JUDGMENT : K.M. Thaker, J. 1. Heard Mr. Mishra, learned advocate for petitioner and Mr. Upadhyay learned advocate for respondent Company. 2. In present petition, original claimant before the learned Labour Court has challenged the judgment dated 22.10.2003 passed by learned Labour Court in T-Application No. 381 of 1988 as well as the judgment dated 28.02.2006 passed by learned Industrial Tribunal in Appeal (IC) No. 99 of 2003. 3. Learned Labour Court, vide judgment dated 22.10.2003 in T-Application No. 381 of 1988, rejected the T-Application filed by present petitioner. 3.1 Feeling aggrieved by the said judgment, the original claimant had filed Appeal No. 99 of 2003. 3.2 The Appeal Court reached to the same finding of fact as recorded by learned Labour Court, however, learned Industrial Court considered it appropriate to award Rs. 25,000/- as lump sum compensation to the claimant on the ground that the claimant had no intention of causing damage or loss to the company. 4. The claimant is dissatisfied with the said conclusion and also by the final directions. According to the claimant, the order terminating his service should have been set aside by the Courts and the learned Courts should have directed the company to reinstate him with all benefits. 5. Before proceeding further, it is relevant and necessary to mention at the outset that according to the submission by learned advocate for petitioner (original Claimant) the petitioner has already attained and crossed age of superannuation and that, therefore, the claim for reinstatement in service now does not survive. 6. So far as factual background is concerned, it has emerged from the record and from the submissions that the claimant joined the service with the respondent company on 04.11.1985 as Junior Assistant (Rotary). According to claimant, his service was confirmed vide order dated 07.02.1987. The claimant alleged that without any fault on his part, the opponent company illegally and arbitrarily terminated his service on 18.10.1987. The claimant alleged that his service record was clean and blot-less, however, some officers had grudge against him and, therefore, by way of victimisation, his service came to be terminated. He claimed that incorrect allegations were leveled against him and arbitrarily domestic inquiry was conducted. The claimant alleged that his service record was clean and blot-less, however, some officers had grudge against him and, therefore, by way of victimisation, his service came to be terminated. He claimed that incorrect allegations were leveled against him and arbitrarily domestic inquiry was conducted. He also alleged that though any allegation against him was not proved the Inquiry Officer submitted his report that the allegations are proved and the Company acted on such erroneous report and terminated his service on 08.07.1988. With such allegations, the claimant demanded reinstatement on his original post and he also demanded full backwages and other benefits. 7. The opponent Company opposed the application and the demand. The company filed its reply. The Company accepted that the claimant had joined the service with the Company on November, 1985 as Junior Assistant (Rotary) and that his service was confirmed vide order dated 07.02.1987. The company further claimed that the claimant was transferred to Dying Department with effect from 16.10.1982 and at the time when his service was discontinued the claimant was drawing salary of Rs. 2600/-. Against the claim, the Company contended that a report with reference to misconduct allegedly committed by the claimant was submitted to the company and that, therefore, a show cause notice dated 13.4.1988 was issued and the claimant was called upon to offer his explanation and response with regard to the complaint received against him. According to the Company the reply by the claimant was not found satisfactory, therefore, the Company issued charge sheet and departmental inquiry was conducted. According to the company, the domestic inquiry was conducted in legal and fair manner and the claimant was awarded full opportunity of hearing and defence during domestic inquiry. Upon conclusion of the domestic inquiry, Inquiry Officer submitted his report wherein he held, inter alia, that the allegations and charges against the delinquent are proved. The disciplinary and competent authority considered the record of inquiry and findings of Inquiry Officer and having considered the material available on record and report of the Inquiry Officer as well as nature and gravity of the misconduct and past record of claimant, the Company formed opinion that it would not be in the interest of company to continue the claimant in service and that therefore his service came to be terminated vide order dated 08.07.1988. After receipt of the termination order, the claimant issued notice (under Section 42(4) of the B.I.R Act) and demanded that he should be reinstated in service. Subsequently, he filed T-Application No. 381 of 1988 and prayed for reinstatement in service with consequential benefits. 