JUDGMENT : Rajiv Sharma, J. This appeal is instituted against the judgment and order dated 31.01.2011, rendered by learned Sessions Judge, Pithoragarh in Sessions Trial No.05 of 2010, whereby the accused namely Ram Singh and Janki Devi, who were charged with and tried for the offences under Section 302, 201 and 120-B of IPC, were acquitted. The accused Darvan Singh was convicted and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment under Section 302 of IPC and to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/-and in default of payment of fine to undergo simple imprisonment for two years. The accused namely Darvan Singh, who was also charged with and tried for the offences under Section 120-B and 201 of IPC, was acquitted. 2. The case of the prosecution, in a nutshell, is that Ram Singh, S/o Ganga Singh lodged a report with Nayab Tehsildar Gangolihat on 01.11.2009. According to the averments contained in the report, his daughter Hema Devi was married to Darvan Singh, S/o Ram Singh. On 17.10.2009, his daughter was beaten by her husband and she was ousted from the house. Hema Devi lodged a report on 23.10.2009 with the District Magistrate, Pithoragarh. Janki Devi (mother-in-law) of Hema Devi came to his house to take his daughter back, but his daughter was scared. She did not go with her mother-in-law. On 27.10.2009, Janki Devi again came to village Bungli with criminal intention and took his daughter after winning her confidence. His daughter was killed by her mother-in-law Janki Devi, husband Darvan Singh and father-in-law Ram Singh. 3. It is further averred in the FIR that earlier, on 07.01.2000, his daughter had lodged a report against her father-in-law and mother-in-law. However, a compromise took place between them. 4. The FIR was accordingly lodged. There is no inordinate delay in lodging the FIR. The incident happened on 29.10.2009 and the FIR was lodged on 30.10.2009. The inquest report was prepared. The body was sent for postmortem examination. The postmortem was conducted by Dr. M.S. Rajwar on 01.11.2009. The investigation was completed and the challan was put up after completing all the codal formalities. 5. The prosecution has examined as many as twelve witnesses in its support. The statements of the accused were recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. They denied the case of the prosecution. The appellant was convicted and sentenced, as noticed hereinabove. Hence, the present criminal jail appeal. 6. 5. The prosecution has examined as many as twelve witnesses in its support. The statements of the accused were recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. They denied the case of the prosecution. The appellant was convicted and sentenced, as noticed hereinabove. Hence, the present criminal jail appeal. 6. Learned Amicus Curiae for the appellant has vehemently argued that the prosecution has failed to prove its case. Learned counsel on behalf of the State has supported the judgment and order dated 31.01.2011. 7. We have heard learned counsel for both the parties and perused the judgment and record carefully. 8. PW1 Ram Singh, the father of the deceased has deposed that his daughter was married with the accused Darvan Singh in the year 1999. He had given dowry to his daughter as per his capacity. His daughter has lodged the report against the accused on 07.01.2000. She again submitted the report to the District Magistrate on 20.05.2000 naming the accused. His daughter was beaten up by the accused on 17.10.2009. Hema Devi came to her parental house along with her children. A report was lodged by Hema Devi to District Magistrate, Pithoragarh on 23.10.2009. On 25.10.2009, Janki Devi (mother-in-law of his daughter) came to his house to take Hema Devi back, however, his daughter being scared, refused to go with her mother-in-law. The mother-in-law of his daughter persuaded Hema Devi to go to her matrimonial house on 27.10.2009. On 29.10.2009, he came to know that his daughter was murdered. 9. PW2 Dr. M.C. Rajwar, has conducted the postmortem examination. He noticed the following ante mortem injuries on the body of Hema Devi: (i) 2X2cm. L.W. +nt 2cm about the L+ eye brown, black colour. (ii) Bluish black contusion + nt per orbital regions of L+ eye. (iii) 2X1 cm contusion X nt just below R+ lower eye lid. Colour black blue. (iv) 3X2 cm rounded contusion + 12 o’clock pesitis forehead 5.5 cm above the bridge of nose. (v) Laceration 3X2 cm + nt inner aspect upper lip. (vi) 5X4 cm. rounded contusion + nt R+ check mallar region blackish blue colour. (vii) 2X2.5 cm contusion + nt R+ forearm 4 cm. above the oleiraner probers of R+ ulna. (viii) Contusion + nt 2X1 cm 4.5 cm below the rt forearm, bluish black colour. 10. According to postmortem report, the deceased died due to subdural hematoma + rt. Frontal-rt. rounded contusion + nt R+ check mallar region blackish blue colour. (vii) 2X2.5 cm contusion + nt R+ forearm 4 cm. above the oleiraner probers of R+ ulna. (viii) Contusion + nt 2X1 cm 4.5 cm below the rt forearm, bluish black colour. 10. According to postmortem report, the deceased died due to subdural hematoma + rt. Frontal-rt. Parietal region scalp & hemorrhagic shock due to ante mortem injuries. The time lapse between death and postmortem was 70-84 hours. 