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2017 DIGILAW 369 (GAU)

Wepretso-u Therie v. State of Nagaland, Represented through the Commissioner & Secretary to the Government of Nagaland, Works & Housing Department

2017-03-23

SONGKHUPCHUNG SERTO

body2017
JUDGMENT & ORDER : 1. This is a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for setting aside the impugned letter No. WH/EST/161/2012 dated 19/05/2015 of the Under Secretary to the Government of Nagaland Works & Housing Department, Establishment Branch addressed to the Engineer-in-Chief NPWD, Nagaland, conveying partial modification of the Government approval conveyed vide letter dated 19/05/2015. The same is reproduced herein below: “GOVERNMENT OF NAGALAND WORKS AND HOUSING DEPARTMENT ESTABLISHMENT BRANCH WH/EST/161/2012 Dated, Kohima the 19th May, 2015 To, The Engineer-in-Chief, NPWD Nagaland Kohima Sub:- Approval for appointment to the post of SA under PWD (R&B)-partial modification reg. Sir, I am directed to refer to this department’s letter of even number dated 13th May 2015 on the subject cited above and to say that in partial modification of the Government approval accorded in respect of Smti Wepretso-u Therie is cancelled and Shri Pelo Kupa is approved for appointment to the post of Sectional Assistant (SA) against the vacancy of Shri Kepeyie SA retired on 31-03-2015 under PWD (R&B) Pfutsero Division. Formal appointment order may be issued at your end under intimation to this Department as the original application along with its enclosures has already been returned vide the letter quoted above. Yours faithfully (NEILHIPE K. MERO) Under Secretary to the Govt. of Nagaland” 2. The case of the petitioner as submitted by Mr. C.T. Jamir, learned Sr. Counsel for the petitioner is as follows: (i) That in pursuance of the Government approval conveyed vide letter No. WH/EST/161/2012, dated 13/05/2015, 3(three) persons including the petitioner, were appointed to the post of Sectional Assistant under PWD (R&B) Department, by separate orders. The petitioner’s appointment was issued vide Order No. PW(E1)-33/COR/R&B/ 2014, dated 20/05/2015. Immediately after the issuance of the said appointment order, the petitioner joined the office of the Executive Engineer, PWD (R&B) Pfutsero Division, on 21/05/2015 by submitting his joining report dated 21/05/2015. While serving in the post, to her surprise, she came across a copy of the impugned letter, which was sent to the Engineer-in-Chief PWD Nagaland (given above), with an attempt to appoint Shri. Pelo Kupa (respondent No. 5) to the same post. Realising the motive and intent of the respondents to deprive her of her recent appointment and to appoint the said person (respondent No. 5) in her place, the petitioner filed the writ petition praying as stated above. Realising the motive and intent of the respondents to deprive her of her recent appointment and to appoint the said person (respondent No. 5) in her place, the petitioner filed the writ petition praying as stated above. (ii) That when the petition was moved on 25/05/2015 an interim order was passed suspending the operation of the letter dated 19/05/2015 conveying the cancellation of the approval for appointment of the petitioner to the post of Sectional Assistant and at the same time according approval for appointment of Shri. Pelo Kupa. Because of the stay order passed by this Court the petitioner has continued in service but, no salary has ever been paid to her till date. And that since the intention of the authorities as manifested by the aforesaid letter, was to replace adhoc appointment with another adhoc appointment the same is illegal therefore, the petitioner has approached this Court to set aside and quash the same. (iii) That in order to ascertain the basis or the reason for issuing the impugned letter dated 19/05/2015, the petitioner made enquiry on her own and it came to light that the same was sent at the instance of the Chief Minister who was then the concerned Minister of the Department. And this fact has not been denied by the respondents No. 1 to 4 in their counter affidavit, therefore, it has to be assumed that the Government’s move was to replace the petitioner by the private respondent No. 5 for extraneous considerations, and not based on just and fair decision making process. 