8. Learned Labour Court adjudicated the application and after considering the material available on record, the learned Labour Court reached to the conclusion that the claimant failed to establish the allegations against the Company and also failed to make out any case in support of his request for reinstatement in service. Having reached to such conclusion, learned Labour Court dismissed the T-Application filed by the claimant. 9. Feeling aggrieved by the said decision of the learned Labour, the claimant unsuccessfully challenged the judgment by filing Appeal No. 99 of 2003. The Industrial Court considered the Appeal. The Industrial Court considered it appropriate to award compensation to the tune of Rs. 25,000/-. Therefore, the Court passed the judgment dated 28.02.2006. The original claimant is dissatisfied with the said decision of the Industrial Court. Hence, this petition. 10. Mr. Mishra, learned advocate for the claimant assailed that the judgment by learned Labour Court and Learned Industrial Court and submitted that both the Courts failed to appreciate that the claimant had not committed any misconduct and there was no justification to terminate service of the claimant. Mr. Mishra, learned advocate for claimant submitted that even according to the charge sheet, on account of the alleged negligence in mixing the colour, the resultant mixture was defective which changed the shade of the colour whereas the Company proceeded against the claimant on the ground that due to negligence in performance of duty by the claimant, about 1200 sq.mts of cloth was spoiled which resulted into financial loss occurred. Mr. Mishra submitted that there was no justification for the allegation of negligence in duty and the said allegation or charge was not proved and, therefore, there was no basis or justification to terminate the service of the claimant. Mr. Mishra submitted that there was no justification for the allegation of negligence in duty and the said allegation or charge was not proved and, therefore, there was no basis or justification to terminate the service of the claimant. He also submitted that though the Learned Industrial Court found that there was no intention on the part of the claimant to spoil the colour/mixture or to not follow the recipe of the colour and learned Court also found that the claimant committed genuine and bona-fide mistake and learned Industrial Court failed to award relief to the claimant and committed error in rejecting petitioner's claim for reinstatement in service and, therefore, judgment by learned Industrial Court is also unjust. Mr. Mishra, learned advocate for the claimant submitted that the learned Court ought to have directed the Company to reinstate the claimant with appropriate backwages. He submitted that the learned Courts failed to appreciate that the penalty imposed by the Company was extremely harsh and unjust and arbitrary and should have been set aside by the learned Court. With such submissions, Mr. Mishra, learned advocate submitted that the award may be set aside and it may be appropriately modified since now the claimant has crossed the age of superannuation. 11. The submission in petition of the claimant are opposed by the learned advocate for the respondent. Mr. Upadhyay, learned advocate for the respondent submitted that the action of the claimant amounted to negligence in performance of duty i.e. misconduct of serious nature and, therefore, action in accordance with the law was taken against the claimant. He submitted that before taking action for the misconduct, the Company had issued show cause notice and invited explanation from the claimant. His explanation was not found satisfactory and, therefore, charge sheet was issued which was followed by domestic inquiry. The Inquiry Officer submitted report wherein he held that the allegation and charge against the claimant are proved and that therefore the disciplinary authority imposed penalty for proved misconduct. He submitted that the legality of the inquiry was not disputed and that, therefore, there was no basis of justification to interfere with the penalty determined by the Company. Mr. The Inquiry Officer submitted report wherein he held that the allegation and charge against the claimant are proved and that therefore the disciplinary authority imposed penalty for proved misconduct. He submitted that the legality of the inquiry was not disputed and that, therefore, there was no basis of justification to interfere with the penalty determined by the Company. Mr. Upadhyaya, learned advocate further submitted that learned Trial Court (learned Labour Court) and learned Appeal Court (Learned Industrial Court) have reached to concurrent findings of fact and, therefore, there is no ground to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by learned Trial Court and confirmed by learned Appeal Court. Mr. Upadhyay learned advocate for the Company further submitted that when the employer imposed penalty in respect of proved misconduct, the learned Court would not be justified in interfering with the quantum of penalty, more particularly when it is not proved that the quantum of penalty determined by the employer was shockingly disproportionate and smacked of victimisation. Mr. Upadhyay, learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that the claimant failed to establish victimisation and that, therefore, also there is no basis or justification to interfere with the judgments by learned Labour Court and Learned Industrial Court. Mr. Upadhyay learned advocate for the company submitted that both the Courts reached to the conclusion that finding of fact recorded by Inquiry Officer are not perverse and that, therefore, the petition may not be entertained. 