JUDGMENT : D.N. Patel, J. 1. This writ petition has been preferred for quashing and setting aside the order dated 8th February, 2003 (Annexure-32) passed by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Jharkhand, Ranchi whereby, partially the claim of refund was allowed in pursuance of Standing Order No. 478 dated 22nd December, 1995. Originally the claim of the refund for this petitioner was at Rs. 8,47,70,166.07/-, out of this, refund claim allowed is of Rs. 5,19,25,216/-. Being aggrieved and feeling dissatisfied by the order of Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Jharkhand, Ranchi, this petition has been preferred by the petitioner. 2. FACTUAL MATRIX: Petitioner set up its industrial unit in the year 1974 for manufacturing of Electrolytic Tinplate (hereinafter to be referred to as “ETP” for the sake of brevity),for which the main raw material was Tin, Mill, Black Plate (hereinafter to be referred to as “TMBP” for the sake of brevity).This TMBP was imported by this petitioner from various countries. The erstwhile State of Bihar issued Industrial Policy, 1995 (Annexure-1), conferring various incentives including exemption from payment of sales tax, upon purchase of raw materials, within the State. As per Clause 16.1, 16.2 and 16.3 to be read with Clause 16.4, the benefits were given for category 'A' and category 'B' districts. Here, we are concerned with category 'B' districts because petitioner is falling within category 'B' district and, therefore, it is claimed by the petitioner that it is entitled to get the exemption for 8 years, because, for category 'A', the exemption is for 10 years and for category 'B' the exemption is for 8 years. As per Clause 16.3, the units which are going to diversification, were also entitled to the benefits. The petitioner is claiming exemption from payment of sales tax upon purchase of raw materials for the period running from 05.04.1996 to 31.03.1998. In view of Clause 16.4 of the Industrial Policy, 1995 (Annexure-1), the erstwhile State of Bihar issued a notification being Standing Order No. 478 dated 22nd December, 1995 (Annexure-2) which imposes the procedure and condition for taking the benefit of exemption from payment of sales tax upon the purchase of raw materials. Original Clause no. 15 is now replaced by a new clause as per Standing Order No. 57 dated 02.03.2000 (Annexure-9). As per Clause 2 of Standing Order No. 57 dated 02.03.2000, original Clause no. Original Clause no. 15 is now replaced by a new clause as per Standing Order No. 57 dated 02.03.2000 (Annexure-9). As per Clause 2 of Standing Order No. 57 dated 02.03.2000, original Clause no. 15 of Standing Order No. 478 dated 22nd December, 1995 was replaced and now Clause no. 15(2) has also been incorporated looking to the original Industrial Policy, 1995 Clause No. 16.4. This substituted Clause no. 15(2) is the bone of contention in this matter. Much has been argued out by counsels for both the sides upon the substituted Clause no. 15.2. Similarly, Clause No. 15(4) (Ga) provides for benefit of exemption to be granted to diversified products. Petitioner, who was importing TMBP from various countries, now wanted to manufacture the same. For this manufacturing, the raw materials are Hot Rolled Coil, Zinc and Tin. This petitioner is claiming exemption from payment of sales tax upon purchase of only one raw material viz. Hot Rolled Coil and not upon Zinc and Tin. These facts have been clarified by the counsel appearing for the petitioner more than once. While manufacturing TMBP coils, other 8 items were also manufactured and as they are new items, which were never manufactured earlier and, therefore, it is known as a diversification for all the items manufactured for the first time, as per Standing Order No. 478 dated 22nd December, 1995 to be read with Standing Order No. 57 dated 02.03.2000. The petitioner is entitled to get exemption upon the payment of sales tax upon purchase of raw materials viz. Hot Rolled Coil for all the 9 items, whereas, Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Jharkhand, Ranchi has granted exemption from the payment of sales tax upon purchase of Hot Rolled Coil only up to 61% because, out of the total raw materials, this much percentage i.e. 61% of the raw materials has been utilized for the manufacturing of a new item TMBP. For other items even if the raw material is utilized, no exemption has been granted to this petitioner from payment of sales tax upon purchase of Hot Rolled Coil because other 8 items were never included in the exemption certificate, which is at Annexure5 to the memo of this writ petition. Exemption certificate granted by the State of Jharkhand dated 23rd June, 1998 is only for TMBP and not for any other products. Exemption certificate granted by the State of Jharkhand dated 23rd June, 1998 is only for TMBP and not for any other products. The exemption certificate at Annexure5 dated 23rd June, 1998 is in exercise of the powers by the State Government under substituted Clause no. 15(2) to be read with Clause 16.4 of the Industrial Policy. Initially, the order was passed by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Administration), Jamshedpur Division, Jamshedpur dated 30th June, 2000 and 1st July, 2000, whereby, the claim of the refund of this petitioner for the year 1996-1997 was disallowed and was restricted to 2/3rd of incremental capacity for which a writ petition being CWJC No. 2857 of 2000 (R) was preferred, which was decided by the Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 10th May, 2002 and the matter was remanded by the Division Bench of this Court and in pursuance of this order of the Division Bench, fresh order was passed by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Jharkhand, Ranchi dated 8th February, 2003 (Annexure-32) whereby, partly the claim of refund was allowed. Being aggrieved and feeling dissatisfied by this order, the present writ petition i.e. W.P.(T) 992 of 2003 was preferred by this petitioner which was withdrawn by this petitioner and to that effect order was passed on 15.03.2005. After withdrawal of the writ petition, the petitioner approached Hon'ble the Supreme Court by way of Special Leave to Appeal and Hon'ble the Supreme Court, vide order dated 15th January, 2014 granted liberty to this petitioner to prefer an application for recalling the earlier order dated 15th March, 2005. Hence, C.M.P. No. 107 of 2014 was preferred before the Division Bench of this Court in the present writ petition for recalling the order dated 15th March, 2005. This C.M.P. No. 107 of 2014 was allowed by this Court vide order dated 2nd December, 2015 with a cost of Rs. 25,000/-, which has been paid, as per the direction given by the Division Bench of this Court and order passed by this Court dated 15th March, 2005 was recalled and the present writ petition was restored to its original file with the same number. The C.M.P. No. 107 of 2015 was, thus, allowed with cost. 25,000/-, which has been paid, as per the direction given by the Division Bench of this Court and order passed by this Court dated 15th March, 2005 was recalled and the present writ petition was restored to its original file with the same number. The C.M.P. No. 107 of 2015 was, thus, allowed with cost. Hence, the present writ petition has been argued out at length by the counsel for both the sides which basically involves interpretation of Industrial Policy, Clause 16.1, 16.2, 16.3 and 16.4 to be read with Standing Order No. 478 dated 22nd December, 1995. 