3. Thereafter, the learned counsel pointed out what is stated at paragraph-9 and 11 of the counter affidavit of the respondent Nos. 1 to 4, wherein it is stated that the Government who has the authority to issue appointment order also has the authority to cancel the same therefore, there is no illegality or wrong in its decision to cancel the appointment of the petitioner, and submitted that this is manifestation of nepotism, arbitrariness and autocratic attitude and way of functioning embedded in the Government, specially while dealing with matters of employment in Government services where such things should have no place. The learned counsel further submitted that the private respondent No. 5 in his affidavit in opposition has submitted that the appointment of the petitioner was illegal because she was already over age at the time of appointment. The learned counsel further submitted that the private respondent No. 5 in his affidavit in opposition has submitted that the appointment of the petitioner was illegal because she was already over age at the time of appointment. This objection is supported with a provisional certificate of Class-VIII, dated 10/7/2015, issued by the Headmaster, Government High School Zuketsa. After the same was filed by the respondent No. 5, the petitioner wrote a letter dated 12/06/2016, at annexure-B of reply affidavit, to the Headmaster seeking clarification regarding the same. The Headmaster through his letter dated 13/07/2016, clarified that in the school record, in the academic year 1987, the name of Wepretso-u under Roll. No. 25 was found, but no name as Wepretso-u Therie was found. According to the learned counsel, this shows that the provisional certificate on which basis the respondent No. 5 claimed that the petitioner was over age at the time of issuance of the appointment order is not that of the petitioner therefore, it cannot be relied upon. The learned counsel also submitted that for determining the age of a person electoral roll is not a reliable document, but the most reliable documents are the birth certificate and academic certificates of the person. The learned counsel drew my attention to annexure-D, annexure-E, annexure-F, annexure-G, annexure-H of the reply affidavit filed by the petitioner. Annexure-D is the birth certificate of the petitioner issued by the Government of Nagaland, Department of Economic & Statistics showing the date of birth of the petitioner as 12/10/1990. Annexure-E is the mark statement of the petitioner in Secondary School examination issued by National Institute of Open Schooling. In this mark statement, date of birth of the petitioner is shown as 12/10/1990. Annexure-F is the provisional certificate of the petitioner for having passed the secondary school examination issued by the National Institute of Open Schooling showing the date of birth of the petitioner as 12/10/1990. Annexure-G is Migration cum Transfer certificate of the petitioner issued by the National Institute of Open Schooling showing the date of birth of the petitioner as 12/10/1990 and Annexure-H is the transfer/leaving certificate of the petitioner issued by the National Institute of Open Schooling showing the date of birth of the petitioner as 12/10/1990. Annexure-G is Migration cum Transfer certificate of the petitioner issued by the National Institute of Open Schooling showing the date of birth of the petitioner as 12/10/1990 and Annexure-H is the transfer/leaving certificate of the petitioner issued by the National Institute of Open Schooling showing the date of birth of the petitioner as 12/10/1990. After showing all these certificates, the learned counsel submitted that the petitioner did not crossed the age of 35 years at the time of her appointment, therefore, the ground on which the respondent No. 5 had challenge the appointment of the petitioner has no basis at all. It is also submitted by the learned Counsel that all these certificates were documents issued to the petitioner much before the dispute about her appointment came about, therefore, there is no reason to doubt the genuineness or veracity of such documents. The learned counsel re-enforcing or reiterating his submission submitted further that the respondents were trying to follow the policy of pick and choose according to their own whims and fancies which amounts to discrimination, therefore, the same cannot be allowed. He also submitted that the letter dated 19/05/2015, which is impugned herein is a document issued back dated in order to scuttle the appointment of the petitioner. And, if such letter was actually issued on the date mentioned and given to the department the appointment order dated 20/05/2015 of the petitioner could never have been issued. Therefore, such letter issued under such circumstances, with such motive and intension which will result in discrimination and arbitrariness deserves to be set aside and quash. 4. Mr. N. Angami, learned Government Advocate who appears on behalf of the State respondents briefly submitted that the Government who can issue the appointment order has also the authority to cancel the same therefore, there is nothing wrong in the impugned letter. 5. Mr. Sentiyanger, learned counsel who appeared on behalf of the private respondent No. 5 submitted that for appointment to Government services, the Government should advertised the vacancies and give opportunity to everybody to apply for the same and in this case, since it was done without following such process, the appointment should be cancelled and fresh advertisement should be issued. 