JUDGMENT & ORDER : 1. This is the third round of litigation initiated by the petitioner seeking seniority over the private respondents. The material facts of the case were already summarized by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No.192 of 2003, which may, mutatis mutandi, be incorporated here. The petitioner, being a Diploma holder Civil Engineer was appointed as Junior Engineer (Civil) on 30-1-1990 by the Chief Executive Officer of the Tripura Tribal Areas Autonomous District Council (“District Council” for short) , and in the final seniority list of Junior Engineers published on 9-9-1996, his name was shown at Serial No.4. On the other hand, the respondents No.6 and 7 were initially appointed as Overseers (later designated as Junior Engineer) by the Director for the Welfare of Scheduled Tribes, Govt. of Tripura on 13-9-1984 and posted in the Office of the District Council, Agartala on deputation. While serving there on deputation, they were absorbed as Junior Engineer in the service of the District Council w.e.f. 1-1-1997 vide the Notification dated 20-1-1997 issued by the Deputy Chief Executive Officer, District Council against the two personal posts created for them by the District Council and with the consent of the parent Department. One of the conditions of their absorption was that their absorption would not affect the seniority of other Junior Engineers of the District Council. Thus, in terms of the length of service in the District Council, the petitioner, who was directly appointed on 30-1-1990, was senior to the respondents No.6 and 7 as they were borne in the services of the district Council only with effect from 1-1-1997. 2. However, much to the consternation of the petitioner, the private respondents were promoted to the posts of Assistant Engineer by the Memorandum dated 18-8-1998 issued by the Deputy Chief Executive Officer with effect from 6-7-1998. According to the petitioner, this was done by ignoring his case and without finalizing the seniority list of Junior Engineers Grade-I. This prompted the petitioner to file WP(C) No.192 of 2003 before this court, which, after hearing the parties, by the judgment dated 1-2-2005 disposed of the writ petition with the following observations and directions: “9. I have carefully taken into consideration the rival submissions. Though the submissions of Mr. I have carefully taken into consideration the rival submissions. Though the submissions of Mr. Bhattacharjee that during the formation period of District Council, the appointment letters of the respondents No. 4 and 5 (respondents 6 and 7 herein) were issued by the Director of Tribal Welfare Department, Govt. of Tripura acting on behalf of the District Council are fairly robust, the records available unfortunately do not support this position, particularly, when the order of absorption clearly mentioned that they were on deputation to the District Council. No speaking order was ever passed either by the State Government or by the District Council that the Director of Tribal Welfare acted on behalf of the District Council while appointing the two private respondents and in the absence of any such action, it is difficult for this Court to hold that they were the regular employees of the District Council from the very beginning. It is also not in dispute that while promoting the two private respondents, the petitioner and other regular Junior Engineers, who have claimed seniority over the two private respondents due to continuous length of service, were not taken into consideration and as such the impugned promotion order cannot stand to legal scrutiny. Strictly from the legal point of view once it is accepted that the petitioner or other regular Junior Engineers of the District Council were senior to the private respondents, creation of personal posts only to promote the juniors cannot also stand to legal scrutiny. 10. For the reasons discussed above, this writ petition succeeds holding that the impugned promotion order of the two private respondents by Memorandum dated 18-8-1998 is not sustainable in law. However, considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, particularly the fact that the two private respondents were in service of the District Council from the date of their appointment, the respondent District Council is at liberty to take suitable steps according to law for saving the impugned promotion order and while doing so it should be kept in mind that the regular Junior Engineers, who are senior to the private respondents, have a right to be considered for promotion to the posts of Assistant Engineer, if necessary by creating personal/supernumerary post w.e.f. the date when their juniors were promoted. Needless to mention that such seniors have only right to be considered for promotion but no right to be promoted. 11. Needless to mention that such seniors have only right to be considered for promotion but no right to be promoted. 