JUDGMENT & ORDER : 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 26-8-2013 passed by the learned Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, West Tripura, Agartala in TS (MAC) No. 177 of 2010 for enhancement of the compensation and interest awarded to the appellant. 2. The facts giving rise to the appeal, in a nutshell, are that on 1-4-2009 at about 5 PM, when the appellant was returning home on foot along the left side of Bishalgarh-Agartala Road, one TATA Truck bearing registration No. TR-01-C-1733, driven rashly and negligently in a high speed, knocked her down behind her back. As a result, she sustained several injuries on different parts of her body. After prolonged treatment of 3 months in the hospital, she was discharged on 1-7-2009. However, when her condition deteriorated, she was admitted in the Tripura Medical College & Dr. BR Ambedkar Memorial Teaching Hospital, Hapania as indoor patient and underwent major surgery on her left leg for compound fracture on 30-8-2009. Even after her discharge, she continued to attend the OPD for constant treatment regularly. The District Disability Board, West Tripura, after examining her, issued the Certificate of Physical Disability certifying that her physical disability was to the extent of 60%. The appellant thereafter filed the claim petition claiming a compensation of Rs. 10,44,000/-. 3. The claim petition was resisted by both the owner of the offending truck and the Insurance Company by filing their respective written statements. Both of them denied that there was any vehicular accident involving the appellant or that they were not liable to pay any compensation to the appellant. On the pleadings of the parties, the Tribunal framed the following issues: 1. Whether the claimant sustained any injury occurred on 1-4-2009 at about 5 PM due to road traffic accident at Babul Chowmuhani Surjyamaninagar Kachari on Bishalgarh Agartala road under the Amtali PS due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of TATA Truck No. TR-01-C-1733? 2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get the compensation under the provision of MV Act, 1988? If so, to what extent and who shall be liable to pay the same? 4. The claimant-appellant examined herself as PW-1 and produced some documents, which are marked as Exbt. 1 series on admission of both sides waiving the formal proof thereof, to substantiate her claim. If so, to what extent and who shall be liable to pay the same? 4. The claimant-appellant examined herself as PW-1 and produced some documents, which are marked as Exbt. 1 series on admission of both sides waiving the formal proof thereof, to substantiate her claim. No oral evidence was adduced by the respondents though some documents pertaining to the offending vehicle were produced by the respondent No. 1. At the conclusion of the trial, the Tribunal passed the impugned judgment in favour of the appellant awarding a compensation of Rs. 4,71,096/- with interest @9% per annum from the date of the claim petition. Dissatisfied with the quantum of the compensation so awarded, the appellant is preferring this appeal. 5. On the basis of the evidence adduced by the appellant, the Tribunal held that the road traffic accident occurred on 1-4-2009 causing multiple injuries to the appellant, which resulted in her sustaining disability to the extent of 60% for the rest of her life thereby correspondingly losing her earning capacity to the extent of 60% as her right leg got shortened. The Tribunal, on the basis of the entry of her age made by the GBP Hospital, Agartala and Tripura Medical College in her Discharge Certificate, also recorded the finding that the appellant was 45 years old at the time of the accident. The Tribunal awarded Rs. 69,200/- for the period of her stay in both the Hospitals @ Rs. 400, which comes to Rs. 400 X 173 = Rs. 69,200/- and another sum of Rs. 28,495.85/- for purchasing medicines. Thus, the Tribunal awarded a total of Rs. 97,696/- towards medical expenses and other charges of both the Hospitals. The Tribunal found that the appellant was a daily labourer and applied some element of guesswork and accordingly assessed her income as Rs. 3,000/- per month. So, the Tribunal worked out the loss of income of the appellant for 7 months to be Rs. 21,000/-. As the loss of earning capacity of the appellant was found to be 60%, the Tribunal held that her monthly loss of earning came to Rs. 1,800/- (60% of Rs. 3,000). Therefore, the yearly loss of earning capacity of the appellant would come to Rs. 1,800 X 12 = Rs. 21,600/-. 21,000/-. As the loss of earning capacity of the appellant was found to be 60%, the Tribunal held that her monthly loss of earning came to Rs. 1,800/- (60% of Rs. 3,000). Therefore, the yearly loss of earning capacity of the appellant would come to Rs. 1,800 X 12 = Rs. 21,600/-. As the appellant was found to be 45 years at the time of the accident, the Tribunal, based on Sarla Verma and others v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121 , adopted a multiplier of 14 and computed the future loss of earning capacity to be Rs. 21,600x14 = Rs. 3,02,400/-. The Tribunal also awarded a lump sum of Rs. 50,000/- for pain and suffering. The total amount of compensation so awarded comes to Rs. 97,696 + Rs. 21,000 + Rs. 3,02,400 + Rs. 50,000 = Rs. 4,71,096/-. 