11. PW3 Pooran Singh testified that on 28.10.2009, he had gone to village Pali along with his horses. When he was coming back to his village Tharadi via Sugdi on 29.10.2009, deceased Hema Devi met him at a distance of 10-15 meters from her house. He wished her. Then she started weeping. He has admitted in his cross-examination that Darvan Singh was residing in the house situated below the road and accused Ram Singh was residing in the separate house along with his wife. 12. PW4 Heera Singh is the material witness. He has deposed that on 29.10.2009, he was posted as a ward boy in P.H.C. Chaurpal. On that day, the doctor was on leave. Accused Darvan Singh came to him at 7-7:30 PM and told him that his wife Hema Devi has received injuries. He went to village Sugdi along with accused Darvan Singh at about 8:00 PM. He noticed that Hema Devi was lying on the cot inside the house. He examined her pulse and declared her dead. He noticed the injuries on the face of the deceased. In his cross-examination, he stated that on the same day i.e. 29.10.2009, accused Ram Singh came to him in the hospital in the morning and asked him that his wife was ill and requested him to administer glucose to her. 13. PW5 Kedar Singh has deposed that he knew the accused and the deceased. On 27.10.2009, accused Janki Devi came to village Bungli to take back the deceased Hema Devi. Ram Singh (the father of the deceased) told him that Darvan Singh used to beat his daughter. Her mother-in-law came to take her back. She also assured that nobody would give beatings to Hema Devi. 14. PW6 Smt. Geeta Devi testified that she knew the accused Ram Singh, Darvan Singh and Janki Devi. The accused came to her house and asked her husband to give his mobile phone. Her mother-in-law came to take her back. She also assured that nobody would give beatings to Hema Devi. 14. PW6 Smt. Geeta Devi testified that she knew the accused Ram Singh, Darvan Singh and Janki Devi. The accused came to her house and asked her husband to give his mobile phone. Her husband handed over the mobile phone to the accused Darvan Singh. 15. PW7 Mohan Singh is the brother of the deceased Hema Devi. According to him, on 17.10.2009, his sister Hema Devi was beaten and thrown out from her matrimonial house. She came back to her parental house. On 23.10.2009, she lodged a report with the District Magistrate, Pithoragarh against her husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law. On 27.10.2009, Janki Devi came to his house and took his sister along with her. She stated that Darvan Singh had changed his attitude. She assured her in the presence of PW5 Kedar Singh that she will be treated properly. His sister went back. On 30.10.2009 at about 5:00 PM, accused Darvan Singh told him that his sister has died. 16. PW8 Narayan Singh is also the brother of the deceased Hema Devi. He resides at Khatima along with his family. On 30.10.2009, his younger brother Mohan singh called him on phone and told him that his brother-in-law has killed his sister. He also reiterated that his sister Hema Devi was thrown out from her matrimonial house by the accused Darvan Singh. Accused Janki Devi came to his village Bungli to call the victim but she refused to go. Accused Janki Devi again came back on 27.10.2009. His sister went back with her mother-in-law. 17. PW10 Km. Kavita is the daughter of the deceased Hema Devi. She has deposed that her mother died nine months back. She noticed her mother lying dead on the cot. She did not see any blood on the body of her mother. She did not know how she died. She went to the school in the morning and came back in the evening. She called her father. Her father called the doctor, who declared her mother dead. She was declared hostile. She was confronted with her statement recorded under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. She replied that her statement was not recorded by Nayab Tehsildar. 18. PW11 S.S.I. Umesh Ram Arya was the second I.O. of the case. She called her father. Her father called the doctor, who declared her mother dead. She was declared hostile. She was confronted with her statement recorded under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. She replied that her statement was not recorded by Nayab Tehsildar. 18. PW11 S.S.I. Umesh Ram Arya was the second I.O. of the case. He arrested the accused Janki Devi on 27.12.2009 and recorded her statement. 19. PW12 Bhuwan Chandra Pandey, Nayab Tehsildar, was the first I.O. of the case. He has admitted in his cross-examination that on 01.11.2009 he received a written report from Ram Singh, S/o Ganga Singh. He also received a report from the office of S.D.M. which was written by the deceased Hema Devi against her husband Darvan Singh and which was addressed to the District Magistrate, Pithoragarh. On 30.10.2009, accused Ram Singh (father-in-law) of the deceased had informed about the death of his daughter-in-law. The body was taken into possession. He noticed injuries on the body of the deceased Hema Devi. He got the postmortem conducted. He also recorded the statement of witnesses Jagat Singh, Narayan Singh and Debuli Devi. He recorded the statement of Km. Kavita on 10.11.2009. He arrested accused Darvan Singh on 15.11.2009. He also recorded the statement of Pitamber Dutt on 27.11.2009. 20. What emerges from the facts, as enumerated hereinabove is that the marriage of the appellant Darvan Singh and Hema Devi was solemnized in the year 1999. Hema Devi has lodged a report against her husband in the year 2000. However, the matter was compromised. Thereafter, on 17.10.2009, appellant Darvan Singh has given beatings to Hema Devi. Hema Devi came back to her parental house. The mother-in-law came on 25.10.2009 to bring her daughter-in-law back. Hema Devi refused to go back with her. On 27.10.2009, again Janki Devi persuaded Hema Devi to go with her. Hema Devi was killed on 29.10.2009. The FIR was lodged by PW1 Ram Singh, the father of the deceased. The postmortem was conducted by PW2 Dr. M.C. Rajwar. 21. Learned Amicus Curiae appearing on behalf of the appellant has vehemently argued that Hema Devi was murdered by the villagers due to enmity. However, the Amicus Curiae could not point out any evidence to this effect. Moreover, no suspected villager, behind the murder of his wife, has been named by the accused. M.C. Rajwar. 21. Learned Amicus Curiae appearing on behalf of the appellant has vehemently argued that Hema Devi was murdered by the villagers due to enmity. However, the Amicus Curiae could not point out any evidence to this effect. Moreover, no suspected villager, behind the murder of his wife, has been named by the accused. The father of the appellant has also informed PW12 Bhuwan Chandra Pandey, Nayab Tehsildar about the death of Hema Devi on 30.10.2009. There is no murmur that Hema Devi was killed by the co-villagers due to enmity. In case, Hema Devi was killed by the villagers, the father-in-law of the deceased was supposed to mention this fact in his report. 