JUDGMENT Ajay Mohan Goel, J. —By way of this appeal, appellant/State has challenged the judgment passed by the Court of learned Sessions Judge, Kinnaur, Sessions Division at Rampur Bushahr, in Sessions Trial No. 0100053/2010, dated 22.03.2013, vide which, learned Trial Court acquitted the present respondent (hereinafter referred to as ''accused'') for commission of offences punishable under Section 376 and 417 of Indian Penal Code (in short ''IPC''). 2. The case of the prosecution in brief was that prosecutrix, who was studying in 10th class, came in contact with the accused who fell in love with her. Prosecutrix also out of ignorance started loving the accused who allured her to marry her and also established physical relations with her on this pretext. As per prosecution, accused established physical relations with prosecutrix on the pretext of marriage and he also made her to run from her house and thereafter solemnized marriage with her at Hattu temple in the absence of Pandit and relatives. Further the case of the prosecution was that after the marriage, accused brought the prosecutrix to Shimla where she was kept in a rented house at Sanjauli/Dhalli for about three months and thereafter she was taken to village Hutli where accused owned some land. Prosecutrix was kept there for some time and when prosecutrix asked the accused to take her to his parental house, he told her that firstly he would go alone and thereafter will take her after ensuring that everything was settled. However, later on prosecutrix was informed by accused that his parents had refused to accept her in their house and he had to marry somewhere else. From village Hutli, when prosecutrix went to house of accused, he threatened to kill her with a sword. On this, prosecutrix went to Police Station, Kumarsain where she was told to file case in the Court. When the parents of prosecutrix came to know that she was pregnant, they refused to keep her in their house and asked her to live with the accused. In the meantime, she went to house of her maternal uncle at Shimla who also refused to keep her when he came to know that she was pregnant. Prosecutrix gave birth to a child at Rippon Hospital, Shimla on 28.06.2009. As per prosecution case, accused even refused to own newly born child and at that time, he asked/advised her to put the child in orphanage. Prosecutrix gave birth to a child at Rippon Hospital, Shimla on 28.06.2009. As per prosecution case, accused even refused to own newly born child and at that time, he asked/advised her to put the child in orphanage. In this background, prosecutrix registered the case against the accused. 3. After registration of the case, prosecutrix was medically examined at D.D.U, Shimla. On 21.07.2009, she got demarcated the place where she was kept by accused at Dhalli and on 22.07.2009, she got the spot map of the place prepared where she was kept at village Hutli. On 10.08.2009, accused was got medically examined, blood samples of accused, prosecutrix and newly born child were taken for the purpose of DNA test. Report obtained suggested that accused was the biological father of the child. 4. After the conclusion of the investigation, challan was filed in the Court and as a prima-facie case was found against the accused, he was charged for commission of offences punishable under Sections 376 and 417 of IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. 5. Learned trial Court on the basis of evidence produced before it by the prosecution held that from the evidence it could not be said that accused had cheated the prosecutrix by fraudulently solemnizing marriage with her. Learned trial Court also held that evidence of the prosecutrix could not prove that accused had cheated her in terms of Section 415 of IPC and accused could not thus be held guilty for commission of offence punishable under Section 417 of IPC. It was also held by the learned trial Court that though evidence collected from the DNA test, blood samples of accused and prosecutrix and newly born child opined that accused was the biological father of the child but on this score, it could not be held that accused had committed rape on the prosecutrix. Learned trial Court concluded that prosecutrix had continued to remain in love with the accused for many years and during that period, she had established sexual relations with accused on her own sweet will while being aware of the consequences of such relations with the accused prior to marriage. Learned trial Court concluded that prosecutrix had continued to remain in love with the accused for many years and during that period, she had established sexual relations with accused on her own sweet will while being aware of the consequences of such relations with the accused prior to marriage. Learned trial Court also concurred with the contention of learned counsel for the defence that there was no evidence on record which proved that accused had committed rape on the prosecutrix at any time as prosecutrix had consented to have sexual relations with the accused and thus, if prosecutrix contended that she had consented to have sexual acts with the accused on the allurement of the accused to marry her, the same was not sufficient to show that while indulging in the acts of physical relations with the accused, her voluntary consent was lacking. On these bases, learned trial Court acquitted the accused. 6. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment so passed by the learned trial Court, the State has filed this appeal. 7. We have heard the learned Deputy Advocate General as well as the learned counsel for the respondent/accused. We have also gone through the records of the case as well as the judgment passed by the learned trial Court. 