11. Subject to the observations made above, this writ petition is allowed leaving the parties to bear their own cost.” 3. The appeal preferred by the District Council against the aforesaid judgment was dismissed by the Division Bench on 17-4-2009 of WA No.27 of 2005. At this stage, it may be noticed that the DPC constituted by the District Council in its meeting held on 17-3-2003 had recommended the promotion of the petitioner to the post of Assistant Engineer with effect from 1-7-1998, but District Council did not immediately act upon the recommendation and promoted him to that post only with effect from 6-7-2007 and not with effect from 1-7-1998. To return to the original narrative, the District Council did not take any action to implement the judgment of this Court. On the contrary, the Deputy Chief Executive Officer issued the Memorandum dated 30-4-2011 published the final seniority list of Assistant Engineer Diploma Holder (Civil) placing the respondent No.6 and 7 at Serial No.1 and 2 while the petitioner found a place at Serial No.5 below the private respondents. Thus, both the private respondents came to be promoted with effect from 6-7-1998 while the petitioner was promoted only with effect from 6-7-2007 thereby the private respondents stole a march over the petitioner in the final seniority list. It is contended by the petitioner that this amounts to violation of the directions of this Court which had declared the promotion order dated 18-8-1998 of the private respondents to the post of Assistant Engineer as unsustainable in law. However, the respondent authorities, in the face of the Contempt Case(C) No. 19/2011 initiated by the petitioner, issued the Memorandum dated 11-7-2011 canceling the notification dated 26-4-2011 (whereby the services of the private respondents were deemed to have been absorbed in the TTAADC against regular posts of Junior Engineer with effect from the date of their joining with seniority, i.e. 13-9-1984) and the Memorandum dated 30-4-2011 (the final seniority). 4. 4. When the petitioner thought that his misfortune had ultimately disappeared, another Notification dated 20-3-2012 was issued by the District Council reversing their earlier decision dated 11-7-2011 and absorbing the services of the private respondents in the District Council in the posts of Junior Engineer with effect from 14-9-1984 and 18-9-1984 respectively with pay protection on the purported ground that the earlier decision to that effect had been taken by the Executive Committee in its meeting held on 8-4-2011,which could not be cancelled by the Deputy Chief Executive Officer without placing the same before the Executive Committee. The net effect of the notification dated 20-3-2012 is that the seniority of the private respondents over the petitioner has been restored. Aggrieved by this, the petitioner is initiating this third round of litigation against the District Council and the private respondents. 5. The District Council as well as the private respondents resisted the writ petition and filed their respective counter affidavits. According to the District Council, the Memorandum dated 11-11-2011 had to be issued as the same was issued by the Deputy Chief Executive Officer without any reconsideration/modification by the Executive Committee; the Deputy Chief Executive Officer had no authority to cancel or modify the resolution of the Executive Committee, which was the only competent authority taking the decision to absorb the services of the private respondents with retrospective effect. It is the case of the respondent authorities that the Executive Committee in its 28th meeting held on 8-4-2011 resolved that in partial modification of the earlier Notification dated 20-1-1997, the private respondents were deemed to have been absorbed in the District Council against regular posts of Junior Engineer from the date of joining the District council, i.e. 14-9-1984 and 18-9-1984. The above resolution was carried out by the Deputy Chief Executive Officer in the Notification dated 26-4-2011. This vital fact was not brought to the notice of this Court when the contempt petition was taken up for further proceedings. On the contrary, the Deputy Chief Executive Officer, in hot haste, issued the Memorandum dated 11-7-2011 canceling the Notification dated 26-4-2011 absorbing the services of the private respondents to the District Council without placing the matter before the Executive Committee. 6. On the contrary, the Deputy Chief Executive Officer, in hot haste, issued the Memorandum dated 11-7-2011 canceling the Notification dated 26-4-2011 absorbing the services of the private respondents to the District Council without placing the matter before the Executive Committee. 6. According to the District Council, it was under the aforesaid circumstances that the impugned Notification dated 20-3-2012 was issued canceling the said Memorandum dated 11-7-2011 and reiterating the earlier Notification dated 26-4-2011 as good in law and still in force. As the private respondents were absorbed w.e.f. 18-9-1984 and 14-9-1984 respectively when they were initially brought to the service of the District Council on deputation against the post of Junior Engineer, they are senior to the petitioner, who was appointed as Junior Engineer only on 30-1-1990. It is pointed out by the answering respondents that WP(C) No.192/2003 was disposed of on the basis of the fact available to this Court at that time that the petitioner was appointed on 30-1-1990 in the post of Junior Engineer vis-à-vis the respondents No.6 and 7, who were appointed as Junior Engineer on 11-2-1997. The basis of this judgment was taken away by the decision of the Executive Council of the District Council in its 28th meeting held on 8-4-2011, which was carried out by the Notification dated 26-4-2011 issued by the Deputy Chief Executive Officer by which their services were deemed to have been absorbed in the District Council against the regular post of Junior Engineer from the date of their joining the District Council with seniority. The private respondents appeared