ORDER: 1. The appellant is the victim. This unnumbered appeal has been filed by the victim against the order of acquittal of the accused in S.C. No. 408 of 2008 on the file of the Additional Sessions Court - 1, Kasargod. 2. The Registry has refused to number the appeal and has noted a defect which reads as follows: "As per the decision reported in Satya Pal Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others [2015(9) SC 281], an application for leave to appeal is required." 3. Sri. B. Premnath, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, submitted that only a composite application is required and there is no necessity to file a separate application for leave. Reliance is placed on the decision of the Apex Court in State of Rajastan v. Ramdeen and Others [ 1977 (2) SCC 630 ] and of this Court in State of Kerala v. Abdul Razak [ 2001 (1) KLT 750 ]. According to the learned counsel, he has prayed for grant of leave to appeal against the judgment impugned as the first prayer. 4. Heard the learned Public Prosecutor as well. 5. In Satya Pal Singh (supra), the Apex Court has held that a right of questioning the correctness of the judgment and order of acquittal by preferring an appeal to the High Court is conferred upon the victim including the legal heir and others, as defined under Section 2(wa) of Cr.P.C., under proviso to Section 372 of the Code, but only after obtaining the leave of the High Court as required under sub-section (3) to Section 378 of Cr.P.C. 6. The only question is whether a separate application for leave is required before preferring an appeal against the order of acquittal and whether only on grant of such a leave an appeal can be entertained. 7. Section 378(3) reads as follows: "No appeal to the High Court under Sub­section (1) or sub-Section (2) shall be entertained except with the leave of the High Court. However, Section 378(4) of the Code which deals with appeals filed against an order of acquittal is worded differently. 7. Section 378(3) reads as follows: "No appeal to the High Court under Sub­section (1) or sub-Section (2) shall be entertained except with the leave of the High Court. However, Section 378(4) of the Code which deals with appeals filed against an order of acquittal is worded differently. It reads as follows: 378(4): If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case instituted upon complaint and the High Court, on an application made to it by the complainant in this behalf, grants special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal, the complainant may present such an appeal to the High Court. 8. While Section 378(3) of the Code contemplates only a leave prior to entertainment of the appeal by the High Court, Section 378(4) of the Code places greater restrictions. The complainant has to file an application and unless special leave to appeal is granted by the High Court, the appeal cannot be presented before Court. 9. M/s. Lakshmiratan Engineering Works Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner I, Sales Tax & Anr. [ AIR 1968 SC 488 ], the Apex Court had occasion to consider the meaning of the word 'entertain' in Section 9 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act and Rule 66(2) of the Rules framed thereunder. The Supreme Court held that when the proviso to the above section speaks of entertainment of the appeal, it means that appeal, even if was filed, will not be admitted for consideration, unless there is satisfactory proof available of the making of the deposit of the admitted tax. It was held that the word 'entertain1 means 'admit to consideration'. 10. In Ramdeen (supra), identical question raised in this case had come up for consideration of the Apex Court. In the said case, against an order of acquittal, the State of Rajastan preferred an application describing it as a petition for leave to appeal under Section 378(3) of the Code with a prayer to accept the said petition to file an appeal. The application was described as one under Section 378(3) of the Code and all the facts and other requisites for a memorandum of appeal including the grounds were raised in the said application. The High Court after hearing the State granted leave to appeal. The appeal was thereafter filed after the period of 90 days prescribed under Section 114(a) of the Limitation Act, 1963. The High Court after hearing the State granted leave to appeal. The appeal was thereafter filed after the period of 90 days prescribed under Section 114(a) of the Limitation Act, 1963. The appeal was taken up and the same was dismissed as time barred. This was taken up in appeal before the Apex Court. It was held as follows in paragraph Nos. 8 and 10 of the judgment. "8. The matter will, therefore, have to be decided in terms of S.378(1) and (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. S.378(1), so far as it is material for our purpose, provides that the State Government may direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court from an original or appellate order of acquittal. Sub-s. (3) of that section provides that such an appeal shall not be entertained except with the leave of the High Court. Under the law it will be perfectly in order if a composite application is made giving the necessary facts and circumstances of the case along with the grounds which may be urged in the appeal with a prayer for leave to entertain the appeal. It is not necessary as a matter of law, that application for leave to entertain the appeal should be lodged first and only after grant of leave by the High Court an appeal may be preferred against the order of acquittal. If such a procedure is adopted as above, it is likely, as it has happened in this case, the appeal may be time barred if the High Court takes more than ninety days for disposal of the application for leave. The possibility that the High Court may always in such cases condone the delay on application filed before it does not, in law, solve the legal issue. The right conferred by S.378(1), CrPC upon the State to prefer an appeal against acquittal will be jeopardised if such a procedure is adopted for in certain cases it may so happen that the High Court may refuse to exercise its discretion to condone the delay. The right conferred under the section cannot be put in peril by an interpretation of S.378, CrPC which is likely to affect adversely or even perhaps to destroy that right xxx xxx xxx 10. The right conferred under the section cannot be put in peril by an interpretation of S.378, CrPC which is likely to affect adversely or even perhaps to destroy that right xxx xxx xxx 10. We are, therefore, clearly of opinion that the application for leave to appeal, which was made by the State in this case, is equivalent to & memorandum- of appeal under S.378 (1) read with sub-s. (3) of that section of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The fact that the application mentioned S.378(3) is not decisive of the true character of the application which to all intents and purposes was a memorandum of appeal. There was, therefore, no need for presentation of a second petition of appeal nor for an application for condonation of delay in this case. The petition of appeal was filed within time and the High Court committed an error of law in dismissing the same as time barred, (emphasis supplied). 11. Thus, it was held in unmistakable terms that what is contemplated under Section 378(3) of the Code is only a composite application giving the necessary facts and circumstances of the case along with the grounds which may be urged in the appeal with a prayer for leave to entertain the appeal. It is not necessary as a matter of law, that an application for leave to entertain the appeal should be lodged first and only after grant of leave by the High Court an appeal may be preferred against the order of acquittal. 12. To similar effect, a Division Bench of this Court in State of Kerala v. Abdul Razak [ 2001(1) KLT 750 ] following the decision of the Apex Court held that the application for leave to appeal made by the State are equivalent to memorandum of appeals under Section 378(1) read with sub-Section (3) of the Code and only a composite application is required to be filed. It was held that there is no necessity of filing a separate petition for leave before preferring an appeal against acquittal. 13. However, Ramdeen and Razak are cases which dealt with appeals filed by the State against an order of acquittal. The question whether the same procedure can be followed in an appeal filed by the victim need not detain this Court in view of the decision in Satya Pal Singh (supra). 13. However, Ramdeen and Razak are cases which dealt with appeals filed by the State against an order of acquittal. The question whether the same procedure can be followed in an appeal filed by the victim need not detain this Court in view of the decision in Satya Pal Singh (supra). In paragraph No. 14 of the said judgment, it was held that the proviso to Section 372 of the Code must be read along with its main enactment i.e., Section 372 itself and together with sub-Section (3) of Section 378 of the Code, or otherwise, the substantive provision of Section 372 of the Code will be rendered nugatory. In that view of the matter, the ratio of the decisions Will certainly apply on all fours insofar as the procedure is concerned, to the appeal filed by the victim as well. Hence, I hold that a composite application can be entertained and there is no necessity for filing a separate petition for leave before preferring an appeal against acquittal by the victim under the proviso to Section 372 of the Code. The Registry is directed to number the appeal and post the same for admission.