8. In the present case, the case as put forth by the prosecution and the evidence on record clearly and categorically demonstrate that admittedly there were physical relations between the prosecutrix and the accused. A child having been born out of these physical relations is also not a disputed fact. 9. The point for consideration before us is whether the findings returned by the learned trial Court to the effect that physical relations which were established by the accused with the prosecutrix were with the consent of the prosecutrix and there was no allurement given by him to marry her for the purpose of establishing physical relations with her is correct finding or not. It is thus necessary to minutely scrutinize the testimony of prosecutrix who entered the witness box as PW2. A perusal of her statement demonstrates that she deposed in the Court that she was in contact with the accused since she was studying in 10th class and thereafter both of them fell in love with each other and also established physical relations with each other. A perusal of her statement demonstrates that she deposed in the Court that she was in contact with the accused since she was studying in 10th class and thereafter both of them fell in love with each other and also established physical relations with each other. According to her, accused established physical relations with her on the allurement that he would marry her. She further deposed that on 23.08.2008 accused took her to Hattu temple from the house of her maternal uncle and performed marriage with her and thereafter took her to Shimla and kept her in a rented accommodation situated at bypass road near Dhalli tunnel for about three months. She further deposed that when she asked the accused to take her to his ancestral house, he used to put off the same on one pretext or the other. She further deposed that during Navatras of the year 2008, accused took her to Hulli near Chhaila and kept her there in a rented house and after some time when he had gone to his ancestral house, accused telephonically told her that his family members were not ready to accept her and were planning to marry him somewhere else. She further stated that thereafter she visited the ancestral house of accused at village Shilbag but the accused threatened to do away with her life. She deposed that thereafter she came back to the house of her maternal uncle and narrated the entire incident to him and also visited Police Station, Kumarsain to lodge complaint. She also deposed that during the period she stayed with the accused she got pregnant from him and when she disclosed this fact to her parents, they refused to keep her at her parental house and asked her to stay with accused. She deposed that thereafter she visited the house of her maternal uncle at Shimla and he also refused to keep her in his house when he came to know about her pregnancy. She further deposed that on 29.06.2009, she gave birth to a male child at Rippon Hospital, Shimla. She also deposed that accused refused to own the child and asked her to keep him at some orphanage and thereafter she made a complaint against the accused to S.P. Shimla. She also stated that during the course of investigation, her blood and DNA samples were also obtained. She also deposed that accused refused to own the child and asked her to keep him at some orphanage and thereafter she made a complaint against the accused to S.P. Shimla. She also stated that during the course of investigation, her blood and DNA samples were also obtained. She also deposed that accused had committed sexual intercourse with her by assuring her that he will marry her and thus cheated her. In her cross examination, prosecutrix deposed that her date of birth was 25th of September, 1982. She further stated that she passed her matriculation examination around in the year 1998. She further stated that she could not remember as to in which year accused started loving her. She deposed that they used to meet once or twice in a week at village Madhawani and when they used to meet, her sister-in-law (Bhabhi) used to be present with her. She also deposed that during this period when she used to meet the accused, they used to go to stations like Rampur, Shimla, Narkanda etc. and they used to stay together for one or two days. She deposed that whenever she used to go with accused she used to inform her home that she was going to meet some relative at Shimla. She deposed that her affair continued with accused for about eight years and accused established physical relations with her after 3 or 4 months of their coming into contact with each other. She further stated in her cross examination that the complaint Ext. PW2/A was prepared by her cousin Virender Thakur at her instance, who was a Reporter in ''Doordarshan'' at Shimla. She further stated that after she performed marriage with the accused at Hattu temple, she used to live like a married woman. She also stated that she was aware of the consequences of having physical relations before marriage. She further stated that when she went to the house of accused, his parents and nephew threatened her and gave her beatings but she did not suffer any injury. When she was confronted with her statement recorded earlier wherein it was not so recorded, she deposed that she did not disclose the factum of her marriage with accused to her parents, however she stated that her Bhabhi was aware of this fact. When she was confronted with her statement recorded earlier wherein it was not so recorded, she deposed that she did not disclose the factum of her marriage with accused to her parents, however she stated that her Bhabhi was aware of this fact. She admitted it to be correct that she had filed Civil Suit No. 13-1 of 2009 against the accused in he Court of Civil Judge (Sr. Divn.), Rampur to restrain accused from contracting marriage with other girl. She further admitted it to be correct that said suit was withdrawn by her later on. She denied that accused had not promised to marry her during the last five years preceding to filing of complaint by her. She admitted that she had given her consent for physical relations with the accused but thereafter self stated that she had given such consent after accused had promised to marry her. 10. A perusal of statement of the prosecutrix categorically demonstrates that she had developed physical relations with the accused about 3-4 months after she initially came in contact with him. Now it has come in her statement that accused came in contact with her when she was studying in 10th class. In her cross examination, this witness deposed that she passed her matriculation around in the year 1998. However, a careful perusal of the statement of this witness demonstrates that narration made by her in the Court was to the effect that after the accused came in contact with