12. I have considered rival submissions and I have also considered the judgments by learned Labour Court and learned Industrial Court and other material available on record. 13. What has emerged from record and rival submissions by learned advocates for petitioner and respondent and the award is that a domestic inquiry was conducted against present petitioner in pursuance of reported misconduct. The Inquiry Officer held that the charge and allegations are proved. Disciplinary authority relied on the findings of the Inquiry Officer and terminated service of present petitioner. Feeling aggrieved by the said action of opponent Company, the petitioner-claimant instituted proceeding before learned Labour Court. The learned Court held that the claimant failed to prove the allegations against the employer. Learned Labour Court did not find any irregularity or illegality in the decision of the employer i.e. present respondent. Consequently, learned Labour Court dismissed the application filed by present petitioner. The learned Court held that the claimant failed to prove the allegations against the employer. Learned Labour Court did not find any irregularity or illegality in the decision of the employer i.e. present respondent. Consequently, learned Labour Court dismissed the application filed by present petitioner. The petitioner unsuccessfully challenged the learned Labour Court's judgment before Appeal Court. The Industrial Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Labour Court, however, on the ground that the claimant committed bona-fide mistake and he had no intention to cause loss or damage to the company, the Appeal Court considered it appropriate to award lump sum compensation to the claimant. Therefore, while confirming the judgment of the learned Labour Court, the learned Industrial Court directed the employer to pay Rs. 25000/- as lump sum compensation. The workman is not satisfied with the judgment. He has challenged both the decisions in this petition. 14. The charge sheet in pursuance of which the inquiry was conducted, is on record at annexure-A (page-12) of this petition. On reading the charge sheet it comes out that the only allegation against present petitioner was to the effect that he did not mention the recipe of colour according to the standard formula and he did not write correct recipe for Lot No. 13322 running on New Rapid Jet Machine, the material turned out to be defective and colour shade was not as defined and required, which resulted into defective material of 1200 mts. 14.1 It also comes out from the plain reading of the charge sheet that even the employer had not alleged that the workman intentionally mentioned incorrect colour recipe which resulted into such loss. 14.2 There is scope, on account of allegations in the charge sheet, to contend that the error in mentioning the colour recipe was bona-fide and genuine mistake and not an intentional act. 14.3 That is precisely the contention of the learned advocate for the petitioner who submitted that due to inadvertent and unintentional mistake, there was error in writing the recipe but the claimant never intended to cause any loss to the company and that therefore penalty in nature of termination from service is harsh and excessive. 15. In this context, it is appropriate to take into account the report/finding by the Inquiry Officer. 16. 15. In this context, it is appropriate to take into account the report/finding by the Inquiry Officer. 16. On reading the finding of the Inquiry Officer it comes out that even the Inquiry Officer has not reached to the conclusion or finding that the workman intentionally mentioned/wrote incorrect colour recipe/formula. 16.1 The Inquiry Officer has accepted and held that that on account of misunderstanding and misreading of the requirement, mistake occurred in mentioning the recipe. Even the Inquiry Officer did not find and did not hold that the workman intentionally mentioned incorrect recipe and that the claimant acted with intention to cause loss or damage to the employer. Actually the Inquiry Officer has not even mentioned that the claimant is guilty of negligence. 