JUDGMENT & ORDER : 1. Both these appeals are directed against the judgment dated 6-10-2012 passed by the learned Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, West Tripura, Agartala in T.S.(MAC) No.342 of 2010 awarding a compensation of Rs. 14,14,103/- together with interest @ 6% per annum in favour of the claimant. MAC Appeal No.144 of 2012 is filed by the insurer for setting aside the impugned award on the ground that the claimant respondent No.1 was a gratuitous passenger and is not liable to satisfy the award so passed, whereas MAC Appeal No.1 of 2013 is filed by the claimant seeking enhancement of the compensation. 2. The facts giving rise to both the appeals are that on 24-7-2010, the claimant was proceeding towards Badarghat Stadium in Auto Truck bearing registration No. TR-01-K-0713 allegedly loaded with wooden files and bamboos for doing construction work and when the vehicle reached Shekertote market, the vehicle fell down by the side of the road while negotiating a turning. According to the claimant/appellant, the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the vehicle. Due to the accident, the claimant sustained several injuries on his body and was in a senseless condition and was taken to BRAM Teaching Hospital, Hapania where he got admitted as an indoor patient on 24-7-2010. After two days, he was shifted to AGMC and GBP Hospital, Agartala as indoor patient and was discharged on 21-8-2010 with an advice to attend the OPD of the Hospital. Accordingly, he attended the OPD of the Hospital. A major operation had to be performed by which the left hand below the shoulder of the claimant was amputated. The claimant is said to have become permanently disabled to the extent of 100% though the District Disability Board, West Tripura certified him to suffer permanent disability to the extent of over 80%. The claimant was 34 years old at the time of accident and used to earn Rs. 7,500/per month as a mason. The police registered a regular case over the accident i.e. Amtali P.S. Case No.79/2010 U/s 279/338 IPC. He claimed that he had incurred Rs. 1,00,000/- for his treatment and claimed a compensation of Rs. 31,50,000/-. 3. Both the owner of the vehicle, respondent 1, and the insurer, appellant, contested the claim petition and filed their respective affidavits. The police registered a regular case over the accident i.e. Amtali P.S. Case No.79/2010 U/s 279/338 IPC. He claimed that he had incurred Rs. 1,00,000/- for his treatment and claimed a compensation of Rs. 31,50,000/-. 3. Both the owner of the vehicle, respondent 1, and the insurer, appellant, contested the claim petition and filed their respective affidavits. The respondent 1 took the stand that the averments of the claimant are all false and concocted, and submitted that if at all any compensation was payable, the same would be paid by the insurer as the vehicle was insured with them. The insurer, in the written statement, also submitted that the claim of the claimant was a false and based on a concocted story and that the vehicle was a goods carrying vehicle and as per the terms of the policy, no passenger or person was allowed to travel in the vehicle in question. Nor was the claimant a labourer of the vehicle and as he was travelling in that vehicle not as a labourer, the policy did not cover him thereby absolving the insurer of any liability to satisfy the sward. The insurer, therefore, claimed that the claim petition was without merit and was liable to be dismissed. The Tribunal framed the following points for consideration: 1. Whether the vehicle met an accident on 24-7-2010 at about 9.45 AM near Sekerkote market on Agartala Bishalgarh road under Amtali PS due to rash and negligent driving of the vehicle? 2. Whether the petitioner Khudiram Das sustained injuries as a result of that accident? 3. Whether the petitioner is entitled to get any compensation and, if so, what shall be the reasonable amount? 4. Who shall make the payment of compensation, if any,? 4. The claimant examined himself and one other witness to prove his claim and submitted some documents, which were marked as Exbt. 1 Series. The insurer examined one of its Deputy Managers as DW-1 to rebut the case of the claimant. The owner of the vehicle did not examine himself or any other witness to rebut the case of the claimant. At the conclusion of the trial, the impugned order was passed. Aggrieved by the order of compensation, the insurer preferred MAC Appeal No.114 of 2012 for absolving it of satisfying the award, while the claimant filed MAC Appeal No.1 of 2013 for enhancement of the compensation. 5. At the conclusion of the trial, the impugned order was passed. Aggrieved by the order of compensation, the insurer preferred MAC Appeal No.114 of 2012 for absolving it of satisfying the award, while the claimant filed MAC Appeal No.1 of 2013 for enhancement of the compensation. 