22. In has come on record that PW3 Pooran Singh has seen the deceased on 29.10.2009. It has come in the statements of PW5 Kedar Singh, PW7 Mohan Singh and PW8 Narayan Singh that the appellant’s mother had come twice to the parental house of Hema Devi on 25.10.2009 and 27.10.2009. Hema Devi refused to go with her mother-in-law on 25.10.2009 but she was persuaded to come back on 27.10.2009. 23. PW4 Heera Singh has deposed that he was informed by the appellant that his wife has received injuries. He noticed injuries on the face of the deceased. He examined her pulse but there was no response. She was declared dead. 24. Hema Devi was seen alive by PW10 Km. Kavita in the morning in the house of accused. She deposed that she left for school in the morning and came in the evening. She saw her mother lying dead on the cot. She informed her father. Her father called the doctor. She was 9 years old at the time of incident and 12 years old when her statement was recorded. Thus, the possibility of her being tutored and prompted cannot be ruled out. 25. Hema Devi was living with her husband along with the children. It was for the appellant to explain the circumstances under which she died in his house. It has come on the record that in the year 2000, Hema Devi has lodged a report against her husband. The report was also lodged by Hema Devi against her husband on 23.10.2009. This fact has been admitted by PW12 Bhuwan Chandra Pandey. 26. The conduct of accused-husband in this case was unnatural and unreasonable. He disappeared from the scene w.e.f. 29.10.2009. The report was also lodged by Hema Devi against her husband on 23.10.2009. This fact has been admitted by PW12 Bhuwan Chandra Pandey. 26. The conduct of accused-husband in this case was unnatural and unreasonable. He disappeared from the scene w.e.f. 29.10.2009. He did not attend the funeral of his wife. He was arrested on 15.11.2009. In case, he was innocent, he would not have left his house and absconded. The accused after killing his wife has cleaned her wounds and changed her clothes. There is no evidence on record that the accused has any enmity with co-villagers. Even the father of the appellant-accused Darvan Singh has not stated in his report made to the Nayab Tehsildar that his daughter-in-law was killed by the villagers due to some enmity. 27. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in 2010 (1) SCC 199 , in the case of “Jayabalan vs. Union Territory of Pondicherry”, have held that the conduct of the appellant in scaling up the bathroom wall instead of opening the bolt and coming out, and leaving for the hospital for his own treatment without telling anyone as to what had actually happened, is unnatural and unreasonable conduct. At the hospital, the appellant informed the doctor that he had suffered the injuries while lighting the stove, instead of telling that he had suffered those injuries while trying to save his wife from burning. Their Lordships have held as under: - “30. The conduct of the appellant in scaling up the bathroom wall instead of opening the bolt and coming out, and leaving for the hospital for his own treatment without telling anyone as to what had actually happened, is unnatural and unreasonable conduct. The stand of the appellant that he attempted to save the deceased from burning is untenable in view of the fact that after coming out from the bathroom by scaling the wall, the appellant immediately proceeded to the hospital without even making an endeavour to rescue the deceased or render help to the people who had gathered there at his house to facilitate her rescue. 31. At the hospital, the appellant informed the doctor that he had suffered the injuries while lighting the stove, instead of telling that he had suffered those injuries while trying to save his wife from burning. 31. At the hospital, the appellant informed the doctor that he had suffered the injuries while lighting the stove, instead of telling that he had suffered those injuries while trying to save his wife from burning. If that were true, the appellant would not have hesitated in informing the doctor about the same. Hearing the screams of the deceased, PW 1 arrived at the scene of occurrence and at that time, he saw the appellant scaling the wall for coming out from the bathroom. The appellant knew that the deceased was burning inside the bathroom. Instead of opening the door of the bathroom so as to bring the deceased out from there, the appellant chose to scale the bathroom wall despite having sustained burn injuries.” 28. In the instant case, the accused has gone missing immediately after the death of his wife and was arrested after 15 days. 29. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in 2015 (11) SCC 43 , in the case of “Raja @ Rajinder vs. State of Haryana”, have laid down the following principles, if the case is based on circumstantial evidence: - “10. As the factual matrix would show, the case of the prosecution entirely hinges on circumstantial evidence. When a case rests on circumstantial evidence, the Court has to be satisfied that: “(1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established; (2) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused; (3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else; and (4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence.” (See Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P., SCC pp. 71011, para 10.) 11. In Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab it has been laid down that: (SCC p. 262, para 4) “4. 71011, para 10.) 