3. ARGUMENTS CANVASSED BY COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONER : Counsel for the petitioner submits that petitioner has set up its plant in the year 1974, for manufacturing of ETP for which the raw material was TMBP. This raw material was imported from various countries. Petitioner decided to manufacture TMBP for which the raw material is Hot Rolled Coil, Zinc and Tin. It is submitted by counsel appearing for the petitioner that while manufacturing new item TMBP, there are other 8 items also first time manufactured by the petitioner and hence, as all the products are new one, for all the products as per Clause 16.1, 16.2, 16.3, the benefit of exemption from the payment of sales tax upon the raw material should have been granted by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Jharkhand, Ranchi vide order dated 8th February, 2003. Counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that out of total 9 products, an application was preferred for exemption as per Annexure-3 to the memo of this writ petition. The said application is dated 25th May, 1996. The benefit of exemption from payment of sales tax upon the raw materials has been given only to the extent to which the said raw materials were used for manufacturing of TMBP, whereas, the same raw material is also utilized for manufacturing of other 8 items which are also new products. This aspect of the matter has not been properly appreciated by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, State of Jharkhand, Ranchi, while passing the impugned order dated 08th February, 2003. It is submitted by counsel for the petitioner that what is given by the Industrial Policy, 1995 cannot be taken away by the Standing Order. This aspect of the matter has not been properly appreciated by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, State of Jharkhand, Ranchi, while passing the impugned order dated 08th February, 2003. It is submitted by counsel for the petitioner that what is given by the Industrial Policy, 1995 cannot be taken away by the Standing Order. In fact, Standing Order No. 57 dated 02nd March, 2000 which replaces Clause No. 15 of Standing Order No. 478 dated 22nd December, 1995 is not applicable to the facts of the present case because, the period for which the exemption is sought for, is running from 05.04.1996 to 31.03.1998. Counsel for the petitioner further submitted that there is one more Standing Order No. 479 dated 22nd December, 1995, published by the erstwhile State of Bihar, granting exemption from payment of the sales tax upon the sale of the new products. Under this Standing Order No. 479, exemption from the payment of sales tax upon sale of all the 9 new items manufactured by this petitioner has been granted. It is further submitted by counsel for the petitioner that though, we are not concerned with the Standing Order No. 479 dated 22nd December, 1995, but, the facts remain that the very same government has granted exemption from the payment of sales tax upon the sale of all the 9 items, meaning thereby, all the 9 items which are mentioned at Annexure3 to the memo of this writ petition including TMBP are the new items and once they are new items manufactured by this petitioner, which is accepted for the applicability of the Standing Order No. 479, there is no reason why Standing Order No. 478 dated 22nd December, 1995 is not applicable to the very same new 9 items. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes has applied Standing Order No. 478 dated 22nd December, 1995 only for one of the items, out of total 9 new items. This is an error apparent on the face of the record, committed by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, State of Jharkhand, Ranchi, while passing the order dated 08th February, 2003 (Annexure-32) and hence, the said order deserves to be quashed and set aside. This is an error apparent on the face of the record, committed by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, State of Jharkhand, Ranchi, while passing the order dated 08th February, 2003 (Annexure-32) and hence, the said order deserves to be quashed and set aside. It is contended by counsel for the petitioner that the very purpose and object of the Industrial Policy, 1995 floated by the erstwhile State of Bihar was to give incentive to the newly established units or to the existing units, which are manufacturing new items which is also known as diversification the items which were never manufactured by the same unit. Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the decisions rendered by Hon’ble the Supreme court as reported in: (i) (1999)1 SCC 31 (State of Bihar & Ors. Vs. Suprabhat Steel Ltd. & Ors.) (ii) (2006)4 SCC 57 (State of Jharkhand & Ors. V. Tata Cummins Ltd. & Anr.) (iii) (2016)1 SCC 560 (Lloyd Electric & engineering Ltd. Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.) Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the interpretation of the Industrial Policy is quite different from interpretation of the Taxing Statutes. Interpretation of exemption clauses in the Industrial Policy is different from interpretation of exemption granted under the Taxing Statutes. The interpretation of the Industrial Policy should be made liberally. What is granted by one hand by the State cannot be taken away by another hand. It is further contended by counsel for the petitioner that looking to the impugned order dated 08th February, 2003 (Annexure-32), passed by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, State of Jharkhand, Ranchi, the only reason given is that other products (other than TMBP) they can be sold independently and further processing of these items is required to make TMBP. These reasons have been given in paragraph no. 5 of the impugned order. It is submitted by counsel for the petitioner that these reasons reveal that Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Jharkhand, Ranchi has lost sight of the fact that we are concerned with Standing Order No. 478 dated 22nd December, 1995 and not with Standing Order No. 479 dated 22nd December, 1995. These reasons given by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes reveal non-application of mind upon Standing Order No. 478. These reasons reveal that extraneous considerations have been appreciated by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes which is known as Wednesbury unreasonableness. These reasons given by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes reveal non-application of mind upon Standing Order No. 478. These reasons reveal that extraneous considerations have been appreciated by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes which is known as Wednesbury unreasonableness. When any adjudicating authority is taking into consideration irrelevant interpretation while adjudicating the dispute, the same is known as Wednesbury unreasonableness. Thus, it is submitted by counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order dated 08th February, 2003, at Annexure32 suffers from Wednesbury unreasonableness. Counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that subsequent affidavit filed by the respondent-State in the year 2016 which supplies additional reasons to justify the impugned order is not permissible in the light of the judgment and order delivered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill & Anr. Vs. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and ors. reported in (1978) 1 SCC 405 . On the basis of the aforesaid decision, it is submitted by counsel for the petitioner that if further reasons are permitted to be supplied in the counter affidavit to support the impugned order, perhaps, all the weak orders or all the orders which are not tenable at law will be provided strength or will be provided legality in the reasoning process, by the new ideas mentioned in the counter-affidavit. This type of additional reasons given in the counter-affidavit, which are never mentioned in the impugned order, which were even never contemplated while passing the impugned order, cannot make an order reasonable or legal, if otherwise, it is not tenable at law. Counsel for the petitioner further submitted that affidavits have also been filed in this writ petition to the effect that not only upon TMBP, but, also upon other 8 newly manufactured items, the excise duty has also been paid. Thus, there is manufacturing of not only TMBP, but, also other 8 new items and, therefore, the benefit of the Industrial Policy, 1995 (Annexure-1) to be read with Standing Order No. 478 dated 22nd December, 1995, ought to have been given to this petitioner. This aspect of the matter has not been properly appreciated by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Jharkhand, Ranchi, while passing the impugned order dated 08th February, 2003 (Annexure-32) and hence, the same deserves to be quashed and set aside. This aspect of the matter has not been properly appreciated by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Jharkhand, Ranchi, while passing the impugned order dated 08th February, 2003 (Annexure-32) and hence, the same deserves to be quashed and set aside. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that as per Clause appended to Industrial Policy, 1995, especially as per Clause No. 7 thereof, only intimation is to be given for diversification which has already been given as per Annexure3 and as per the manufacturing process submitted by this petitioner to the respondents and, hence, subsequently changed Clause no. 15 as per Standing Order no. 57 dated 2nd March, 2000 is not applicable to the facts of the present case. Even otherwise also, the period with which this petitioner is concerned is running from 5.4.1996 to 31.3.1998, whereas, Standing Order no. 57 has been issued on 2nd March, 2000 and, hence, also the same is not applicable to this petitioner. Counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that if prior permission is required to be taken as per Clause 17(2) of Standing Order No. 478 dated 22nd December, 1995, an order has already been passed by Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Administration) Jamshedpur Division, Jamshedpur dated rd September, 1998 (Annexure-6 to the memo of this writ petition) by which it has been held that for the whole raw material, the petitioner is entitled to exemption. It is submitted by the counsel for the petitioner that as per the impugned order dated 08th February, 2003 (Annexure32) only 61% of the raw material, which is used for manufacturing, has been given exemption from payment of the sales tax. This 61% has been wrongly finalized by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes. In fact, 100% of the raw material which have been utilized for manufacturing of not only TMBP, but, also for other 8 new items should have been given exemption from payment of sales tax upon the purchase of the raw material viz. Hot Rolled Coil. It is further submitted by the counsel for the petitioner that 61% has been finalized looking to the yield of the manufacturing for TMBP only which has a corelation with the same. This is an error apparently committed by the said authority because there is another Standing Order No. 479 of the very same date i.e. 22nd December, 1995, which is concerned with the sale. This is an error apparently committed by the said authority because there is another Standing Order No. 479 of the very same date i.e. 22nd December, 1995, which is concerned with the sale. Here in the present case, we are concerned with the purchase of the raw material, which is used for manufacturing of new items and if the raw material is purchased for the manufacturing of new items, then the industries are exempted from the payment of sale tax upon the purchase of such type of raw materials. It is further submitted by counsel for the petitioner that inspection was carried out by the respondent-state on 03.02.2003. The said report is at Annexure31 and on the basis of the inspection report the refund application was preferred by the petitioner for the year 1996-1997. This report given by the respondent-state dated 03.02.2003 (Annexure-31) finds out that purchase of Hot Rolled Coil involves the total payment of sales tax of Rs. 3,34,68,907/-. Thus, sales tax paid upon the raw materials by this petitioner, which is Hot Rolled Coil is Rs. 3,34,68,907/-for the year 19961997. As per the Industrial Policy Clause 16.1, 16.3 to be read with Standing Order No. 478 dated 22nd December, 1995, this Hot Rolled Coil (raw material) has been fully utilized by this petitioner, has been totally used by this petitioner for the manufacturing of 9 new items including TMBP and hence, Refund Application No. 1 was preferred in the proper format under the Bihar Finance Act, 1981 for refund of Rs. 3,34,68,907.09/-paisa for the year 1996-1997 (Annexure-21 series). Similarly, on the basis of the inspection report given by the State Government dated 03.02.2003, which is at Annexure31, for the year 19971998, the purchase of the raw material from TISCO involves payment of sales tax by this petitioner at Rs. 4,89,19,802.47/-paisa and purchase of the raw materials from SAIL upon which sales tax is paid comes to Rs. 2,39,3805.20/-paisa. Thus total sales tax paid by this petitioner for the period 1997-1998 upon the purchase of the raw material viz. Hot Rolled Coil comes to Rs. 5,13,13,607/- (Rs. 4,89,19,802.47/- paisa+Rs. 23,93,805.20/- paisa). 4,89,19,802.47/-paisa and purchase of the raw materials from SAIL upon which sales tax is paid comes to Rs. 2,39,3805.20/-paisa. Thus total sales tax paid by this petitioner for the period 1997-1998 upon the purchase of the raw material viz. Hot Rolled Coil comes to Rs. 5,13,13,607/- (Rs. 4,89,19,802.47/- paisa+Rs. 23,93,805.20/- paisa). Thus, payment of sales tax ought to have been refunded by the State in view of Clause 16.1 to be read with Clause 16.3 to be read with Standing Order No. 478 dated 22nd December, 1995 and, hence, Refund Application No. II was preferred by this petitioner which is at Annexure21 series. These two refund applications have been decided by the impugned order dated 8th February, 2003 by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, State of Jharkhand, Ranchi and partly these refund applications have been allowed and in stead of total refund of Rs. 8,47,70,166.07/- (Rs. 3,34,68,907.09/- + Rs. 5,13,13,607.17/- ), only Rs. 5,19,25,216/- has been allowed and paid, whereas, rest of the amount has not been refunded only on the ground that part of the raw material was never utilized for the manufacturing of TMBP. The said part of the material is 39% of the total raw materials. The bifurcation made by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes is 61% and 39%, by wrong interpretation of Industrial Policy as well as Standing Order No.478 dated 22nd December, 1995 and looking to the reasons given in para 5 of the impugned order, perhaps, the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, has wrongly entered into the periphery of Standing Order No. 479 of the very same date i.e. 22nd December, 1995. The reasons given in para 5 is about sale of the goods, whereas, we are concerned with the purchase of the raw material and the use thereof is manufacturing of items which are brand new items and which were never manufactured earlier which is known as diversification as per Industrial Policy Clause no. 16.1 to be read with clause 16.3 to be read with Standing Order No. 478. The order passed by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes is so weak that it requires additional reasons to be given in counter affidavit, which is not permissible as per the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill & Anr. Vs. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi & Ors. reported in 1978(1)SCC 405. 4. The order passed by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes is so weak that it requires additional reasons to be given in counter affidavit, which is not permissible as per the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill & Anr. Vs. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi & Ors. reported in 1978(1)SCC 405. 4. ARGUMENTS CANVASSED BY COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENTSTATE Counsel appearing for the respondent-State Mr. Kumar Sundaram has submitted that no error has been committed by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, State of Jharkhand, Ranchi while deciding the refund application preferred by the petitioner, vide order dated 08th February, 2003 (Annexure-32), much less in interpretation of the Industrial Policy to be read with Standing Order No. 478 dated 22nd December, 1995. Counsel for the respondent-State submitted that looking to Industrial Policy, 1995 especially Clause 16.1 to be read with Clause 16.3 to be read with Clause 16.4, the State Government has all power, jurisdiction and authority to prescribe the required procedure and condition for extending sales tax incentives to the industrial units. It is further submitted by counsel for respondent-state Mr. Kumar Sundaram that in pursuance of the Clause 16.4 of the Industrial Policy, 1995, Standing Order No. 478 was issued by the erstwhile State of Bihar dated 22nd December, 1995 and as per clause 15 thereof, for diversification also the benefit of exemption from payment of sales tax is available, but, as per clause 17 thereof especially 17(2) which prescribes the procedure and condition for getting exemption which has not been fulfilled by this petitioner and, hence, no error has been committed by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, while partly rejecting the refund application preferred by this petitioner vide order dated 8th February, 2003. Counsel for respondent-state has submitted that exemption certificate granted by the respondent-State which is at Annexure5 dated 23rd June, 1998 is for TMBP and not for other 8 items. Moreover, this exemption certificate is not under challenge. In view of this exemption certificate also, the raw material viz. Hot