6. Assailing the impugned judgment, Mr. Sankar Deb, the learned senior counsel, submits that the Tribunal has overlooked the statement of the appellant that she was aged about 39 years, 8 months and 18 days on the date of the accident, which was not even contradicted or denied in her cross-examination by the respondents, of the entry in the Electoral Roll for Ward No. 7, Sukanta Colony, Surjya Mani Nagar Gram Panchayat in respect of the date of birth of the appellant as 13-7-1969 and the entry of her age as 35 years in the charge sheet submitted by the police and erroneously took into account her age as 45 years entered in her discharge certificate, which was done without her knowledge. According to the learned senior counsel, the Tribunal should have accepted the age of the appellant as deposed by her when her statement was never denied or challenged by the respondents in cross. It is next contended by the learned senior counsel that the Tribunal has erroneously held that just because the physical disability of the appellant happened to be 60%, the loss of her earning capacity should also be 60% oblivious of the fact that in this case, she cannot move without crutch or go to toilet without the help of someone and is incapacitated from doing any work thereby losing her earning capacity to the extent of 100%. As the appellant was found to be less than 40 years of age at the time of the accident, a multiplier of 15 should be adopted to enable her to receive just and fair compensation. The learned senior counsel also contends that the Tribunal was too economical in assessing the monthly income of the appellant as Rs. 3,000/- by overlooking the ground realities that at the time of the accident, even a daily labour could easily earn Rs. 150/- or more per day; it ought to have held that she was earning a sum of Rs. 4,500/- per month at the time of the accident. Lastly, the learned senior counsel maintains that the appellant is entitled to enhanced compensation as follows: Rs. 4,500 X 12 X15 = Rs. 8,10,000/-; a sum of Rs. 25,000/- for loss of amenities of life; a sum of Rs. 25,000/- for mental shock and agony, inconvenience, frustration and a sum of Rs. 25,000/- for loss of expectation of life, the total whereof comes to Rs. 11,57,696/-. The learned senior counsel presses into service the decisions of the Apex Court in Jakir Hussein v. Sabir & others, (2015) 7 SCC 252 ; Kumari Kiran v. Sajjan Singh & others, (2015) 1 SCC 539 and Rajesh & others v. Rajbir Singh & others, (2013) 9 SCC 54 to fortify his various submissions. 7. Refuting the contentions of the learned senior counsel for the appellant, Mr. A. Gon Choudhury, the learned counsel for the insurer, submits that when no unimpeachable certificate of date of birth of the appellant could be produced by her, more so, when her age shown in the various documents as available on record are conflicting in nature, the Tribunal did not commit any infirmity in rejecting her self-serving statement and in holding that she was 45 years old at the time of the accident. He further argues that not a single witness was examined by the appellant to prove that she was earning more than Rs. 3,000/- per month at the time of the accident and the income as assessed by the Tribunal i.e. Rs. 3,000/- per month does not warrant the interference of this Court. He further argues that not a single witness was examined by the appellant to prove that she was earning more than Rs. 3,000/- per month at the time of the accident and the income as assessed by the Tribunal i.e. Rs. 3,000/- per month does not warrant the interference of this Court. In the absence of any corroboration from any witnesses that the appellant could no longer move on her own and requires constant support, submits the learned counsel, it will amount to perverse finding and misplaced sympathy to hold that the loss of her earning capacity is to the extent of 100%. Reminding this Court that compensation must be just and reasonable and should neither be a bonanza nor a source of profit nor a pittance, the learned counsel contends that the enhancement of compensation so claimed by the appellant is exorbitant and borders on irrationality. The learned counsel also seriously questions the authenticity of the so-called Electoral Roll for Gram Panchayat which did not even reflect the signature and seal of the issuing authority and cannot, therefore, be acted upon for determining the age of the appellant. He, therefore, strenuously urges that the appeal has no merit at all and is liable to be dismissed. 8. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions advanced on behalf of the learned counsel appearing for the parties. I have also carefully gone through the impugned judgment and other materials available on record. The first point for determination is whether the finding of the Tribunal that the appellant was 45 years old at the time of the accident is corrector not? No unimpeachable certificate of date of birth such as matriculation certificate or certificate to that effect issued by the competent authority or by the Hospital where she was delivered could be produced by the appellant. Not a single witness was produced by the appellant who could vouch for her age. In other words, no effort was made at the stage of the trial to produce the best available evidence which could be obtained. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the insurer, the so-called electoral roll for Gram Panchayat did not reflect the name of the issuing authority or his signature to inspire confidence in the contents thereof. In other words, no effort was made at the stage of the trial to produce the best available evidence which could be obtained. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the insurer, the so-called electoral roll for Gram Panchayat did not reflect the name of the issuing authority or his signature to inspire confidence in the contents thereof. Similarly, the age of the appellant mentioned in the charge sheet, in the absence of any corroborative evidence, cannot be relied upon to prove the age of the appellant. It is unfortunate that there is a tendency to make all out and desperate efforts only at the stage of the appellate proceedings to salvage the case of an appellant without proper foundation being laid at the stage of the trial. In the face of such conflicting evidence about the age of the appellant, I am of the view that the Tribunal was left with no choice but to hold that the age of the appellant was 45 years at the time of the accident, for which the interference of this Court is not called for. As the appellant was between the age range of 40 to 50 at the time of the accident, a multiplier of 14 shall have to be adopted for multiplying the multiplicand. 