11. In Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab it has been laid down that: (SCC p. 262, para 4) “4. … the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully proved and those circumstances must be conclusive in nature to connect the accused with the crime. All the links in the chain of events must be established beyond a reasonable doubt and the established circumstances should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence. In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the court has to be on its guard to avoid the danger of allowing suspicion to take the place of legal proof and has to be watchful to avoid the danger of being swayed by emotional considerations, howsoever strong they may be, to take the place of proof.” 12. From the aforesaid it is clear as day that the court is required to evaluate the circumstantial evidence to see that the chain of events has been established clearly and completely to rule out any reasonable likelihood of the innocence of the accused. Needless to say whether the chain is complete or not would depend on the facts of each case emanating from the evidence and no universal yardstick should ever be attempted (see Ujjagar Singh v. State of Punjab, SCC p. 98, para 14). 13. In the instant case, the circumstances that have been established by the prosecution are that the deceased had accompanied the appellant-accused, being called by him, from his house in the early part of the evening on the date of occurrence. The mother of the deceased, Kalawati PW 11, has deposed in that regard. Thereafter, from the material brought on record, it is clearly revealed that the appellant was seen at the tea stall with the deceased. The said fact has been deposed by Mahender PW 10. Thus, from the aforesaid evidence, two facts are established, namely, the accused and the deceased had left the house of the deceased and were seen taking tea together at the tea stall. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that the last seen theory as advanced by the prosecution is not acceptable inasmuch as the owner of the tea stall has not been examined. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that the last seen theory as advanced by the prosecution is not acceptable inasmuch as the owner of the tea stall has not been examined. When the testimony of the aforesaid two witnesses deserve acceptance and receive corroboration from the other evidence on the record, no adverse inference should be drawn because of non-examination of the tea-stall owner, who, as has been submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant, is a material witness. It is well settled in law that non-examination of a material witness is not a mathematical formula for discarding the weight of the testimony available on record, if the same is natural, trustworthy and convincing (see State of H.P. v. Gian Chand. That apart, he was not such a witness who alone was the competent witness to depose about a fact and his non-examination would really destroy the version of the prosecution. 14. Another reason for acceptance of the last seen theory is that the brother of the deceased, Subhash PW 8, has testified that he had enquired from the accused as regards the whereabouts of the deceased, for the deceased had accompanied the accused and at that juncture the accused had replied that at the tea stall a Sikh boy came and the deceased went with him. As per the prosecution case, the deceased and the accused are co-villagers. In his statement recorded under Section 313 CrPC, the appellant-accused totally denied to have accompanied the deceased. The learned trial Judge and the High Court have placed reliance on the evidence of the mother, Kalawati PW 11; the brother, Subhash PW 8 and Mahender PW 10. The cumulative reading and apposite appreciation of the said evidence proves beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased was last seen with the accused. 15. Another circumstance that has been proven is about the recovery of knife, bloodstained clothes and the ashes of the burnt blanket. The seizure witnesses Sukha PW 7 and Nanak PW 9 have proven the seizure. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that the police had recorded the confessional statement of the appellant-accused at the police custody and thereafter, as alleged, had recovered certain things which really do not render any assistance to the prosecution, for the confession recorded before the police officer is inadmissible. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that the police had recorded the confessional statement of the appellant-accused at the police custody and thereafter, as alleged, had recovered certain things which really do not render any assistance to the prosecution, for the confession recorded before the police officer is inadmissible. That apart, the accused had advanced the plea that the articles and the weapon were planted by the investigating agency. 16. To appreciate the said submission in proper perspective, we may profitably reproduce a passage from State of U.P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya: (AIR p. 1129, para 7) “7. … The expression, ‘accused of any offence’ in Section 27, as in Section 25, is also descriptive of the person concerned i.e. against a person who is accused of an offence, Section 27 renders provable certain statements made by him while he was in the custody of a police officer. Section 27 is founded on the principle that even though the evidence relating to confessional or other statements made by a person, whilst he is in the custody of a police officer, is tainted and therefore inadmissible, if the truth of the information given by him is assured by the discovery of a fact, it may be presumed to be untainted and is therefore declared provable insofar as it distinctly relates to the fact thereby discovered. Even though Section 27 is in the form of a proviso to Section 26, the two sections do not necessarily deal with the evidence of the same character. The ban imposed by Section 26 is against the proof of confessional statements. Section 27 is concerned with the proof of information whether it amounts to a confession or not, which leads to discovery of facts. By Section 27, even if a fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received, only that much of the information is admissible as distinctly relates to the fact discovered.” 