Rolled Coil which is utilized to the extent to which TMBP has been manufactured, prorata, for this raw material (61% of the total usage of Hot Rolled Coil) the exemption from the payment of sales tax upon the raw material is given. In view of this exemption certificate also, the raw material viz. Hot Rolled Coil which is utilized to the extent to which TMBP has been manufactured, prorata, for this raw material (61% of the total usage of Hot Rolled Coil) the exemption from the payment of sales tax upon the raw material is given. Meaning thereby too, the very same raw material especially 39% thereof has been utilized for manufacturing of an item or items, other than TMBP and, hence, 39% raw material viz. Hot Rolled Coil, the purchase thereof is not exempted from the payment of sales tax. This aspect of the matter has been properly appreciated by the Commissioner of Commercial Tax, Jharkhand, Ranchi. It is further submitted by counsel for the respondent-State that prior permission or ratification is not a new thing as inserted by Standing Order No. 57 dated 02nd March, 2000 (Clause No. 15(2), but, it was already in existence in Clause No. 17(2) of Standing Order No. 478 dated 22nd December, 1995. Counsel for the respondent-State submitted that neither the condition of the Standing Order especially Clause No. 17(2) is under challenge nor the exemption certificate which is at Annexure5 dated 23rd June, 1998 is under challenge. Counsel for the respondent-State has relied upon the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Jharkhand & ors. Vs. Ambay Cements & Anr. reported in (2005)1 SCC 368 as well as the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Star Industries Vs. Commissioner of Customs (Imports), Raigad reported in (2016)2 SCC 362 and it is submitted that if the notification, condition are not under challenge, the same are binding to this petitioner and no direction can be given to the State to grant the exemption and strict must be the interpretation of exemption clauses. These aspects of the matter have been properly appreciated by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Jharkhand, Ranchi while passing the impugned order dated 08th February, 2003 (Annexure-32) and, hence, this petition may not be entertained by this Court. 5. These aspects of the matter have been properly appreciated by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Jharkhand, Ranchi while passing the impugned order dated 08th February, 2003 (Annexure-32) and, hence, this petition may not be entertained by this Court. 5. REASONS : Having heard counsel for both the sides and looking to the facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements, as mentioned herein below, we hereby, quash and set aside the order passed by the Commissioner, Commercial Taxes dated 8th February, 2003 (Annexure-32) to the extent to which benefit of exemption from payment of sales tax upon the purchase of raw material – Hot Rolled Coil is denied to the petitioner and to the extent to which the refund application preferred by this petitioner has been rejected consequently. (i) The erstwhile State of Bihar has floated an Industrial Policy, 1995 Clause no. 16 with following objects as stated in Clause No. 4 thereof which reads as under: “4. In this context it is imperative for the State Government Bihar to restate its policy on vital issues concerning industrial development. The aims and objectives of the new policy are to : create an environment for optimal utilisation of state's agro climatic, mineral and human resources; provide quality infrastructure for accelerated industrialisation of the State; attract investment to generate economic activities employment, incomes and growth; revive potentially viable and closed industries; boost exports of goods in production of which the State enjoys comparative advantages; and simplify procedures to expedite and impart transparency in decision making.” (ii) As per the Industrial Policy, 1995, Clause no. 16, Sales Tax incentives have been granted on purchase of raw materials vide clause no. 16.1, upon the payments of sales tax, upon the sale of finished goods as per Clause No. 16.2. As per Clause No. 16.3, the existing units, which are now engaging in diversification i.e. for the production of new items, which were never manufactured by the same unit, will be treated as a new item and the benefit of Clause Nos. 16.1 & 16.2 will be extended for manufacturing of those new items. Clause 16.4 is power of the commercial taxes authorities to prescribe the procedure and condition for extending the sales tax incentives to the industrial units. For the ready reference Clause No. 16 of the Industrial Policy, which has been read and reread by counsel for both the sides, reads as under: “16. Clause 16.4 is power of the commercial taxes authorities to prescribe the procedure and condition for extending the sales tax incentives to the industrial units. For the ready reference Clause No. 16 of the Industrial Policy, which has been read and reread by counsel for both the sides, reads as under: “16. SALES TAX INCENTIVES Sales Tax benefits play an important role in attracting and directing investment and in sustaining industrial development in a State. 16.1 SALES TAX ON PURCHASE OF RAW MATERIALS New Units will be allowed the facility of either “Set Off” or “Exemption” at their choice, on purchase of raw materials within the State. New units opting for deferment of Sales Tax on sale of finished goods (vide para 16.2) will, however, be eligible for “Set off” only on purchase of raw materials. The period of exemption for new units will be limited to 10 years for category 'A' and 8 years for Category 'B' District from the date of commencement of production of the unit. 16.2 SALES TAX ON SALE OF FINISHED GOODS FOR NEW UNITS New Units, in addition to the benefit of “Exemption “Set Off” of Sales Tax on purchases, will also have the option to choose deferment or exemption of Sales Tax (both Bihar Sales Tax (BST) & Central Sales Tax (CST) on sale of finished goods for a period of 10 years for category 'A' and 8 years for category 'B' Districts from the date of production of the unit with a ceiling of 100% of the fixed investment made by the unit. However, those industries which are considered 'Thrust Industries' as listed earlier in Para 15 (excluding Telecommunication, Computers, Software/Hardware & Electronics Industries) as also industries located in 'A' category Backward districts the ceiling for deferment would be 150% of the fixed investment. The ceiling for deferment linked to the fixed investment in regard to Telecommunication, Computers, Software/Hardware & electronics Industries would be 300% of the fixed investment made by the unit. The amount of sales tax collected under Sales Tax deferment option would require to be returned in equal six monthly installments in such a manner so that the entire amount is returned by the 13th year from the commencement of deferment option. The amount of sales tax collected under Sales Tax deferment option would require to be returned in equal six monthly installments in such a manner so that the entire amount is returned by the 13th year from the commencement of deferment option. 16.3 UNITS UNDER TAKING EXPANSION/DIVERSIFICTION Such units should be given identical treatment as new units for their expanded/diversified capacity and incremental production both in purchase of raw materials and for sales tax on finished goods. All such incentives will be admissible to such units which are covered by the definition of expansion/diversification as given in the Annexure. Incremental production means: “The incremental production shall mean the excess of actual production over 2/3 of the originally installed capacity or the highest production in 3 years immediately preceding the year in which such expansion/diversification commenced, whichever of the two is higher.” 