6. Sentiyanger, learned counsel who appeared on behalf of the private respondent No. 5 submitted that for appointment to Government services, the Government should advertised the vacancies and give opportunity to everybody to apply for the same and in this case, since it was done without following such process, the appointment should be cancelled and fresh advertisement should be issued. 6. From the facts and circumstances submitted by the learned counsels and the documents filed by both the parties, what has clearly emerged are as follows: (i) that the petitioner was appointed to the post of Sectional Assistant with the approval of the Government; (ii) that the Government after thought had issued the impugned letter to remove the petitioner and replace her with another adhoc appointment which is not permissible in law as it was enunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana and Others vs. Piara Singh and Others, reported in (1992) 4 SCC 118 , (relevant paragraph 46). The relevant portion of the same is given here below:- “46. Secondly, an adhoc or temporary employee should not be replaced by another adhoc or temporary employee; he must be replaced only by a regularly selected employee. This is necessary to avoid arbitrary action on the part of the appointing authority.” (iii) that the petitioner’s age was only 25 years at the time of her appointment, as her date of birth shown as 12/10/1990 in her appointment order dated 20/05/2015 is supported by her birth certificate and academic certificates. Therefore, the same has to be accepted; (iv) that no appointment has been made to the post, the petitioner was appointed due to the stay order passed by this Court on 25/05/2015, but, no pay has been given to the petitioner since the day her appointment order was issued; (v) that the impugned letter was issued at the instance of people in power without any reasonable reason or basis. To say the least, on the face of the letter discrimination, arbitrariness and nepotism are writ large. Therefore, it cannot be allowed to subsist or to run its course, as not to do so, would mean allowing it to disturb the balance of equality in matters of appointment in Government service, and also, to violate the law enunciated by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Piara Singh (supra). Therefore, it cannot be allowed to subsist or to run its course, as not to do so, would mean allowing it to disturb the balance of equality in matters of appointment in Government service, and also, to violate the law enunciated by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Piara Singh (supra). Further, to contend that a candidate already selected and appointed can be replaced by another candidate without any reasonable reason would be to deny a fundamental principle of our constitutional life. 7. I am unable to agree with the submission of the learned Government Advocate that because the Government issued the appointment order it can also issue cancellation order in any manner and whenever it chooses. Because, Government has to act within the parameters of law and not according to the whims and fancies of the man or people in power. In a democratic system of Government, since the Government is of the people, by the people and for the people it is required to function according to the laws of the land that flows from the Constitution of the Country which is the cannon of all laws. Anybody or any person however, highly placed he may be is not above the law. The power given by the law of the land has to be exercised as per the law of the land. Discretion given by law has to be exercised according to and within the parameters of the law. It is never unfettered or free from the bound of law. Discretion guided by or colored with nepotism, favoritism, arbitrariness and discrimination has no place in our constitutional scheme. On this, what the Hon’ble Supreme Court said in the case of Suman Gupta and Others vs. State of J & K and Others, reported in (1983) 4 SCC 339 and in the case of Shri Sitaram Sugar Company Limited and Another vs. Union of India and Others, reported in (1990) 3 SCC 223 are both relevant and instructive. Therefore, the relevant portions of the two judgments are given herein below:- In the case of Suman Gupta and Others vs. State of J & K and Others, reported in (1983) 4 SCC 339 . Therefore, the relevant portions of the two judgments are given herein below:- In the case of Suman Gupta and Others vs. State of J & K and Others, reported in (1983) 4 SCC 339 . “6....................We think it beyond dispute that the exercise of all administrative power vested in public authority must be structured within a