17. Section 27 is concerned with the proof of information whether it amounts to a confession or not, which leads to discovery of facts. By Section 27, even if a fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received, only that much of the information is admissible as distinctly relates to the fact discovered.” 17. In State of Maharashtra v. Damu, while dealing with the fundamental facet of Section 27 of the Evidence Act, the Court observed that the basic idea embedded in the said provision is the doctrine of confession by subsequent events, which is founded on the principle that if any fact is discovered in a search made on the strength of any information obtained from a prisoner, such a discovery is a guarantee that the information supplied by the prisoner is true. It further stated that the information might be confessional or non-inculpatory in nature, but if it results in discovery of a fact it becomes a reliable information and, therefore, the legislature permitted such information to be used as evidence by restricting the admissible portion to the minimum. 18. Thus, if an accused person gives a statement that relates to the discovery of a fact in consequence of information received from him is admissible. The rest part of the statement has to be treated as inadmissible. In view of the same, the recovery made at the instance of the appellant-accused has been rightly accepted by the trial court as well as by the High Court, and we perceive no flaw in it. 19. Another circumstance which has been taken note of by the High Court is that the bloodstained clothes and the weapon, the knife, were sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory. The report obtained from the laboratory clearly shows that bloodstains were found on the clothes and the knife. True it is, there has been no matching of the blood group. However, that would not make a difference in the facts of the present case. The accused has not offered any explanation as to how the human blood was found on the clothes and the knife. In this regard, a passage from John Pandian v. State is worth reproducing: (SCC p. 153, para 57) “57. … The discovery appears to be credible. It has been accepted by both the courts below and we find no reason to discard it. In this regard, a passage from John Pandian v. State is worth reproducing: (SCC p. 153, para 57) “57. … The discovery appears to be credible. It has been accepted by both the courts below and we find no reason to discard it. This is apart from the fact that this weapon was sent to the forensic science laboratory (FSL) and it has been found stained with human blood. Though the blood group could not be ascertained, as the results were inconclusive, the accused had to give some explanation as to how the human blood came on this weapon. He gave none. This discovery would very positively further the prosecution case.” In view of the aforesaid, there is no substantial reason not to accept the recovery of the weapon used in the crime. It is also apt to note here that Dr N.K. Mittal PW 1, has clearly opined that the injuries on the person of the deceased could be caused by the knife and the said opinion has gone unrebutted. 20. Another circumstance which needs to be noted is that Sukha PW 7, a taxi driver, has deposed that on 18-1-2003 about 11.00 p.m. while he was going to Fatehabad for taking passengers, he saw a bullock cart parked in front of the house of the accused and certain persons were tying a bundle in a “palli”. On query being made by him, the accused persons told him that they are carrying manure to the fields. Though, this witness has given an exaggerated version and stated differently about the time of arrest, yet his testimony to the effect that he had seen the accused with a bundle in “palli” at a particular place cannot be disbelieved. The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, is not applicable in India. In Krishna Mochi v. State of Bihar, it has been held thus: (SCC pp. 113-14, para 51) “51. … The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus has no application in India and the witnesses cannot be branded as liars. The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus (false in one thing, false in everything) has not received general acceptance nor has this maxim come to occupy the status of the rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution. The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus (false in one thing, false in everything) has not received general acceptance nor has this maxim come to occupy the status of the rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts to is, that in such cases testimony may be disregarded, and not that it must be disregarded.” 21. In Yogendra v. State of Rajasthan, it has been ruled that: (SCC p. 404, para 13) “13. … The court must assess the extent to which the deposition of a witness can be relied upon. The court must make every attempt to separate falsehoods from the truth, and it must only be in exceptional circumstances, when it is entirely impossible to separate the grain from the chaff, for the same are so inextricably intertwined, that the entire evidence of such a witness must be discarded.” Thus viewed, the version of PW 7 to the extent that has been stated hereinabove is totally acceptable and credible. 22. In a case based on circumstantial evidence, motive assumes great significance as its existence is an enlightening factor in a process of presumptive reasoning (see Kundula Bala Subrahmanyam v. State of A.P.). 