16.4 The commercial Taxes Authorities will prescribe the required procedure and condition for extending aforesaid sales tax incentives to industrial units.” (Emphasis Supplied) (iii) Annexure appended to the industrial policy reveals that the said industrial policy has been brought into force with effect from 1st September, 1995 and will remain enforce for five years. As per Clause 7 of the Annexure appended to the industrial policy for expansion, modernization, diversification of an existing industrial unit, prior intimation is to be given. This prior intimation has already been given by the petitioner to the respondent for diversification i.e. for manufacturing of new items that are: 1. COLD ROLLED FULL HARD COIL 2. COLD ROLLED GALVANISED PLLAIN COIL/SHEET 3. COLD ROLLED GALVANISED CORRUGATED COIL/SHEET 4. HOT ROLLED PICKLED AND DILED COIL 5. COLLED ROLLED PINCH PASSED COIL/SHEET 6. COLLED ROLLED PINCH PASSED COIL/SHEET 7. COLLED ROLLED ANNEALED COIL/SHEET 8. T.M.B.P. COILS 9. SCRAPS ARISING DURING MANUFACTURE OF ABOVE. All the aforesaid items were new items which were manufactured by this petitioner which includes TMBP coils for which raw material is Hot Rolled Coil and if the petitioner is utilizing the raw material viz. Hot Rolled Coil, for all the aforesaid items then petitioner is exempted from making payment of sales tax upon purchase of raw material. The respondent-authorities have given exemption from payment of sales tax, upon the purchase of raw material Hot Rolled Coil to the extent to which TMBP is manufactured. This process consumed, as per respondents, only 61% of the raw materials. The respondent-authorities have given exemption from payment of sales tax, upon the purchase of raw material Hot Rolled Coil to the extent to which TMBP is manufactured. This process consumed, as per respondents, only 61% of the raw materials. This is an error committed by the respondent while passing the impugned order, because, not only TMBP is a new product, but, all other eight products are also new products, which were never manufactured earlier by the petitioner. This phenomena is known as diversification, as per Clause 16.1 to be read with Clause 16.3 to be read with Standing order no. 478 dated 22nd December, 1995. Thus, what is true for TMBP is also true for rest of the eight products. Thus, nothing special about TMBP than rest of the products, so far as the exemption of payment of sales tax upon purchase of the raw material is concerned. It ought to have been kept in mind by the respondent authorities that so long as, the raw material is utilized for manufacturing of the new items, which were never earlier manufactured by very same industrial unit, payment of sales tax upon purchase of such raw material is exempted. There is nothing like main product and subsidiary product. There is nothing like main product and byproduct. There is nothing like useful product and unuseful product. There is nothing like desirable product and undesirable byproduct. These aspects ought to have been kept in mind by the respondent authorities while interpreting the Industrial Policy, 1995 to be read with Standing Order 478 dated nd December, 1995. What is true for TMBP is also true for rest of the eight products, because all are brand new products, manufactured by this petitioner. Nothing is so special about TMBP and nothing is to be neglected for rest of the products. (iv) Looking to the order passed by the Joint Commissioner, Commercial Taxes dated 23rd September, 1998, which is at Annexure 6 and especially looking to the last paragraph thereof, for whole of the raw materials, the exemption from payment of sales tax is to be given. The manufacturing has been started after giving proper intimation to the respondent-State for all the aforesaid nine products. Nothing has been suppressed by this petitioner, nor there is any misrepresentation by this petitioner. The manufacturing has been started after giving proper intimation to the respondent-State for all the aforesaid nine products. Nothing has been suppressed by this petitioner, nor there is any misrepresentation by this petitioner. There is a wrong notion in the mind of the respondents that the main manufacturing is of TMBP and rest of the products are undesirable and, hence, the raw material, which is utilized for manufacturing of undesirable products, is not covered by the Industrial Policy, 1995 to be read with Standing Order no. 478. This interpretation is absolutely wrong interpretation by the State of Jharkhand. Looking to the Industrial Policy, whenever new items are being manufactured then the raw material purchased by the Industrial Unit and especially sales tax paid thereupon is exempted. It may be utilized for manufacturing of the main product or for subsidiary product. The test to be applied by the State of Jharkhand is usage of the raw material in the manufacturing of new item/items. (v) Much has been argued out by counsel for the respondent-State that exemption certificate which is dated rd June, 1998 (Annexure- 5) reveals in Column No.5 thereof that raw materials used is Hot Rolled Coil (Zinc and Tin being imported by this petitioner hence, we are not concerned with Zinc and Tin as submitted by counsel for the petitioner) and the manufacturing item is mentioned as Tin Plate, meaning thereby, eight other manufacturing items have not been approved by the State, as per Clause 17.2 of Standing Order no. 478 dated 22nd December, 1995 to be read with Clause no. 16.4 of the Industrial Policy, nor this exemption certificate is under challenge and hence, the raw material used by the petitioner for manufacturing of other items, other than TMBP is not covered by Industrial Policy. This contention is not accepted by this Court mainly for the following reasons : (a) Exemption application preferred by this petitioner (Annexure-3) which includes all the nine items, one of them is TMBP and eight other items. Thus, there is no suppression of facts by this petitioner about the manufacturing of new items, over and above TMBP. (b) There is no allegation by the respondent-State in the impugned order dated February, 2003 (Annexure-32) that there is a misrepresentation of any facts by the petitioner. Thus, there is no suppression of facts by this petitioner about the manufacturing of new items, over and above TMBP. (b) There is no allegation by the respondent-State in the impugned order dated February, 2003 (Annexure-32) that there is a misrepresentation of any facts by the petitioner. (c) Looking to the letter written by the petitioner dated 26th August, 1998, which is at Annexure8 to the supplementary affidavit filed by the petitioner, objection was already raised that only one item has been mentioned in the exemption certificate, leaving aside rest of the eight items. (d) Once, the Industrial Policy Clause no. 16.1 to be read with Clause 16.3 grants the exemption from payment of sales tax upon purchase of the raw-materials, which are utilized for manufacturing of new items then there is no power, jurisdiction and authority vested with the respondent-State to reject the claim of exemption, because what is given by the Industrial Policy, cannot be taken away by subsequent decision of the respondent-State. If, Industrial policy, grants exemption, it cannot be taken away by executives. If the Industrial policy does not grant exemption, then, it cannot be given by the executives. Thus, Industrial Policy is at pivotal place and the exemption certificate issued by the executives cannot be wiser than Industrial Policy floated by the State. What is given by one hand, cannot be taken away by another hand. The case of the petitioner is absolutely covered by Clause no. 16.1 to be read with Clause 16.3 of the Industrial Policy, 1995 (Annexure-1). (e) The fact that TMBP and other eight products are brand new products has also been accepted by the respondent-State. Standing Order no. 479 of the very same date i.e. 22nd December, 1995, grants exemption from payment of sales tax, if any manufacturer, sales its new items manufactured. The state of Jharkhand, under Standing Order No. 479, accepted that all the aforesaid nine items are brand new items. Hence, there is no reason, not to give benefit to this petitioner under the Industrial Policy, 1995 Clause No. 16.1 to be read with 16.3 to be read with Standish Order no. 478, for all the new products. (f) There is nothing so special about TMBP. What is true for TMBP is also true for rest of the eight products. Hence, there is no reason, not to give benefit to this petitioner under the Industrial Policy, 1995 Clause No. 16.1 to be read with 16.3 to be read with Standish Order no. 478, for all the new products. (f) There is nothing so special about TMBP. What is true for TMBP is also true for rest of the eight products. The logic which is applied for TMBP is also applicable to the rest of the eight new products. (g) Looking to paragraph no. 5 of the impugned order dated 8th February, 2003 (Annexure- 32), the reason given by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes is to the effect that the other items can be sold independently and further processing