in the departmental examination on 12-5-1998 and came out successful vide F.2 (278)ADC/Estt./98/12340-80 dated 20-7-1998. According to the respondent authorities, since the Notification dated 20-1-1997 had erroneously absorbed the services of the private respondents w.e.f. 1-1-1997 by overlooking the past services rendered by them in the service of the District council since its inception, the District Council decided to absorb their services with retrospective effect; there is thus no infirmity in the Memorandum dated 26-4-2011. As the Deputy Chief Executive Officer issued the Memorandum dated 11-7-2011 canceling the Notification dated 26-4-2011 absorbing the services of the private respondents with retrospective effect without authority, the Notification dated 20-3-2012 was issued restoring the position of the private respondents in the final seniority list. As the Deputy Chief Executive Officer issued the Memorandum dated 11-7-2011 canceling the Notification dated 26-4-2011 absorbing the services of the private respondents with retrospective effect without authority, the Notification dated 20-3-2012 was issued restoring the position of the private respondents in the final seniority list. According to the answering respondents, the private respondents were appointed as Junior Engineers after their selection by the Tripura Public Service Commission in the year 1984 where after their services were placed at the disposal of the District Council at the time of formation of the latter, and they have exhausted their prime life in building up the District Council and continue to do so; there is absolutely no reason to deny them the service benefits. These are the sum and substance of the case of the answering respondents, which are also adopted by the private respondents in their affidavit. 7. Mr. D. Bhattacharjee, the learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. T D Majumdar, the learned counsel for the District Council and Mr. Sankar Deb, the learned senior counsel for the private respondents have been heard at length. The first point for consideration is, whether the basis of the judgment dated 1-2-2005 of this Court in WP(C) No.192 of 2003 has been taken away by the decision dated 20-3-2012 of the District Council by canceling the Memorandum dated 11-7-2011? 8. It may be noted that the Deputy Chief Executive Officer of the District Council, thereafter in compliance with the direction of this Court, issued the Memorandum dated 11-7-2011 cancelled the Notification dated 26-4-2011 absorbing the private respondents from the date of joining the District Council and the Memorandum dated 30-4-2011 canceling the final seniority list of Assistant Engineer Diploma Holder (Civil). However, during the pendency of this writ petition, the District Council, holding that the Deputy Chief Executive Officer had no authority to issue the said memorandum dated 11-7-2011 without placing it before the Executive Committee, took up the matter in its 66th meeting held on 16-3-2012 and stood by its earlier resolution dated 8-4-2011 and resolved that the Memorandum dated 11-7-2011 issued under the signature of the Deputy Chief Executive Officer be cancelled. Pursuant to this resolution, the Deputy Chief Executive Officer issued the Notification Dated 26-4-2011 declaring that the private respondents were deemed to have been absorbed to the service of the District Council against the regular posts of Junior Engineer from the date of their joining in the District Council with seniority. This was followed by the impugned Notification dated 20-3-2012 canceling the Memorandum dated 11-7-2011 issued by him and declaring that the Notification dated 26-4-2011 remained good in law and still in force. In my opinion, the bases of the judgment dated 1-2-2005 are as follows: 1. The services of the private respondents were initially placed at the disposal of the District Council in the year 1984 on deputation. 2. They were absorbed as Junior Engineers by the order dated 20-1-1997; their period of deputation ended only on 20-1-1997. 3. The petitioner was directly appointed as Junior Engineer (Civil) on 30-1-1990 and was, therefore, a regular employee of the District Council since the date of his appointment. 4. After their absorption on 20-1-1997, they were promoted to the posts of Assistant Engineer w.e.f. 6-7-1998 even before they completed a period of two years while the petitioner who had by then completed about 8 years of regular service as Junior Engineer, was not considered for promotion.” 9. Once the District Council issued the Notification dated 20-3-2012 absorbing the services of the private respondents w.e.f.18-9-1984 and 14-9-1984 respectively with seniority and pay protection, whatever benefit derived by the petitioner from the judgment of this Court has been rendered otiose. As a matter of fact, what the District Council did was an act of defiance against the order validly passed by this Court, which has remained unchallenged. Until and unless the order passed by this Court is set aside by a superior Court, the District Council cannot go behind or circumvent it. However, in order to deny the petitioner the benefit of the aforesaid judgment, the respondent authorities by the impugned Notification restored the position of the private respondents vis-à-vis the petitioner by taking the stance that the bases of the said judgment have now been taken away. I have carefully gone through the decision of the Apex Court in State of Maharashtra and others v. Kumari Tanuja, (1999) 2 SCC 462 cited by Mr. I have carefully gone through the decision of the Apex Court in State of Maharashtra and others v. Kumari Tanuja, (1999) 2 SCC 462 cited by Mr. T.D. Majumdar, the learned counsel for the District Council and the decisions of the Apex Court in Novva Ads v. Deptt. of Municipal Admn. and Water Supply, (2008) 8 SCC 42 ; Bakhtawar Trust v. M.D. Narayan and others, (2003) 5 SCC 298 and Madan Mohan Pathak and others v. Union of India and others, (1978) 2 SCC 50 cited by Mr. Sankar Deb, the learned senior counsel for the private respondents. 