17. In present case, learned Labour Court has proceeded on the premise that the claimant had admitted legality and propriety of the inquiry. In that background, learned Labour Court also observed and held that the fact that the colour recipe which was mentioned by the claimant in the slip forwarded to dyeing department was incorrect, is proved and established. Learned Labour Court has also taken note of the fact that the colour recipe mentioned/written by the claimant in the slip was not correct and, therefore, the finding of the Inquiry Officer cannot be said to be perverse. 18. Learned Labour Court also observed that when it is established that the inquiry was conducted in legal and fair manner and the findings of the Inquiry Officer are not perverse, the Labour Court should not interfere with the employer's decision about penalty. On such premise, learned Labour Court dismissed the application. 19. In the facts of the case, more particularly when the findings by Inquiry Officer are not found perverse and it is also established that legal and fair inquiry was conducted, the conclusion by learned Labour Court cannot be faulted. 20. From the decision of the learned Industrial Court it appears that the learned Industrial Court proceeded on the premise that the Labour Court failed to take into account that though in charge sheet allegation about negligence was levelled, the Inquiry Officer did not record, in his findings, that that the claimant acted with negligence and/or that the inquiry officer did not hold that negligence is established. 21. 21. Even if the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer are read to mean that allegation about negligence is proved then also the fact, as recorded by learned Industrial Court, that from the findings of Inquiry Officer it does not come out that the claimant had acted intentionally and he had intention to cause loss or damage to the employer and that the mistake caused in mentioning colour recipe was genuine, bona-fide and inadvertent error, without any ill-intention to cause damage or loss to the employer, cannot be ignored. 22. In this context, it would not be out of place to note that learned Industrial Court has taken into account the provision under applicable standing order which were invoked by the disciplinary authority for the purpose of levelling charge and conducting domestic inquiry. The learned Industrial Court noticed that the charge sheet was issued by invoking provision under Clause 21(l), (m) and (p) of the applicable standing orders. When the said provisions are taken into account it comes out that the Clause 21(l) contemplates habitual negligence and dereliction in performance of duty whereas Clause 21(p) contemplates intentional damage to the property of the Company or any work of the Company. 23. It is pertinent that in present case it was not even the Company's allegation that the claimant was in habit of negligence in performing his duties or for dereliction in duty. Undisputedly the alleged incident was first incident during claimant's tenure. Therefore, clause (l) would not be attracted in case of the Petitioner. 24. It is also pertinent that it was having regard to the said specific provision under Clause 21(p) of the standing order that the learned Appellate Court (learned Industrial Court) proceeded to examine as to whether intention was established or not. 25. On this count it is necessary to note and mention that clause itself specifically employs the, expression intentional. Therefore proof of intention to cause damage is necessary to drive home the charge under Clause 21(p). If intention i.e. intention to cause damage is not proved and/or if it is not proved that damage was cause intentionally then workman cannot be held guilty for misconduct under Clause 21(p). It is pertinent that in case where service regulation and/or Clause in Standing Order which contemplates intention, the charge cannot be held as proved so long as intention is not established. It is pertinent that in case where service regulation and/or Clause in Standing Order which contemplates intention, the charge cannot be held as proved so long as intention is not established. If, in absence of evidence as regards intention, it is held that the charge under the clause or regulation is proved then it would amount to rendering important requirement viz. intention to cause loss to company or to cause damage to the property redundant and nugatory and Court, in such case, would be compelled to hold that finding is erroneous and unjustified, if not perverse. Therefore, learned Industrial Court examined the case from said perspective. 26. In the process the learned Industrial Court found that the incident in question was the first incident in the tenure of the claimant and there was no past history of any similar or other misconduct in the tenure of the claimant and that therefore Clause 21(l) would not be applicable and so far as clause 21(p) is concerned, learned Industrial Court found that intention was not proved and even Inquiry Officer did not come to the conclusion that the claimant had intentionally caused damage. 