JUDGMENT : A seemingly ubiquitous issue, relating to the claim of two teachers for appointment to the post of High School Assistant under the provisions of the Kerala Education Act and Rules ('KER' for short), throws up certain untested and virgin considerations of law in this writ petition. 2. Before I go to the narration of facts of this case, I record that the essential question for consideration in law is as to whether the right of a teacher under Rule 51 A of Chapter XIV A KER would continue to inure to his or her benefit even after he has been appointed to a substantive vacancy subsequent to his obtaining such a claim. 3. The assertion of the petitioner is that such claim do not get extinguished even if the teacher is appointed to a lower category and that the 51 A claim would continue till such time as the teacher is appointed to the same category from which he or she was relieved for want of vacancy. The issue raised assumes multifarious proportions because there are some amendments which are relevant to the said Rule and it would have, in its application different connotations depending upon the facts of each case. 4. The facts are not too many. The petitioner claims that she was appointed as a High School Assistant in July 2003 till November 2003 in a leave vacancy and that she was thereafter appointed as an Upper Primary School Assistant (UPSA) from November 2003 till June 2006 again in a leave vacancy. This is the spell of service, on the strength of which, she obtains the claim under Rule 51 A. Subsequently, on 5.6.2006, she was appointed as an Upper Primary School Assistant in the same school and Ext.P3 would indicate that she was appointed under Rule 51 A of the KER. The authorities have taken the stand that by such appointment, the petitioner's claim under the said Rule would stand satisfied and that it would not give her any further benefit in future. It is this that has been controverted by the petitioner making specific reference to the said Rule. 5. The authorities have taken the stand that by such appointment, the petitioner's claim under the said Rule would stand satisfied and that it would not give her any further benefit in future. It is this that has been controverted by the petitioner making specific reference to the said Rule. 5. Since the entire controversy revolves around the way in which the rule is now worded, it would be appropriate to extract the same and I do so as under : "51 A. Qualified teachers who are relieved as per Rule 49 or 52 or on account of termination of vacancies shall have preference for appointment to future vacancies in the same or higher or lower category of teaching posts, for which he is qualified that may arise if there is no claimant under rule 43 in the lower category in schools under the same Educational Agency or an Educational Agency to which the school may be subsequently transferred provided they have not been appointed in permanent vacancies in schools under any other Educational Agency." 6. A reading of the Rule extracted above would make it perspicuous that a qualified teacher, who is relieved for want of vacancy, shall always have a preference for appointment to future vacancies be that in the same, higher or lower category of teaching posts. This is the point of essential controversy in this case. The petitioner says that even though she has been appointed as UPSA with effect from 5.6.2006, her claim under Rule 51 A, to be appointed as HSA from the post which she was relieved earlier, would continue notwithstanding the fact that her subsequent appointment is to a substantive vacancy. According to her, a Rule 51 A claim would stand extinguished only if she obtains appointment in a permanent vacancy in a school under any other educational agency. This submission is obviously based on the last limb of Rule 51 A as extracted above. 7. When a vacancy in the post of HSA arose in the school, the petitioner staked a claim on the basis that she is a Rule 51 A claimant, which was contested by the seventh respondent on the strength of her being a Rule 43 claimant under Chapter XIV A of KER. 7. When a vacancy in the post of HSA arose in the school, the petitioner staked a claim on the basis that she is a Rule 51 A claimant, which was contested by the seventh respondent on the strength of her being a Rule 43 claimant under Chapter XIV A of KER. Rule 43 provides that vacancies in a higher grade or pay shall be filled up by promotion of qualified hands in the lower grade according to seniority. Admittedly, going by seniority, the seventh respondent is senior to the petitioner. The petitioner, therefore, would be entitled to be appointed under Rule 43 only if she can show that she is senior to the seventh respondent. This factually is not possible since the petitioner is not so senior. Therefore, the only method by which she can sustain her claim to the post of HSA is by asserting that she has a 51 A claim, which at least until 2012, had priority over a Rule 43 claim. I say this because, an amendment was brought to both these Rules with effect from 5.7.2012 making it explicit that a Rule 43 claimant could stake a claim for appointment only in the absence of a Rule 51 A claimant. Therefore, the priority between these two Rules, after 2012 is virtually settled. This is not very relevant because I have already noticed above that even if both the teachers claim the benefit of Rule 43, the seventh respondent would be found senior and hence found eligible for appointment. It is only if the petitioner is able to show that she has a subsisting Rule 51 A claim that she would have any method of supporting or defending her claim for appointment as HSA. 8. Rule 51 A of Chapter XIV A KER, prior to amendment in 2005, read that qualified teachers who are relieved as per Rule 49 or 52 or on account of termination of vacancies shall have preference for appointment to future vacancies. This was interpreted by this Court in several cases to mean that the claim of a teacher, under Rule 51 A, would continue until such time as he or she was appointed to a future vacancy in the same category of teaching posts from which he or she was relieved. This was interpreted by this Court in several cases to mean that the claim of a teacher, under Rule 51 A, would continue until such time as he or she was appointed to a future vacancy in the same category of teaching posts from which he or she was relieved. However, this position had a paradigm shift on account of the amendment in the year 2005, wherein the words "in the same or higher or lower category of teaching posts, for which he is qualified that may arise" was introduced in the said Rule. Thus obviously means that a person who has been relieved as HSA would also be then required to be considered for appointment in a lower or higher posts if it becomes available