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Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2017 DIGILAW 356 (HP)

Chandermani v. Mia Ditta

2017-04-13

AJAY MOHAN GOEL

body2017
Ajay Mohan Goel, J.: By way of this appeal, the appellant has challenged the judgment and decree passed by the Court of learned District Judge, Mandi, in Civil Appeal No. 53 of 2005 dated 01.06.2006, vide which, learned Appellate Court partially modified the judgment and decree passed by the Court of learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Chachiot at Gohar, District Mandi, in Civil Suit No. 312 of 2000 dated 31.03.2005, whereby learned trial Court had decreed the suit of the plaintiffs to the extent that the suit land was held to be joint Hindu family and coparcenary property of the plaintiffs and the sale deeds dated 22.08.2000 qua the suit land by Sawaru in favour of defendants No. 1 and 2 were held to be wrong, null and void and the plaintiffs alongwith defendant No. 4 were held to be joint owner in possession of the suit land. 2. Brief facts necessary for adjudication of the present appeal are that respondents/plaintiffs, hereinafter referred to as the plaintiffs, filed a suit for declaration with confirmation of joint possession as well as for injunction on the ground that the land comprised in Khewat/Khatauni No. 87/132, bearing Khasra Nos. 585, 601, 605, 615, 645, 647, 651, Kitas 7, measuring 11-18-17 bighas and ½ share of land comprised in Khewat/Khatauni No. 88/133, Khasra Nos. 592, 674, Kitas 2, measuring 0-10-19 bigha, situated at Mouja Kandi, Tehsil Chachiot, District Mandi, H.P., was recorded in the ownership and possession of defendant No. 3 as per revenue record for the year 1996-97 and said entry which reflected defendant No. 3 as exclusive owner in possession of the suit land was wrong, null and void. As per the plaintiffs, land comprised in Khewat/Khatauni No. 56min/107, bearing Khasra Nos. 1107 and 1112, measuring 2-19-5 bighas and ½ share of the land comprised in Khewat/ Khatauni No. 115/228, bearing Khasra Nos. 1110 and 1117 measuring 0- 14-19 bighas, situated at Mouja Sarua, Tehsil Chachiot, District Mandi, H.P., was also recorded in the ownership and possession of defendant No. 2 as per jamabandi for the year 1989-90 and the said entries were also wrong, null and void. As per the plaintiffs, parties to the suit were Hindu by religion and the suit property as mentioned in Para-1(a) of the plaint was joint Hindu coparcenary property of plaintiffs, defendants No. 3 and 4. As per the plaintiffs, parties to the suit were Hindu by religion and the suit property as mentioned in Para-1(a) of the plaint was joint Hindu coparcenary property of plaintiffs, defendants No. 3 and 4. Plaintiffs and defendant No. 4 were real brothers, whereas defendant No. 3 was their father. The suit land was joint Hindu family coparcenary property of plaintiffs and defendants No. 3 and 4 as the same had been inherited from common ancestor late Dayalu and all the coparceners had acquired right in this property by virtue of their birth. It was further the case of the plaintiffs that the land described in Para-1(b) of the plaint was also joint Hindu family coparcenary property as previously it was in the tenancy of late Dayalu, father of Sawaru, defendant No. 3 and later on it came in the hands of defendant No. 3 as well as other members of the family but Sawaru never exercised his independent dominion over the same and the same was thrown in joint nucleus of the coparceners and the land was enjoyed by all the coparceners commonly by treating it as joint Hindu family property. It was further the case of the plaintiffs that Sawaru (defendant No. 3) was 90 years old, rustic villager, who on account of his old age could not analyze his good and bad and defendants No. 1 and 2, who were sons of defendant No. 4, in connivance with defendant No. 4 and one Sobha Ram got manipulated sale deeds qua Khasra Nos. 585, 601, 615 and 651 measuring 7-11-12 bighas out of the land described in Para-1(a) of the plaint and ½ share of Khasra Nos. 1107 and 1112 measuring 2-19-5 bighas as described in Para-1(b) of the plaint from defendant No. 3 by taking the benefit of wrong revenue entries, on 22.08.2000 which sale deeds were wrong, null and void and not binding on the plaintiffs. As per the plaintiffs, sale deeds were also wrong, null and void on the ground that defendant No. 3 was having no right, title and interest to sell this property nor there was any legal necessity for which the alleged sale deeds were executed. As per the plaintiffs, sale deeds were also wrong, null and void on the ground that defendant No. 3 was having no right, title and interest to sell this property nor there was any legal necessity for which the alleged sale deeds were executed. It was