27. On this count, it would be appropriate to take into account observation by Division Bench of this Court in case of Navinchandra Shakerchand Shah v. Ahmedabad Co-op. Department Stores Ltd. 1978 GLR 108 . "11. The first aspect that disturbs, when one looks at the record, is whether what was alleged was at all a misconduct much less a gross misconduct. This is very important because in the name of discipline the employer is not there to clutch at a straw to style anything as misconduct so as to throw out the employee. If anything can be alleged to be a misconduct, the protection afforded to the employees by various labour laws will not only be illusory but would be deceptive. The allegation against the petitioner was that he was a helper in charge of two duties, namely, to prepare a bill for one who comes to purchase foodgrains and after preparing the bill to weigh the foodgrains purchased by the customer in the scales. It is an admitted position that the incident on which the allegation of misconduct is found occurred in the evening. The petitioner prepared a bill showing sale of 10 kg. of wheat. It is an admitted position that the incident on which the allegation of misconduct is found occurred in the evening. The petitioner prepared a bill showing sale of 10 kg. of wheat. It is admitted that this customer who had come to purchase wheat was not known to the petitioner or was not related to the petitioner or the petitioner was not in any way interested in him. In fact curiously in the inquiry the name of this customer is not disclosed or divulged. He is not called as a witness. No attempt is made to establish any relationship between him and the petitioner. There is not the slightest suggestion that the petitioner wanted to oblige the customer or that he was inclined to obtain any wrongful advantage for himself by giving 5 kg. of wheat more to the customer. There is not the slightest suggestion. In fact once the customer's name is not disclosed and he is not called and no attempt is made to establish any relationship between him and the petitioner, such an allegation could never have been made. Therefore, on the record as it is, petitioner is shown to have sold 10 kg. of wheat by preparing a bill to a stranger. After preparing the bill when the petitioner proceeded to weigh the wheat, it appears that he had put weights for 15 kg. Therefore, if the error was not found, petitioner would have handed over 15 kg. wheat to that customer. The question is as what stage the whole thing was nipped in the bud and in this connection the first complaint made soon after by Mr. Tharkarda in charge of the food-grains section possibly reveals the whole truth. Mr. Thakarda says in Ext. 10 prepared immediately after the occurrence that after writing the bill for 10 kg. of wheat sold to the customer, when he was weighing the wheat, Mr. Thakarda and Antiben in time looked at the quantity of wheat and the petitioner was stopped before the wheat passed from the scale to the hand-bag of the customer. Therefore, the wheat was never handed over to the customer. The wheat still remained the property of the employer. It was still in the scale. Before that Antiben and Thakarda both pointed out that the wheat was more than what was purchased and from the scale itself 5 kg. Therefore, the wheat was never handed over to the customer. The wheat still remained the property of the employer. It was still in the scale. Before that Antiben and Thakarda both pointed out that the wheat was more than what was purchased and from the scale itself 5 kg. were returned to the jute bag from which wheat was taken. This is the initial allegation. Two things are worth noting. There is not the slightest reference to Udesing who appears to be the villain of the piece who has subsequently interposed himself and given a different colour to this modest possible error to be, as the most heinous crime. There is not the slightest reference to Udesing being present at the time. There is not the slightest reference in Ext. 10 that Udesing ever drew attention of anyone to what was happening. In Ext. 10 it is not suggested that the wheat ever went into the cloth handbag of the customer. The wheat was in the scale and 5 kg. were taken out before the quantity was put in the handbag of the customer. Two persons, Thakarda and Antiben, who saw the incident interposed and drew the attention of the petitioner that the quantity of wheat was more than what is sold and assert in Ext. 10 that by mistake petitioner was likely to give 5 kg. more wheat to the customer and would have thereby caused loss to the employer. Those who witnessed the occurrence and had the entire picture before them styled or described the incident as mistake. Mistake is also an error. There is no negligence in it. No mala fides are attributed. A pure accidental error is described in Ext. 10 which is the complaint. Should anyone take note of this incident unless it is said that human being serving with the present employer must be wholly infallible enough not to commit the slightest mistake and the efficiency of the employee must be 100 per cent. Apart from that it being absurd, humanly it is not conceivable. It is