5. The first point for consideration is whether the claimant is a gratuitous passenger and is, as such, not covered by the insurance policy. If he is found to be so, he will not be entitled to any compensation from the insurer and the need for dealing with the other contentions will stand obviated. Before proceeding further, I may refer to the findings of the Tribunal in this behalf, which read thus: “Ld. Counsel appearing for the O.P. Insurance Company has contended that the petitioner (claimant) was a gratuitous passenger in the offending Auto Truck bearing No.TR-01-K-0713 which is meant for carrying goods. Ld. Counsel has also contended that the Insurance Policy in respect of the offending vehicle does not cover the risk of any passenger other than the owner of goods who is on board of the vehicle as it is a goods carrying vehicle. As per the Insurance Policy of the vehicle seat capacity of the offending Auto Truck is 2 (two) including the driver and as such the Petitioner being the gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle the O.P. Insurance Company is not liable to pay any compensation as per the Policy. Per contra, Ld. Counsel appearing for the Petitioner has contended that the Petitioner was carrying his goods i.e. the building materials in the offending vehicle and he was not the gratuitous passenger of the said vehicle. According to Ld. Counsel, the Petitioner, being the owner of the building material with which he boarded the vehicle with the knowledge of the driver of the offending vehicle and as such the Insurance Company cannot be absolved from paying compensation on behalf of the insured who is the owner of the offending vehicle. I have considered the submission of both sides. From the pleadings as well as the evidence on record, I have found that the Petitioner as a Mason has claimed that he had boarded the offending vehicle with wooden files, etc. in it in order to reach his construction side at Badharghat Stadium, Bishalgarh. I have considered the submission of both sides. From the pleadings as well as the evidence on record, I have found that the Petitioner as a Mason has claimed that he had boarded the offending vehicle with wooden files, etc. in it in order to reach his construction side at Badharghat Stadium, Bishalgarh. The assertion of the Petitioner is found to have been corroborated by the evidence of PW2 and the contents of the charge sheet which has been filed against the driver of the offending vehicle bearing No. TR-01-K-0713. The Petitioner is found to have dominium over the building materials with which he was travelling in the offending vehicle and as such I am of the considered opinion that the O.P. No.2 i.e. the insurer of the said vehicle cannot be absolved from the liability for making payment of the compensation amount which has been determined by this Tribunal. As such, the O.P. No.2, the New India Assurance Company Ltd., Agartala Branch is to make payment of the compensation with interest thereon to the Petitioner.” 6. In the instant case, the undisputed fact is that the injured was travelling in a goods vehicle. The incident took place on 24-7-2010 i.e. after the amendment of Section 147(1)(b)(i) the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 in 1994, which inserted the words “injury to any person, including owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle” after the words “against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the death or bodily”. The effect of this amendment came up for consideration before the Apex Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Satpal Singh, (2000) 1 SCC 237 . The Apex Court held as follows: “10. The proviso to the said subsection is not relevant here as it pertains to death or bodily injury to the employee mentioned therein. The effect of this amendment came up for consideration before the Apex Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Satpal Singh, (2000) 1 SCC 237 . The Apex Court held as follows: “10. The proviso to the said subsection is not relevant here as it pertains to death or bodily injury to the employee mentioned therein. Sub-section (2) provides that a policy of insurance shall cover any liability incurred in respect of any accident, up to the following limits, namely: “(a) save as provided in clause (b), the amount of liability incurred; (b) in respect of damage to any property of a third party, a limit of rupees six thousand: Provided that any policy of insurance issued with any limited liability and in force, immediately before the commencement of this Act, shall continue to be effective for a period of four months after such commencement or till the date of expiry of such policy whichever is earlier.” Hence, under sub-section (2), there is no upper limitation for the insurer regarding the amount of compensation awarded in respect of death or bodily injury of a victim of the accident. It is, therefore, apparent that the limit contained in the old Act has been removed and the policy should insure the liability incurred and cover injury to any person including owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle. The legislature has also taken care of even the policies which were in force on the date of commencement of the Act by specifically providing that any policy of insurance containing any limit regarding the insurer’s liability shall continue to be effective for a period of four months from commencement of the Act or till the date of expiry of such policy, whichever is earlier. This means, after the said period of four months, a new insurance policy consistent with the new Act is required to be obtained. 