JUDGMENT : K.M. JOSEPH, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties in Special Appeal No. 329 of 2017 on the delay condonation application. In the circumstances, the delay of 34 days in filing the appeal will stand condoned. The delay condonation application will stand allowed. 2. All these appeals being connected, we are disposing of the same by this common judgment. 3. The appellants are the State of Uttarakhand and other respondents 4. The common judgment pronounced by the learned Single Judge reads as follows: “Mr. Amar Shukla with Mr. B.M. Pingal, Advocates, for all the petitioners. Mr. BPS Mer, Brief Holder, for the State. Counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is permitted to be taken on record. Applications made therefor, stand disposed of accordingly. Since the common questions of law and facts are involved in these petitions, the same have been taken up together and decided by this common judgment. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the present lis is squarely covered by the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of Hon. Allahabad High Court in SPA No. 187 of 2009, State of U.P. & others vs. Chandra Prakash Pandey & others and analogous petitions, decided on 19.11.2010. Accordingly, the present petitions are disposed of in terms of the judgment cited hereinabove. The respondents are directed to grant the ACP to the petitioners and to count the past services of the petitioners for the purpose of selection grade, promotional scale and post-retiral benefits including pension etc. from due date within a period of ten weeks from today. All pending applications stand disposed of in the above terms.” Nineteen Writ Petitions came to be disposed of by the aforesaid common judgment. 5. These 19 appeals which we are disposing of by this common judgment can be divided into two categories of cases. The prayers in all the writ petitions, from which Special Appeal Nos. All pending applications stand disposed of in the above terms.” Nineteen Writ Petitions came to be disposed of by the aforesaid common judgment. 5. These 19 appeals which we are disposing of by this common judgment can be divided into two categories of cases. The prayers in all the writ petitions, from which Special Appeal Nos. 306 of 2017, 308 of 2017, 309 of 2017, 310 of 2017, 311 of 2017, 321 of 2017, 324 of 2017, 326 of 2017, 327 of 2017, 328 of 2017 and 329 of 2017 are preferred, read as follows: “(I) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding and directing the respondent authorities to grant the ACP to the petitioner forthwith and also pay the arrear to the petitioner along with 18% interest per annum from the due date till the actual payment of arrear is paid to the petitioner by the respondent authority. (II) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding and directing the respondents to count the past services of the petitioner for the purpose of Selection Grade, Promotional Scale and Post reitral benefits including pension etc. from petitioner respective date of appointment i.e. 15-02- 1995.” 6. The prayers in the other writ petitions, from which the Special Appeal Nos. 305 of 2017, 323 of 2017, 325 of 2017, 322 of 2017, 314 of 2017, 315 of 2017, 316 of 2017 and 319 of 2017 are preferred, read as follows: (i) Issue a writ order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding and directing the respondents to refund/pay the entire arrears of the salary with interest @ 18% per annum to the petitioners which has arbitrarily been adjusted by the respondents towards the commission in gross violation of judgment and order rendered by this Hon’ble Court dated 31-03-2006 in writ petition no. 4796 of 2001 (S/S) as modified by the judgment and order dated 14-09-2010 passed by the Division Bench of this Hon’ble Court in Special appeal no. 24 of 2007 at the time when the petitioners were declared as a Government Servant in Cooperative Department. (ii) Issue a writ order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding and directing the respondents to count the past services of the petitioners members for the purpose of Selection Grade, Promotional Scale and post retiral benefits including pension etc. 24 of 2007 at the time when the petitioners were declared as a Government Servant in Cooperative Department. (ii) Issue a writ order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding and directing the respondents to count the past services of the petitioners members for the purpose of Selection Grade, Promotional Scale and post retiral benefits including pension etc. from their respective date of appointment.” It is these writ petitions which were disposed of by the aforesaid common judgment passed by the learned Single Judge. 7. The common claim of the writ petitioners appears to have been that the Uttaranchal Sangarsh Kurk Amin Parishad preferred a writ petition before High Court of Uttarakhand to implement the order in true spirit by granting full status of the holder of civil post with all consequential benefits w.e.f. 16.01.1985 to the Kurk Amins alike the other Government servants and with the further prayer that the State Government may not make any Rule or Regulation as it would be against the spirit of the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Chandra Prakash Pandey Vs. State of U.P. reported in 2001 (4) SCC 78 and other decisions of the Hon’ble High Court of Lucknow and Hon’ble High Court of Allahabad. 8. We heard Mr. Paresh Tripathi, learned Chief Standing Counsel on behalf of the appellants, Mr. B.M. Pingal, Advocate for the respondents in all the Special Appeals except SPA No. 311 of 2017 and SPA No. 329 of 2017 and Mr. Niranjan Bhatt, Advocate for respondents in SPA No. 311 of 2017 and SPA No. 329 of 2017. 9. Learned Chief Standing Counsel for the appellants would submit that the learned Single Judge has erred in not appreciating that as far as the writ petitioners serving in the State of Uttarakhand are concerned, the matter is squarely covered by the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court, which is produced as Annexure no. 2 in all the writ petitions. In paragraph no. 7 of the said judgment, it is held as follows: “7. 2 in all the writ petitions. In paragraph no. 7 of the said judgment, it is held as follows: “7. We, accordingly, conclude the matter and, as such, refuse to interfere with the judgment and order under appeal, except to the effect that the consequential benefits which the members of the petitioner can have pursuant to the said judgment and order, will be from 9th November, 2000 and not w.e.f. 16th November, 1985, as had been directed by the judgment and order under appeal. The appeal is, accordingly, disposed of.” He would submit that the result of the aforesaid paragraph was to interfere with the direction given by the learned Single Judge in its judgment produced as Anenxure No. 1. He would, however, complain that the learned Single Judge proceeded to dispose of the matter relying on what was considered by the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court. This was impermissible and he would submit that even the judgment of the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court has been set aside in the Special Appeal. 10. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents Mr. B.M. Pingal would submit that the issue was considered by the learned Single Judge of the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court from which the Special Appeal, which is referred to by the learned Single Judge in this case arose and, similarly, the benefits which were directed to be given, were given in the said case though the judgment of the Division Bench was partially set aside by the Hon’ble Apex Court. He would further point out about the cases where ACP has been directed to be given and would complain that many have been given ACP but the writ petitioners have been discriminated against and, therefore, there is no basis for not giving the ACP. He would submit that there are no disciplinary proceedings taken against the writ petitioners and there was no legal ground to withhold the payment of ACP. He would also submit that the benefits, which they are entitled to by virtue of the long service which they have rendered, prior to the period when they were appointed in the State of Uttarakhand, cannot be ignored and as far as the benefits are concerned, they are not seeking the monetary benefits as such and, therefore, the Court has no ground to interfere. He would also submit that the Statutory Rules were framed in the year 2011 in the State of Uttarakhand and, therefore, the earlier Government Orders under which they were appointed in the undivided State of Uttar Pradesh continued to hold good. He would point out that actually there is no appointment order as such but the writ petitioners were only absorbed as they were appointed in the undivided State of Uttar Pradesh. 11. To the same, it is pointed out by learned Chief Standing Counsel that if one goes by the Regulation under which they were appointed, it did not confer the benefit of Government servant on the petitioners as such. The case of the appellants would appear to be that pursuant to Annexure nos. 1 and 2 judgments, they have proceeded to create supernumerary posts, 86 in number against which the writ petitioners were appointed. He would further submit that actually the post of Kurk Amin was not allocated to the State of Uttarakhand and it is created only pursuant to Annexure nos. 1 and 2 judgments and they have been given all the benefits on the said basis w.e.f. 09.11.2000 and they cannot get it prior to that. 12. Mr. Niranjan Bhatt, learned counsel appearing for the respondents in SPA No. 311 of 2017 and SPA No. 329 of 2017 would point out that as far as ACP is concerned, the ACP has been given to similarly situated persons in District Rudraprayag and District Udham Singh Nagar. 13. In order to resolve the controversy, it is necessary to give the background, which led to litigation in both the Hon’ble High Court in the Lucknow and Allahabad Benches, which reached the Hon’ble Apex Court and also the litigation, which was launched in this Court besides the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Allahabad, which is in the second round of litigation. 14. Since the matter has been considered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment rendered in the case of State of U.P. and others Vs. Chandra Prakash Pandey reported in (2001) 4 SCC 78 , we deem it appropriate to refer to certain paragraphs of the said judgment, which will give the facts in its entirety. Paragraph nos. 3, 4 and 5 of the said judgment read as follows: “3. Chandra Prakash Pandey reported in (2001) 4 SCC 78 , we deem it appropriate to refer to certain paragraphs of the said judgment, which will give the facts in its entirety. Paragraph nos. 3, 4 and 5 of the said judgment read as follows: “3. The short facts are that the Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Uttar Pradesh framed a scheme on 8.5.1978 for appointment of Kurk Amins throughout the State by the concerned District Collector for realisation of outstanding dues of the cooperative societies as land revenue and their salary and conditions of service were also prescribed. Pursuant to the said scheme, Kurk Amins were appointed in different Districts of the State. Subsequently, it transpired that such Kurk Amins were not recovering sufficient outstanding dues to meet even payment of salary to them. Therefore, they were asked to work on commission basis. Those Kurk Amins who agreed to work on commission basis were retained in service whereas services of others were terminated, which led to filing of a writ application before the Allahabad High Court by one Ram Bihari Misra giving rise to CMWP No. 738/1980 claiming therein that he was regular employee as such his services could not have been terminated. Similarly situated persons also filed other writ applications in the same year. All the writ applications were heard and disposed of by a Division Bench of the High Court on 16.11.1985 whereby orders of termination of the writ petitioners were quashed and it was held that they were Government servants as such their services could not have been terminated otherwise than in accordance with the procedure prescribed under law. 4. Thereafter, one Chandra Prakash Pandey and others, who are respondents in Civil Appeal Nos. 8467-68 of 1995, filed a writ application before the High Court for a direction to the State to pay regular scale to them as was payable to Kurk Amins of the Revenue Department. 4. Thereafter, one Chandra Prakash Pandey and others, who are respondents in Civil Appeal Nos. 8467-68 of 1995, filed a writ application before the High Court for a direction to the State to pay regular scale to them as was payable to Kurk Amins of the Revenue Department. The learned Single Judge of the High Court following the judgment rendered by the Division Bench on 16.11.1985 in CMWP No. 738/1980 referred to above allowed the writ application and directed to pay salary and regular scale of pay to the writ petitioners against which order Special Appeal was preferred by the State of Uttar Pradesh before the Division Bench whereas writ petitioner Chandra Prakash Pandey also preferred an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge as no direction was given for fixing their pay and granting arrears. Both the appeals were disposed of by judgment dated 5th May, 1995. The appeal preferred by the State was dismissed and the appeal preferred by the writ petitioner was allowed which gave rise to Civil Appeal Nos. 8467-68 of 1995. 