on these basis that the suit was filed by the plaintiffs praying for the following reliefs:- “(i) It be declared that the land described in paras No. 1a and 1b of the plaint is Joint Hindu Family coparcenery property of the plaintiffs, and defendant Nos. 3 and 4; (ii) The sale deeds executed by Shri Swaru defendant No. 3 in favour of the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 on 22.8.2000 qua the joint suit land as described above, be also declared wrong, null and void, and joint possession of the plaintiffs and defendant Nos. 3 and 4 be confirmed over the same. (iii) As a consequential relief, the defendants be restrained from dispossessing the plaintiffs from the suit land in any manner whatsoever. (iv) Any other relief to which the plaintiffs are found entitled to, the same may kindly be granted to the plaintiffs against the defendants and justice be done. (v) Cost of the suit be also awarded.” 3. The suit was contested by the defendants, who in their written statement denied the factum of the suit property being joint Hindu family coparcanary property of the plaintiffs. According to the defendants, plaintiffs did not constitute joint Hindu family with the defendants. The case put up by the defendants was that the property was not inherited from common ancestor, Dayalu as alleged and the plaintiffs had not acquired any interest in the suit land by virtue of birth. As per defendants, suit land described in Para-1(a) of the plaint was self acquired property of defendant No. 3 who had acquired the same with his own money and the suit property as described in Para-1(b) of the plaint was in possession of defendant No. 3 as tenant and later on, he was conferred the proprietary rights over the same. It was further mentioned in the written statement that the sale deeds were not manipulated by the defendants in connivance with Sobha Ram as alleged. It was further mentioned in the written statement that the sale deeds were not manipulated by the defendants in connivance with Sobha Ram as alleged. It was also mentioned in the written statement that the plaintiffs in fact never considered defendant No. 3 as their father and they never looked after him and they had refused to manage day-to-day living of defendant No. 3 and said defendant was residing separately from the plaintiffs for the last many years and in order to meet his bonafide requirements he had incurred debts from different persons and amount was required by defendant No. 3 for his day-today expenses in order to keep him alive. 4. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, learned trial Court framed the following issues:- 1. Whether the suit land (described in para no. 1a and ib of the plaint) is joint Hindu family, Coparcenary property of the plaintiffs and defendant no. 3 and 4 as alleged? … OPP 2. Whether the sale deed executed by Sh. Sawaroo defendant no. 3 in favour of defendant no. 1 and 2 on 22.8.2000 qua the joint suit land is wrong, null and void? … OPP 3. Whether the suit of the plaintiff is bad for nonjoinder of necessary parties? … OPD 4. Whether the suit of the plaintiff is bad for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction as alleged? … OPD 5. Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action to file the present suit? … OPD 6. Whether the defendant no. 1 and 2 are bonafide purchaser for the consideration of the suit property as alleged? … OPD (1 and 2) 7. Whether the defendant no. 3 has sold the suit land to defendant no. 1 and 2 for legal necessity as alleged? … OPD 8. Relief. 5. On the basis of the evidence which was led by the respective parties before learned trial Court, the following findings were returned to the issues so framed by it:- Issue No. 1: Yes. Issue No. 2: Yes. Issue No. 3: No. Issue No. 4: No. Issue No. 5: No. Issue No. 6: No. Issue No. 7: No. Issue No. 8: The suit is decreed as per operative part of the judgment. 6. Issue No. 2: Yes. Issue No. 3: No. Issue No. 4: No. Issue No. 5: No. Issue No. 6: No. Issue No. 7: No. Issue No. 8: The suit is decreed as per operative part of the judgment. 6. Accordingly, learned trial Court decreed the suit so filed by the plaintiffs by holding that the suit land was joint Hindu family and coparcenary property of the plaintiffs and defendants and sale deeds dated 22.08.2000 executed qua the suit land by defendant No. 3 in favour of defendants No. 1 and 2 were wrong, null and void and plaintiffs alongwith defendant No. 4 were joint owner in possession over the suit land. While arriving at the said findings, it was held by learned trial Court that it stood proved that the suit land described in Para-1(a) and Para-1(b) of the plaint was joint Hindu coparcenary property of the plaintiffs, defendant No. 4 and Sawaru (Defendant No. 3). Learned trial Court held that Ext. PA jamabandi