11. The result is that under the new Act an insurance policy covering third-party risk is not required to exclude gratuitous passengers in a vehicle, no matter that the vehicle is of any type or class. Hence the decisions rendered under the old Act vis-à-vis gratuitous passengers are of no avail while considering the liability of the insurance company in respect of any accident which occurred or would occur after the new Act came into force.” (Underlined for emphasis) 7. Hence the decisions rendered under the old Act vis-à-vis gratuitous passengers are of no avail while considering the liability of the insurance company in respect of any accident which occurred or would occur after the new Act came into force.” (Underlined for emphasis) 7. Thus, in terms of Satpal Singh case, even a gratuitous passenger including owner of goods or his representative were deemed to be covered by the Insurance Policy and were, therefore, entitled to be paid compensation by the insurer by indemnifying the owner of the vehicle. However, this decision was reviewed by the three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Asha Rani and others, (2003) 2 SCC 223 . This is what the Apex Court said: “8. Under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 the requirements of policies and limits of liability had been provided in Section 95. Proviso to Section 95(1) of the said Act unequivocally states that the policy shall not be required in case of a goods vehicle for passengers being carried in the said vehicle. In Mallawwa v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., (1999) 1 SCC 403 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 58 while approving the earlier decision of the Court in Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi case, Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi v. Ranjit Ginning & Pressing Co. Ltd., (1977) 2 SCC 745 the Court construed the provisions of Section 95(1)(b) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and held that while the expression “any person” and the expression “every motor vehicle” are in wide terms but by proviso (ii) it restricts the generality of the main provision by confining the requirement to cases where the vehicle is a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment, therefore, the vehicle had to be a vehicle in which passengers are carried. The Court further held that the goods vehicle cannot be held to be a passenger vehicle even if the vehicle was found to be used on some stray occasions for carrying passengers for hire or reward. Undoubtedly, Mallawwa case, (1999) 1 SCC 403 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 58 was dealing with a situation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. ** 9. In Satpal case, New India Assurance Co. Undoubtedly, Mallawwa case, (1999) 1 SCC 403 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 58 was dealing with a situation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. ** 9. In Satpal case, New India Assurance Co. v. Satpal Singh, (2000) 1 SCC 237 ; 2000 SCC (Cri) 130 the Court assumed that the provisions of Section 95(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 are identical with Section 147(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, as it stood prior to its amendment. But a careful scrutiny of the provisions would make it clear that prior to the amendment of 1994 it was not necessary for the insurer to insure against the owner of the goods or his authorised representative being carried in a goods vehicle. On an erroneous impression this Court came to the conclusion that the insurer would be liable to pay compensation in respect of the death or bodily injury caused to either the owner of the goods or his authorised representative when being carried in a goods vehicle the accident occurred. If the Motor Vehicles Amendment Act of 1994 is examined, particularly Section 46, by which the expression “injury to any person” in the original Act stood substituted by the expression “injury to any person including owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle”, the conclusion is irresistible that prior to the aforesaid Amendment Act of 1994, even if the widest interpretation is given to the expression “to any person” it will not cover either the owner of the goods or his authorised representative being carried in the vehicle. The objects and reasons of clause 46 also state that it seeks to amend Section 147 to include owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle for the purposes of liability under the insurance policy. The objects and reasons of clause 46 also state that it seeks to amend Section 147 to include owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle for the purposes of liability under the insurance policy. It is no doubt true that sometimes the legislature amends the law by way of amplification and clarification of an inherent position which is there in the statute, but a plain meaning being given to the words used in the statute, as it stood prior to its amendment of 1994, and as it stands subsequent to its amendment in 1994 and bearing in mind the objects and reasons engrafted in the amended provisions referred to earlier, it is difficult for us to construe that the expression “including owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle” which was added to the preexisting expression “injury to any person” is either clarificatory or amplification of the preexisting statute. On the other hand it clearly demonstrates that the legislature wanted to bring within the sweep of Section 147 and making it compulsory for the insurer to insure even in case of a goods vehicle, the owner of the goods or his authorised representative being carried in a goods vehicle when that vehicle met with an accident and the owner of the goods or his representative either dies or suffers bodily