of these other items is required to make TMBP. These two reasons have nothing to do with Industrial Policy no.95, Clause no. 16.1 and 16.3 nor these reasons have anything to do with Standing Order no. 478 dated 22nd December,1995. (vi) Brand new argument has been canvassed that ratification of the Government is must for getting benefit of exemption from payment of sales tax upon the purchase of raw material, as per newly substituted Clause no. 15.2 by Standing order no. 57 dated 2nd March, 2000 and by Clause no. 17.2 of Standing order no. 478 dated 22nd December, 1995. This reason has never been canvassed while passing the impugned order dated 8th February, 2003. This is the product of the fertile mind of the officer, who had filed affidavit on behalf of the State to further substantiate or to provide strength or to provide further logic and reasons to the impugned order. This is prohibited as per decision rendered by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill and Another Vs. the Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and Others reported in (1978) 1 SCC 405 , paragraph no.8 thereof reads as under: “8. The second equally relevant matter is that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to Court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. We may here draw attention to the observations of Bose. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to Court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. We may here draw attention to the observations of Bose. J. in Gordhandas Bhanji: Public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the actings and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself. Orders are not like old wine becoming better as they grow older.” (Emphasis supplied) (vii) In view of this decision also, no new reasons can be supplied by way of counter-affidavit, otherwise, all unreasoned orders will be converted into reasoned order. The wrong reasonings given in the impugned order, cannot be saved by providing other reasons in the counter-affidavit. What this court has to check and verify is what was running in the mind of the adjudicating authority while passing the impugned order. The reason is the soul of the order. This soul cannot be changed by way of counter-affidavit. As stated here-in-above, in paragraph no.5 of the impugned order the reasons given in the order 8th dated February, 2003 have nothing to do with Industrial Policy No. 1995 nor they have anything to do with Standing Order no. 478 dated 22nd December, 1995 and new reasons cannot be given in the counter affidavit filed by the State. For ready reference the relevant part of the paragraph no. 5 of the impugned order dated 8th February, 2003 reads as under.: “5. (b)The principle of incremental production has no application in case of diversification (para 13 of the order) It is also to be noted that other Cold Rolled products e.g. FHCR etc. are not TMBP because these can be sold independently and further processing of these is required to make TMBP. These are thus commercially different goods.” (Emphasis Supplied) (viii) Even if any small error is committed by the industry, but, if it fulfills the major conditions of the Industrial Policy under clause no. are not TMBP because these can be sold independently and further processing of these is required to make TMBP. These are thus commercially different goods.” (Emphasis Supplied) (viii) Even if any small error is committed by the industry, but, if it fulfills the major conditions of the Industrial Policy under clause no. 16.1 and 16.3 i.e if new items are being manufactured and if the raw material is purchased there for, then such units are entitled to get exemption from the payment of sales tax upon purchase of such raw material. Small error herein, on the part of the industry, ought not to have been encashed by the State. The basic test stated hereinabove, for exemption is being fulfilled by this industry-petitioner hence, petitioner is entitled to exemption from payment of sales tax upon purchase of Hot Rolled Coil for manufacturing of all nine items including TMBP. This aspect of the matter has not been properly appreciated by the Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, State of Jharkhand, Ranchi, while passing the impugned order dated 8th February, 2003 (Annexure-32). (ix) Looking to the impugned order, it appears that there is total non-application of mind by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes. All the 9 products are new products including TMBP. What is observed in the impugned order that only for manufacturing of TMBP, the raw material, is exempted from the payment of sales tax and therefore, only 61% of the total purchase of the raw material, the sales tax has been exempted. Nowhere, it has been mentioned in Clause 16.1 and 16.3, nor in Standing Order No. 478 that the exemption is granted from the payment of sales tax upon the purchase of raw material is only for the main product. The word used under Standing Order No. 478 dated 22nd December, 1995 (Annexure-32) as per clause 15(4) that exemption is given from the payment of sales tax upon the purchase of raw material, which is used for manufacturing of goods, which were never earlier manufactured. This is only test for getting exemption. Even if the new item is byproduct, even if the new product is subsidiary, even if the new product is over and above the main product, then also, for all those types of new products, if the raw material is purchased, then exemption is granted from the payment of sales tax upon such raw material. Even if the new item is byproduct, even if the new product is subsidiary, even if the new product is over and above the main product, then also, for all those types of new products, if the raw material is purchased, then exemption is granted from the payment of sales tax upon such raw material. There is no power vested in the State to bifurcate main product and subsidiary product. (x) It further appears from Standing Order No. 57 dated 02.03.2000 as per Clause 4(c), this exemption is given if the petitioner is manufacturing new items. Though, we are not concerned with this Standing Order No. 57 because it is introduced later on. The period with which we are concerned is running from 05.04.1996 to 31.03.1998. (xi) It further appears that inspection was carried out by 3rd the respondents on February, 2003 of the factory premises of this petitioner as well as of books of account etc., the detailed report has been given at Annexure31 by the respondent-State. The purchase of the raw material viz. Hot Rolled Coil from TISCO for the period 1996-1997 and sales tax paid thereupon is Rs. 3,34,68,907.10/- paisa for which the refund application no. I was preferred by this petitioner for the year 19961997, which is at Annexure21 series to the memo of this writ petition. Likewise, as per inspection report dated 3rd February, 2003, prepared by the respondent-State for the subsequent year 1997-1998, it appears that sales tax paid upon raw material Hot Rolled Coil is Rs. 4,89,19,802.47/- paisa (purchased from TISCO) and Rs. 23,93,805.20/- (raw material purchased from SAIL). Thus, total sales tax paid by this petitioner for the year 1997-1998 upon the raw material– Hot Rolled Coil used for manufacturing of new items comes to Rs. 5,13,13,607/for which the refund application no. II was preferred, which is at Annexure21 series and the total amount of these two applications comes to Rs. 8,47,70,166.07/- paisa, out of which the refund has been allowed at Rs. 5,19,25,216/- mainly for the reasons, stated in paragraph no. 5 of the impugned 8th order dated February, 2003. Thus, reasons stated hereinabove, are absolutely misinterpretation of the Industrial Policy, 1995, especially Clause No. 16.1, 16.3 to be read with Standing Order No. 478 dated 22nd December, 1995. 