23. In the case at hand, it had come in the evidence that the appellant-accused was suspicious of an illicit relationship between the deceased and his wife. The accused has taken the plea that he was never married. It is noteworthy that the materials brought on record go a long way to show that after the death of his brother he had entered into the wedlock with his sister-in-law as per the tradition of the community, that is, “Kareva” marriage. The said facet of evidence has really not been assailed or shaken. Thus, it has been established that there was suspicion by the accused that the deceased was having relationship with his brother’s wife and that had aroused his anger. The said motive further strengthens the case of the prosecution.” 30. The said facet of evidence has really not been assailed or shaken. Thus, it has been established that there was suspicion by the accused that the deceased was having relationship with his brother’s wife and that had aroused his anger. The said motive further strengthens the case of the prosecution.” 30. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in 2015 (11) SCC 178 , in the case of “Kirti Pal vs. State of West Bengal” and analogous matter, have held that the theory of “last seen alive” comes into play when the time gap between the way the accused and the deceased were last seen together and the deceased was found dead was so small, the possibility of any other person committing the murder becomes impossible. Their Lordships have held as under: - “16. From the evidence of PWs 6, 7 and 10, the prosecution has thus established that Anjali was last seen alive in the company of first appellant Kiriti Pal on the evening of 11-11-2008 and that at about 10.00-10.30 p.m., first appellant Kiriti Pal came alone. The theory of “last seen alive” comes into play when the time gap between the way the accused and the deceased were last seen together and the deceased was found dead was so small, the possibility of any other person committing the murder becomes impossible. On the next day morning at about 9.30 a.m., the body of deceased Anjali was found in Babuibona Jungle, an isolated place which is 25 km away from her residence. The place where the dead body was found was connected with Rajnagar-Suri Road. The time when Anjali left with first appellant Kiriti Pal and the time she was found dead is so proximate which, in our view, points to the guilt of the first appellant. 17. Having regard to the time gap being small, it is for the first appellant to explain the circumstances how and where and in what manner he parted company with Anjali. Thus, on the principle that the person who is last found in the company of another is dead or missing, the person with whom he was last found alive has to explain the circumstances in which he parted company. Thus, on the principle that the person who is last found in the company of another is dead or missing, the person with whom he was last found alive has to explain the circumstances in which he parted company. As pointed out by the trial court and the High Court, the first appellant has failed to discharge the onus and failed to offer any explanation as to how, as to when and how and in what manner he parted the company of Anjali, is a strong militating circumstance against the first appellant Kiriti Pal. There is force in the submission of the learned counsel for the State that the first appellant Kiriti Pal failed to offer any explanation, it must be held that he failed to discharge the burden cast upon him by Section 106 of the Evidence Act. 18. In State of U.P. v. Satish, this Court had stated that the last seen theory comes into play where the time gap between the point of time when the accused and the deceased were last seen alive and when the deceased is found dead is so small that possibility of any person other than the accused being the author of the crime becomes impossible. In State of Rajasthan v. Kashi Ram, in para 23, this Court has held as under: (SCC p. 265) “23. It is not necessary to multiply with authorities. The principle is well settled. The provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act itself are unambiguous and categorical in laying down that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of a person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Thus, if a person is last seen with the deceased, he must offer an explanation as to how and when he parted company. He must furnish an explanation which appears to the court to be probable and satisfactory. If he does so he must be held to have discharged his burden. If he fails to offer an explanation on the basis of facts within his special knowledge, he fails to discharge the burden cast upon him by Section 106 of the Evidence Act. In a case resting on circumstantial evidence if the accused fails to offer a reasonable explanation in discharge of the burden placed on him, that itself provides an additional link in the chain of circumstances proved against him. In a case resting on circumstantial evidence if the accused fails to offer a reasonable explanation in discharge of the burden placed on him, that itself provides an additional link in the chain of circumstances proved against him. Section 106 does not shift the burden of proof in a criminal trial, which is always upon the prosecution. It lays down the rule that when the accused does not throw any light upon facts which are specially within his knowledge and which could not support any theory or hypothesis compatible with his innocence, the court can consider his failure to adduce any explanation, as an additional link which completes the chain. The principle has been succinctly stated in Naina Mohamed, In re.” 19. Taking into consideration the case of the prosecution in its entirety and keeping in mind the circumstances preceding and following the point of having so last seen, “the last seen theory”, in our view, is a strong incriminating circumstance in the chain of circumstances that would point to the guilt of the first appellant with some certainty. 