injury. The judgment of this Court in Satpal case, New India Assurance Co. v. Satpal Singh, (2000) 1 SCC 237 ; 2000 SCC(Cri) 130 therefore must be held to have not been correctly decided and the impugned judgment of the Tribunal as well as that of the High Court accordingly are set aside and these appeals are allowed. It is held that the insurer will not be liable for paying compensation to the owner of the goods or his authorised representative on being carried in a goods vehicle when that vehicle meets with an accident and the owner of the goods or his representative dies or suffers any bodily injury.” (Italics mine) 8. It is held that the insurer will not be liable for paying compensation to the owner of the goods or his authorised representative on being carried in a goods vehicle when that vehicle meets with an accident and the owner of the goods or his representative dies or suffers any bodily injury.” (Italics mine) 8. Thus, the decision in Satpal Singh case that even a gratuitous passengers including owner of goods or his representative are deemed to be covered by the Insurance Policy and are, therefore, entitled to be paid compensation by the insurer by indemnifying the owner of the vehicle, does not seem to be, with due respect, the correct law when the three-Judge Bench in Asha Rani case held that the insurer will not be liable for paying compensation to the owner of the goods or his authorised representative on being carried in a goods vehicle when that vehicle meets with an accident and the owner of the goods or his representative dies or suffers any bodily injury. This decision was followed by the Apex Court in National Insurance Company Ltd. v Bhukya Tara and others, (2010) 14 SCC 768 . That was a case where the deceased was travelling in a goods vehicle. The Apex Court held that the case was squarely covered by the decision of a three Judge Bench of the Court in New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Asha Rani (supra). 9. An attempt was, however, made by the P. Chakraborty, the learned counsel for the claimant that as there was solid proof that the claimant was travelling in the vehicle along with his goods and sustained grievous injuries when the vehicle met with the accident resulting in his permanent disablement, the insurer is liable to indemnify the owner of the vehicle. He strongly relies on the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Prem Bai and others, 2016 ACJ 1634 to fortify his submission. In that case, the insurer disputes its liability on the ground that the owner of the goods means only the person who travels in the cabin of the vehicle and since the deceased was not travelling in the cabin he was not representative of the owner of the goods. In that case, the insurer disputes its liability on the ground that the owner of the goods means only the person who travels in the cabin of the vehicle and since the deceased was not travelling in the cabin he was not representative of the owner of the goods. Refuting this contention, the High Court held that the vehicle was a small auto-rickshaw type loading vehicle in which there was no cabin so that the owner of the goods could sit in the cabin and that the owner of the goods and his representatives can travel in the goods vehicle and it is immaterial whether the deceased was sitting in a cabin or not as there would be no violation of policy conditions if a representative of the owner of goods is not sitting in the cabin. Apparently, on facts so found, the High Court held that the insurer was not absolved of the liability to satisfy the award. With due respect, I am unable to accept the view taken the Hon’ble Madhya Pradesh High Court in Prem Bai and others case (supra) as it ran counter to the law laid down by the Apex Court in Asha Rani case (supra). The object of the amending Section 147(1)(b)(i) by inserting the words “injury to any person, including owner of the goods or his authorised representative in the vehicle” therein in Section 2 of the Act of 1994 cannot be overlooked. This was recognised by the Apex Court in Asha Rani case when it observed that the amendment “clearly demonstrates that the legislature wanted to bring within the sweep of Section 147 and making it compulsory for the insurer to insure even in case of a goods vehicle or his authorised representative being carried in a goods vehicle when that vehicle met with an accident and the owner of goods or his representative either dies or suffers bodily injury.” Therefore, when the owner of the goods or his representative such as the claimant was not insured at the time of the accident, the insurer cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be held to be liable to satisfy the award. If the accident had taken place prior to 14-11-1994 i.e. before the coming into force of Section 46 of the Act 54 of 1994 amending Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 with the insertion noticed earlier, things would have been different and the decisions in Satpal Singh case (supra) or Prem Bai and other (Supra) would have come to the rescue of the claimant. Unfortunately, that is not the case here. 10. For example, in one of the cases i.e. CA @ SLPs (C) Nos.7288-90 of 2003, decided in National Insurance Company v. Cholleti Bharatamma, (2008) 1 SCC 423 , the Apex Court followed Asha Rani case (supra). To understand the implication of Cholleti Bharatamma case (supra), I take the pain of reproducing below paras 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31and 32 of the report, which read thus: “CAs @ SLPs (C) Nos.728890 of 2003 26. In this case, the accident took place on 15-1-997. Indisputably, the respondent was travelling as a passenger. The Tribunal, while determining the issue as to whether the accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the first respondent driver of lorry AEW 5199, held: .