her, he allured her for having physical relations with her on the promise of marriage and thereafter he took her to Hattu temple where they solemnized marriage on 23.08.2008 and after performing marriage with her, he initially kept her at Shimla in rented accommodation and thereafter at village Hulli again in a rented accommodation and during this period, he established physical relations with her. In our considered view, the version so put forth by the prosecutrix cannot be believed. This is for the reason that it is her own case that accused came in contact with her when she was studying in 10th class, meaning thereby that they came in contact with each other somewhere in the year 1998 and they established physical relations with each other about 3-4 months thereafter as has come in the testimony of the prosecutrix. If it is so then the aforesaid version of the prosecutrix belies the case put forth by her wherein she wants this Court to believe that accused took her to Hattu temple and performed marriage with her on 23.08.2008 and thereafter he established physical relations with her. Thus it is evident that prosecutrix has not been able to establish that initially when she and accused developed physical relations with each other, there was any allurement given by the accused that he would marry her or the accused cheated her on the pretext of marriage and thus established physical relations with her. It is further evident from her testimony that she maintained relationship with accused for a fairly long time and she used to visit various places with the accused by keeping her family in dark. It has also come on record that when she came to know about marriage of accused with some other girl she filed a civil suit for restraining the accused from marrying some other person which suit was subsequently withdrawn by her. The said conduct of the prosecutrix, in our considered view, demonstrates that she was a willing party to the alleged acts of sexual relations which existed between her and the accused. The alleged factum of her having married the accused at Hattu temple was concealed by her from her parents as has come in the deposition of the prosecutrix. She had stated in her cross examination that she was aware of the consequences of having physical relations before marriage but it remains a fact that despite this, she had maintained physical relations with the accused. Therefore, in our considered view, prosecution has not been able to prove that accused had committed rape on the prosecutrix or had established physical relations with her without her consent by alluring her as is the case of the prosecution. 11. Though it is matter of record that the accused is the biological father of the accused who was given birth by the prosecutrix, but in our considered view, this factum alone cannot be taken as a piece of evidence to prove that accused had raped the prosecutrix. It is a matter of record that prosecutrix maintained relations with accused for a substantial long period of time and during the said period she established physical relations with him willingly. It is a matter of record that prosecutrix maintained relations with accused for a substantial long period of time and during the said period she established physical relations with him willingly. This is apparent from her own deposition whereby she stated to be fully aware of the consequences of such relations before marriage. The material on record categorically demonstrates that prosecutrix from the very beginning had been a consenting party to the alleged acts of sexual intercourse with the accused. There is no evidence on record produced by the prosecution from which it can be inferred that consent of the prosecutrix while establishing physical relations with the accused was on the promise of marriage. There is also no evidence on record from which it could be proved that accused committed rape on the prosecutrix on the alleged allurement of either solemnizing marriage with her or fraudulently on account of marrying her. Not only this, the complaint filed by the prosecutrix when compared with her deposition in the Court shows that besides contradictions and inconsistencies in both of them there are lot of improvements in her deposition in the Court. The prosecutrix has also admitted that complaint in fact was prepared by her cousin namely Virender Thakur at her instance who happens to be a Reporter in''Doordarshan'' at Shimla. 12. If we consider the evidence placed on record by the prosecution from another different perspective, what apparently can be deduced from the evidence placed on record including the testimony of prosecutrix is that accused in fact was interested in marrying the prosecutrix but the family of the accused was not interested in the accused marrying her. That being so, it cannot be said that accused had cheated the prosecutrix. In our considered view, accused could have been convicted for commission of offence punishable under Section 417 of IPC only if the prosecution had been able to prove that he had deceived the prosecutrix which the prosecution had not been able to prove on record beyond reasonable doubt. 13. Before proceeding further, it is relevant to take note of the fact that this Court is not oblivious to the fact that in a case under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, conviction of the accused can be based on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix itself if the same is cogent, trustworthy and reliable. 14. 13. Before proceeding further, it is relevant to take note of the fact that this Court is not oblivious to the fact that in a case under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, conviction of the accused can be based on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix itself if the same is cogent, trustworthy and reliable. 14. It is settled law that a prosecutrix complaining of having been a victim of the offence of rape is not an accomplice after the crime. There is no rule of law that her testimony cannot be acted upon without corroboration in material particulars. This is for the reason that the prosecutrix stands at a higher pedestal than an injured witness. However, the fact still remains that the testimony of the prosecutrix on the face of it has to be acceptable. {See State of U.P. v. Pappu alias Yunus and another (2005) 3 Supreme Court Cases 594 }. 