not for a moment suggested that all an errors must be overlooked as an error simpliciter. An error which has the consequence of leading to serious or atrocious consequences may be styled as negligence and it can only be gross provided the degree of culpability is very high. It is not for a moment suggested that all an errors must be overlooked as an error simpliciter. An error which has the consequence of leading to serious or atrocious consequences may be styled as negligence and it can only be gross provided the degree of culpability is very high. If every error is to be negligence, one would never have the word error" but would always be substituting the word negligence". And look at this error. It is alleged as a mistake. It is styled as a mistake. It is considered bona fide. It is not suggested that the petitioner had any pie in the game for sharing the ill-gotten gain that would have unsued had the error not been disclosed. If the petitioner is a weighman in charge of weighing foodgrains and gives more than what is purchased and it is not detected and if it is repeated, one can say that it is habitual negligence. But one incident, first of its kind, because the Labour Court says that the petitioner's record is clean, and Mr. Nanavati did not attempt to suggest that in the past for two and half years that this petitioner served, he committed the slightest error in discharge of his duties, cannot constitute negligence, much less gross negligence. An inference must be drawn of the fact that the manager who held the inquiry must be conscious of the requirements of clause (6) of Standing Order 23 which requires that before awarding punishment of dismissal, the entire record of the workman has to be examined and though the record reveals that he is oblivious of the requirements and provisions of the Standing Orders, normal presumption is that he knows the relevant provisions and would ordinarily comply with them. He must examine the same and yet he does not say that this petitioner was in the past guilty of slightest negligence in the discharge of his duties. The immediate superiors or co-workers whichever way we look at, Thakarda and Antiben described the incident soon after the occurrence as a mistake committed by the petitioner. Now look at the degree of the consequences because Mr. Nanavati has relied on one or two authorities to show how frightful are the consequences. Loss to the employer would be Rs. 8-50 ps. If the lapse was not detected in time and the goods had gone out of the employer's institution. Now look at the degree of the consequences because Mr. Nanavati has relied on one or two authorities to show how frightful are the consequences. Loss to the employer would be Rs. 8-50 ps. If the lapse was not detected in time and the goods had gone out of the employer's institution. Could it be said to be serious or irreparable or even atrocious or very harmful consequences. However what is worth noting is that loss of not even a pie has been suffered. In support of the submission that error may have serious consequences reliance was placed in Kalyani v. Air France, Calcutta, 1963 (I) L.L.J. 679 . Two mistakes were committed by the employee while checking the load-sheets and balance charts and in defence it was said that some others were also checking load-sheets and balance charts. It was found that the mistakes committed by the workman in that case were serious involving possible accident to the aircraft and possible loss of human life. Now unless we equate 5 kg. of wheat with the value of an aircraft running into crores of rupees or the human life which is invaluable, it is not possible to go by the ratio of this decision. 12. It is not for a moment suggested that the employer should tolerate or be indulgent to the employee who would be negligent in work or discharge of duties which causes loss to the employer. But if a possible lapse is to be styled as gross negligence so as to result in dismissal, the word "gross" would be without meaning. Negligence is qualified by the use of adjective gross. When negligence is inferred from possible consequences of the act or omission, the consequence should be such as to be irreparable or the resultant damage must be so heavy that the degree of culpability would be very high. Mr. Nanavati intelligently, therefore, avoided the charge "habitual negligence" because unless thrice repeated, it cannot be the subject-matter of charge. By taking recourse to gross negligence he avoided mere negligence as this was the first instance. If he were to urge that it was habitual negligence, he was out of Court because he could not show that it has been thrice repeated and that is what the Standing Order itself requires. By taking recourse to gross negligence he avoided mere negligence as this was the first instance. If he were to urge that it was habitual negligence, he was out of Court because he could not show that it has been thrice repeated and that is what the Standing Order itself requires. Therefore, taking recourse to gross negligence, he wants