“… The lorry was overturned and caused the instantaneous death of four passengers. He received small injuries. He also deposed that the accident took place due to the negligence of the driver of the said lorry. On perusing his evidence I am satisfied that he is a truthful witness. He was travelling in the crime vehicle along with the deceased along with his goods as per his evidence….” 27. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that from the aforementioned finding, it is evident that the respondent was travelling as the owner of the goods. We do not think that the said submission is correct. PW 2, in his evidence, stated: “I am doing tamarind business. I witnessed the accident which took place about 3 years back at about 6 a.m. at Borrampalem junction beyond Talluru. At the time of the accident I was in the crime lorry by the side of the driver. My self and 6 others were carrying tamarind in that lorry belonging to us. We boarded the lorry along with our load of tamarind at Dharamavaram to go to Rajanagaram. At the time of the accident I was in the crime lorry by the side of the driver. My self and 6 others were carrying tamarind in that lorry belonging to us. We boarded the lorry along with our load of tamarind at Dharamavaram to go to Rajanagaram. We were selling the tamarind at Rajanagaram in retail by taking the tamarind there in our lorry from our village of Dharamavaram.” 28. The Tribunal, therefore, correctly recorded that according to PW 2, he was travelling with his goods as owner thereof and not the deceased. 29. Shaik Shabbeer Pasha and Shaik Nazeer Pasha are the driver and owner respectively of the lorry which was travelling to Rajahmundry from Visakhapatnam. At Borrampalem, while trying to overtake another speeding lorry, the same turned turtle. Three persons who were travelling in the vehicle had been killed. Claims for compensation were filed before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The appellants therein opposed the claim. The Tribunal awarded compensation to the legal heirs of the deceased. 30. Challenging the legality of the award of the Tribunal, learned counsel for the appellant contended that the deceased were gratuitous passengers and the policy did not cover their lives. Learned counsel also submitted that the decision in Satpal Singh case, (2000) 1 SCC 237 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 130 : 2000 ACJ 1 being referred to a larger Bench in Asha Rani case, (2003) 2 SCC 223 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 493 the same was not a binding authority. 31. While stating that the submissions of learned counsel for the Insurance Company could not be sustained, the High Court dismissed the appeal of the Insurance Company following Satpal Singh, (2000) 1 SCC 237 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 130 : 2000 ACJ 1. 32. In view of the nature of evidence available before us, we have no other option but to set aside the judgment. These appeals are, therefore, allowed accordingly. There shall be no order as to costs in each case.” 11. Be that as it may, the question which remains to be decided is whether the principle of “pay and recover” is applicable to the facts of this case. These appeals are, therefore, allowed accordingly. There shall be no order as to costs in each case.” 11. Be that as it may, the question which remains to be decided is whether the principle of “pay and recover” is applicable to the facts of this case. As the decision of this Court on this aspect of the matter is likely to have wide ramifications in this State, I may refer to the latest position of the law as enunciated by the Apex Court in Manuara Khatun and others v. Rajesh Kr. Singh and others, (2017) 4 SCC 796 . Paras 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 21 of the report are important, and are extensively reproduced below in extenso: “13. The only question, which arises for consideration in these appeals, is whether the appellants are entitled for an order against the insurer of the offending vehicle, i.e. (Respondent No. 3) to pay the awarded sum to the appellants and then to recover the said amount from the insured (owner of the offending vehicle Tata Sumo) Respondent No.1 in the same proceedings. 14. The aforesaid question, in our opinion, remains no more res integra. As we notice, it was the subject matter of several decisions of this Court rendered by three-Judge Bench and two Judge Bench in past viz. National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Baljit Kaur, (2004) 2 SCC 1 , National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Challa Upendra Rao, (2004) 8 SCC 517 , National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kaushalaya Devi, (2008) 8 SCC 246 , National Insurance Co. v. Roshan Lal, (2017) 4 SCC 803 and National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Parvathneni, (2009) 8 SCC 785 . 