9. Coming now to the income of the appellant, the appellant in her claim petition as well as her examination-in-chief stated that she used to work as daily labourer from 6 AM to 6 PM under one sub-contractor, Sri Roydhan Chowdhury, the principal contractor being Sri Paresh Saha for the Rose Valley Projects at Surjamaniagar Park and also worked as a labourer in NREGA provided by the Government of Tripura and had to work as domestic agriculture to maintain her family. She used to earn in average at least Rs. 150/- per day i.e. Rs. 4,500/- per month by which she used to maintain her entire family as her husband is physically unable to perform any hard work due to waist and heart ailments and has to remain in a sick-bed. The same statements were reiterated by her in her examination-in-chief by affidavit. Interestingly, these statements are not denied or disputed by the respondents in their cross-examination. The same statements were reiterated by her in her examination-in-chief by affidavit. Interestingly, these statements are not denied or disputed by the respondents in their cross-examination. The approach of the Tribunal to the evidence of the appellant regarding her income is very casual, particularly, in the absence of rebuttal evidence adduced by the respondents. In my opinion, since the income of Rs. 4,500/- per month by the appellant cannot be said to be exorbitant by any standard and is rather reflective of the ground realities prevailing in 2009, such claim can be accepted in the absence of any documentary evidence to the contrary. Therefore, I set aside the finding of the income of the Tribunal and hold that the income of the appellant was Rs. 4,500/- per month at the time of the accident. 10. This then takes me to the loss of earning capacity of the appellant following the physical disability sustained by her to the extent of 60%, it must be remembered that it is not physical disability which determines the compensation, but it is the loss of earning capacity resulting from such disability which will determine the quantum of compensation payable to the claimant. The Tribunal proceeded on the basis that since the permanent disability of the appellant was 60%, the loss of her future earning capacity was also 60%. This approach is wrong and could lead to serious miscarriage of justice. The law is now well-settled that all permanent disability resulting from injuries in a vehicular accident do not necessarily result in loss of earning capacity. The appellant in her evidence-in-chief deposed that since the date of the accident on 1-4-2009, she had lost her physical ability to do any work and lost her earning capacity and that she had become totally 100% disabled and would not be able to work in future. She further deposed that she is not able to move without the help of crutch and cannot go for bath, latrine, etc. without the help of any person round the clock. Except for random denial, the cross-examination of the appellant by the insurer does not elicit to discredit her statement. As already noticed, the Certificate for the Person with Disability (Exbt. 3) indicates that the appellant’s case is that of loco-motor disability (permanent) with restricted movement due CH OM Lt Knee with deformity Left Ankle with 60% disability. Except for random denial, the cross-examination of the appellant by the insurer does not elicit to discredit her statement. As already noticed, the Certificate for the Person with Disability (Exbt. 3) indicates that the appellant’s case is that of loco-motor disability (permanent) with restricted movement due CH OM Lt Knee with deformity Left Ankle with 60% disability. In the absence of sufficient rebuttal evidence from the respondents, I am of the view that the loss of the future earning capacity of the appellant will come to 80% and not 100%, as claimed by the learned senior counsel as there is no conclusive evidence to show that the appellant would be totally incapable of earning anything. 11. Thus, the loss of earning capacity of the appellant will come to Rs. 4,500 X 12 X 14 X 80/100 = Rs. 6,04,800/-. The appellant will be entitled to (a) Rs. 1,00,000/- for pain and sufferings (instead of Rs. 50,000/- awarded by the Tribunal), (b) a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- for loss of amenities, (c) future medical expenses of Rs. 1,00,000/- and (d) a sum of Rs. 25,000/- for litigation expenses and (d) another sum of Rs. 4,500 X 7 = Rs. 31,500/- (instead of Rs. 21,000/- awarded by the Tribunal) for loss of income, the total whereof will come to Rs. 6,04,800+Rs. 1,00,000+Rs. 1,00,000+Rs. 1,00,000+Rs. 25,000+Rs. 31,500 = Rs. 9,61,300/. This will be in addition to Rs. 97,696/- already awarded for purchasing medicines and other medical expenses. Thus, the total amount of compensation payable to the appellant is enhanced to Rs. 10,58,996/-, which will carry interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of the claim petition. 12. The result of the foregoing discussion is that this appeal is partly allowed. The insurer is directed to deposit a sum of Rs. 10,58,996/- together with interest @ 9% per annum from the date of the claim petition to this Registry within two months from the date of receipt of this judgment. As and when the amount is deposited, the appellant will be permitted to withdraw half of the deposited amount after satisfying the usual formalities without further reference to this Court. The remaining amount shall be kept in a fixed deposit in any nationalized Bank for a period of five years though the appellant may be permitted to withdraw the yearly accrued interest till maturity of the fixed deposit. The remaining amount shall be kept in a fixed deposit in any nationalized Bank for a period of five years though the appellant may be permitted to withdraw the yearly accrued interest till maturity of the fixed deposit. Any amount already deposited or paid to the appellant shall stand adjusted accordingly. The impugned judgment, therefore, stands modified in the manner and to the extent indicated above. Transmit the L.C. record forthwith.