us to hold that this possible loss not suffered was such as to condemn this petitioner as being guilty of gross negligence. He is right when he said that all instances of negligence cannot be dismissed as mere errors. An error can be indicative of negligence and the degree of culpability may indicate the grossness of the negligence. Carelessness can often be productive of more harm than deliberate wickedness of malevolence. Leaving aside the classic example of the sentry who sleeps at his post and allows the enemy to slip through, there are other more familiar instances of which a compositor who carelessly places a plus sign instead of a minus sign in a question paper may cause numerous examines to fail; a compounder in a hospital or chemists' shop who makes up the mixtures or other medicines carelessly may cause quite a few deaths; the man at an airport who does not carefully filter the petrol poured into a plane may cause it to crash; the railway employee who does not set the point carefully may cause a head-on collision. Misplaced sympathy can be a great evil. Vide Royal Printing Works v. Industrial Tribunal, Madras, 1959 (II) L.L.J. 619. 14. We may take a leaf from the decided case. In Andhra Scientific Co v. Seshagiri Rao, AIR 1967 SC 408 , the misconduct alleged was habitual negligence as work of arranging the items in order and fixing up labels was not completed during the prescribed time. The Supreme Court posed to itself a question whether on the facts alleged the employee could be said to be guilty of habitual negligence and held that the acts of which the workman has been found guilty do not amount to habitual negligence and held that the acts of which the workman has been found guilty do not amount to habitual negligence of work. The relevant clause in the conditions of service requires that before a person can be said to be guilty of habitual negligence it has to be shown that he has been guilty of negligence on several occasions so as to show that this is his habit. It was found as a fact that the negligence was over a period but it was treated as one incident of negligence and it was observed that the fact that the negligence continued over several months does not make it a habitual negligence. 15. Taking every illustration which Mr. Nanavati could intelligently and adroitly put forth before us and comparing it with the present one so as to buttress his submission that this is a case of gross negligence, if we ever agree with it, it would be doing violence to language. Remove the word "gross" and read a possible loss of Rs. 8.50 which had not occurred and the trifling character of the charge would be exposed. We cannot merely subscribe to language devoid of facts. It is the facts which must inform the language. The facts have to be described by proper language not that once we have the language, facts can be moulded to suit the language. That cannot be tolerated. We presume while discussing this aspect that the employer's approach was fair. He possibly believed that there was likely to be a loss which had not occurred because of the careful intervention of two other very careful employees Thakarda and Bhanuben and yet as far as the present petitioner was concerned, he must be visited with the extreme penalty because every employee can be held in terror in that a slight error not causing any loss but was likely to cause loss will end in being thrown out of employment where the salaries are to say the least meagre if not paltry." 28. When the findings and conclusion of learned Industrial Court with reference to the requirement of proof and as regards "intention" and negligence are examined then it emerges that the said aspects have not been proved and there was no material on record before the learned Industrial Court (or even before the inquiry officer) in light of which it can be said that "intention" to cause damage was proved. Learned Industrial Court is right in holding that even the Inquiry Officer did not hold that negligence is proved and/or ill-intention on the part of the claimant is established. Under the circumstances, the findings and final conclusion by learned Industrial Court cannot be faulted. 29. The employer has not challenged the findings, the observations and the conclusions and/or the decision of the Industrial Court. Thus the employer has accepted said observation, findings and conclusion by learned Industrial Court as just, correct and reasonable. Even the workman has not challenged said observations and findings by learned Industrial Court. Thus, while examining the issue regarding appropriate penalty or appropriate relief the said finding ought to have been taken into consideration. 30. Having reached said conclusion, learned Industrial Court proceeded to mould the relief. The learned Industrial Court reached to the conclusion that lump sum compensation would be just and proper relief. 31. In light of above mentioned finding by Industrial Court which is not opposed and not challenged even by the employer the said decision by learned Industrial Court i.e. direction to pay lump sum compensation would be just and proper relief, cannot be faulted. 