20. It has come out from the testimony of PW 6 that on the fateful evening of 11-11-2008, Anjali left her home stating to PW 6 that she is going to Rajnagar to attend the function of Prosenjit and Chiranjib. PW 11 Asit Dey is the Principal of Rajnagar High School who has deposed that no function was scheduled to be held on 11-11-2008 in the school ground either of Prosenjit or Chiranjib or of any other film artist. The fact that there was no function scheduled to be held at Rajnagar High School is yet another incriminating circumstance against the first accused.” 31. In the instant case, the accused was living with his wife. He has not explained the circumstances in which his wife died. According to postmortem report, she had received six injuries. The cause of death of the deceased was subdural hematoma + rt. Frontal-rt. Parietal region scalp & hemorrhagic shock due to ante mortem injuries. 32. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in 2016 (12) SCC 665 , in the case of “Harijan Bhala Teja vs. State of Gujarat”, have held that when the appellant alone was staying with his wife at time of her death, it was for him to show as to in what manner she died, when prosecution successfully proved her homicidal death. Their Lordships have held as under: - “19. Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872 provides that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Since it is proved on the record that it was only the appellant who was staying with his wife at the time of her death, it is for him to show as to in what manner she died, particularly, when the prosecution has successfully proved that she died homicidal death.” 33. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in 2016 (4) SCC 604 , in the case of “Gajanan Dashrath Kharate vs. State of Maharashtra”, have held in view of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872 corresponding burden also lies on inmates of house to cogently explain how crime was committed inmates to the house cannot get away by simply keeping quiet and offering no explanation on supposed premise that burden to establish its case lies entirely upon prosecution and there is no duty at all on accused to offer explanation. Their Lordships have held under: - “13. As seen from the evidence, appellant Gajanan and his father Dashrath and mother Mankarnabai were living together. On 7-4-2002, mother of the appellant-accused had gone to another Village Dahigaon. The prosecution has proved presence of the appellant at his home on the night of 7-4-2002. Therefore, the appellant is duty-bound to explain as to how the death of his father was caused. When an offence like murder is committed in secrecy inside a house, the initial burden to establish the case would undoubtedly be upon the prosecution. In view of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, there will be a corresponding burden on the inmates of the house to give cogent explanation as to how the crime was committed. The inmates of the house cannot get away by simply keeping quiet and offering no explanation on the supposed premise that the burden to establish its case lies entirely upon the prosecution and there is no duty at all on the accused to offer. On the date of the occurrence, when the accused and his father Dashrath were in the house and when the father of the accused was found dead, it was for the accused to offer an explanation as to how his father sustained injuries. On the date of the occurrence, when the accused and his father Dashrath were in the house and when the father of the accused was found dead, it was for the accused to offer an explanation as to how his father sustained injuries. When the accused could not offer any explanation as to the homicidal death of his father, it is a strong circumstance against the accused that he is responsible for the commission of the crime. 14. In Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra, it was held as under: (SCC pp. 694-95, para 22) “22. Where an accused is alleged to have committed the murder of his wife and the prosecution succeeds in leading evidence to show that shortly before the commission of crime they were seen together or the offence takes place in the dwelling home where the husband also normally resided, it has been consistently held that if the accused does not offer any explanation how the wife received injuries or offers an explanation which is found to be false, it is a strong circumstance which indicates that he is responsible for commission of the crime. In Nika Ram v. State of H.P. it was observed that the fact that the accused alone was with his wife in the house when she was murdered there with “khukhri” and the fact that the relations of the accused with her were strained would, in the absence of any cogent explanation by him, point to his guilt. In Ganeshlal v. State of Maharashtra the appellant was prosecuted for the murder of his wife which took place inside his house. It was observed that when the death had occurred in his custody, the appellant is under an obligation to give a plausible explanation for the cause of her death in his statement under Section 313 CrPC. The mere denial of the prosecution case coupled with absence of any explanation was held to be inconsistent with the innocence of the accused, but consistent with the hypothesis that the appellant is a prime accused in the commission of murder of his wife. In State of U.P. v. Ravindra Prakash Mittal the medical evidence disclosed that the wife died of strangulation during late night hours or early morning and her body was set on fire after sprinkling kerosene. In State of U.P. v. Ravindra Prakash Mittal the medical evidence disclosed that the wife died of strangulation during late night hours or early morning and her body was set on fire after sprinkling kerosene. The defence of the husband was that the wife had committed suicide by burning herself and that he was not at home at that time. The letters written by the wife to her relatives showed that the husband ill-treated her and their relations were strained and further the evidence showed that both of them were in one room in the night. It was held that the chain of circumstances