8,47,70,166.07/- paisa, out of which the refund has been allowed at Rs. 5,19,25,216/- mainly for the reasons, stated in paragraph no. 5 of the impugned 8th order dated February, 2003. Thus, reasons stated hereinabove, are absolutely misinterpretation of the Industrial Policy, 1995, especially Clause No. 16.1, 16.3 to be read with Standing Order No. 478 dated 22nd December, 1995. The reasons given in paragraph 5 of the impugned order, in fact, have nothing to do with the Industrial Policy and Standing Order No. 478. It appears that the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes has mixed up Standing Order No. 479 of the very same date i.e. dated 22nd December, 1995 which is meant for sale of final product, whereas, we are concerned with payment of sales tax upon the raw material, which is used for brand new manufacturing items. Thus, the consideration given by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes is known as extraneous consideration, which is in the eye of law known as Wednesbury unreasonableness, The impugned order suffers from Wednesbury unreasonableness. Only up to the 61% of the raw material has been utilized for manufacturing of TMBP and hence, to that extent only the exemption has been given from the payment of sales tax. In fact, petitioner is entitled to exemption from payment of sales tax upon purchase of whole of the Hot Rolled Coil, which is used for not only manufacturing of TMBP, but, also which is utilized for the manufacturing of rest of the 8 products and, therefore, the bifurcation of 61% and 39% is absolutely wrong as mentioned in the impugned order. Petitioner is entitled to get the refund of Rs. 8,47,70,166.07/- paise, out of which Rs. 5,19,25,216/- have been allowed and refunded to the petitioner. Thus, the petitioner is entitled to get Rs. 3,28,44,950.07/- paise, with statutory interest. (xii) Much has been argued out, about the strict interpretation to be made of the clauses of exemption. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decisions reported in:- (i) (2005)1 SCC 368 , (State of Jharkhand & Ors. Vs. Ambay Cements & Anr.) (ii) (2005)4 SCC 272 , (Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. Vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors.) (iii) (2015)13 SCC 198 and; (Ivrcl Infrastructure and Projects Limited Vs. Commissioner of Customs Chennai) (iv) (2016)2 SCC 362 (Star Industries Vs. Vs. Ambay Cements & Anr.) (ii) (2005)4 SCC 272 , (Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. Vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors.) (iii) (2015)13 SCC 198 and; (Ivrcl Infrastructure and Projects Limited Vs. Commissioner of Customs Chennai) (iv) (2016)2 SCC 362 (Star Industries Vs. Commissioner of Customs (Imports), Raigad) Looking to the facts of the present case, it appears that the very purpose of the Industrial Policy, 1995 was to give acceleration to the industries in the erstwhile State of Bihar. Sales tax incentives have been given in Clauses 16.1 and 16.3, as stated hereinabove, to be read with Standing Order No. 478 dated 22nd December, 1995. A plain and simple condition precedent attached for getting sales tax incentives is manufacturing of new items and if any industry is using any raw material for manufacturing of new items, then such industrial unit is exempted from payment of sales tax upon purchase of the raw material. This condition has been fulfilled by this petitioner because petitioner is using Hot Rolled Coil for manufacturing of TMBP and other 8 items, as stated herein above. Admittedly, all these items are brand new manufactured items. The application preferred, which is at Annexure-3 for getting exemption and in this application also there is reference of all these 9 items. Moreover, as per Standing Order No. 479 of the very same date i.e. dated 22nd December, 1995 exemption from payment of sales tax on finished products all the aforesaid 9 items have been granted by the State of Jharkhand. Thus, it is admitted that all 9 products including TMBP are brand new manufactured items. Even Excise duty under the Excise Act, 1944 has also been paid upon all these 9 items, by the petitioner. (xiii) The respondent has also given benefit of Clause 16.1. and 16.3 for the items TMBP. Thus even, prima-facie, reading of Clause 16 of the Industrial Policy, 1995, especially Clause No. 16.1 and 16.3 to be read with Standing Order No. 478, the petitioner is entitled to exemption from payment of sales tax upon purchase of Hot Rolled Coil for the year 1996-1997 and for the year 1997-1998. What is true for TMBP product is also true for rest of the products. These facts make the present case different from the facts of the aforesaid decisions, upon which the reliance has been placed by the respondent-state. What is true for TMBP product is also true for rest of the products. These facts make the present case different from the facts of the aforesaid decisions, upon which the reliance has been placed by the respondent-state. Even if the strict interpretation is made by this Court, the petitioner is not going out of the applicability of the Industrial Policy, 1995 to be read with Standing Order No. 478. Strict interpretation is not working like a centrifugal force which oust the petitioner from Industrial Policy and Standing Order No. 478. (xiv) Looking to the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar and others Vs. Suprabhat Steel Ltd. and others reported in 1999 (1) SCC page 31 in paragraph no. 6 & 7 as under : “6. A bare look at the aforesaid clause makes it crystal clear that under sub-clause (a), while the industrial units coming into production between 1.4.1993 to 31.3.1998 whose investment in plant and machinery does not exceed Rs. 15 crores would be entitled to the facility of exemption on the purchase of raw material for a period of seven years from the date of production, under sub-clause (b) the old industrial units whose investment in plant and machinery does not exceed Rs. 15 crores on 1.4.1993 would be entitled to the said facility of sales tax exemption on the purchase of raw material for a period of seven years from 1.4.1993. In view of the clear and unambiguous language of sub-clause (b) of clause 10.4, it is difficult to accept the contention of Mr. Dwivedi, learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the State that even the said sub-clause (b) would be subject to the terms indicated in the beginning of the Resolution that the Policy would be applicable only to those industrial units which would come into production from 1.4.1993 to 31.3.1998. While considering the benefits and incentives given to the several industrial units under the Policy Resolution of 1993, it would not be appropriate to exclude those industrial units who would be otherwise entitled to the sales tax exemption on the purchase of raw material under clause 10.4 (i) (b) of the Policy. While considering the benefits and incentives given to the several industrial units under the Policy Resolution of 1993, it would not be appropriate to exclude those industrial units who would be otherwise entitled to the sales tax exemption on the purchase of raw material under clause 10.4 (i) (b) of the Policy. Reading the Policy as a whole, the only conclusion which can be arrived at is while generally the incentives under the 1993 Policy would be available to the industrial units coming into production between 1.4.1993 to 31.3.1998, but so far as sales tax exemption on the purchase of raw material is concerned which is provided under clause 10.4, even though the old industrial units have started production prior to 1.4.1993, but whose investment in plant and machinery does not exceed Rs. 15 crores on 1.4.1993. We are entirely in agreement with the conclusion arrived at by the High Court in this regard and we do not find any error committed by the High Court in granting the benefits of the said clause 10.4 (i)(b) of the Policy to the respondents industrial units. We accordingly have no hesitation to affirm the conclusion of the High Court on this score and reject the submission of Mr. Dwivedi, the learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the appellant. 