for the year 1996-97 reflected that the suit land mentioned in Para-1(a) of the plaint was ancestral land as the same was inherited by the father of the plaintiffs and defendant No. 4 from Dayalu and Dayalu had inherited the same from Chhabar. Learned trial Court thus held that this demonstrated that the plaintiffs had inherited the land mentioned in Para-1(a) from their great grand father Chhabar. It further held that jamabandi for the year 1989-90 Ext. PF reflected that the suit land mentioned in Para-1(b) of the plaint was coming in the ownership and possession of Sawaru qua half share from his father Dayalu and Dayalu had inherited the same from Chhabar which fact also established that the suit land mentioned in Para-1(b) of the plaint was joint Hindu family property. Learned trial Court after discussing oral as well as documentary evidence led by the parties, held that DW-5 Khaku Ram had admitted that he alongwith his brothers and sisters was brought up by his father Sawaru, they lived together and their marriages were also solemnized by their father Sawaru. Learned trial Court also held that DW-5 admitted that the marriage of his elder brother was solemnized by his father and they used to cultivate the suit land jointly. Learned trial Court also held that DW-5 admitted that the marriage of his elder brother was solemnized by his father and they used to cultivate the suit land jointly. On these basis it was held by learned trial Court that statement of DW-5 demonstrated that the plaintiffs alongwith defendant No. 4 were members of joint Hindu family consisting of plaintiffs, defendant No. 4 and their father Sawaru. Learned trial Court further held that in fact defendant No. 4 who entered the witness box as DW-5 had admitted that he alongwith his brothers and sisters were brought up together and further there was nothing in his statement from which it could be inferred that the suit land was in fact self acquired property of Swaru. On these basis, it was held by learned trial Court that from the statements of defendant No. 1 Khem Chand, who entered the witness box as DW-3 and defendant No. 4 who entered the witness box as DW-5, it could not be established that the plaintiffs were not members of joint Hindu family or that the suit land was self acquired property of Sawaru. Thus, on the basis of documentary evidence Ext. PA jamabandi for the year 1996- 97 and Ext. PF jamabandi for the year 1989-90, it was concluded by learned trial Court that the suit land in fact was ancestral and was inherited by Sawaru from his predecessor-in-interest. Learned trial Court accordingly held that the evidence oral as well as documentary produced on record by the plaintiffs demonstrated that the suit land was joint Hindu coparcneary property of the plaintiffs, defendants and Sawaru. Learned trial Court also concluded that defendants No. 1 and 2 were not bonafide purchasers for consideration of the suit land and Sawaru had sold the suit land to defendants No. 1 and 2 without legal necessity and, therefore, the sale deeds were held wrong, null and void. 7. The judgment and decree so passed by learned trial Court was challenged by defendants Khem Chand and Chandermani. 8. In appeal, learned Appellate Court held that whether the suit property as mentioned in Para-1(a) and 1(b) of the plaint was ancestral or coparcenary in nature being inherited by defendant No. 3 from his father or ancestors, the onus to prove the same was heavily upon the plaintiffs. Learned Appellate Court further held that Misal Haqiat for the year 1996-97 Ext. Learned Appellate Court further held that Misal Haqiat for the year 1996-97 Ext. PA clearly demonstrated that Sawaru was owner in possession of Khasra Nos. 585 (469 old), 601 (465 old), 605 (462 old), 615 (507 and 508 old), 645 (522 min old), 647 (521 old) and 651 (504 old), kitas 7 measuring 11-18-17 bighas. It further held that jamabandi for the year 1990-91 Ext. PB which was a pre consolidation jamabandi demonstrated that defendant No. 3 was having joint khata with other tenure holders and in the said jamabandi old Khasra Nos. 469, 465, 462, 507, 508, 522 min, 521 and 504 alongwith other Khasra Nos. were mentioned and the suit land was recorded in the name of Sawaru, Dahlu sons of Dayalu. Learned Appellate Court further held that mutation No. 60 Ext. PD demonstrated that after the death of Dayalu, common ancestor of the parties, his estate was inherited by Daya Ram, Sawaru and Dahlu in equal shares. Learned Appellate Court further held that Daya Ram was grandson of late Dayalu and his father Bhagu pre deceased Dayalu. Learned Appellate Court further held that the land mentioned in Ext. PD pertained to the estate of Dayalu in Muhal Jaggas, new name of which was Muhal Kandi and mutation Ext. PE pertained to Muhal Jugas and vide mutation