5. In the meantime, Uttar Pradesh Sahakari Sangharsh Karamchari Sangh filed a writ petition being Writ Petition No. 2829(S)/92 praying therein, inter alia, for payment of regular scale to Kurk Amins appointed on commission basis for realising dues of the cooperative societies as was payable to Kurk Amins of Revenue Department. Some other organisations and individual Kurk Amins also filed separate writ applications and following the decision rendered in CMWP No. 738/1980 on 16.11.1985, a Division Bench of the High Court held that the principle laid down in the aforesaid case also applied to the case of Kurk Amins appointed on commission basis as if both stood on the same footing, without considering the distinction between the two. The said decision was challenged before this Court by way of a Special Leave to Appeal being SLP (C) Nos. The said decision was challenged before this Court by way of a Special Leave to Appeal being SLP (C) Nos. 1046, 945, 1462-1463 of 1991 and when the same were placed for consideration before this Court on 16.1.1992 leave was granted, appeals were allowed and the matter was remanded to the High Court for considering the question as to whether cases of Kurk Amins appointed on commission basis can be treated to be at par with that of Kurk Amins appointed on salary basis and the ratio of the decision in CMWP No. 738/1980 rendered by the High Court on 16.11.1985 would be applicable to them or not. As by the time the matter was remanded, writ applications, according to the Rules of that High Court, were required to be heard by a Single Judge, the same were placed for consideration before a Single Judge, who, by order dated 22.3.1996, recorded a tentative finding that the cases of Kurk Amins appointed on commission basis were at par with that of Kurk Amins appointed on salary basis, but was of the opinion that the matter should be heard by a larger bench. Against the said order, special appeal was preferred before the High Court and a Division Bench disposed of the same on 4.4.1997 by allowing the appeal, setting aside that portion of judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge whereby he directed the matter to be placed before a larger bench and held that the Kurk Amins appointed on commission basis also held civil posts like Kurk Amins appointed on salary basis for realisation of outstanding dues of cooperative societies. Challenging the said decision of the Division Bench, Civil Appeal No. 6075 of 1997 has been preferred.” 15. In the said judgment, the Court repelled the argument of the State that the Kurk Amins were not holding civil posts. The Court, inter alia, held as follows: “15. From a bare perusal of the aforementioned decisions of the two different benches of the High Court it would be clear that after taking into consideration all relevant factors as laid down by this Court in its judgment referred to above, the High Court has come to the conclusion and recorded a finding of fact that Kurk Amins appointed on commission basis for recovery of outstanding dues of the cooperative societies were members of service and government servants. On behalf of the State, it has not been challenged that the aforesaid statements of facts in the two judgments are incorrect. During the course of arguments learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the State made an unsuccessful attempt to refer to a scheme prepared by the Registrar of Cooperative Societies, but in view of the fact that neither any counter affidavit was filed before the High Court nor the said scheme was filed before this Court either along with the Special Leave Petitions or with any other affidavit, we are of the opinion that it is not possible for us to look into the said scheme as such the same can be of no avail to the State by its mere production in Court during the course of argument.” 16. It is now necessary to refer to the second round of litigation, which was launched as Writ Petition (S/S) No. 7326 of 2004, inter alia, by Shri Chandra Prakash Pandey and others before the learned Single Judge of the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court. In the said case, it appears that after the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in the first round of litigation, which we have referred to, the question relating to the exact pay, which they were entitled was left to be decided by the Authority. This is besides arrears and other things relating to the petitioners’ claim. Pursuant to the judgment of the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court, the District Magistrate appointed the petitioners therein as Government servants and fixed their pay in accordance with the Rules, which were framed as the U.P. Cooperative Collection Fund and Amin and other Employees Service Rules, 2002. It was the said order, which was challenged before the learned Single Judge. The case of the petitioners was that grant of pay scale under the 2002 Rules was a totally different aspect inasmuch as they were already appointed as Kurk Amins and there was no question of appointing them as Government Servants since declaration was already made by the High Court, which was confirmed by the Hon’ble Apex Court holding that they were Government servants and there was no occasion for appointing the petitioners and it was wholly mischievous act in passing the impugned orders i.e. by firstly appointing the petitioners as Government servants and, thereafter, giving them pay scale under the 2002 Rules only ignoring the actual directions of the Court. Therefore, it appears to us that in the said litigation, the petitioners had called in question not only the order granting pay scale but also the very order appointing them under the 2002 Rules besides giving them the pay scale and they claimed that they were entitled to the payment of salary from the date of their appointment at par with their counterparts in terms of the directions given by the Court vide judgment dated 05.05.1995, which has been confirmed by the Hon’ble Apex Court. The learned Single Judge agreed with the case of the writ petitioners and allowed the writ petition. The respondents were directed to consider the entitlement of the petitioners for appropriate pay scales with all other benefits with effect from 01.01.1986 and 01.01.1996 onwards treating their appointment on the post of Kurk Amin on the pay scale which was mentioned therein w.e.f. from 30.06.1984 and 08.06.1999 respectively and to pass an appropriate order determining benefits in respect to appropriate pay scale, arrears of salary etc. to which the petitioners were entitled and to pay the same. 17. This judgment came to be challenged before the Division Bench of the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court. The Bench while considering the Appeal filed by the State and others proceeded to consider the history of the litigation culminating in the judgment in the year 2001. It, thereafter, referred to the Rules made in the year 2002 and held as follows: “The submission is that the Rules, 2002 do not speak anywhere about issuing any appointment letter, much less a fresh appointment letter to any of the existing Kurk Amins on enforcement thereof. What has been mentioned in the Rules is that the existing Kurk Amins shall be absorbed in terms of Rule 18. Interpreting Rule 6, which is the sheet-anchor of the respondents' case, counsel for the respondents submitted that the recital that the vacancies of Amin shall be filled by already serving Amins on salary basis, cannot be taken to mean that it would be a fresh appointment so as to render the past services of the respondent invalid. The Rules, 2002 came into force on 20.10.2002. Rule 5 of the said Rules lays down the cadre of service. 206 posts were placed in the cadre of Amin saying that three posts had to be there in each district. The Rules, 2002 came into force on 20.10.2002. Rule 5 of the said Rules lays down the cadre of service. 206 posts were placed in the cadre of Amin saying that three posts had to be there in each district. However, in district having less than three tehsils, two posts were to be there in each district. The respondents' specific case is that they fall within the norms aforesaid prescribed, and, therefore, it cannot be urged by the appellants that there was no vacancy against which the respondents could be absorbed even before the enforcement of the Rules. This position is also not disputed by the appellants, but what is being disputed is that according to the appellants, it is only on creation of posts under the Rules, the respondents can be treated to be regularly appointed whereas the respondents say that it is not a case of creation of posts by the Rules but only a case of prescribing the strength of the cadre of Amin which was pre-existing. In support of their claim, the respondents further say that they have been working for the last more than 30-35 years and, therefore, it cannot be presumed that there were no posts, rather posts shall be deemed to be available, as after such a long time, the continuity thereof cannot be put to a naught. Of course there was no cadre as there were no Rules and these Kurk Amins were not being treated as Government servants, but it is unbelievable that such a large number of Kurk Amins were appointed by the District Magistrate/Collectors in each district without there being any post or necessity. Even assuming that the posts/vacancies were not specifically carved out and these persons were appointed in exigency of work for collection of revenue, working on such posts for such a long time would definitely entitle them to claim the benefit of past services rendered by them. Our view finds support from the fact that once the Supreme Court has declared these Kurk Amins as Government servants holding civil posts, they are entitled to the scale of pay which was payable to Kurk Amins appointed on regular basis in the Revenue Department from the very beginning, including pay revisions which might have taken place in between. Our view finds support from the fact that once the Supreme Court has declared these Kurk Amins as Government servants holding civil posts, they are entitled to the scale of pay which was payable to Kurk Amins appointed on regular basis in the Revenue Department from the very beginning, including pay revisions which might have taken place in between. In case any other interpretation is given to this view, it would defeat the very purpose of the directives issued by the Supreme Court. It will make no sense to say that though the Kurk Amins hold civil posts since they started working as such, and they are entitled to the protection of Article 311 of the Constitution also, but the benefit of the payscale, as given to the Government servants, can be given only after the enforcement of the Rules, and deny them the regular payscale for the period during which they were worked prior to the commencement of the Rules, 2002. The Court did not say that the Rules should be framed so as to declare the respondents as Government servants or that their status as Government servants, was made dependent upon the declaration so made by the State Government by framing the Rules and till then deny them the payscale which is given to their counterparts working in the Revenue Department. Denial of salary in the payscale with all revisions of pay to the respondents would, therefore, be wholly arbitrary and not supported by any law, rather in violation of the dictum of the Apex Court. The respondents once having been declared as Government servants holding civil posts are entitled to be paid salary in the given payscale of the Kurk Amins of Revenue Department with the benefit of revision of pay which might have taken place during all the period of their service, since they joined the service. The next question is regarding the counting of past services which the respondents rendered before the enforcement of the Rules, 2002 for the purposes of other service benefits including grant of selection grade and post retiral dues. So far as selection grade is concerned, there cannot be any reason for not counting the services rendered by the respondents as such before the enforcement of the Rules, 2002. So far as selection grade is concerned, there cannot be any reason for not counting the services rendered by the respondents as such before the enforcement of the Rules, 2002. As the selection grade is granted on completion of satisfactory service for a particular period in the given grade and since the respondents have already been held to be entitled to the payscale which was available to the Kurk Amins of Revenue Department, they are also entitled to the selection grade by counting their service period as aforesaid. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that unless the respondents put in regular service for a period of ten years, they would not be entitled to pension in terms of G.O. dated 1.7.1989 read with Articles 361 and 371 of the C.S.R. A perusal of the Rules, 2002 reveals that in fact they were framed with a view to absorb the existing Kurk Amins and not to appoint them afresh. Rule 18 specifically provides that on the date of commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Co-operative Collection Fund and the Amins and other Staff Service Rules, 2002, Amin and their Sahoyogi shall be considered to be absorbed against the vacancies available and their recruitment shall be considered as substantive. Option was given to the employees for refusing absorption within three months and if such an option is given, then such a person shall not be treated as member of service. The language in the aforesaid rule, uses two words specifically and distinctively, namely, "absorption" and "recruitment". The phrase "Amin and their Sahoyogi shall be considered to be absorbed against the vacancies available and their recruitment shall be considered as substantive" has got its own significance. Recruitment is a fact which, in the present case, had taken place much before the enforcement of the Rules. Recruitment means inducting a person into service. The respondents were recruited into service decades before. Such a recruitment was not substantive of course as there were no rules and there was no prescription of vacancies/posts. Therefore, the Rules provided that such existing Kurk Amins be deemed as absorbed in service first and their recruitment should be treated as substantive. Once a Kurk Amin, appointed more than 30 years back, is absorbed in service, then his recruitment is taken to be substantive. Therefore, the Rules provided that such existing Kurk Amins be deemed as absorbed in service first and their recruitment should be treated as substantive. Once a Kurk Amin, appointed more than 30 years back, is absorbed in service, then his recruitment is taken to be substantive. This is in consonance with the directives issued by the Court, for the reason that unless there is substantive appointment, the benefit of the service rendered in past would not be available to the employee. To overcome this legal obstacle, the Rules provided for absorption of the Amins and their Sahoyogis, with legal fiction that their recruitment would be termed as substantive. The provisions in the Rules cannot be read in isolation so as to make it a rule for fresh recruitment of the existing Kurk Amins who are already in service for filling up the posts/vacancies available. The respondents have been declared as Kurk Amins holding civil posts and entitled for salary and other benefits as was being given to Kurk Amins of the Revenue Department i.e. Government servants, from the very inception of their service and, therefore, all that period, which they had rendered as Government servants in the prescribed payscale, cannot be negated by making a rule which nullifies the declaration so made by this Court and upheld by the Apex Court. If they are denied the benefit of service rendered by them before the enforcement of the Rules, 2002, it would result into gross miscarriage of justice. The purpose of above declaration would be defeated and, therefore, once they are absorbed in service, their past service rendered as Government servants cannot be ignored. It is not a case where fresh recruitment was to be made against a post newly created or vacancy newly occurred, but by virtue of the Rules the Kurk Amins (respondents) have been absorbed into service, therefore, their past service as Government servants cannot be put to a nullity nor can stand wiped off. Learned Single Judge Sudhir Agarwal, J., in his judgment, has considered the effect of the declaration of Kurk Amins (respondents) as Government servants and has also shown concern in the manner the Rules, 2002 have been drafted, which in fact if read literally would deny the benefit of long drawn litigation to the respondents. Learned Single Judge Sudhir Agarwal, J., in his judgment, has considered the effect of the declaration of Kurk Amins (respondents) as Government servants and has also shown concern in the manner the Rules, 2002 have been drafted, which in fact if read literally would deny the benefit of long drawn litigation to the respondents. No such rule could have been framed by the State Government so as to take away the benefits given by the High Court and upheld by the Supreme Court and, therefore, we have read down the rule so as to save its validity. For reasons aforesaid, we do not find any illegality in the orders passed by the learned Single Judges. The special appeals being devoid of merit are, therefore, dismissed. We further provide that the respondents shall be paid the entire arrears of salary by fixing their pay in payscales, as provided to Kurk Amins of the Revenue Department, giving benefit of revision of payscales, as might have been done during this period. They shall also be considered for grant of selection grade in accordance with law and rules, and shall, on attaining the age of superannuation, be paid post-retiral dues including pension by counting the period of service they have rendered as Kurk Amins prior to the enforcement of Rules, 2002. Those Kurk Amins, who have already retired, shall be given the difference of pay as arrears of salary and post-retiral dues including pension by refixing their payscales accordingly. This shall be done within a maximum period of three months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order. The amount deposited in Court by the appellants towards arrears of pay of the respondents shall be allowed to be withdrawn by the respondents. The balance amount shall be paid to them as per the directives given above. 18. This is a matter, which further engaged the attention of Hon’ble Apex Court in Civil Appeals, which arose out of Special Appeal filed by the State of U.P. and others. The balance amount shall be paid to them as per the directives given above. 18. This is a matter, which further engaged the attention of Hon’ble Apex Court in Civil Appeals, which arose out of Special Appeal filed by the State of U.P. and others. Thereafter, we notice the following portion of the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court, which reads as under: “The Division Bench of the High Court while affirming the said judgment of the Single Judge gave further directions to the following effect: “We further provide that the respondents shall be paid the entire arrears of salary by fixing their pay in pay-scales, as provided to Kurk Amins of the Revenue Department, giving benefit of revision of pay-scales, as might have been done during this period. They shall also be considered for grant of selection grade in accordance with law and rules, and shall, on attaining the age of superannuation, be paid post-retiral dues including pension by counting the period of service they have rendered as Kurk Amins prior to the enforcement of Rules, 2002. Those Kurk Amins, who have already, retired, shall be given the difference of pay as arrears of salary and post-retiral dues including pension by re-fixing their pay-scales accordingly. This shall be done within a maximum period of three months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order. The amount deposited in Court by the appellants towards arrears of pay of the respondents shall be allowed to be withdrawn by the respondents. The balance amount shall be paid to them as per the directives given above.” While the view taken by learned Single Judge is for enforcement of the judgment of this Court, mentioned above, the judgment of the Division Bench, to the extent it has gone beyond the relief granted by learned Single Judge in the appeal filed by the State, is not sustainable and to that extent the said directions is set aside. The appeals shall stand disposed of in terms of the judgment of learned Single Judge. No costs.” 19. We may, at once, notice that the aspect of the matter decided by the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court, which could have relevance for the purpose of deciding this litigation has been set aside by the Hon’ble Apex Court. 20. The appeals shall stand disposed of in terms of the judgment of learned Single Judge. No costs.” 19. We may, at once, notice that the aspect of the matter decided by the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court, which could have relevance for the purpose of deciding this litigation has been set aside by the Hon’ble Apex Court. 20. Having considered the development, insofar as it relates to the litigation in the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court and reaching up to the Apex Court, it is now necessary to consider as to what transpired in this Court. Annexure no. 1 is the Writ Petition filed by the Uttaranchal Sangrah Kurk Amin Parishad along with another person, who is apparently the member of the same. The said writ petition was decided on 31.03.2006. Therein, the Court was approached by the petitioners seeking a mandamus to implement the order in its true spirit by granting full status of the holder of civil post with all consequential benefits w.e.f. 16.11.1985 like the Government servants and we have already noticed the further prayer which was sought. After stating the contentions of both sides, the learned Single Judge proceeded to dispose of the matter as follows: “Looking to the grievance of the petitioner, a writ of mandamus is issued to the opposite parties to implement the order in its true spirit by according full status of holder of civil post with all consequential benefits w.e.f. 16.11.1985 like the Govt. servants in view of the aforesaid judgment. Writ petition is allowed. No order as to costs.” 21. The State carried the matter in Special Appeal. The judgment was rendered on 14.09.2010. Therein, the State contended that the Kurk Amins were to be appointed under the scheme prepared by the Registrar of Cooperative Societies and they could not be treated as Government employees as they were to be appointed for a particular Cooperative Society in order to enable the Cooperative Society to recover its debts. Their salaries were to be paid by the Cooperative Societies for whom they were to be appointed and they were to be paid the same from the realization and at no point of time, any money belonging to the State Exchequer was spent for payment of their salaries or commission. Their salaries were to be paid by the Cooperative Societies for whom they were to be appointed and they were to be paid the same from the realization and at no point of time, any money belonging to the State Exchequer was spent for payment of their salaries or commission. Though the Kurk Amins were appointed by the District Collector/Magistrate but having regard to the purpose and nature of appointment of Kurk Amins it was contended that they were not treated to be a part of the Government establishment. Reliance was placed on judgment passed in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka & others Vs. Uma Devi and others reported in 2006 (4) SCC 1 and it was contended that the judgment in the case of State of U.P. and others Vs. Chandra Prakash Pandey reported in (2001) 4 SCC 78 , which we have already referred to earlier, cannot be treated as a precedent and the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of the Hon’ble High Court at Allahabad prior to the creation of State of Uttarakhand, cannot be treated as good law guiding the State of Uttarakhand. It was also the case of the appellants that at no point of time the State of Uttar Pradesh created any post of Cooperative Kurk Amins and, accordingly, no Cooperative Kurk Amins were allocated to the State of Uttarakhand. It was also submitted that if judgment under Appeal is allowed to remain, it will compel the Government to create posts for the first time, for accommodating the members of the petitioner in those posts. The reasoning, thereafter, given by the Division Bench is relevant and we extract the same as follows: “5. The contention of the State of Uttarakhand, as above, may or may not be correct. We are, however, not in a position to go into that aspect of the matter, in view of the law laid down by the High Court at Allahabad, which law became the law enforceable, in so far as, the State of Uttarakhand is concern, upon its creation. It was well within the competence of the State of Uttarakhand to make such law in order to avoid the law so made by the High Court at Allahabad, which became applicable to the State of Uttarakhand, but the fact remains that the State of Uttarakhand did not make any such law. It was well within the competence of the State of Uttarakhand to make such law in order to avoid the law so made by the High Court at Allahabad, which became applicable to the State of Uttarakhand, but the fact remains that the State of Uttarakhand did not make any such law. The fact that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has declared the status of ‘Cooperative Kurk Amins’ as that of Government Servant, in confirmation of the law declared by the High Court at Allahabad, is not in dispute. But for the creation of the State of Uttarakhand, the members of the petitioner, who were working in the State of Uttar Pradesh before bifurcation of the said State and continued to work in the bifurcated State of Uttarakhand at the same place they were working before bifurcation, would have had the advantage of the said judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, rendered in the case of State of U.P. & others Vs. Chandra Prakash Pandey and others. Only because the State was bifurcated, to which they had no role to play, they would be deprived of such advantage is not comprehendible to us. We, under those circumstances, cannot deprive the members of the petitioner of the benefit or advantage of the said judgment, nor we can avoid to follow the ratio of the said judgment. 6. It is true that in Uma Devi (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has discussed when and how a Government Servant is appointed and how a person can acquire the status of a Government Servant. However, that discussion was made in the backdrop of appointments given in the Government contrary to the Rules and Regulations framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. As against that in State of U.P. & others Vs. Chandra Prakash Pandey and others (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court agreed with the recognition of the status of the ‘Cooperative Kurk Amins’ as that of Government Servants. We do not think that on the strength of the ratio of the judgment rendered in Uma Devi (Supra), we can avoid to follow what has been held in the State of U.P. & others Vs. Chandra Prakash Pandey & others, in relation to persons, who are sailing in the same boat.” 22. It is thereafter, that the Division Bench proceeded to conclude the matter in paragraph no. Chandra Prakash Pandey & others, in relation to persons, who are sailing in the same boat.” 22. It is thereafter, that the Division Bench proceeded to conclude the matter in paragraph no. 7, which we have already extracted. 23. It is now necessary to notice, even according to the writ petitioners, what happened. It is submitted that contempt was filed and Government Orders dated 26.04.2011 and 29.04.2011 were passed. In Annexure no. 4 Government Order dated 26.04.2011, with reference to Government Order dated 16.04.2011, it is recited that on the basis of available records, 86 persons working as Kurk Amins have been declared as Government Servants. It is also recited that all the Kurk Amins will be given the benefit of Government servants. It is further recited in clause no. 3 that there will be a deduction from their salary towards Income Tax from 09.11.2000. The further order dated 29.04.2011 produced as Annexure No. 4, inter alia, states that the Kurk Amins will be given salary and other consequential benefits treating them as Government servants from 09.11.2000. 24. It appears that when they were paid the salary, the Government deducted the commission, which they were being paid. Though, there was a prayer in some of the writ petitions, as noticed by us, neither was it considered and granted by the learned Single Judge nor is there any complaint raised before us regarding the said aspect. As regards the complaint regarding the non-payment of ACP, the case of the appellants appears to be that ACP has already been given to about 60 Kurk Amins, whereas, it was not given to 25 Kurk Amins, who were the writ petitioners before this Court, who have claimed the said benefit. In fact, the directions given in the common judgment across the board should be understood as only meaning a direction in those cases where such a prayer is there, as we have noted that different petitions were clubbed together and disposed of by a common judgment. We would take up the complaint relating to payment of ACP. The case of the appellants appears to be that even without there being any adverse entry in the ACR, it is open to the State to withhold the ACP if the work is found unsatisfactory. It is not as if the ACP is to be granted on the completion of the requisite service. The case of the appellants appears to be that even without there being any adverse entry in the ACR, it is open to the State to withhold the ACP if the work is found unsatisfactory. It is not as if the ACP is to be granted on the completion of the requisite service. The period of service must be satisfactory. The issue is governed by the Government Order. There is no dispute regarding these aspects. In the counter affidavit, specifically the stand has been taken that ACP was denied on the basis that the service of the writ petitioners was not satisfactory. No details as such is provided. The case appears to be that the writ petitioners were appointed as Kurk Amins for the purpose of effecting recovery from the Cooperative Societies and the case set up appears to be that those who have not done satisfactory work have been denied ACP. 25. According to Mr. B.M. Pingal, learned counsel for the writ petitioners, there is no such provision in the Government Order. What we would think is that instead of having directed the payment of ACP, as was done by the learned Single Judge, the learned Single Judge ought to have directed consideration of the claim by passing a speaking order giving reasons if it is not given in each individual’s case. So to that extent the judgment of the learned Single Judge would require modification. Coming to the complaint that the service rendered prior to 09.11.2000 could not be considered for the purpose of selection grade, promotional scale and post retiral benefits, we notice from the direction given by the learned Single Judge that the previous service was to be counted from the due date. The very issue was what was the due date. There is no clarity on this matter. As we have noticed by Annexure no. 1 judgment, in the earlier round in this Court, at the instance of the Uttaranchal Sangrah Kurk Amin Parishad and another, learned Single Judge directed that consequential benefits must be given w.e.f. 1985. The very issue was what was the due date. There is no clarity on this matter. As we have noticed by Annexure no. 1 judgment, in the earlier round in this Court, at the instance of the Uttaranchal Sangrah Kurk Amin Parishad and another, learned Single Judge directed that consequential benefits must be given w.e.f. 1985. It is pointed out to us by learned Chief Standing Counsel that the date in 1985 is to be read in the context of the date 16.11.1985, which was the date on which originally the judgment in the Hon’ble High Court of Allahabad was rendered whereby, the orders of termination of the writ petitioners in the said case were quashed and it was held that they were Government servants. The petitioners in the earlier round also sought the said benefit and the learned Single Judge had issued a direction to accord full status of the holder of civil post with all consequential benefits w.e.f. 16.11.1985 like the Government servants in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court and the Hon’ble Apex Court. 26. It is interesting to note that, in fact, the petitioners in some cases have been appointed on dates, which are not same as 16.11.1985 and they are much after. As we have already noticed, the matter was taken up in Appeal before this Court in an intra-court appeal and we have noticed paragraph no. 7 of the Division Bench judgment. Quite clearly, the writ petitioners would be governed in the matter of consequential benefits on the basis of the conclusions rendered in paragraph no. 7 of the Division Bench judgment, which has become final. Though, the State carried the matter in Special Leave, which was unsuccessful, the writ petitioners in the said case accepted the said judgment. It was accepting the said judgment that in contempt, orders were passed as Annexure no. 4, which we have adverted to. The result of the disposal of the Special Appeal by the Division Bench of this Court appears to be that the Division Bench did not accept the contention of the appellants that merely being appointed on commission basis as Kurk Amins for the purpose of recovering amounts due to the Cooperative Societies would render them ineligible to be treated as Government servants and the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Chandra Prakash Pandey (supra) was accepted. The Court modified the direction of the learned Single Judge, which we have noticed to give benefit w.e.f. 1985 and it was substituted with the date 09.11.2000. 09.11.2000 is the appointed day under the U.P. Reorganisation Act, 2000 by which the State of Uttaranchal (subsequently renamed as State of Uttarakhand) was created. To that extent, therefore, by the judgment of this Court, which has become final and which binds the writ petitioners also, though they become entitled to be treated as Government servants, the Court limited the benefits, which they would have otherwise been entitled in the form of consequential benefits from 09.11.2000. The benefit of counting the period of service prior to 09.11.2000 would appear to be not in tune with what was declared by this Court in paragraph no. 7. In fact, in the case of the employees in the undivided State of Uttar Pradesh and who were allocated to the State of Uttar Pradesh, the position may be slightly different. As far as they are concerned, the matter reached the Hon’ble Apex Court and in the case of Chandra Prakash Pandey (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court having confirmed the judgment of the Division Bench, probably 16.11.1985 would continue to remain relevant even for the purposes of consequential benefits. That is not a matter which we need be detained with. But since we are concerned with the writ petitioners, it must be remembered that they were never allocated as such to the State of Uttarakhand in the aftermath of Reorganisation, who were working as Kurk Amins(Cooperative Societies). On approaching this Court, the judgments of this Court, as we have noticed were pronounced, which we have noticed as Annexure nos. 1 and 2 and the Government acting on the basis of the said Annexure no. 2 judgment created supernumerary posts and petitioners were declared as Government servants from 09.11.2000. They were also declared as entitled to the benefit from 09.11.2000. They cannot be given the benefits and consequential benefits from an anterior date in view of what this Court has laid down in the earlier round of litigation, which binds the writ petitioners. The writ petitioners have not challenged Annexure no. 4. This we say because Mr. B.M. Pingal, learned counsel for the writ petitioners would point out that they were never appointed after the judgment of this Court but they were only absorbed. The writ petitioners have not challenged Annexure no. 4. This we say because Mr. B.M. Pingal, learned counsel for the writ petitioners would point out that they were never appointed after the judgment of this Court but they were only absorbed. As we noticed that though they were found eligible to be treated as Government servants by the Division Bench, the Division Bench specifically and expressly accepted the appeal of the State to the extent that the date was modified from 16.11.1985 to 09.11.2000 insofar as consequential benefits are concerned. It is this judgment, which was actually implemented by the State purporting to give the benefit from 09.11.2000. Therefore, in such circumstances, directing taking into account the service rendered prior to 09.11.2000 for the purpose of selection grade, promotional scale and post retiral benefits including pension, as done by the learned Single Judge cannot be sustained. The writ petitioners will be certainly entitled to count the period of service from 09.11.2000 for all purposes. 27. We also see no merit in the contention of Mr. B.M. Pingal, learned counsel for the writ petitioners that subsequently in the year 2011, Statutory Rules were made and therein in Rule 3(8), substantive appointment is referred to as any appointment, which is not adhoc in nature and regulated by any Government Order or Regulation. He would point out that writ petitioners were actually appointed in the undivided State of Uttar Pradesh and, therefore, the said appointment should be considered as a substantive appointment and, therefore, the benefit should be given. We must first notice that these Rules were framed in the year 2011; and came into force in the year 2011. Even assuming that it must be treated as having retrospective effect and, therefore, it would cover the case of the writ petitioners, we would think that in view of the judgment of this Court in the earlier round, we need not be detained by this aspect as explained in the judgment. The writ petitioners may not be entitled to get the said benefit. The said Rule may not advance the case of the writ petitioners. 28. The case of Mr. The writ petitioners may not be entitled to get the said benefit. The said Rule may not advance the case of the writ petitioners. 28. The case of Mr. Niranjan Bhatt, Advocate for the respondents in SPA No. 311 of 2017 and SPA No. 329 of 2017 appears to be that there is discrimination and ACP has been given in some districts is sought to be reconciled by learned Chief Standing Counsel by pointing out that those are the persons who were found eligible. 29. The upshot of the above discussion is that the appeals have to be allowed and the judgment of the learned Single Judge is set aside and modified in the following way: The direction of the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment to count the past services of the petitioners for the purposes of selection grade, promotional scale and post retiral benefits including pension etc. from the due date will stand clarified as meaning that the past services of the petitioners for the purposes of selection grade, promotional scale and post retiral benefits including pension will be counted from 09.11.2000 and not from any anterior period, as was the claim of the petitioners. 30. We further clarify that the matter will be considered for the purpose of counting the past services from 09.11.2000 for the purpose of selection grade and promotional scale and a decision will be taken within a period of six weeks from the date of production of a certified copy of this judgment. 31. As regards the grant of ACP in the writ petitions, where ACP was claimed by the writ petitioners, as we have noted, we direct that the appellants will consider the case of each of the writ petitioners, who have raised such a claim in the writ petitions for grant of ACP, and take a decision in accordance with law within a period of six weeks from the date of production of a certified copy of this judgment and the said decision will be communicated to the writ petitioners. If the writ petitioners are found ineligible, the reasons for the same and the material relied on for denying the ACP will also be indicated in the orders. 32. The appeals are allowed as above. No order as to cost.