was complete and it was the husband who committed the murder of his wife by strangulation and accordingly this Court reversed the judgment of the High Court acquitting the accused and convicted him under Section 302 IPC. In State of T.N. v. Rajendran the wife was found dead in a hut which had caught fire. The evidence showed that the accused and his wife were seen together in the hut at about 9.00 p.m. and the accused came out in the morning through the roof when the hut had caught fire. His explanation was that it was a case of accidental fire which resulted in the death of his wife and a daughter. The medical evidence showed that the wife died due to asphyxia as a result of strangulation and not on account of burn injuries. It was held that there cannot be any hesitation to come to the conclusion that it was the accused (husband) who was the perpetrator of the crime.” Same view was reiterated by this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Parthu. 34. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in 2016 (12) SCC 682, in the case of “State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Rajiv Jassi”, have held that accused was in the company of the deceased at the time of occurrence. Various contusions of big size found on body of deceased including swelling in womb. Thus, it was for accused to explain injuries found on person of deceased and the failure of the accused to explain same coupled with other evidence is a grave circumstance mitigating against him. Their Lordships have held as under: - “15. Various contusions of big size found on body of deceased including swelling in womb. Thus, it was for accused to explain injuries found on person of deceased and the failure of the accused to explain same coupled with other evidence is a grave circumstance mitigating against him. Their Lordships have held as under: - “15. In our opinion, the judgment and order of conviction passed by the trial court was based upon proper appreciation of evidence, the circumstances found established by the trial court in the instant case have been unnecessarily doubted and brushed aside lightly by the High Court. The High Court has unnecessarily doubted the post-mortem report which recorded as many as aforesaid seven injuries. There were various contusions of big size on periorbital area, intraorbital area, forehead, upper eyelid, cheek, 8 cm × 7 cm contusion over the chin, contusion over the lower lip, 11 cm × 5 cm multiple small abrasions over neck and upper chest, 10 cm × 4 cm contusion in infra-axillary area. The aforesaid nature of the injuries indicates that they could not have been caused by convulsions. That the accused was in the company of the victim in the same room is not disputed. Thus, it was for him to explain the injuries found on the person of the deceased. Exact number of injuries had not been noted by Dr Chaudhary, PW 2 as he himself had admitted that he could not examine the entire body physically as the condition of the victim was precarious and he was busy in giving her treatment then referred her to hospital at Shimla. The victim became unconscious at the house itself. The High Court has unnecessarily doubted the deposition of the autopsy surgeon who has clearly opined that the nature of injuries indicated positively the administration of poison forcibly to the victim. Such injuries could be caused while administering poison forcibly when victim was trying to save herself from that. In the cross-examination, Dr Choudhary, PW 2, has also stated that it could not be a suicidal case. However, on a suggestion being made to PW 2 and PW 3 that it could be a case of voluntary consumption of poison by the victim to commit suicide, obviously the doctors were not able to deny the said suggestion as they were not eyewitnesses. However, on a suggestion being made to PW 2 and PW 3 that it could be a case of voluntary consumption of poison by the victim to commit suicide, obviously the doctors were not able to deny the said suggestion as they were not eyewitnesses. Moreover, they were not supposed to be an arbiter on this issue whether the victim had taken the poison herself. Their objective opinion stands writ large that considering the nature of injuries it could be a case of forcible poisoning and in the process the accused had caused injuries while the deceased had struggled. Thus, the approach of the High Court cannot be said to be of objective assessment of evidence. 16. The accused was admittedly in the company of the deceased. It was for him to explain so many injuries found on the person of the deceased as to how they were caused including swelling in womb. He has totally failed to explain them. It was not stated by him that the injuries were caused to the deceased due to convulsions. It was not stated by him that she ever fell down during convulsions, if any. The injuries on her lips, chin, throat and neck, etc. as held by the trial court, were caused while administering the poison forcibly is a strong circumstance against the accused which cannot be brushed aside lightly. More so, in view of the overall conduct of the accused to be discussed hereinafter. Injuries were on the front part of the body which indicates that the deceased was subjected to violence before she succumbed due to poisoning. Section 106 of the Evidence Act requires a person having special knowledge of the fact to explain the same as required by Section 106 of the Evidence Act, and laid down by this Court in C.S.D. Swami v. State, P.N. Krishna Lal v. State of Kerala, and Manu Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi). Failure to explain that the deceased was in an unconscious position coupled with other evidence is a grave circumstance which militates against such a person.” 35. Accordingly, there is no merit in this jail appeal and the same is hereby dismissed. Appellant shall serve out the sentence, so awarded, to him by the trial court. 36. Let a copy of this judgment along with LCR be sent to the trial court.