No. 62 dated 21.03.1955 the estate of Dayalu was shown to be inherited by his grandson Daya Ram son of Bhagu and his son Sawaru and Dahlu in equal shares and Dayalu died on 20.09.1953 before the enforcement of Hindu Succession Act. Learned Appellate Court also held that defendant Khaku while appearing as DW-5 admitted in his cross-examination that after the death of Dayalu his entire estate was inherited by his sons in equal shares. On these basis it was held by learned Appellate Court that it stood duly proved that the suit land in Muhal Kandi (old Juggas) was inherited by the sons of Dayalu in equal shares and learned Appellate Court thus held that the suit land mentioned in Para-1(a) of the plaint was ancestral in nature as was evident from the documentary evidence on record as well as the admission of the defendant. 9. 9. Learned Appellate Court further held in Para-39 of the judgment as under:- “The law is very clear, any property which is inherited by a person from his father, grandfather and great grandfather is ancestral/ coparcenary property in the hand of his son, grand sons and great grandson. Resultantly, the suit land mentioned in para 1-a of the plaint is ancestral or coparcenary property in the hand of defendant No. 3 Sawaru who inherited the same from his father Dayalu.” 10. It was further held by learned Appellate Court that there was no specific evidence on record to suggest that defendant No. 3 had any bonafide need to effect sale deeds Ext. DA and Ext. DB in favour of his grandsons defendants No. 1 and 2. Learned Appellate Court also held that recitals of sale deeds Ext. PA and Ext. DB demonstrated that it was mentioned therein that Swaru was to discharge debts as a result of which the sale deeds were required to be made. Learned Appellate Court held that there was no legal necessity requiring the execution of sale deeds. Learned Appellate Court in fact held that broadly speaking the term, legal necessity, includes all those acts which are necessary for the members of the family and the same did not mean actual compulsion but it meant pressure on the estate which in law may be regarded as serious and sufficient. It was thus concluded by learned Appellate Court that it had come in evidence that during life time of Dayalu his sons used to remain jointly with him and even at the time of his death, there was a joint family and simply because presently plaintiffs were living separately or were having their separate houses, the same would not put an end to the joint nature of the suit land. On these basis, it was held by learned Appellate Court that the findings rendered by learned trial Judge to the effect that there was no legal necessity to effect the sale deed did not call for any interference. Learned Appellate Court thus held that the defendants had failed to prove that the sale deeds Exts. DA and DB were effected for legal necessity. As far as suit land described in Para-1(b) of the paint is concerned, it was held by learned Appellate Court that the same was not strictly speaking ancestral or coparcenary property. Learned Appellate Court thus held that the defendants had failed to prove that the sale deeds Exts. DA and DB were effected for legal necessity. As far as suit land described in Para-1(b) of the paint is concerned, it was held by learned Appellate Court that the same was not strictly speaking ancestral or coparcenary property. While arriving at the said conclusion it was held by learned Appellate Court that there was ample evidence on record to suggest that the said parcel of land was under the tenancy of Dayalu previously and later on the tenancy rights were inherited by his sons including defendant No. 3, who became owner of portion of land. Learned Appellate Court held that plaintiffs in Para-3 of the plaint had specifically stated that the said parcel of land was previously under the tenancy of late Dayalu, father of defendant No. 3 Sawaru and subsequently, it came in the hands of defendant No. 3 and other family members. Learned Appellate Court held by relying upon a judgment of this Court in Gajjan Ram Vs. Hira Singh and others, 1991 SLJ 994, that the tenant who has become owner of the land under the tenancy law is absolute owner of such property and the same shall be deemed to be his self acquired property and not ancestral property. Learned Appellate Court thus held that after the conferment of proprietary rights the property ceases to be ancestral and same would be presumed to be self acquired property of such tenant who has become owner now. Learned Appellate Court thus went on to hold that the said land mentioned in Para-1(b) of the plaint was self acquired property of Sawaru and alienation of the same cannot not be impeached under the Hindu law. 11. Accordingly, the appeal was partially allowed