system of controls informed by both relevance and reason-relevance in relation to the object which it seeks to serve, and reason in regard to the manner in which it attempts to do so. Wherever the exercise of such power affects individual rights, there can be no greater assurance protecting its valid exercise than its governance by these twin tests. A stream of case law radiating from the now well known decision of this Court in Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India, has laid down in clear terms that. Article 14 of the Constitution is violated by powers and procedures which in themselves result in unfairness and arbitrariness. It must be remembered that our entire constitutional system is founded in the Rule of Law, and in any system so designed it is impossible to conceive of legitimate power which is arbitrary in character and travels beyond the bounds of reason.” In the case of Shri Sitaram Sugar Company Limited and Another vs. Union of India and Others, reported in (1990) 3 SCC 223 . “46. Any arbitrary action, whether in the nature of a legislative or administrative or quasi-judicial exercise of power, is liable to attract the prohibition of Article 14 of the Constitution. As stated in E.P. Royappa vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Another, (1974) 2 SCR 348 "equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic while the other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch." Unguided and unrestricted power is affected by the vice of discrimination: Mrs. Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India & Another, (1978) 1 SCC 248 at 293-294. The principle of equality enshrined in Article 14 must guide every State action, whether it be legislative, executive, or quasi-judicial: Ramana Dayaram Shetty vs. The International Airport Authority of India & Others, (1979) 3 SCR 1014 at 1042; Ajay Hasia & Others vs. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi & Others, (1981) 1 SCC 722 and D.S. Nakara & Others vs. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305 . 47. 47. Power delegated by statute is limited by its terms and subordinate to its objects. The delegate must act in good faith, reasonably, intra vires the power granted, and on relevant consideration of material facts. All his decisions, whether characterised as legislative or administrative or quasi-judicial, must be in harmony with the Constitution and other laws of the land. They must be "reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling legislation". See Leila Mourning v. Family Publications Service, 411 US 356, 36 L Ed. 2d. If they are manifestly unjust or oppressive or outrageous or directed to an unauthorised end or do not tend in some degree to the accomplishment of the objects of delegation, courts might well say, "Parliament never intended to give authority to make such rules; they are unreasonable and ultra vires." per Lord Russel of Killowen, C.J. in Kruse vs. Johnson, (1988) 2 Q.B. 91, 99. 48. The doctrine of judicial review implies that the repository of power acts within the bounds of the power delegated and he does not abuse his power. He must act reasonably and in good faith. It is not only sufficient that an instrument is intra vires the parent Act, but it must also be consistent with the constitutional principles: Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 , 314-315.” Viewing the impugned letter in the light of what has been stated and in the light of what the Hon’ble Supreme Court has said in the above given cases this Court has no hesitation in holding that the same is discriminatory, arbitrary and is coloured with favourtism and nepotism. 8. The submission of the learned counsel for the respondent No. 5 that advertisement should be issued is well appreciated but it is a little out of the context, because in this case we are dealing with a person who has been appointed on adhoc/temporary appointment and whose appointment is sought to be replaced by another adhoc/temporary appointment. From his submission, it appears that the private respondent No. 5 has no case at all. In view of what has been stated above, I find merit in the case of the petitioner, accordingly, the impugned letter dated 19/05/2015, is set aside and quashed. Therefore, the petitioner should not be disturbed or removed from her service till a regular appointment is made to the post as per law. In view of what has been stated above, I find merit in the case of the petitioner, accordingly, the impugned letter dated 19/05/2015, is set aside and quashed. Therefore, the petitioner should not be disturbed or removed from her service till a regular appointment is made to the post as per law. Further, it is also directed that the petitioner should be paid her monthly salary and allowances admissible under the rules. With this, the writ petition is disposed.