15. Though it is settled law that corroboration is not sine qua non for conviction in a rape case, however, it is relevant to refer to the judgment of Hon''ble Supreme Court in Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1952 SC 54 , in which it has been observed as under: "The rule, which according to the cases has hardened into one of law, is not that corroboration is essential before there can be a conviction but that the necessity of corroboration, as a matter of prudence, except where the circumstances make it safe to dispense with it, must be present to the mind of the judge...." 16. In our considered view, in the facts of the present case, as they emerge from the evidence which has been placed on record by the prosecution, it cannot be said that the testimony of the prosecutrix is either cogent or it is trustworthy, reliable or the same seems to be truthful. Further, the credibility of the testimony of the prosecutrix has also been impinged by the defence in her cross-examination. Not only this, there are inconsistencies and contradictions in her statement recorded in the Court of law and which was previously recorded with the police, but she has also made improvements in the same which have gone unexplained. Further, the credibility of the testimony of the prosecutrix has also been impinged by the defence in her cross-examination. Not only this, there are inconsistencies and contradictions in her statement recorded in the Court of law and which was previously recorded with the police, but she has also made improvements in the same which have gone unexplained. At the cost of repetition, we state that the prosecution has not been able to produce iota of evidence to substantiate that prosecutrix was raped by the accused on the promise of marriage. 17. The Hon''ble Supreme Court has held in State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh and others, (1996) 2 Supreme Court Cases 384 : "x x x x x x x x x x The courts must, while evaluating evidence, remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no self-respecting woman would come forward in a court just to make a humiliating statement against her honour such as is involved in the commission of rape on her. In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed considerations which have no material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. The inherent bashfulness of the females and the tendency to conceal outrage of sexual aggression are factors which the Courts should not over-look. The testimony of the victim in such cases is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. Why should the evidence of a girl or a woman, who complains of rape or sexual molestation, be viewed with doubt, disbelief or suspicion? Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. Why should the evidence of a girl or a woman, who complains of rape or sexual molestation, be viewed with doubt, disbelief or suspicion? The Court while appreciating the evidence of a prosecutrix may look for some assurance of her statement to satisfy its judicial conscience, since she is a witness who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her, but there is no requirement of law to insist upon corroboration of her statement to base conviction of an accused. The evidence of a victim of sexual assault stands almost at par with the evidence of an injured witness and to an extent is even more reliable. Just as a witness who has sustained some injury in the occurrence, which is not found to be self inflicted, is considered to be a good witness in the sense that he is least likely to shield the real culprit, the evidence of a victim of a sexual offence is entitled to great weight, absence of corroboration notwithstanding. Corroborative evidence is not an imperative component of judicial credence in every case of rape. Corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under given circumstances. It must not be over-looked that a woman or a girl subjected to sexual assault is not an accomplice to the crime but is a victim of another person''s lust and it is improper and undesirable to test her evidence with a certain amount of suspicion, treating her as if she were an accomplice. Inferences have to be drawn from a given set of facts and circumstances with realistic diversity and not dead uniformity lest that type of rigidity in the shape of rule of law is introduced through a new form of testimonial tyranny making justice a casualty. Courts cannot cling to a fossil formula and insist upon corroboration even if, taken as a whole, the case spoken of by the victim of sex crime strikes the judicial mind as probable. Courts cannot cling to a fossil formula and insist upon corroboration even if, taken as a whole, the case spoken of by the victim of sex crime strikes the judicial mind as probable. In State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain ( 1990 (1) SCC 550 ) Ahmadi, J. (as the Lord Chief Justice then was) speaking for the Bench summarised the position in the following words: (SCC p. 559, para 16) "A prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put on par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. What is necessary is that the court must be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her. If the court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some reason the court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is an adult and of full understanding the court is entitled to base a conviction of her evidence unless the same is shown to be infirm and not trustworthy. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case disclose that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence." 18. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case disclose that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence." 18. The Hon''ble Supreme Court in Radhu v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2007) 12 Supreme Court Cases 57 has held: "6. It is now well settled that a finding of guilt in a case of rape, can be based on the uncorroborated evidence of the prosecutrix. The very nature of offence makes it difficult to get direct corroborating evidence. The evidence of the prosecutrix should not be rejected on the basis of minor discrepancies and contradictions. If the victim of rape states on oath that she was forcibly subjected to sexual intercourse, her statement will normally be accepted, even if it is uncorroborated, unless the material on record requires drawing of an inference that there was consent or that the entire incident was improbable or imaginary. Even if there is consent, the act will still be a ''rape'', if the girl is under 16 years of age. It is also well settled that absence of injuries on the private parts of the victim will not by itself falsify the case of rape, nor construed as evidence of consent. Similarly, the opinion of a doctor that there was no evidence of any sexual intercourse or rape, may not be sufficient to disbelieve the accusation of rape by the victim. Bruises, abrasions and scratches on the victim especially on the forearms, writs, face, breast, thighs and back are indicative of struggle and will support the allegation of sexual assault. The courts should, at the same time, bear in mind that false charges of rape are not uncommon. There have also been rare instances where a parent has persuaded a gullible or obedient daughter to make a false charge of a rape either to take revenge or extort money or to get rid of financial liability. Whether there was rape or not would depend ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case." 19. In Narender Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 7 Supreme Court Cases 171 , the Hon''ble Supreme Court has held: "20. Whether there was rape or not would depend ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case." 19. In Narender Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 7 Supreme Court Cases 171 , the Hon''ble Supreme Court has held: "20. It is a settled legal proposition that once the statement of prosecutrix inspires confidence and is accepted by the court as such, conviction can be based only on the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix and no corroboration would be required unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate the court for corroboration of her statement. Corroboration of testimony of the prosecutrix as a condition for judicial reliance is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under the given facts and circumstances. Minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies should not be a ground for throwing out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. 21. A prosecutrix complaining of having been a victim of the offence of rape is not an accomplice after the crime. Her testimony has to be appreciated on the principle of probabilities just as the testimony of any other witness; a high degree of probability having been shown to exist in view of the subject matter being a criminal charge. However, if the court finds it difficult to accept the version of the prosecutrix on its face value, it may search for evidence, direct or substantial, which may lend assurance to her testimony. (Vide: Vimal Suresh Kamble v. Chaluverapinake Apal S.P and Vishnu v. State of Maharashtra ). 22. Where evidence of the prosecutrix is found suffering from serious infirmities and inconsistencies with other material, prosecutrix making deliberate improvements on material point with a view to rule out consent on her part and there being no injury on her person even though her version may be otherwise, no reliance can be placed upon her evidence. (Vide: Suresh N. Bhusare & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra. 23. In Jai Krishna Mandal & Anr. v. State of Jharkhand , this Court while dealing with the issue held: (SCC p. 535, para 4) "4. ....the only evidence of rape was the statement of the prosecutrix herself and when this evidence was read in its totality, the story projected by the prosecutrix was so improbable that it could not be believed." 20. v. State of Jharkhand , this Court while dealing with the issue held: (SCC p. 535, para 4) "4. ....the only evidence of rape was the statement of the prosecutrix herself and when this evidence was read in its totality, the story projected by the prosecutrix was so improbable that it could not be believed." 20. In Munna v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2014) 10 Supreme Court Cases 254 , the Hon''ble Supreme Court has been pleased to held: "7. We are conscious that testimony of the prosecutrix is almost at par with an injured witness and can be acted upon without corroboration as held in various decisions of this Court. Reference may be made to some of the leading judgments. 8. In Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat , this Court held as under (SCC pp. 224-26, paras 9-10) "9. In the Indian setting, refusal to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault in the absence of corroboration as a rule, is adding insult to injury. Why should the evidence of the girl or the woman who complains of rape or sexual molestation be viewed with the aid of spectacles fitted with lenses tinged with doubt, disbelief or suspicion? To do so is to justify the charge of male chauvinism in a male dominated society. We must analyze the argument in support of the need for corroboration and subject it to relentless and remorseless cross examination. And we must do so with a logical, and not an opinionated, eye in the light of probabilities with our feet firmly planted on the soil of India and with our eyes focused on the Indian horizon. We must not be swept off the feet by the approach made in the western world which has its own social milieu, its own social mores, its own permissive values, and its own code of life. Corroboration may be considered essential to establish a sexual offence in the backdrop of the social ecology of the western world. It is wholly unnecessary to import the said concept on a turnkey basis and to transplant it on the Indian soil regardless of the altogether different atmosphere, attitudes, mores, responses of the Indian society, and its profile. The identities of the two worlds are different. The solution of problems cannot therefore be identical. 