and that such appointment would then satisfy the rigour of Rule 51 A. 9. In the case at hand, the position is something on the above lines. The petitioner was relieved as HSA in the year 2003. She was then appointed as UPSA and again relieved in the year 2006. Obviously, therefore, the petitioner's appointments in these two vacancies which were leave vacancies would inure to her a claim under Rule 51 A and would entitle her to seek preference for appointment in a future vacancy. In June, 2006 she was appointed as UPSA and the order of her appointment was issued as if her claim under Rule 51 A was being satisfied. If that be so, it would be justified to suspect that the petitioner would obtain no further benefit under Rule 51 A. However, the petitioner says this is not so. 10. The petitioner relies on a judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Sandhya v. Jalaja Kumari [ 2008 (3) KLT 655 ], which is produced as Ext.P7 and her learned counsel requests my attention to Paragraph 18 thereof, which reads as under: "18. We also notice that there is no provision in the Kerala Education Act, 1958 or in the K.E.R. which interdicts a R.43 claimant from claiming appointment to the higher post under R.51 A as well, where such a claim also exists. We also notice that there is no provision in the Kerala Education Act, 1958 or in the K.E.R. which interdicts a R.43 claimant from claiming appointment to the higher post under R.51 A as well, where such a claim also exists. A Division Bench of this Court in W.A. No.658 of 1988, Elizabath Oommen v. Beena Mariam George (2000 (2) KLT SN 47 (C. No.55) had recognized such a situation and directed the Manager to consider the claim of the appellant therein either under Rule 51 A or Rule 43 as and when vacancies arise in the school. Such a direction was issued evidently on the premise that a teacher can claim appointment to the higher post either under R.43 or under R.51 A of Chap.XIV A of the K.E.R." The learned counsel for the petitioner says that this Court has recognized that a regular teacher continuing in service can also have a 51 A claim. The petitioner, therefore, asserts that she has a claim both under Rule 51 A and under Rule 43 of the KER at the same time. 11. I am afraid that this submission may look attractive at first blush, it would loose its lustre on a deeper understanding of the impact of the amendments. In Ext.P7 judgment, this Court was considering the scenario prior to the amendment in the year 2005 to Rule 51 A of the KER. As I have already noticed above prior to the amendment, a teacher's claim under Rule 51 A would continue until such time as he or she is granted a subsequent appointment in the same category from which she was relieved. In other words, even if the teacher has been appointed to a substantive vacancy in a lower category it would be legally possible for the teacher to continue the claim under Rule 51 A and stake appointment to a higher category both under the benefit of that Rule or under Rule 43 of the KER because she is also a teacher working in a substantive vacancy but lower in category from which he or she was earlier relieved. This is why in Ext.P7 judgment which was one dealing with pre-amendment scenario, the Division Bench had noticed that a claimant, with a subsisting claim under Rule 51 A, who is working in a lower category of post and then also being entitled to a Rule 43 claim, will have to be given precedence for appointment over a teacher who is a claimant under Rule 43, when there is a conflict between such claimants. This cannot be interpreted to mean that every teacher, even after amendment, who is relieved earlier would continue to have the benefit of both Rule 51A and Rule 43 for all times to come. I am certain in my mind that consequent to the amendment noticed above, a teacher who is appointed substantively to a vacancy that arose subsequent to him/her being relieved, the claim under Rule 51A would stand effaced and satisfied for future appointments. 12. The learned counsel for the petitioner, almost as if in brinkmanship, contends that even if my view being as above, the petitioner would not lose her claim under Rule 51A until such time as she is appointed in a permanent vacancy in schools under any other educational agencies. This submission is, of course, founded on the last limb of the Rule which reads as a proviso. However, I have to say that this contention can never obtain approval. To say that a teacher who has secured appointment in the same school, albeit in a lower category of post, will continue to hold a claim in the School under Rule 51 A until such time as he or she is appointed in a permanent vacancy in any other Educational Agency would amount to repugnance and in certain cases even absurdity. When Rule 51 A says that the right of a teacher under that Rule will continue, provided they have not been appointed in permanent vacancies in schools under any other Educational Agency would only mean that a teacher who gets appointment subsequently under another Educational Agency would lose the benefit of the claim for appointment in the school in which he or she was working. The last limb of Rule 51 A, in my view, cannot be interpreted in any other manner. 13. The last limb of Rule 51 A, in my view, cannot be interpreted in any other manner. 13. From the pleadings on record and materials available, I see that the Educational Authorities have taken a view that the claim of the petitioner under Rule 51 A, on her being appointed as UPSA in June, 2006, which was a substantive vacancy, stood completely satisfied. The Authorities have concluded that after such appointment, the petitioner cannot say that she would continue to hold a claim until such time as she is appointed as an HSA. I see that the Authorities have acted correctly and in terms of the Rule because it is now explicit by its terms that a claim of a teacher under it is not confined to the same category from which he or she was relieved, but to any category - be that higher or lower. There cannot be any other way to look at it, according to me. In such circumstances, I have no other option but to hold that Exts.P3 and P6 orders, which are impugned in this writ petition, have been issued validly and under the support of the legal sanction available under the provisions of the KER. I cannot see that these orders suffer from arbitrariness, capriciousness or non-application of mind since I am of the view that the competent Authorities have acted correctly and in terms of their jurisdiction vested on them by the provisions of the Act and Rules. In such circumstances, I dismiss this writ petition confirming the order impugned in the writ petition. In the facts and circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs and the parties are directed to suffer their respective costs.