by learned Appellate Court in the following terms:- “As a sequel to my findings on point No. 1 above, the appeal filed by the appellants is party accepted. The judgment and decree under appeal are modified. Consequently a declaratory decree to the effect that the suit land described in para 1-a of the plaint is joint Hindu family property/ancestral property is passed in favour of the plaintiffs and the sale deed Ext. The judgment and decree under appeal are modified. Consequently a declaratory decree to the effect that the suit land described in para 1-a of the plaint is joint Hindu family property/ancestral property is passed in favour of the plaintiffs and the sale deed Ext. DA dated 22.8.2000 qua the said suit land by defendant No. 3 in favour of defendants No. 1 and 2 is held to be legally null and void and not binding on the plaintiffs. However, as discussed above, the suit land mentioned in para 1-b of the plaint is held to be self acquired property of defendant No. 3 Sawaru and as such, the sale deed Ex. DB in respect of the suit land is held to be legally valid and the findings of the trial Court in respect of this parcel of the suit land is hereby set aside.” 12. Though the findings returned by learned Appellate Court qua the suit land described in Para-1(b) of the plaint have not been assailed by the plaintiffs, however, the findings returned by learned Appellate Court qua the suit land described in Para-1(a) of the plaint have been challenged by defendant No. 2 Chandermani by way of this appeal. 13. This appeal was admitted on 09.07.2008 on the following substantial questions of law: “1. Whether the courts below have misread and mis-appreciated oral and documentary evidence, especially Ex. PA to Ex. PJ, Ex. DA and statements of PW1, DW2 to DW5 and findings as such on this count are bad in law? 2. Whether discharge of debt and medical treatment by the Karta and Manager of the joint HUF property can be construed to be legal necessity for said Karta to sell the coparcenary property and whether such sale on account of legal necessity is a valid sale? 3. Whether recitals in the registered sale deed regarding discharge of debt and to meet medical treatment expenses is sufficient to prove legal necessity and are admissible in evidence to be used for corroborative purpose along with other evidence to raise the inference against the party seeking to set aside the registered sale deed?” 14. As all the substantial questions of law are interlinked, therefore, I will be dealing with them together. As all the substantial questions of law are interlinked, therefore, I will be dealing with them together. There are concurrent findings returned by both the learned Courts below to the effect that the suit property described in Para-1(a) of the plaint was ancestral and coparcenary property of the plaintiffs and defendant No. 4 alongwith their father. 15. Ext. PB is jamabandi for the year 1990-91, a perusal of which demonstrates that in the said jamabandi against the suit land described in Para-1(a) of the plaint Sawaru alongwith Dahlu son of Dayalu are reflected as cosharers alongwith other co-sharers. While arriving at the conclusion that the property mentioned in Para-1(a) of the plaint is ancestral property, learned Courts below had taken into consideration the fact that mutation No. 60 Ext. PD demonstrated that after the death of Dayalu, his estate was inherited by Daya Ram, Sawaru and Dahlu in equal shares. Learned Courts below also held that Daya Ram was grandson of late Dayalu and his father Bhagu had in fact pre deceased Dayalu. Learned Courts below also held that pedigree table on mutation No. 60 Ext. PD demonstrated that Dayalu son of Chhabar had three sons i.e. Dahlu, Sawaru and Bhagu. There is a specific finding returned by learned Appellate that land mentioned in Ext. PD pertained to the estate of Dayalu in Muhal Jaggas and the new name of the said Muhal was Muhal Kandi and that land entered in mutation Ext. PD pertained to Khata No. 9 and as per jamabandi for the year 1954-55 Ext. PC, this land was the same which was shown to be mutated in the name of legal heirs of Dayalu. Learned Appellate Court also specifically held that mutation Ext. PE which pertained to Muhal Jaggas demonstrated that vide mutation No. 62 dated 21.03.1955, the estate of Dayalu was shown to be inherited by his grandson Daya Ram son of Bhagu and his sons Sawaru and Dahalu in equal shares. In my considered view, the above findings are duly borne out from the records of the case and the same cannot be said to be a result of either misappreciation or misreading of the documentary evidence. In my considered view, the above findings are duly borne out from the records of the case and the same cannot be said to be a result of either misappreciation or misreading of the documentary evidence. The findings returned by learned Courts below to the effect that in his cross-examination it was admitted by defendant Khaku that after the death of Dayalu his entire estate was inherited by his three sons in equal shares, also duly borne out from the records especially the statement of Khaku, who deposed in the Court as DW-5. 