7. Coming to the second question, namely, the issuance of notification by the State Government in exercise of power under Section 7 of the Bihar Finance Act, it is true that issuance of such notifications entitles the industrial units to avail of the incentives and benefits declared by the State Government in its own industrial incentive policy. But in exercise of such power, it would not be permissible for the State Government to deny any benefit which is otherwise available to an industrial unit under the incentive policy itself. The industrial incentive policy is issued by the State Government after such policy is approved by the Cabinet itself. The issuance of the notification under Section 7 of the Bihar Finance Act is by the State Government in the Finance Department which notification is issued to carry out the objectives and the policy decisions taken in the industrial policy itself. The industrial incentive policy is issued by the State Government after such policy is approved by the Cabinet itself. The issuance of the notification under Section 7 of the Bihar Finance Act is by the State Government in the Finance Department which notification is issued to carry out the objectives and the policy decisions taken in the industrial policy itself. In this view of the matter, any notifications issued by government order in exercise of power under Section 7 of the Bihar Finance Act, if is found to be repugnant to the industrial policy declared in a government resolution, then the said notification must be held to be bad to that extent. In the case in hand, the notification issued by the State Government on 4.4.1994 has been the Industrial Incentive Policy, more particularly, the policy engrafted in clause 10.4 (i)(b). Consequently, the High Court was fully justified in striking down that part of the notification which is repugnant to sub-clause (b) of clause 10.4 (i) and we do not find any error committed by the High Court in striking down the said notification. We are not persuaded to accept the contention of Mr. Dwivedi that it would be open for the Government to issue a notification in exercise of power under Section 7 of the Bihar Finance Act, which may override the incentive policy itself. In our considered opinion, the expression “such conditions and restrictions as it may impose” in subsection (3) of Section 7 of the Bihar Finance Act will not authorise the State Government to negate the incentives and benefits which any industrial unit would be otherwise entitled to under the general policy resolution itself. In this view of the matter, we see no illegality with the impugned judgment of the High Court in striking down a part of the notification dated 4.4.1994.” (Emphasis supplied) (xv) It has been held by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of State of Jharkhand and others Vs. Tata Cummins Ltd. and another reported in (2006)4 S.C.C. 57 [: 2006(3) JLJR (SC)66] in paragraph nos.16 and 17 which reads as under: “16. Before analysing the above policy read with notifications, it is important to bear in mind the connotation of the word “tax”. A tax is a payment for raising general revenue. It is a burden. It is based on the principle of ability or capacity to pay. Before analysing the above policy read with notifications, it is important to bear in mind the connotation of the word “tax”. A tax is a payment for raising general revenue. It is a burden. It is based on the principle of ability or capacity to pay. It is a manifestation of the taxing power of the State. An exemption from payment of tax under an enactment is an exemption from the tax liability. Therefore, every such exemption notification has to be read strictly. However, when an assessee is promised with a tax exemption for setting up an industry in the backward area as a term of the industrial policy, we have to read the implementing notifications in the context of the industrial policy. In such a case, the exemption notifications have to be read liberally keeping in mind the objects envisaged by the industrial policy and not in a strict sense as in the case of exemptions from tax liability under the taxing statute. 17. Applying the above tests to the facts of the present case, the object behind enactment of the Industrial Policy, 1995 was to confer incentives on industries set up in the State. As part of the incentives, the industrial policy envisaged allotment of land/building in growth centres to companies for setting up industrial units on lease for 99 years with an option for renewal. As a part of the incentives, it was also envisaged under clause 16 that sales tax benefit/exemption shall be granted to attract investments in order to sustain industrial development in the State. It is in this background, that we have to consider clause 16.1 and clause 16.2 of the Industrial Policy, 1995. The two notifications are merely instruments giving effect to the policy envisaged under the Industrial Policy, 1995.” (Emphasis supplied) (xvi) It has been held by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Lloyd Electric and Engineering Limited vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and others reported in (2016)1 S.C.C. 560 paragraph nos. 14 and 15 thereof reads as under: “14. The state Government cannot speak in two voices. Once the Cabinet takes a policy decision to extend its 2004 Industrial Policy in the matter of CST concession to the eligible units beyond 3132009, up to 3132013, and the Notification dated 2952009, accordingly, having been issued by the Department concerned viz. 14 and 15 thereof reads as under: “14. The state Government cannot speak in two voices. Once the Cabinet takes a policy decision to extend its 2004 Industrial Policy in the matter of CST concession to the eligible units beyond 3132009, up to 3132013, and the Notification dated 2952009, accordingly, having been issued by the Department concerned viz. Department of Industries, thereafter, the Excise and Taxation Department cannot take a different stand. What is given by the right hand cannot be taken by the left hand. The Government shall speak only in one voice. It has only one policy. The departments are to implement the government policy and not their own policy. Once the Council of Ministers has taken a decision to extend the 2004 Industrial Policy and extend tax concession beyond 31.3.2009, merely because the Excise and Taxation Department took some time to issue the notification, it cannot be held that the eligible units are not entitled to the concession till the Department issued the notification. 15. It has to be noted that the Finance Department of the State Government had concurred with the proposal of the Department of Industries to extend the tax concession beyond 31.3.2009 till 3132013 and the Council of Ministers had accordingly taken a decision also. No doubt, the statutory notification issued by the excise and Taxation Department under Section 8(5)(b) of the Act on 18.6.2009 has stated that the eligible units will be entitled to the concession with immediate effect. Merely because such an expression has been used, it cannot be held that the State Government can levy the tax against its own policy. The State Government is bound by the policy decision taken by the Council of Ministers and duly notified by the Department concerned viz. Department of Industries.” (Emphasis supplied) In view of the aforesaid decisions, whenever there is an exemption from the payment of tax under any statute then such clauses are to be interpreted strictly. However, when the assessee is promised for exemption of tax for setting up any industry and if this Court has to interpret the notification (in the present case Standing Order No. 478) in context of the industrial policy, in such eventuality, exemption notification have to be read liberally, keeping in mind, the objects envisaged by the industrial policy and, hence, what is given by one hand cannot be taken away by another hand. Nonetheless, as stated hereinabove, even if the strict interpretation principle is applied to the Industrial Policy as well as to the Standing Order no. 478, it appears that the basic test for sales tax incentives, as per Clause no. 16.1 to be read with Clause no. 16.3 is the usage of the rawmaterial for manufacturing of new items. Admittedly, in the facts of the present case, 100% of Hot Rolled Coil along with Zinc and Tin were used for manufacturing of TMBP and other eight products as stated in Annexure 3 to the memo of this petition. Unnecessarily, bifurcation has been made in the impugned order dated 8th February, 2003 of 61% and 39% with a wrong notion in the mind of the State that TMBP is the main product and other products can be sold independently and other products require further processing for manufacturing of TMBP. These reasons given in Para 5 of the impugned order are absolutely baseless and have nothing to do with Industrial Policy, 1995 as well as with Standing Order no. 478. They can also be lebelled as extraneous consideration, which in the eye of law known as Wednesburry unreasonableness. 6. We, therefore, quash and set aside the order passed by the Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, Jharkhand Ranchi dated 08th February, 2003 (Annexure-32) and direct the respondents to refund rest of the claim of the petitioner-industry, which is 3,28,44,950.07/- Paise, with statutory interest, in accordance with law, as early as possible preferably within 16 weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order. 7. This petition is allowed and disposed of.