10. The law is now well-settled that in our Constitution no legislature has the power to abrogate civil courts’ decrees or orders or judicial adjudications by merely declaring under a law made by it that such decrees or orders or adjudications are no longer valid or binding on the parties, for such power of declaration would be a judicial function which cannot be encroached upon by a legislature and the only way by which a competent legislature can make the judicial adjudications, decrees or orders ineffective is by fundamentally altering the law on which they are based. If any authority is needed, I may conveniently cite the decision of the Apex Court in Union of India and others v. Tushar Ranjan Mohanty and others, (1994) 5 SCC 450 . In that case, the material facts of the case are as follows: Indian Statistical Service (the service) is governed by statutory rules called the Indian Statistical Service Rules, 1961 (the Rules). Respondents, in the appeal herein, are the members of the Indian Statistical Service governed by the Indian Statistical Service Rules, 1961. The respondents were members of the service. The respondent No.1 [Tushar Ranjan Mohanty (Mohanty)] belonged to the general category whereas Respondents 2 to 9 were members of the Scheduled Castes. Respondents 2 to 9 were promoted from Grade-IV to Grade-III in the service. They were promoted against the vacancies reserved for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes under the instructions issued by the Government of India from time to time. Mohanty, being senior to Respondents 2 to 9 in Grade-IV, challenged their promotions before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Calcutta Bench, (the Tribunal) on the ground that under the reservation, in respect of appointments to the service by promotion, was not permitted under the Rules. Mohanty, being senior to Respondents 2 to 9 in Grade-IV, challenged their promotions before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Calcutta Bench, (the Tribunal) on the ground that under the reservation, in respect of appointments to the service by promotion, was not permitted under the Rules. The Tribunal accepted the contention of Mohanty and came to the conclusion that promotion of Respondents 2 to 9 in super-session of the claim of Mohanty was against the Rules. The Tribunal, however, did not disturb the promotions already given to the respondents and directed that Mohanty be deemed to have been promoted to Grade-III from the same date when respondents were promoted and he be placed above the respondents in the seniority list of Grade-III. The Union of India, however, preferred an appeal against the judgment of the Tribunal. The appeal was dismissed. As the proposition of law laid down in Tushar Ranjan Mohanty case (supra)has an important bearing on the instant case, I decide to extensively reproduce hereunder the crucial paragraphs of the judgment: “9.We take up the first and the second contentions together for consideration. It is obvious from the plain language of Rule 8(1)(b)(i) that all Grade-IV officers who have completed four years of service on regular basis are entitled to be considered for promotion to Grade-III on the basis of their seniority provided they are not found unfit by the Controlling Authority. The rule gives a statutory right to Grade-IV officers to be considered for promotion in the order of their seniority. The said right is further strengthened by the proviso to Rule 8(1)(b)(i). The proviso makes it obligatory that when a junior officer in Grade-IV is eligible and is considered for promotion all officers senior to him in that grade shall also be considered for promotion. Even otherwise, “to be considered for promotion” is a guaranteed right under Article 16(1) of the Constitution of India. It is, therefore, clear that Mohanty and other senior general category Grade-IV officers had a vested right under the Rules — as also under Article 16(1) of the Constitution — to be considered for promotion when persons junior to them were being considered and in fact promoted. Respondents 2 to 9 were admittedly junior to Mohanty and as such they could not be promoted, without considering the case of Mohanty. Respondents 2 to 9 were admittedly junior to Mohanty and as such they could not be promoted, without considering the case of Mohanty. Rule 13 of the Rules — before its amendment — did not permit any reservation in respect of appointments to be made by way of promotion. There can, therefore, be no dispute that on 24-11-1987 when Respondents 2 to 9 were promoted to Grade-III, Mohanty and other general category candidates senior to him had a vested right to be considered for promotion. Whether such a right can be rendered nugatory by retrospective legislation? The question is not resintegra. There are several pronouncements of this Court on the subject. 10. In State of Gujarat v. Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni, (1983)2 SCC 33 this Court had an occasion to deal with the question as to whether the status as civil servant conferred on the Panchayat employees could be taken away by retrospective operation of amended law. The Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1961 aimed at democratic decentralisation of important governmental functions by vesting such functions in Gram, Nagar, Taluqa and District Panchayats and by enabling the State Government to transfer other powers, functions and duties to the Panchayat institutions. The dispute having arisen regarding the status of the Panchayat employees, some of them filed a writ petition before the Gujarat High Court seeking various reliefs. The High Court allowed the writ petition holding that the members of the Panchayat service belonging to the local cadre were government servants and issued consequential directions for equation of posts, revision of pay scales and payment of salaries. The State Government filed appeal against the judgment of the High Court before this Court, but during the pendency of the appeal, the Gujarat Panchayats (Third Amendment) Act, 1978 was enforced with a view to nullify the basis of the decision of the High Court. The employees filed writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India before this Court challenging the constitutional validity of the Amending Act. The State appeal and the writ petitions were heard together by a Constitution Bench of this Court. This Court held that the Gujarat Panchayats (Third Amendment) Act, 1978 was arbitrary, unreasonable and unconstitutional on the following reasoning: “The law must satisfy the requirements of the Constitution today taking into account the accrued or acquired rights of the parties today. The State appeal and the writ petitions were heard together by a Constitution Bench of this Court. This Court held that the Gujarat Panchayats (Third Amendment) Act, 1978 was arbitrary, unreasonable and unconstitutional on the following reasoning: “The law must satisfy the requirements of the Constitution today taking into account the accrued or acquired rights of the parties today. The law cannot say, 20 years ago the parties had no rights, therefore, the requirements of the Constitution will be satisfied if the law is dated back by 20 years. We are concerned with today’s rights not yesterday’s. A legislature cannot legislate today with reference to a situation that obtained 20 years ago and ignore the march of events and the constitutional rights accrued in the course of the 20 years. That would be most arbitrary, unreasonable and a negation of history. It was pointed out by a Constitution Bench of this Court in B.S. Yadav v. State of Haryana, 1980 Supp SCC 524. Chandrachud, C.J., speaking for the Court held: ‘Since the Governor exercises the legislative power under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution, it is open to him to give retrospective operation to the rules made under that provision. But the date from which the rules are made to operate must be shown to bear either from the face of the rules or by extrinsic evidence, reasonable nexus with the provisions contained in the rules, especially when the retrospective effect extends over a long period as in this case.’ Today’s equal cannot be made unequal by saying that they were unequal 20 years ago and we will restore that position by making a law today and making it retrospective. Constitutional rights, constitutional obligations and constitutional consequences cannot be tampered with that way. A law which if made today would be plainly invalid as offending constitutional provisions in the context of the existing situation cannot become valid by being made retrospective. Past virtue (constitutional) cannot be made to wipe out present vice (constitutional) by making retrospective laws. We are, therefore, firmly of the view that the Gujarat Panchayats (Third Amendment) Act, 1978 is unconstitutional, as it offends Articles 311 and 14 and is arbitrary and unreasonable.” 11. This Court in Ex. Capt. Past virtue (constitutional) cannot be made to wipe out present vice (constitutional) by making retrospective laws. We are, therefore, firmly of the view that the Gujarat Panchayats (Third Amendment) Act, 1978 is unconstitutional, as it offends Articles 311 and 14 and is arbitrary and unreasonable.” 11. This Court in Ex. Capt. K.C. Arora v. State of Haryana, (1984) 3 SCC 281 declared ultra vires retrospective amendments made to the Punjab National Emergency (Concessions) Rules, 1965 as applicable to Haryana. Under the Punjab National Emergency (Concessions) Rules, 1965 exemergency commissioned officers were entitled to the benefit of their military service on their reappointment in the State Civil Service against the vacancies reserved for exarmy officers. The Haryana Government by a notification dated 9-8-1976 amended the definition of the expression “Military Service” in the 1965 Rules thereby restricting the benefit of military service only up to 10-1-1968 with the result that the petitioners before this Court were deprived of their army service for the purpose of fixation of seniority in the civil service for the period 1969-1971. The amendment was challenged on the ground that it was ultra vires the Constitution insofar as it affected prejudicially persons who had acquired vested rights. This Court following the Constitution Bench in State of Gujarat v. Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni (supra)struck down the amendment on the following reasoning: ‘The question, however, has been pointedly considered recently by a Constitution Bench of this Court in State of Gujarat v. Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni (supra)…. In view of this latest pronouncement by the Constitution Bench of this Court, the law appears to be well settled and the Haryana Government cannot take away the accrued rights of the petitioners and the appellants by making amendment of the rules with retrospective effect.’ For the foregoing discussion the writ petitions as well as the appeals are allowed and the orders of the High Court dated 10-10-1980 are quashed and the impugned Rule 4(ii) of the Punjab Government National Emergency (Concessions) Rules, 1965, as amended by the Haryana Government Gazette Notification No. GSR 77/Const./Art. 309/Amend/(1)/76 dated 22-3-1976 and the Notification No. GSR 182/Const./Art. 309/Amend/(2)/76 dated 9-8-1976 amending the definition of the expression ‘military service’ in Rule 2 are declared to be ultra vires the Constitution, insofar as they affect prejudicially persons who had acquired rights as stated above.” 12. In T.R. Kapur v. State of Haryana, 1986 Supp SCC 584 three petitioners T.R. Kapur, Mahinder Singh and V.D. Grover, who were diploma holders, were working as Sub-Divisional Officers on regular basis under the unamended Rule 6(b) of the Punjab Service of Engineers, Class I, Public Works Department (Irrigation Branch) Rules, 1964. They were eligible for promotion as Executive Engineers in Class I service despite the fact that they did not possess a degree in engineering. By the notification dated 22-6-1984, Rule 6(b) was amended and it was provided that a degree in engineering was an essential qualification for promotion of Assistant Engineers (Irrigation Branch) to Class I service and thereby the petitioners were rendered ineligible for promotion to the post of Executive Engineer in Class I service. The amendment was challenged in this Court by way of a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. This Court came to the conclusion that the retrospective effect given to the amendment was violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India on the following reasoning: ‘It is well settled that the power to frame rules to regulate the conditions of service under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution carries with it the power to amend or alter the rules with a retrospective effect: B.S. Vadera v. Union of India, (1968)3 SCR: AIR 1969 SC 118 , Raj Kumar v. Union of India, (1975) 4 SCC 13 , K. Nagaraj v. State of A.P., (1985) 1 SCC 523 and State of J & K v. Triloki Nath Khosa, (1974) 1 SCC 19 . It is equally wellsettled that any rule which affects the right of a person to be considered for promotion is a condition of service although mere chances of promotion may not be. It may further be stated that an authority competent to lay down qualifications for promotion, is also competent to change the qualifications. The rules defining qualifications and suitability for promotion are conditions of service and they can be changed retrospectively. This rule is however subject to a well-recognised principle that the benefits acquired under the existing rules cannot be taken away by an amendment with retrospective effect, that is to say, there is no power to make such a rule under the proviso to Article 309 which affects or impairs vested rights.’ 13. This rule is however subject to a well-recognised principle that the benefits acquired under the existing rules cannot be taken away by an amendment with retrospective effect, that is to say, there is no power to make such a rule under the proviso to Article 309 which affects or impairs vested rights.’ 13. Finally this Court considered the effect of retrospective legislation on the vested rights of the affected persons in P.D. Aggarwal v. State of U.P., (1987) 3 SCC 622 Under the U.P. Service of Engineers (Buildings & Roads Branch) Class II Rules, 1936, the Assistant Engineers substantively appointed against temporary vacancies became members of the service and were entitled to seniority on the basis of continuous length of service. The Rules were amended in the years 1969 and 1971 wherein it was provided that the Assistant Engineers would only become members when they are selected and appointed against the quota meant for them and their seniority would be determined only from the date of order of appointment in substantive vacancies. These amendments were made with retrospective effect thereby taking away the vested rights of the Assistant Engineers appointed against temporary posts. The High Court held the retrospective amendment of the rules to be arbitrary and unconstitutional. This Court upheld the judgment of the High Court on the following reasoning: ‘It has been urged that Government has the power to amend rules retrospectively and such rules are quite valid. Several decisions have been cited of this Court at the bar. Undoubtedly, the Government has got the power under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution to make rules and amend the rules giving retrospective effect. Nevertheless, such retrospective amendments cannot take away the vested rights and the amendments must be reasonable, not arbitrary or discriminatory violating Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution …. As has been stated hereinbefore, the Assistant Engineers who have already become members of the Service on being appointed substantively against temporary posts have already acquired the benefit of 1936 Rules for having their seniority computed from the date of their becoming member of the service. As has been stated hereinbefore, the Assistant Engineers who have already become members of the Service on being appointed substantively against temporary posts have already acquired the benefit of 1936 Rules for having their seniority computed from the date of their becoming member of the service. 