10. It is wholly unnecessary to import the said concept on a turnkey basis and to transplant it on the Indian soil regardless of the altogether different atmosphere, attitudes, mores, responses of the Indian society, and its profile. The identities of the two worlds are different. The solution of problems cannot therefore be identical. 10. Without the fear of making too wide a statement, or of overstating the case, it can be said that rarely will a girl or a woman in India make false allegations of sexual assault The statement is generally true in the context of the urban as also rural society. It is also by and large true in the context of the sophisticated, not so sophisticated, and unsophisticated society. Only very rarely can one conceivably come across an exception or two and that too possibly from amongst the urban elites. Because (1) A girl or a woman in the tradition-bound non-permissive society of India would be extremely reluctant even to admit that any incident which is likely to reflect on her chastity had ever occurred. (2) She would be conscious of the danger of being ostracized by the society or being looked down by the society including by her own family members, relatives, friends, and neighbours. (3) She would have to brave the whole world. (4) She would face the risk of losing the love and respect of her own husband and near relatives, and of her matrimonial home and happiness being shattered. (5) If she is unmarried, she would apprehend that it would be difficult to secure an alliance with a suitable match from a respectable or an acceptable family. (6) It would almost inevitably and almost invariably result in mental torture and suffering to herself. (7) The fear of being taunted by others will always haunt her. (8) She would feel extremely embarassed in relating the incident to others being overpowered by a feeling of shame on account of the upbringing in a tradition-bound society where by and large sex is taboo. (9) The natural inclination would be to avoid giving publicity to the incident lest the family name and family honour is brought into controversy. (8) She would feel extremely embarassed in relating the incident to others being overpowered by a feeling of shame on account of the upbringing in a tradition-bound society where by and large sex is taboo. (9) The natural inclination would be to avoid giving publicity to the incident lest the family name and family honour is brought into controversy. (10) The parents of an unmarried girl as also the husband and members of the husband''s family of a married woman, would also more often than not, want to avoid publicity on account of the fear of social stigma on the family name and family honour. (11) The fear of the victim herself being considered to be promiscuous or in some way responsible for the incident regardless of her innocence. (12) The reluctance to face interrogation by the investigating agency, to face the court, to face the cross examination by counsel for the culprit, and the risk of being disbelieved, acts as a deterrent." 9. In State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain , this Court held as under : (SCC pp. 558-60, paras 15-17) "15. It is necessary at the outset to state what the approach of the court should be while evaluating the prosecution evidence, particularly the evidence of the prosecutrix, in sex offences. Is it essential that the evidence of the prosecutrix should be corroborated in material particulars before the court bases a conviction on her testimony ? Does the rule of prudence demand that in all cases save the rarest of rare the court should look for corroboration before acting on the evidence of the prosecutrix ? Let us see if the Evidence Act provides the clue. Under the said statute ''Evidence'' means and includes all statements which the court permits or requires to be made before it by witnesses, in relation to the matters of fact under inquiry. Under Section 59 all facts, except the contents of documents, may be proved by oral evidence. Section 118 then tells us who may give oral evidence. According to that section all persons are competent to testify unless the court considers that they are prevented from understanding the questions put to them, or from giving rational answers to those questions, by tender years, extreme old age, disease, whether of body or mind, or any other cause of the same kind. According to that section all persons are competent to testify unless the court considers that they are prevented from understanding the questions put to them, or from giving rational answers to those questions, by tender years, extreme old age, disease, whether of body or mind, or any other cause of the same kind. Even in the case of an accomplice Section 133 provides that he shall be a competent witness against an accused person; and a conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. However, illustration (b) to Section 114, which lays down a rule of practice, says that the court ''may'' presume that an accomplice is unworthy of credit, unless he is corroborated in material particulars. Thus under Section 133, which lays down a rule of law, an accomplice is a competent witness and a conviction based solely on his uncorroborated evidence is not illegal although in view of Section 114, illustration (b), courts do not as a matter of practice do so and look for corroboration in material particulars. This is the conjoint effect of Sections 133 and 114, illustration (b). 16. A prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put on par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. What is necessary is that the court must be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her. If the court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If the court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some reason the court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is an adult and of full understanding the court is entitled to base a conviction on her evidence unless the same is shown to be infirm and not trustworthy. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case disclose that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence. We have, therefore, no doubt in our minds that ordinarily the evidence of a prosecutrix who does not lack understanding must be accepted. The degree of proof required must not be higher than is expected of an injured witness. For the above reasons we think that exception has rightly been taken to the approach of the High Court as is reflected in the following passage: "It is only in the rarest of rare cases if the court finds that the testimony of the prosecutrix is so trustworthy, truthful and reliable that other corroboration may not be necessary." With respect, the law is not correctly stated. If we may say so, it is just the reverse. Ordinarily the evidence of a prosecutrix must carry the same weight as is attached to an injured person who is a victim of violence, unless there are special circumstances which call for greater caution, in which case it would be safe to act on her testimony if there is independent evidence lending assurance to her accusation. 17. Ordinarily the evidence of a prosecutrix must carry the same weight as is attached to an injured person who is a victim of violence, unless there are special circumstances which call for greater caution, in which case it would be safe to act on her testimony if there is independent evidence lending assurance to her accusation. 17. We think it proper, having regard to the increase in the number of sex violation cases in the recent past, particularly cases of molestation and rape in custody, to remove the notion, if it persists, that the testimony of a woman who is a victim of sexual violence must ordinarily be corroborated in material particulars except in the rarest of rare cases. To insist on corroboration except in the rarest of rare cases is to equate a woman who is a victim of the lust of another with an accomplice to a crime and thereby insult womanhood. It would be adding insult to injury to tell a woman that her story of woe will not be believed unless it is corroborated in material particulars as in the case of an accomplice to a crime. Ours is a conservative society where it concerns sexual behaviour. Ours is not a permissive society as in some of the western and European countries. Our standard of decency and morality in public life is not the same as in those countries. It is, however, unfortunate that respect for womanhood in our country is on the decline and cases of molestation and rape are steadily growing. An Indian woman is now required to suffer indignities in different forms, from lewd remarks to eve-teasing, from molestation to rape. Decency and morality in public life can be promoted and protected only if we deal strictly with those who violate the societal norms. The standard of proof to be expected by the court in such cases must take into account the fact that such crimes are generally committed on the sly and very rarely direct evidence of a person other than the prosecutrix is available. Courts must also realise that ordinarily a woman, more so a young girl, will not stake her reputation by levelling a false charge concerning her chastity." 10. Similar observations were made in State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh , as under : (SCC pp. Courts must also realise that ordinarily a woman, more so a young girl, will not stake her reputation by levelling a false charge concerning her chastity." 10. Similar observations were made in State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh , as under : (SCC pp. 395-96, para 8) "8......The courts must, while evaluating evidence, remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no self-respecting woman would come forward in a court just to make a humiliating statement against her honour such as is involved in the commission of rape on her. In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed considerations which have no material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. The inherent bashfulness of the females and the tendency to conceal outrage of sexual aggression are factors which the courts should not overlook. The testimony of the victim in such cases is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. Why should the evidence of a girl or a woman who complains of rape or sexual molestation, be viewed with doubt, disbelief or suspicion? The court while appreciating the evidence of a prosecutrix may look for some assurance of her statement to satisfy its judicial conscience, since she is a witness who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her, but there is no requirement of law to insist upon corroboration of her statement to base conviction of an accused. The evidence of a victim of sexual assault stands almost on a par with the evidence of an injured witness and to an extent is even more reliable. The evidence of a victim of sexual assault stands almost on a par with the evidence of an injured witness and to an extent is even more reliable. Just as a witness who has sustained some injury in the occurrence, which is not found to be self-inflicted, is considered to be a good witness in the sense that he is least likely to shield the real culprit, the evidence of a victim of a sexual offence is entitled to great weight, absence of corroboration notwithstanding. Corroborative evidence is not an imperative component of judicial credence in every case of rape. Corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under given circumstances. It must not be overlooked that a woman or a girl subjected to sexual assault is not an accomplice to the crime but is a victim of another person''s lust and it is improper and undesirable to test her evidence with a certain amount of suspicion, treating her as if she were an accomplice. Inferences have to be drawn from a given set of facts and circumstances with realistic diversity and not dead uniformity lest that type of rigidity in the shape of rule of law is introduced through a new form of testimonial tyranny making justice a casualty. Courts cannot cling to a fossil formula and insist upon corroboration even if, taken as a whole, the case spoken of by the victim of sex crime strikes the judicial mind as probable." (emphasis in original) 11. Thus, while absence of injuries or absence of raising alarm or delay in FIR may not by itself be enough to disbelieve the version of prosecutrix in view of the statutory presumption under Section 114A of the Evidence Act but if such statement has inherent infirmities, creating doubt about its veracity, the same may not be acted upon. We are conscious of the sensitivity with which heinous offence under Section 376, IPC has to be treated but in the present case the circumstances taken as a whole create doubt about the correctness of the prosecution version. We are, thus, of the opinion that a case is made out for giving benefit of doubt to the accused." 21. We are conscious of the sensitivity with which heinous offence under Section 376, IPC has to be treated but in the present case the circumstances taken as a whole create doubt about the correctness of the prosecution version. We are, thus, of the opinion that a case is made out for giving benefit of doubt to the accused." 21. The Hon''ble Supreme Court of India in Manoharlal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2014) 15 Supreme Court Cases 587 has held: "8. Though as a matter of law the sole testimony of the prosecutrix can sufficiently be relied upon to bring home the case against the accused, in the instant case we find her version to be improbable and difficult to accept on its face value. The law on the point is very succinctly stated in Narender Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) , to which one of us (Dipak Misra, J). was a party, in following terms: (SCC p. 178, paras 29 and 21) "20. It is a settled legal proposition that once the statement of the prosecutrix inspires confidence and is accepted by the court as such, conviction can be based only on the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix and no corroboration would be required unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate the court for corroboration of her statement. Corroboration of testimony of the prosecutrix as a condition for judicial reliance is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under the given facts and circumstances. Minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies should not be a ground for throwing out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. 21. A prosecutrix complaining of having been a victim of the offence of rape is not an accomplice after the crime. Her testimony has to be appreciated on the principle of probabilities just as the testimony of any other witness; a high degree of probability having been shown to exist in view of the subject-matter being a criminal charge. However, if the court finds it difficult to accept the version of the prosecutrix on its face value, it may search for evidence, direct or circumstantial which may lend assurance to her testimony." (emphasis in original) 9. Having found it difficult to accept her testimony on its face value, we searched for support from other material but find complete lack of corroboration on material particulars. Having found it difficult to accept her testimony on its face value, we searched for support from other material but find complete lack of corroboration on material particulars. First, the medical examination of the victim did not result in any definite opinion that she was subjected to rape. Secondly, Riyaz who was like a brother to the victim and thus a close confidant, has not supported the case of the prosecution and has completely denied having met her when she allegedly narrated the incident to him. Thirdly the person who was suffering from fever and to whose house she was first taken by the appellant was not examined at all. Fourthly, the policeman who the victim met during the night was also not examined. Fifthly, neither the brother nor any of the parents of the victim were examined to corroborate the version that she had come from the village of her brother and alighted around 10:00 P.M. at Bajna bus stand. Lastly, the sequence of events as narrated would show that she had allegedly accompanied the appellant to various places. In the circumstances, we find extreme difficulty in relying upon the version of the victim alone to bring home the charge against the appellant. We are inclined to give benefit of doubt to the appellant." 22. It is also relevant to refer to the judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Tilak Raj v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 2016 Supreme Court 406 , in which the Hon''ble Supreme Court has held: "19. We have carefully heard both the parties at length and have also given our conscious thought to the material on record and relevant provisions of The Indian Penal Code (in short "the IPC"). In the instant case, the prosecutrix was an adult and mature lady of around 40 years at the time of incident. It is admitted by the prosecutrix in her testimony before the trial court that she was in relationship with the appellant for the last two years prior to the incident and the appellant used to stay overnight at her residence. After a perusal of copy of FIR and evidence on record the case set up by the prosecutrix seems to be highly unrealistic and unbelievable. 23. From the aforesaid, it is clear that the evidence of the prosecution is neither believable nor reliable to bring home the charges leveled against the appellant. After a perusal of copy of FIR and evidence on record the case set up by the prosecutrix seems to be highly unrealistic and unbelievable. 23. From the aforesaid, it is clear that the evidence of the prosecution is neither believable nor reliable to bring home the charges leveled against the appellant. We are of the view that the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is not based on a careful re-appraisal of the evidence on record by the High Court and there is no material evidence on record to show that the appellant is guilty of the charged offences i.e., offence of cheating punishable under Section 417 of IPC and offence of criminal intimidation punishable under Section 506 part I of IPC." 23. Besides this, we have also carefully gone through the judgment passed by the learned trial Court and a perusal of the judgment passed by the learned trial Court demonstrates that the entire evidence produced on record by the prosecution had been minutely taken into consideration by the learned trial Court and after a careful consideration of the same, learned trial Court had returned the finding of acquittal in favour of accused. 24. Therefore, while concurring with the findings of acquittal returned by the learned trial Court, we dismiss the present appeal being devoid of any merit, so also pending miscellaneous application(s), if any.