32. Learned Industrial Court has recorded just, equitable and reasonable findings for holding that award of lump sum compensation would be just and proper relief in facts of the case. To that extent, the decision by learned Industrial Court is correct and just and does not deserve to be disturbed. 33. Having reached to the said conclusion, learned Industrial Court awarded Rs. 25,000/- as lump sum compensation. 34. This is the point where the claimant i.e. present petitioner has grievance. 35. When the petitioner filed the petition, he demanded that when learned Industrial Court reached to the conclusion that he had no intention of causing loss or damage to the company and that mistake was genuine, bona-fide and inadvertent error then there was no justification to deny relief of reinstatement and backwages at appropriate rate. 36. With passage of time, the demand for reinstatement does not survive inasmuch as now the claimant has crossed age of superannuation. 37. Therefore, the only issue which remains for consideration before this Court is as to whether this court should hold that quantification of lump sum compensation is just and reasonable or that the said quantification deserves to be enhanced. 38. 37. Therefore, the only issue which remains for consideration before this Court is as to whether this court should hold that quantification of lump sum compensation is just and reasonable or that the said quantification deserves to be enhanced. 38. It is noticed that when the opponent company terminated services of claimant he was around 36 years old and was employed as Junior Assistant in the Company. He worked with the Company for 3 years and his past service record was blot-less. It is also noticed that there was no complaint about his conduct or about his merits and efficiency. After considering his performance, his service was confirmed in February, 1987 and his service came to be terminated in April, 1988. The incident in question was first mistake on part of the claimant and in light of evidence on record and finding of the Inquiry Officer the mistake was genuine and bona-fide mistake and not an act of ill-intention on part of the claimant. At the relevant time, the claimant earned salary of Rs. 24,000/- per year. 39. In this context, the grievance by learned advocate for the petitioner with reference to quantification of the compensation appears to be justified. 40. But for the decision of the employer to terminate service of the claimant, in respect of the incident which occurred on account of bona-fide mistake, the period of claimant's employment was shortened and he was deprived of gratuity and other benefits. 41. Undoubtedly, the findings by the Inquiry Officer are upheld by both the Courts i.e. by learned Labour Court as well as learned Appeal Court. The legality of the inquiry was admitted by the workman himself. Therefore, the question of interference by the Court with regard to quantum of penalty or in fixing the quantum of compensation was remote. However, foregoing discussion has brought out that the findings of the Inquiry Officer did not suggest or hold that the damage occurred due to negligence of the claimant. The findings by the Inquiry Officer do not hold that negligence is proved. The undisputed conclusion by learned Industrial Court has brought out that cause for action against the workman was genuine and bona-fide misconduct without ill-intention. The said undisputed finding by learned Industrial Court is crucial. 42. The findings by the Inquiry Officer do not hold that negligence is proved. The undisputed conclusion by learned Industrial Court has brought out that cause for action against the workman was genuine and bona-fide misconduct without ill-intention. The said undisputed finding by learned Industrial Court is crucial. 42. In this background and on over all consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the view that if the quantum of lump sum compensation is revised and enhanced at Rs. 85,000/-, then equity would be balanced and ends of justice would be met. Therefore, following order is passed: "(a) The judgment dated 28.02.2006 passed by learned Industrial Court in Appeal (IC) No. 99 of 2003 is partly set aside and modified. The findings and conclusion recorded by learned Industrial Court are not disturbed. However, the quantum of lump sum compensation determined by the learned Industrial Court is revised/enhanced and instead of the amount fixed by learned Industrial Court i.e. Rs. 25,000/-, the Opponent Company is directed to pay Rs. 85,000/- to the claimant towards lump sum compensation. (b) The respondent employer shall pay Rs. 85,000/- as lump sum compensation expeditiously and preferably within 8 weeks. (c) With the said directions, the impugned judgment of learned Industrial Court in Appeal (IC) No. 99 of 2003 is partly modified. Consequently, the petition is partly allowed and Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent."