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2017 DIGILAW 36 (MAN)

CHANAM CHAOBA SINGH v. STATE OF MANIPUR

2017-12-21

KH.NOBIN SINGH

body2017
JUDGMENT : KH. NOBIN SINGH, J. 1. Heard Shri Kh. Chonjon, the learned Sr. Advocate assisted by Shri Th. Subol, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner; Shri K.R. Pamei, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 5 and Shri R.K. Umakanta, the learned Addl. Government Advocate for the State Respondents. 2. The subject matter in issue involved herein is probably the oldest one in this High Court, in the sense that the order being O.B. No. 1102 dated 04.06.1960 is under challenge in this writ petition. 3.1. The facts of the case as narrated in the petition are that the petitioner was initially appointed by his Highness, the Maharaja of Manipur as a Constable of the erstwhile Manipur State Police on 03.02.1944 under Rule 8 of the Rules for the Management of the State of Manipur. On 06.06.1944 the petitioner was promoted to the post of Asstt. Sub-Inspector and was further promoted to the post of Sub-Inspector vide order dated 30.09.1950. The petitioner, while in service, completed his graduation; passed the prescribed departmental examination under the Assam Public Service Commission in the year 1956 and cadet's training from Barrakpur PTC, West Bengal. While the petitioner was serving as Sub-Inspector, he was superseded by one Shri Th. Shandabihari Singh as Inspector on the plea of his being a graduate and very shortly thereafter, the petitioner learnt of a recommendation made for promotion of one untrained matriculate Jr. Sub-Inspector without considering his case. Being aggrieved by the action of the authorities, he made a protest note / representation dated 22.08.1959 to the Superintendent of Police, Manipur, with an advance copy to the Hon'ble the Chief Commissioner, Manipur for favour of information, praying for consideration of his promotion by holding a Review DPC. 3.2. As a bolt from the blue and to his utter shock and surprise, the Superintendent of Police, Manipur instead of recommending his name for promotion, issued an order being O.B. No. 1102 dated 04.06.1960 by treating his protest note / representation for promotion as a resignation letter. 3.2. As a bolt from the blue and to his utter shock and surprise, the Superintendent of Police, Manipur instead of recommending his name for promotion, issued an order being O.B. No. 1102 dated 04.06.1960 by treating his protest note / representation for promotion as a resignation letter. Being aggrieved by the said discharge order dated 04.06.1960, the petitioner made various representations to the State Government and its authorities from time to time including the representation dated 11.03.1998 which was disposed of by the State Government vide its letter dated 13.10.1998 to the effect that the State Government has carefully examined the representation and rejected the same as his case being too old and opening of such a case will unsettle the already settled cases. 3.3. Thereafter, the petitioner approached the Manipur Human Rights Commission for redressal of his grievance on the allegation that his request for grant of pensionary benefits / compensation was not considered for more than sixteen years and in response thereto, the State Home Department addressed a letter dated 28.06.2004 to the Deputy Secretary, Manipur Human Rights Commission taking a similar stand as indicated in the letter dated 13.10.1998 and on the basis of the stand taken by the State Government, the Manipur Human Rights Commission vide its proceeding dated 03.06.2005 closed the case by observing that the petitioner may approach the proper court of jurisdiction for redressal of his grievance. 3.4. On 23.01.2011 the petitioner approached the Chief Secretary, Manipur praying for taking appropriate action in the matter of discharging him illegally from the service but to no effect and thereafter, he approached the State Government by way of an application under the provisions of the Right to Information Act, through the Chief Information Commissioner, for furnishing information as regards the so called resignation letter said to have been received from him. The State Government turned down the request for furnishing information sought for by him on the ground that the records pertaining to his resignation; acceptance thereof and particulars of the officer passing the order of discharge, were not traceable. Thereafter, the petitioner filed an application dated 24.11.2008 to the Joint Secretary (Home), Government of Manipur requesting him to conduct an enquiry to find out the records / documents in the light of the letter dated 28.06.2004 of the Special Secretary (Home), Government of Manipur. 3.5. Thereafter, the petitioner filed an application dated 24.11.2008 to the Joint Secretary (Home), Government of Manipur requesting him to conduct an enquiry to find out the records / documents in the light of the letter dated 28.06.2004 of the Special Secretary (Home), Government of Manipur. 3.5. Being aggrieved by the inaction on the part of the respondents, the petitioner approached the Hon'ble Gauhati High Court by way of a writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 342 of 2009 praying for quashing the order being O.B. No.1102 dated 04.06.1960 and also for grant of pension which was dismissed as withdrawn on 05.06.2009. In the order, it was observed that the petitioner failed to explain the delay of approaching the court between 1960 to 1998 and by relying upon the principle laid down in State of Maharashtra v. Digambar, (1995) 4 SCC 683 , the learned Single Judge further observed that in view of the delay of 49 years, it was not a fit case to be entertained. On the prayer being made by the counsel appearing for the petitioner, the petition was dismissed as withdrawn but it may be noted that the prayer for grant of liberty to file a fresh petition was considered and rejected. The order dated 05.06.2009 passed by the learned Single Judge is reproduced herein below: "The resignation of the petitioner from the post of Sub-Inspector was accepted by the competent authority w.e.f. 3.6.1960. There has been sea change in the Police Organization between the 1960 and this day. Even the status of the State has been changed from the Union Territory to State. It is stated by the petitioner that a representation dated 11.3.1998 was submitted to the Chief Minister for withdrawal of the resignation letter which was already accepted w.e.f. 3.6.1960 i.e. 38 years ago and thereafter, another representation was submitted to the Secretary (Home0 to the Government of Manipur on 19.6.1998. The Special Secretary (Home) vide communication dated 13.10.1998 informed the petitioner that his request had been considered and rejected and this communication dated 13.10.1998 was not challenged at the relevant time. Thereafter, MHRC Case No. RR No. 4702 dated 1.6.2004 was registered and Human Rights Commission after perusal of the report of the Home Department, Government of Manipur, closed the case by an order passed on 7.6.2005 taking the view that there was no scope for further proceeding. Thereafter, MHRC Case No. RR No. 4702 dated 1.6.2004 was registered and Human Rights Commission after perusal of the report of the Home Department, Government of Manipur, closed the case by an order passed on 7.6.2005 taking the view that there was no scope for further proceeding. It is also noticed that two representations, dated 17.3.2006 and 13.7.2007 have also been filed by the petitioner to the Chief Minister, Manipur. Thereafter, the petitioner took his case before the Chief Information Commissioner, Manipur who was pleased to direct the State Government to provide the necessary documents as requested by the petitioner and thereafter, the Home Department vide communication dated 31.10.2007 has informed the petitioner that his resignation letter and the order of discharge are not traceable as a matter relates to 1959-1960. From the date of acceptance of the resignation and this day, there has been a delay of 49 years and the petitioner has not even explained the delay between 1960 to 1998 i.e., 38 years. The principle laid down in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Digambar, reported in (1995) 4 SCC 683 shall squarely cover this case. In the aforesaid case, the Apex Court held the following - "Thus, in our view, persons seeking relief against the State under Article 226 of the Constitution, be they citizens or otherwise, cannot get discretionary relief obtainable thereunder unless they fully satisfy the High Court that the facts and circumstances of the case clearly justified the laches or undue delay on their part in approaching the Court for grant of such discretionary relief. Therefore, where a High Court grants relief to a citizen or any other person under Article 226 of the Constitution against any person including the State without considering his blameworthy conduct, such as laches or undue delay, acquiescence or waiver, the relief so granted becomes unsustainable even if the relief was granted in respect of alleged deprivation of his legal right by the State. High Court was wholly wrong in granting relief of compensation to a writ petitioner by the judgment under appeal by not considering his entitlement for such relief under Article 226 of the Constitution on account of laches or undue delay." In view of the above discussion and delay of 49 years, it is not a fit case to be entertained. High Court was wholly wrong in granting relief of compensation to a writ petitioner by the judgment under appeal by not considering his entitlement for such relief under Article 226 of the Constitution on account of laches or undue delay." In view of the above discussion and delay of 49 years, it is not a fit case to be entertained. At this stage, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner prays for withdrawal of this case. Prayer for withdrawal is allowed. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed on withdrawal. In the circumstances, prayer for liberty to file a fresh petition is considered and rejected." 3.6. Having not taken any positive action by the Government of Manipur, the petitioner approached the Hon'ble Prime Minister of India with a representation dated 22.12.2010 followed by another representation dated 19.10.2011 and in response thereto, as many as seven letters were sent by the office of the Prime Minister to the State Government for taking appropriate action. Since no positive response was received by him from the State Government, the petitioner submitted a representation dated 25.10.2012 to the Hon'ble President of India which was forwarded to the state Government for appropriate attention and action by describing it as self explanatory. The State Government having failed to take any action, the petitioner submitted another representation dated 14.05.2013 to the Hon'ble President of India and thereupon, a letter dated 14.05.2013 was sent to the Chief Secretary. On 20.05.2015 the Special Secretary (Home), Government of Manipur furnished the petitioner with a copy of the letter dated 19.11.2013 of the Superintendent of Police, Imphal-West by which the application of the petitioner was considered and rejected. Being not satisfied with the information as furnished, he submitted a representation dated 22.05.2015 to the Special Secretary (Home), Government of Manipur which failed to take any action and being aggrieved further by the inaction on the part of the respondents, the instant writ petition has been filed on the inter-alia grounds that the Superintendent of Police is not competent to discharge him from service or to accept his conditional resignation in view of the verdict of the Hon'ble Judicial Commissioner rendered in Ahmad Hassan & anr. v. Deputy Commissioner of Manipur, AIR 1963 Manipur 51 ; that the impugned order is a flout on the Vigilance Manual vide OM dated 06.05.1958 of the Ministry of Home Affairs; that despite various representations being submitted, the State respondents have completely ignored his legitimate right of pensionary benefits; that in terms of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Assam Sanmita Mahasanga v. Union of India, (2015) 3 SCC 1 , a delay of 27 years and laches by itself would not be sufficient to shut the doors of the court, when it is a question of violation of fundamental rights and that fresh cause of action arose when the State Government failed to take appropriate action on the requests made by the Union of India. 4. The stand of the State Government as indicated in their affidavit-in-opposition is that while the petitioner was in service, he tendered his resignation which was duly accepted by the State Government vide impugned order. The Superintendent of Police being the appointing authority, his resignation was accepted by it. After a lapse of long years, the present petition has been filed by making false statement which is highly objectionable. As per Rule 26 of the CCS (Pension) Rules, he forfeits everything on resignation and therefore, the admissibility of compensation does not arise at all and that too, after a lapse of more than 55 years. An affidavit-in-opposition on behalf of the Accountant General has been filed wherein it has been stated that the office of the Accountant General, in terms of the parameters laid down by the C&AG of India, implements the decision taken by the State Government in matters relating to maintenance of GPF, pension and other entitlement. Since the resignation of the petitioner having been accepted, there is no order of the State Government for his admissibility of pension and other retirement benefits and therefore, there is no violation of his fundamental rights by the respondent No.5. 5. Since the resignation of the petitioner having been accepted, there is no order of the State Government for his admissibility of pension and other retirement benefits and therefore, there is no violation of his fundamental rights by the respondent No.5. 5. From the aforesaid pleadings, the question that arises for consideration is as to whether the Superintendent of Police is competent to issue the impugned order or in other words, whether the Superintendent of Police is competent to discharge the petitioner from the service and in addition thereto, on account of a preliminary objection raised by the Government Advocate as regards the maintainability of the petition, the other issue is as to whether the petition is maintainable in view of the fact that the earlier writ petition for the same relief, has been dismissed as withdrawn with the prayer for grant of liberty to file a fresh petition being rejected by the High Court. Since the preliminary objection as regards the maintainability of the petition, has been raised by the Government Advocate, this court deems it appropriate to deal with it first. Shri R.K. Umakanta, the learned Government Advocate has submitted that the writ petition being W.P.(C) No.342 of 2009 wherein the prayer was also to quash the order impugned herein, has been dismissed as withdrawal and the prayer for grant of liberty to file a fresh writ petition was specifically rejected, probably, for the reason that the Hon'ble High Court did not find it to be a fit case to be entertained by it. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance on various decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the High Court, some of which are being referred to hereinafter. In State Bank of Indore v. Govindrao, (1997) 2 SCC 617 , the respondent was dismissed from service on 03.10.1977 after an enquiry being held against him and the appeal preferred by him on 18.07.1978 was dismissed by the appellate authority. Nothing happened thereafter for some years and only on 06.04.1987, he filed a writ petition questioning the order of dismissal which was allowed by the High Court. The appellant came up with an appeal and while allowing the appeal and setting aside the order of the High Court, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: "5. It is difficult to see how this writ petition was entertained at all by the High Court. The appellant came up with an appeal and while allowing the appeal and setting aside the order of the High Court, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: "5. It is difficult to see how this writ petition was entertained at all by the High Court. The date of dismissal was 3.10.1977. The appeal against that order was dismissed on 18.7.1978. The writ petitioner did not choose to challenge that appellate order by way of a writ petition. What was described as special appeal was again dismissed on 12.5.1982. There was no reason for the High Court, after a long lapse of nearly ten years from the date of the order of dismissal, to entertain the writ petition and quash the order of dismissal. We are of the view that the High Court should not have entertained that at all. It should have been dismissed in limine." In Karnataka Power Corporation Ltd. v. K. Thangappan & anr., (2006) 4 SCC 322, the respondent therein did not report for duty since February, 1979 and accordingly, his name was removed from the nominal master roll. On 18.08.1998 a writ petition was filed by the respondent before the High Court which was allowed despite an objection being raised by the appellant that the same was liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. The Division Bench upheld the view of the learned Single Judge. The appeal preferred before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was allowed and accordingly, the orders of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench were set aside. While allowing the appeal, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed: "6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports. Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably." In Vinod Kapoor v. State of Goa & ors., (2012) 12 SCC 378 wherein the respondent No.8 was served with a show cause notice which was challenged by him by way of a writ petition and since the writ petition was dismissed by the High Court, an appeal by way of special leave was preferred before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the same was dismissed as withdrawn on the ground that a review had been filed in the High Court. After the review being rejected by the High Court, the civil appeals were preferred before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and when the said civil appeals were taken up for consideration, a preliminary issue was raised on the ground that the civil appeals by way of special leave petition were not maintainable. Dismissing the civil appeals as not maintainable, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: "9. The question that we have to decide is whether the appeal will lie against the order dated 29.1.2000 of the High Court dismissing Writ Petition No. 253 of 1999 when an earlier special leave petition against the said order dated 29.1.2000 of the High Court was filed by the appellant but was withdrawn with the permission of this Court to pursue his remedy by way of review against the said order dated 29.1.2000 of the High Court. As the appellant has withdrawn the special leave to appeal against the order dated 29.1.2000 of the High Court with permission to pursue his remedy by way of review instead and had not taken the liberty from this Court to challenge the order dated 29.1.2000 afresh by way of special leave in case he did not get relief in the review application, he is precluded from challenging the order dated 29.1.2000 of the High Court by way of special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution. 13. In the result, we hold that the civil appeals are not maintainable and we accordingly dismiss the same. 13. In the result, we hold that the civil appeals are not maintainable and we accordingly dismiss the same. We, however, make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case of the appellant or on whether the Authority or the Municipal Council could under law issue the notices to Respondent 8 or take any action in respect of the construction made by him on the land in Survey No. 250/12 in Village Taleigao." In Sandhya Education Society & anr. v. Union of India, (2014) 7 SCC 701 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: "16. This Court in Vinod Kapoor v. State of Goa, has categorically observed that once the special leave petition is dismissed as withdrawn without obtaining appropriate permission to file a special leave petition once over again after exhausting the remedy of review petition before the High Court, the same is not maintainable." On the other hand, Shri Kh. Chonjon, the learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner has cited a large number of decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, of which only few are relevant for purpose of deciding this issue. In Olga Tellis & ors. v. Bombay Municipal Corporation & ors., (1985) 3 SCC 