years from the date of judgment of Tribunal and we find explanation in para 13 and 14 of writ petition, which reads as under: "13. That the petitioner after obtaining certified copy of the order handed over brief to Sri P.R. Gupta, Advocate, practising in the High Court for filing a writ petition before this Hon'ble Court on 10.11.2014. The petitioner was assured by the said Advocate that he will file writ petition and accordingly the petitioner will be informed. The petitioner again contacted said Advocate on 23.9.2016 and the Advocate again assured that he will file the writ petition within a week. The petitioner received no information from the counsel then he again tried to contact the counsel Shri Gupta on phone but there was no response on phone. The petitioner again came to the residence of the counsel Shri Gupta on 27 August 2016 then it was revealed that Srhi Gupta is no more alive. The petitioner tried to get back his papers so that he may engage another counsel for filing writ petition before this Hon'ble Court. 14. The petitioner contacted again and again for getting back papers including certified copies and he became successful in getting file and papers from the house of late Gupta Advocate only on 9.10.2016. The petitioner tried to get back his papers so that he may engage another counsel for filing writ petition before this Hon'ble Court. 14. The petitioner contacted again and again for getting back papers including certified copies and he became successful in getting file and papers from the house of late Gupta Advocate only on 9.10.2016. After getting papers from the house of the counsel late Shri Gupta the petitioner contacted R.C. Gupta, Advocate on 15.12.2016 for filing present petition. In the circumstances, the delay and latches, has been caused which were beyond the control of the petitioner. In the circumstances, the delay and laches, if any, are liable to be condoned and the writ petition is liable to be entertained for decision on merit." 4. The explanation, as is evident, from a bare reading is wholly unsatisfactory and futile attempt to explain the delay of three years. 5. Delay and laches constitute substantial reason for disentitling relief in equitable jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In New Delhi Municipal Council Vs. Pan Singh and others J.T.2007(4) SC 253, the Apex Court observed that after a long time the writ petition should not have been entertained even if the petitioners are similarly situated and discretionary jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those who approached the Court after a long time. It was held that delay and laches were relevant factors for exercise of equitable jurisdiction. In M/S Lipton India Ltd. And others vs. Union of India and others, J.T. 1994(6) SC 71 and M.R. Gupta Vs. Union of India and others 1995(5) SCC 628 it was held that though there was no period of limitation provided for filing a petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India, ordinarily a writ petition should be filed within reasonable time. In K.V. Rajalakshmiah Setty Vs. State of Mysore, AIR 1961 SC 993 , it was said that representation would not be adequate explanation to take care of delay. Same view was reiterated in State of Orissa Vs. Pyari Mohan Samantaray and others AIR 1976 SC 2617 and State of Orissa and others Vs. Arun Kumar Patnaik and others 1976(3) SCC 579 and the said view has also been followed in Shiv Dass Vs. Union of India and others AIR 2007 SC 1330 = 2007(1) Supreme 455 and New Delhi Municipal Council (supra). Pyari Mohan Samantaray and others AIR 1976 SC 2617 and State of Orissa and others Vs. Arun Kumar Patnaik and others 1976(3) SCC 579 and the said view has also been followed in Shiv Dass Vs. Union of India and others AIR 2007 SC 1330 = 2007(1) Supreme 455 and New Delhi Municipal Council (supra). The aforesaid authorities of the Apex Court has also been followed by this Court in Chunvad Pandey Vs. State of U.P. and others, 2008(4) ESC 2423 . This has been followed in Virender Chaudhary Vs. Bharat Petroleum Corporation & Ors., 2009(1) SCC 297 . In S.S. Balu and another Vs. State of Kerala and others, 2009(2) SCC 479 the Apex Court held that it is well settled principle of law that delay defeats equity. It is now a trite law that where the writ petitioners approaches the High Court after a long delay, reliefs prayed for may be denied to them on account of delay and laches irrespective of the fact that they are similarly situated to other candidates who have got the benefit. In Yunus Vs. State of Maharashtra and others, 2009(3) SCC 281 the Court referred to the observations of Sir Barnesdelay Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Company Vs. Prosper Armstrong Hurde etc. (1874) 5 PC 239 and held as under: "Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. . . . . . . Two circumstances always important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy." 6. . . . . . . Two circumstances always important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy." 6. In view of above discussion, we are clearly of the view that petitioner is not entitled for any relief, hence Tribunal has rightly non suited him by dismissing his Original Application, but we have given different reasons to arrive at the same conclusion that Original Application filed by petitioner deserved to be dismissed. The fact remains that petitioner is not entitled for any relief and reasons we have already discussed above, hence though for different reasons, we confirm the view taken by Tribunal that Original Application of petitioner deserves to be dismissed. No interference is called for in the judgment of Tribunal impugned in this writ petition. 7. Dismissed. 8. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.