15. This question also fell for consideration recently in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Saju P. Paul, (2013) 2 SCC 41 wherein this Court took note of entire previous case law on the subject mentioned above and examined the question in the context of Section 147 of the Act. While allowing the appeal filed by the Insurance Company by reversing the judgment (2011) SCC Online Ker 3791 of the High Court, it was held on facts that since the victim was travelling in offending vehicle as "gratuitous passenger" and hence, the insurance company cannot be held liable to suffer the liability arising out of accident on the strength of the insurance policy. However, this Court keeping in view the benevolent object of the Act and other relevant factors arising in the case, issued the directions against the Insurance Company to pay the awarded sum to the claimants and then to recover the said sum from the insured in the same proceedings by applying the principle of "pay and recover". 16. R.M. Lodha, J. (as his Lordship then was and later became CJI) speaking for the Bench held in paras 20 and 26 as under: (Saju P. Paul Case SCC pp. 52 & 55) "20. The next question that arises for consideration is whether in the peculiar facts of this case a direction could be issued to the Insurance Company to first satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle (Respondent 2 herein). * * * 26. The pendency of consideration of the above questions by a larger Bench does not mean that the course that was followed in Baljit Kaur, (2004) 2 SCC 1 and Challa Upendra Rao, (2004) 8 SCC 517 should not be followed, more so in a peculiar fact situation of this case. In the present case, the accident occurred in 1993. At that time, the claimant was 28 years old. He is now about 48 years. The claimant was a driver on heavy vehicle and due to the accident he has been rendered permanently disabled. He has not been able to get compensation so far due to the stay order passed by this Court. He cannot be compelled to struggle further for recovery of the amount. The Insurance Company has already deposited the entire awarded amount pursuant to the order of this Court passed on 1-8-2011 [National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Saju P. Paul, (2013) 2 SCC 41 ] and the said amount has been invested in a fixed deposit account. Having regard to these peculiar facts of the case in hand, we are satisfied that the claimant (Respondent 1) may be allowed to withdraw the amount deposited by the Insurance Company before this Court along with accrued interest. The Insurance Company (the appellant) thereafter may recover the amount so paid from the owner (Respondent 2 herein). Having regard to these peculiar facts of the case in hand, we are satisfied that the claimant (Respondent 1) may be allowed to withdraw the amount deposited by the Insurance Company before this Court along with accrued interest. The Insurance Company (the appellant) thereafter may recover the amount so paid from the owner (Respondent 2 herein). The recovery of the amount by the Insurance Company from the owner shall be made by following the procedure as laid down by this Court in Challa Upendra Rao (2004) 8 SCC 517 .” 17. The facts of the case at hand are somewhat identical to the facts of the case mentioned supra because here also we find that the deceased were found travelling as "gratuitous passengers" in the offending vehicle and it was for this reason, the insurance companies were exonerated. In Saju P. Paul case (2013) 2 SCC 41 also having held that the victim was "gratuitous passenger", this Court issued directions against the Insurer of the offending vehicle to first satisfy the awarded sum and then to recover the same from the insured in the same proceedings. 18. The learned counsel for Respondent 3 (United India Insurance Co. Ltd.), however, contended that the facts of the case at hand are not identical to the one involved in Saju P. Paul (supra) and hence the law laid down therein cannot be applied to the facts of the case at hand. The learned counsel pointed out that firstly, the awarded compensation in this case is quite substantial and secondly, it is not yet paid to the claimants. The learned counsel also submitted that since the question involved herein is referred to a larger Bench and hence this Court should not give such directions, as prayed by the appellants, against the Insurance Company. 19. We find no merit in any of the submissions. Firstly, as mentioned above, we find marked similarity in the facts of this case and the one involved in Saju P. Paul Case (supra). Secondly, merely because the compensation has not yet been paid to the claimants though the case is quite old (16 years) like the one in Saju P. Paul Case (supra), it cannot be a ground to deny the claimants the relief claimed in these appeals. Secondly, merely because the compensation has not yet been paid to the claimants though the case is quite old (16 years) like the one in Saju P. Paul Case (supra), it cannot be a ground to deny the claimants the relief claimed in these appeals. Thirdly, this Court has already considered and rejected the argument regarding not granting of the relief of the nature claimed herein due to pendency of the reference to a larger Bench as would be clear from Para 26 of the judgment in Saju P. Paul case (supra). That apart, the learned counsel for the appellants stated at the bar that the reference made to the larger Bench has since been disposed of by keeping the issue undecided. It is for this reason also, the argument does not survive any more. 20. It is for all these reasons, we find no good ground to take a different view than the one consistently being taken by this Court in all previous decisions, which are referred supra, in this regard. 21. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the view that the direction to United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (Respondent 3) they being the insurer of the offending vehicle which was found involved in causing accident due to negligence of its driver needs to be issued directing them (United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Respondent No.3) to first pay the awarded sum to the appellants (claimants) and then to recover the paid awarded sum from the owner of the offending vehicle (Tata Sumo) Respondent 1 in execution proceedings arising in this very case as per the law laid down in Para 26 of Saju P. Paul case (supra). 12. What has emerged out of the paragraphs extracted above is that the mere pendency of the issue concerning the principle of “pay and recover” before the larger Bench of the Apex Court does not stand in the way of this Court in applying the said principle to the facts of this case. 12. What has emerged out of the paragraphs extracted above is that the mere pendency of the issue concerning the principle of “pay and recover” before the larger Bench of the Apex Court does not stand in the way of this Court in applying the said principle to the facts of this case. Even though this is a case of non-liability of the appellant to satisfy the award since the claimant-respondent is found to be a gratuitous passenger, the appellant is still required to pay the compensation so awarded and thereafter recover the same from the owner of the vehicle, i.e. respondent No. 2 (Sri Parimal Saha in MAC No. 144/2012) Biswajit Debbarma) in accordance with the procedure laid down in Challa Upendra Rao case (supra). No other contention is raised by the appellant-insurer in challenging the impugned judgment. 13. Coming now to MAC Appeal No. 1 of 2013 preferred by the claimant, it is contended by Ms. S. Deb Gupta, the learned counsel for the claimant-appellant that it was not possible for the claimant to prove with bills/vouchers the actual expenses incurred by him for fooding, lodging, transportation and attendant during the priod of his treatment and, as such, some element of guesswork should have been done by the Tribunal so that the clamant receives fair and just compensation, which, in this case, would come to Rs. 1,00,000/- under the head of medical expenses. The learned counsel further submits that the Tribunal has completely overlooked the fact that the age of the claimant was 34 years and 4 months at the time of the accident, which resulted in adopting the wrong multiplier of 15 whereas it should have adopted a multiplier of 16. It is also contended by the learned counsel that the Tribunal has failed to add future income of 30% to his salary in consonance with the decision of the Apex court in Sarla Verma case (supra). That apart, argues the learned counsel, the claimant is entitled to a sum of Rs. 1,89,000/- as loss of earning for his treatment, which is still continuing, another sum of Rs.1,50,000/- for future medical expenses and replacement of artificial limb, a further sum of Rs. 3,00,000/- as damages for mental and physical shock, pain and sufferings, a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- for loss of amenities of life, a sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- for inconvenience, hardship, etc. 3,00,000/- as damages for mental and physical shock, pain and sufferings, a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- for loss of amenities of life, a sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- for inconvenience, hardship, etc. For all these reasons, maintains the learned counsel for the claimant, the compensation amount payable to the claimant-appellant comes to Rs. 30,86,200/- and not Rs. 14,14,103/- awarded by the Tribunal. 14. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the submissions advanced on behalf of the learned counsel appearing for the rival parties. I have also carefully examined the impugned judgment as well as the materials on record. The Tribunal has assessed the income of the claimant at Rs. 7,000/- per month on the basis of the Income Certificate issued by the Deputy Collector and Magistrate, Bishalgarh Revenue Circle. The claimant claims that he used to work as a Mason at the time of the accident and earned a sum of Rs. 7,500/- per month as an income. Though the Tribunal has erroneously accepted the Income Certificate issued by the Deputy Collector and Magistrate, who is not the competent authority to issue such certificate, and in the process over-assessed his income as Rs. 7,000/- per month, in the absence of challenge to this assessment, I decline to interfere therewith. There is no dispute at the bar that there was amputation of the left hand of the claimant below his shoulder. In the Disability Certificate issued by the District Disability Board, Agartala, the percentage of physical disability of the claimant is certified to be 80%. It is a well-settled proposition of law that compensation is to be awarded on basis of the loss of earning capacity of the claimant and not on the basis of physical disability per se. In most of the cases, the percentage of economic loss, that is, the percentage of loss of earning capacity arising from a permanent disability. Effect of the permanent