545 , the petitioners who are the pavement and basti dwellers of Bombay city, challenged the decision of the respondents regarding their forcible eviction and demolition of the pavement and slum dwellings under the provisions of Bombay Municipal Corporation Act on ground of violation of Article 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India. As regards the objection as to the maintainability of the petitions on the strength of the doctrine of estoppels, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: "28. It is not possible to accept the contention that the petitioners are estopped from setting up their fundamental rights as a defence to the demolition of the huts put up by them on pavements or parts of public roads. There can be no estoppel against the Constitution. The Constitution is not only the paramount law of the land but, it is the source and sustenance of all laws. Its provisions are conceived in public interest and are intended to serve a public purpose. The doctrine of estoppel is based on the principle that consistency in word and action imparts certainty and honesty to human affairs. The Constitution is not only the paramount law of the land but, it is the source and sustenance of all laws. Its provisions are conceived in public interest and are intended to serve a public purpose. The doctrine of estoppel is based on the principle that consistency in word and action imparts certainty and honesty to human affairs. If a person makes a representation to another, on the faith of which the latter acts to his prejudice, the former cannot resile from the representation made by him. He must make it good. This principle can have no application to representations made regarding the assertion or enforcement of fundamental rights. For example, the concession made by a person that he does not possess and would not exercise his right to free speech and expression or the right to move freely throughout the territory of India cannot deprive him of those constitutional rights, any more than a concession that a person has no right of personal liberty can justify his detention contrary to the terms of Article 22 of the Constitution. Fundamental rights are undoubtedly conferred by the Constitution upon individuals which have to be asserted and enforced by them, if those rights are violated. But, the high purpose which the Constitution seeks to achieve by conferment of fundamental rights is not only to benefit individuals but to secure the larger interests of the community. The Preamble of the Constitution says that India is a democratic Republic. It is in order to fulfil the promise of the Preamble that fundamental rights are conferred by the Constitution, some on citizens like those guaranteed by Articles 15, 16, 19, 21 and 29 and, some on citizens and non-citizens alike, like those guaranteed by Articles 14, 21, 22 and 25 of the Constitution. No individual can barter away the freedoms conferred upon him by the Constitution. A concession made by him in a proceeding, whether under a mistake of law or otherwise, that he does not possess or will not enforce any particular fundamental right, cannot create an estoppel against him in that or any subsequent proceeding. Such a concession, if enforced, would defeat the purpose of the Constitution. Were the argument of estoppel valid, an all-powerful State could easily tempt an individual to forego his precious personal freedoms on promise of transitory, immediate benefits. Such a concession, if enforced, would defeat the purpose of the Constitution. Were the argument of estoppel valid, an all-powerful State could easily tempt an individual to forego his precious personal freedoms on promise of transitory, immediate benefits. Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that the petitioners had conceded in the Bombay High Court that they have no fundamental right to construct hutments on pavements and that they will not object to their demolition after October 15, 1981, they are entitled to assert that any such action on the part of public authorities will be in violation of their fundamental rights. How far the argument regarding the existence and scope of the right claimed by the petitioners is well-founded is another matter. But, the argument has to be examined despite the concession. 29. The plea of estoppel is closely connected with the plea of waiver, the object of both being to ensure bona fides in day-to-day transactions. In Basheshar Nath v. Commissioner of Income Tax a Constitution Bench of this Court considered the question whether the fundamental rights conferred by the Constitution can be waived. Two members of the Bench (Das, C.J. and Kapoor, J.) held that there can be no waiver of the fundamental right founded on Article 14 of the Constitution. Two others (N.H. Bhagwati and Subba Rao, JJ.) held that not only could there be no waiver of the right conferred by Article 14, but there could be no waiver of any other fundamental right guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution. The Constitution makes no distinction, according to the learned Judges, between fundamental rights enacted for the benefit of an individual and those enacted in public interest or on grounds of public policy." In Assam Sanmilita Mahasangha & ors. v. Union of India & ors, (2015) 3 SCC 1 , Section 6A which was inserted in the Citizenship Act, 1985 came to be questioned by way of writ petitions wherein a preliminary submission was urged by the Addl. Solicitor General of India that a challenge made in 2012 would be barred by delay and laches. After analyzing the judgment rendered by a Constitution Bench in Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, ( (1969) 1 SCC 110 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: "24. Solicitor General of India that a challenge made in 2012 would be barred by delay and laches. After analyzing the judgment rendered by a Constitution Bench in Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, ( (1969) 1 SCC 110 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: "24. It is clear from a reading of these differing judgments that the ratio of this Constitution Bench judgment can broadly be stated to be that a writ petition filed under Article 32 can be dismissed on the ground of delay. Beyond that, there is no discernible ratio as no majority can be cobbled up for deciding on what basis such writ petition can be so dismissed. 32. Tilokchand Motichand is a judgment involving property rights of individuals. Ramchandra Deodhar case, also of a Constitution Bench of five judges has held that the fundamental right under Article 16 cannot be wished away solely on the 'jejune' ground of delay. Since Tilokchand Motichand case was decided, there have been important strides made in the law. Property Rights have been removed from part III of the Constitution altogether by the Constitution 44th Amendment Act. The same amendment made it clear that even during an emergency, the fundamental right under Article 21 can never be suspended, and amended Article 359(1) to give effect to this. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, decided nine years after Tilokchand Motichand, Article 21 has been given its new dimension, and pursuant to the new dimension a huge number of rights have come under the umbrella of Article 21 [for an enumeration of these rights, see Kapila Hingorani v. State of Bihar, para 57]. Further, in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corpn., it has now been conclusively held that all fundamental rights cannot be waived (at para 29). Given these important developments in the law, the time has come for this Court to say that at least when it comes to violations of the fundamental right to life and personal liberty, delay or laches by itself without more would not be sufficient to shut the doors of the court on any petitioner." 6. Article 226 of the Constitution of the India provides that every High Court shall have the power to issue to any person or authority including any Government directions, orders or writs for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights or any legal right conferred under a statute. Article 226 of the Constitution of the India provides that every High Court shall have the power to issue to any person or authority including any Government directions, orders or writs for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights or any legal right conferred under a statute. The power conferred on the High Court is wide and expansive and the Constitution does not place any fetter on the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction. The power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provisions of the Constitution. While exercising its jurisdiction, the High Court not only acts as a court of law but also as a court of equity. The High Court, in an appropriate case, may grant such relief to which the writ petitioner would be entitled to in law as well as in equity. In addition thereto and from the decisions referred to hereinabove and relied upon by the learned counsels appearing for the parties, it is absolutely clear that the delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when it exercises its discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case, the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved, the matter is still within the discretion of the Court. But it has also been held that in view of the important developments in the law, the time has come for this Court to say that at least when it comes to violations of the fundamental right to life and personal liberty, delay or laches by itself without more would not be sufficient to shut the doors of the court on any petitioner. 7. In the present case, the impugned order was issued on 04.06.1960 by which the petitioner was discharged from service w.e.f. 03.06.1960. 7. In the present case, the impugned order was issued on 04.06.1960 by which the petitioner was discharged from service w.e.f. 03.06.1960. This impugned order has been challenged by the petitioner on the inter-alia grounds that the representation dated 22.08.1959 cannot be considered to be tendering a resignation but one praying for recommendation for his promotion and moreover, the Superintendent of Police was not competent to issue the impugned order. On perusal of the said representation, it is seen that it would mean two things - one, a prayer has been made for recommending his name for promotion to the post of Inspector of police and two, in the event of his being superseded for the second time, he would quit from service. In any case, the impugned order has been issued, rightly or wrongly, by treating the said representation as a letter of resignation. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the petitioner has been discharged from the service vide impugned order issued by the Reserve Inspector of Police for and on behalf of the Superintendent of Police. If the petitioner was really aggrieved by the said order, it was open to him to approach the appropriate forum within a reasonable time. Having failed to do that and after having slept for more than 38 years without any explanation, he wake up all of a sudden and started submitting representations and in particular, the representation dated 11.03.1998 followed by another dated 19.06.1998 which were rejected vide letter dated 13.10.1998 of the Special Secretary (Home), Government of Manipur. It is surprising to note that despite the subject-matter in issue being arisen out of the dismissal from service and not the violation of the fundamental rights like right to life, the petitioner approached the Manipur Human Rights Commission by way of a complaint being MHRC Case No.4702 of 2004 for redressal of his grievances arising out of non-payment of pensionary benefits. The aforesaid case came to be closed on 03.06.2005 on the basis of a report submitted by the State Government with the observation that the petitioner might approach the appropriate court of jurisdiction. The aforesaid case came to be closed on 03.06.2005 on the basis of a report submitted by the State Government with the observation that the petitioner might approach the appropriate court of jurisdiction. Only in the year 2009, the petitioner filed a writ petition being W.P(C) No.342 of 2009 which was dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 05.06.2009 of the High Court and the instant writ petition was filed on the same cause and with the same prayer in the year 2015 after about 55 years from the day when he was discharged from the service. As has been held in the case of Karnataka Power Corporation Ltd. v. K. Thangappan & anr. (supra), the delay or laches shall be one of the factors to be considered by the High Court while exercising its power under Article 226 of the Constitution. On perusal of the averments made in the writ petition, it is seen that there is no explanation at all as to why the appropriate forum was not approached by the petitioner during the period from 1960 to 1998 and moreover, the question of violation of the fundamental rights like right to life did not arise at all. Any interference in the present petition may tantamount to reviewing the earlier dated 05.06.2009 whereby the High Court had made specific observation that in view of the delay of 38 years, it was not a fit case to be entertained and moreover, the prayer for grant of liberty to file a fresh petition was considered and rejected by the High Court. The situation with respect to delay or laches cannot be said to have improved now after about 55 years which may warrant any interference by this court. Therefore, there is no reason as to why an indulgence be given by this court to the petitioner when he himself was grossly negligent and not bothered to redress his grievance in time. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the petitioner could provide proper explanation for the delay in approaching this court, one hurdle will always remain standing on his way. As has been stated hereinabove, the earlier writ petition being W.P.(C) No.342 of 2009 filed by the petitioner when the delay was of 49 years, was withdrawn on 05.06.2009. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the petitioner could provide proper explanation for the delay in approaching this court, one hurdle will always remain standing on his way. As has been stated hereinabove, the earlier writ petition being W.P.(C) No.342 of 2009 filed by the petitioner when the delay was of 49 years, was withdrawn on 05.06.2009. What is to be noted is that while considering the said earlier writ petition, the High Court found that it was not a fit case to be entertained on account of the delay of 49 years and that too, in terms of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in State of Maharashtra v. Digambar, (1995) 4 SCC 683 . It may further be noted that the High Court rejected the prayer for grant of liberty to file a fresh petition. Therefore, this court is of the considered view that the instant writ petition is not maintainable at all and in terms of the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Vinod Kapoor v. State of Goa & ors. (supra) which has been reiterated in Sandhya Education Society & anr. v. Union of India (supra), the same is liable to be dismissed as not maintainable. Similar is the view taken by the Hon'ble Gauhati High Court in Chengajan Krimijan Fishery Samabai Samity Ltd. v. Government of Assam, 2006 (Suppl.) GLT 395. Therefore, there will be no need of going into the merit of the case at this belated stage. 8. For the reasons stated hereinabove, the instant writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed as not maintainable. However, there shall be no order as to costs.