1969 and 1971 Amended Rules take away this right of these temporary Assistant Engineers by expressly providing that those Assistant Engineers who are selected and appointed in permanent vacancies against 50 per cent quota provided by Rule 6 of the Amended 1969 Rules will only be considered for the purpose of computation of seniority from the date of their appointment against permanent vacancies. Therefore the temporary Assistant Engineers who are not only deprived of the right that accrued to them in the matter of determination of their seniority but they are driven to a very peculiar position inasmuch as they are to wait until they are selected and appointed against permanent vacancies in the quota set up for this purpose by the amended Rule 6…. These amendments are not only disadvantageous to the future recruits against temporary vacancies but they were made applicable retrospectively from 1-3-1962 even to existing officers recruited against temporary vacancies through Public Service Commission. As has been stated hereinbefore that the Government has power to make retrospective amendments to the Rules but if the Rules purport to take away the vested rights and are arbitrary and not reasonable then such retrospective amendments are subject to judicial scrutiny if they have infringed Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.’ 14. The legislatures and the competent authority under Article 309 of the Constitution of India have the power to make laws with retrospective effect. This power, however, cannot be used to justify the arbitrary, illegal or unconstitutional acts of the Executive. When a person is deprived of an accrued right vested in him under a statute or under the Constitution and he successfully challenges the same in the court of law, the legislature cannot render the said right and the relief obtained nugatory by enacting retrospective legislation. 15. Respectfully following the law laid down by this Court in the judgments referred to and quoted above, we are of the view that the retrospective operation of the amended Rule 13 cannot be sustained. 15. Respectfully following the law laid down by this Court in the judgments referred to and quoted above, we are of the view that the retrospective operation of the amended Rule 13 cannot be sustained. We are satisfied that the retrospective amendment of Rule 13 of the Rules takes away the vested rights of Mohanty and other general category candidates senior to Respondents 2 to 9. We, therefore, declare amended Rule 13 to the extent it has been made operative retrospectively to be unreasonable, arbitrary and, as such, violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. We strike down the retrospective operation of the rule. In the view we have taken on the point it is not necessary to deal with the other contentions raised by Mohanty.” 11. In the case at hand also, what this Court held in WP(C) No.192 of 2003 was that prior to 1-1-1997, the private respondents were on deputation to the District Council and that they came to be absorbed in the service of the District Council as Junior Engineers only on 1-1-1997 vide the Notification dated 20-1-1997 and that the petitioner, who was directly appointed as Junior Engineer(Civil) on 30-1-1990, was a regular employee from the date of joining the post in terms thereof unlike the private respondents who until 1-1-1997 were deputationists and could not, therefore, have been members of the service. According to this Court, the private respondents were promoted to the posts of Assistant Engineer even before they completed two years while the petitioner, who completed about 8 years of service as Junior Engineer by then, was not even considered for promotion. This Court, therefore, held that the impugned promotion order of the private respondents contained in the Memorandum dated 18-8-1998 was unsustainable. Instead of considering the promotion of the petitioner and other regular Junior Engineers, who are senior to the private respondents, to the post of Assistant Engineer, the Executive Committee of the District Council passed the resolution dated 8-4-2011 in its 28th meeting resolving that in partial modification of the Notification dated 20-1-1997, the private respondents were deemed to have been absorbed in the service of the District Council against the regular posts of Junior Engineer from the dates of joining the District Council with seniority as per their appointment order dated 13-9-1984 issued by the Director, Tribal Welfare Department. This resolution was implemented by the Deputy Chief Executive Officer by issuing the Notification dated 26-4-2011 to that effect. Terming this action as violative of the order of this Court, the petitioner filed Contempt Cas(C) No.19 of 2011 against the respondents before this Court. On receipt of the notice, the Deputy Chief Executive Officer issued the Memorandum dated 11-7-2011 canceling the Notification dated 26-4-2011. 