disability on the earning capacity of the injured has to be quantified in terms of money, to arrive at the future loss of earnings. In the instant case, as a mason, which requires use of both hands, the claimant could hardly continue his occupation as before. In Nagarajappa v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., (2011) 13 SCC 323 , where the accident left the appellant with one useless, the Apex Court held: “9. In the instant case, as a mason, which requires use of both hands, the claimant could hardly continue his occupation as before. In Nagarajappa v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., (2011) 13 SCC 323 , where the accident left the appellant with one useless, the Apex Court held: “9. On perusal of the doctor’s evidence with respect to the nature of injuries suffered by the appellant, the appellant was found, inter alia, to be suffering from the following disabilities as a result of the accident—“gross deformity of the left forearm, wrist and hand, wasting and weakness of the muscles of the left upper limb and shortening of the left upper limb by 1 cm”. As a result, the doctor stated that the appellant could not work as a coolie and could not also do any other manual work. The doctor assessed permanent residual physical disability of the upper limb at 68% and 22-23% of the whole body. 10. The appellant is working as a manual labourer, for which he requires the use of both his hands. The fact that the accident has left him with one useless hand will severely affect his ability to perform his work as a coolie or any other manual work, and this has also been certified by the doctor. Thus, while awarding compensation it has to be kept in mind that the appellant is to do manual work for the rest of his life without full use of his left hand, and this is bound to affect the quality of his work and also his ability to find work considering his disability. Hence, while computing loss of future income, disability should be taken to be 68% and not 20%, as was done by the Tribunal and the High Court. Our view is supported by the ratio in Raj Kumar, Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar, (2011) 1 SCC 343 and from the fact that the appellant is severely hampered and perhaps forever handicapped from performing his occupation as a coolie.” 15. The Tribunal, however, held that “So, considering the nature of work of the petitioner, his percentage of disability would be 100%. The Tribunal, however, held that “So, considering the nature of work of the petitioner, his percentage of disability would be 100%. So, I consider that the petitioner sustained 100% disability due to the said vehicular accident though the Disability Board had been (?) issued the Disability Certificate to the extent of 80% disability.” In my opinion, the Tribunal has completely overlooked the above decision of the Apex Court. However, since no challenge is made to this finding, I decline to interfere with this finding also. Had challenges were made to the above two findings, the amount of compensation payable to the claimant could have been decreased to some exent. Having said that, there are some aspects of the matter, which have escaped the attention of the Tribunal. The claimant ought to have been awarded a lump sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- for mental agony, pain and suffering, another sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- for loss of amenities, Rs. 75,000/- for medical expenses instead of Rs. 33,103/- , and Rs. 25,000/- for litigation expenses. Thus, the total amount of compensation payable to the claimant is enhanced to 16,31,000/- (i.e. Rs. 12,60,000/- + Rs. 21,000/- + Rs. 75,000/- + Rs. 1,50,000/- + Rs. 1,00,000/- + Rs. 25,000/-= = Rs. 16,31,000/-) from Rs. 14,14,103/- , and the same will carry interest @ 9% per annum from the date of the claim petition. 16. The offshoot of the foregoing discussion is that both the appeals are disposed of with the following directions: (a) The insurer-appellant (New India Assurance Co. Ltd.) shall now deposit a sum of Rs. 16,31,000/- with this Registry together with interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of the claim petition within two months from the date of receipt of this judgment for payment to the claimant. (b) Needless to say, any amount already deposited or paid by the insurer shall stand deducted from the compensation with interest enhanced/awarded herein. (c) It shall be open to the insurer to recover the compensation with interest paid by it from the owner of the vehicle in accordance with the procedure laid lawon by the Apex Court from time to time. (d) The impugned judgment stands modified in the manner and to the extent indicated above. (c) It shall be open to the insurer to recover the compensation with interest paid by it from the owner of the vehicle in accordance with the procedure laid lawon by the Apex Court from time to time. (d) The impugned judgment stands modified in the manner and to the extent indicated above. (e) Half of the compensation amount will be released to the claimant immediately after satisfying the usual formalities without further reference to this Court while the remaining amount will be kept in a fixed deposit in any nationalized Bank for a period of five years; the appellant may withdraw the yearly interest accrued thereon till the date of expiry of the fixed deposit after satisfying the usual formalities. (f) Transmit the L.C. record.