16. Ext. DA is a copy of sale deed dated 22.08.2000. A perusal of the same demonstrates that it was mentioned the therein that the vendor was selling the land to the vendees because of his “Gharelu Jarurat”. Now what was the bonafide need for defendant No. 3 in fact to have had executed the sale deed Ext. DA or for that matter Ext. DB in favour of defendants No. 1 and 2, has not been satisfactorily explained by the defendants. While disbelieving that Sawaru had any legal necessity to do away with the said ancestral property, learned Courts below have returned specific findings that there was no mention of any legal necessity requiring the execution of sale deed in the said exhibits. These findings arrived at by learned Courts below in my considered view also cannot be said to be a result of misreading and misappreciation of evidence on record including the two sale deeds. There is no mention in these sale deeds as to what was the legal necessity which was so compelling in nature that the same necessitated defendant No. 3 Sawaru Karta of the HUF to alienate the coparcenary property. Not only this, this Court also cannot lose sight of the fact that vendees in the present sale deeds are none else but the grand sons of Sawaru. 17. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Smt. Rani and another Vs. Smt. Santa Bala Debnath and others, 1970 (3) Supreme Court Cases 722, has held that recitals in a deed of legal necessity do not by themselves prove legal necessity and though the recitals are admissible in evidence their value varies according to the circumstances in which the transaction was entered into. 18. Smt. Santa Bala Debnath and others, 1970 (3) Supreme Court Cases 722, has held that recitals in a deed of legal necessity do not by themselves prove legal necessity and though the recitals are admissible in evidence their value varies according to the circumstances in which the transaction was entered into. 18. Even otherwise it is settled proposition of law that the fact that the sale supported by legal necessity is not by itself sufficient to hold that the sale was valid and it is necessary to prove that it was also a prudent transaction. 19. Coming to the facts of this case, defendant No. 3 has miserably failed to prove that the sales were effected by way of legal necessity. In fact, it is borne out from the records of the case itself that the sale deeds were executed by defendant No. 3 in favour of none else but his own grandsons. This strengthens the case of the plaintiffs that this entire exercise was taken by defendant No. 3 to defeat the cause of plaintiffs and other co-sharers. Not only this, there is no material on record from which it can be inferred that defendant No. 3 had in fact besides there being a legal necessity to effectuate sale deeds Exts. DA and DB also undertook these sale transactions in a prudent manner. Nothing has been placed on record by the defendants to demonstrate that defendant No. 3 Sawaru had either incurred debt so as to pay his medical expenses or that he was actually admitted in any hospital and had undergone medical treatment and in the said process he had incurred debt. Incidentally, a perusal of the sale deeds also demonstrate that there is no such recital in them in this regard nor the defendants have been able to establish this fact by placing any cogent evidence on record. Therefore, I reiterate, as has been held by both learned Courts below, that the defendants miserably failed to prove that defendant No. 3 had executed sale deeds in favour of defendants No. 1 and 2 by way of legal necessity. Substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. 20. Therefore, I reiterate, as has been held by both learned Courts below, that the defendants miserably failed to prove that defendant No. 3 had executed sale deeds in favour of defendants No. 1 and 2 by way of legal necessity. Substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. 20. In view of my discussion held above, I do not find any infirmity with the findings returned by both learned Courts below to the effect that the suit land described in Para-1(a) of the plaint was ancestral and coparcenary property of the plaintiff alongwith defendant No. 4 and their father. Thus, as there is no merit in the present appeal, the same is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs. Miscellaneous applications pending, if any, also stand disposed of. Interim order, if any, also stands disposed of.