12. However, the above Memorandum has turned out to be a short-lived one. Soon rather than latter, the impugned Notification dated 20-3-2012 was issued by the Deputy Chief Executive Officer annulling the Memorandum dated 11-7-2011 on the purported ground that the same was issued by him without placing it before the Executive Committee of the District Council. In the impugned Notification, it was indicated that the services of the private respondents were initially placed at the disposal of the District Council on deputation by the Tribal Welfare Department, Govt. of Tripura and were absorbed in the District Council w.e.f.14-9-1984 and 18-9-1984 respectively with pay protection and that the decision to absorb them from the date of their joining TTAADC was taken in the th meeting of the Executive Committee held on 8-4-2011, which could not be annulled by the Deputy Chief Executive Officer. As already noticed, by means of the impugned notification, according to the learned counsel for the District Council, the bases of the judgment have been taken away. In my opinion, this submission is misconceived and runs counter to the decision of the Apex Court in Tushar Ranjan Mohanty (supra). Mere reiteration of the earlier decision of the District Council that the services of the private respondents stood absorbed to the service of the District Council as Junior Engineers w.e.f.14-9-1984 and 18-9-1984 respectively, which is contrary to the definite finding of this Court that they became regular employee of the District Council only w.e.f. 1-1-1997, cannot be said to have taken away the bases of the judgment of this Court. The District Council does not have the power to render ineffective the earlier judicial decisions by making a law or by passing a resolution which simply ignored the earlier judicial decision by reiterating its earlier decision as invalid or not binding for such power if exercised would not be a legislative power but a judicial power which cannot be encroached upon by a legislature under our Constitution. 13. 13. Moreover, as already noticed, by giving retrospective appointment to the private respondents in the posts of Junior Engineer on dates anterior to the regular appointment of the petitioner, the vested right of the petitioner to be senior to them has been set at naught in violation of his fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Similarly, by giving promotion to the private respondents in the post of Assistant Engineer without first considering the case of the petitioner, who is admittedly senior to them, the fundamental rights of the petitioner to be considered for promotion to the post of Assistant Engineer guaranteed by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution have been infringed. The law is now well-settled that when a person is deprived of an accrued right vested in him under a statute or under the Constitution of India and has successfully challenged the same in a court of law as in this case, the legislature, much less, the Executive Committee of the District Council, which does not even have the plenary power of legislation unlike Parliament or State Legislature, cannot render such right and the declaration obtained by him from a court of law nugatory by passing a retrospective resolution/notification/memorandum; to do so would be arbitrary, illegal or unconstitutional acts of the Executive and, therefore, tantamount to violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Consequently, I hold that the impugned Notification dated 20-3-2012 and the resolution dated 8-4-2011 passed in connection therewith is arbitrary, illegal and unconstitutional. It is, however, brought to the notice of this Court in the course of hearing that both the private respondents are on the verge of retirement on superannuation. In that case, without disturbing the promotions already given to the private respondents, the interest of the petitioner shall have to be protected. This exercise can be undertaken since no other person has come forward to stake similar claim before this Court for the last 14 years. Let an impression be not created in the minds of the public that the judgment of this Court, which remains unchallenged, can be set at naught or nullified by the District Council; the fruits of litigation cannot be simply denied to a successful litigant by taking resort to such dubious actions. 14. Let an impression be not created in the minds of the public that the judgment of this Court, which remains unchallenged, can be set at naught or nullified by the District Council; the fruits of litigation cannot be simply denied to a successful litigant by taking resort to such dubious actions. 14. For what has been stated in the foregoing, this writ petition is disposed of by the issuing the following directions: i. The impugned Notification dated 20-3-2012 and the resolution dated 8-4-2011 passed by the Executive Committee of the District Council in connection therewith is hereby declared unconstitutional. ii. The promotion already given to the private respondents in the posts of Assistant Engineer with effect from 6-7-1998 shall, however, remain undisturbed. iii. The petitioner is deemed to have been promoted to the post of Assistant Engineer from 6-7-1998 when the private respondents were promoted to such posts and he shall be placed above the private respondents in the seniority list of Assistant Engineers. iv. The respondent authorities are directed to issue notification to give effect to the above direction No.3 within two weeks from the date of receipt of this judgment. v. The parties are directed to bear their respective costs.