JUDGMENT Heard. 1. This second appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been filed by the plaintiff being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 20.4.2005 passed by the Court of 8th Additional District Judge, Gwalior in First Appeal No.12-A/2005, whereby it has confirmed the judgment and decree dated 30.9.2004 passed by the Court of 6th Civil Judge Class-II, Gwalior in Civil Suit No.1-A/2002. 2. Brief facts leading to the present second appeal are that the plaintiff had filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction on the ground that she had received the suit property in Mehar from her father-in-law as per the Nikahnama Ex.P-12 and, therefore, she is the sole owner and possessor of the said suit property, thus, sought a declaration that she being the owner of the suit property, she cannot be dispossessed by the respondents in the name of development of a Park. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that in public interest a writ petition bearing Writ Petition No. 207/1990 (PIL) was filed, wherein the plaintiff was not a party and, therefore, the judgment passed in Writ Petition No.207/1990 (PIL) is not binding on her and in fact she is the owner of the land contained in Survey Number 691/1, situated in Patwari Halka No.46, Sheikh Daud-Ki-Tallaiya, Dal Bazar, Lashkar, Gwalior. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant has assailed the judgment and decree on the ground that the learned trial Court has relied on certain unexhibited documents filed by the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior, and on the basis of the certain unexhibited documents, it has drawn a conclusion that the land in question was in fact the land which belongs to the Municipal Corporation for construction of Park inasmuch as in the year 1939 Rahimuddin and Karimuddin Sons of Gayasuddin had executed a sale deed on 10.8.1939, from which it is apparent that there existed a Municipal Park on the North of the property, which was sold by said Rahimuddin and Karimuddin, from whom the plaintiff was claiming the title. Similarly, certain notices Ex.D-2, which is office note of the Municipal Corporation and resolution dated 20.8.1986 in regard to erection of a Park on the land, could not have been relied upon by the trial Court to deny the reliefs as were claimed by the plaintiff. 4. Similarly, certain notices Ex.D-2, which is office note of the Municipal Corporation and resolution dated 20.8.1986 in regard to erection of a Park on the land, could not have been relied upon by the trial Court to deny the reliefs as were claimed by the plaintiff. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mahant Ram Khilawan Das v. State of M.P., as reported in 2008 RN 162=2008 (II) MPJR (SC) 300, to support his contention that since the name of her husband is mentioned in the revenue entries, therefore as per the provisions contained in section 117 of the Land Revenue Code, 1959, presumption will be raised in favour of the plaintiff about her possession. Learned counsel for the appellant has also placed reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of Ramswarup Tripathi v. City Administrator, Gwalior, as reported in AIR 1988 M.P. 264 , to bring home the issue that as per section 83 of the Municipal Corporation Act, the Municipal Corporation is required to maintain a Register of the Properties and the onus was on the Municipal Corporation to exhibit that Register in evidence before the trial Court so as to prove that the land in question is a land for Park and not in possession and ownership of the plaintiff. 5. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent No.1 submits that in fact the suit was required to be proved by the plaintiff and the plaintiff never entered into the witness box to prove the plea of receiving the said property in Mehar. It is also submitted that Nikahnama Ex.P-12, in which there is mention of Mehar, was never proved by the plaintiff. It is also submitted that the plaintiff's power of attorney holder Shri Jagjeet Singh Rana was not entitled to enter the witness box inasmuch as neither he was a witness to the fact of grant of land to the plaintiff in Nikahnama as Mehar by her father-in-law nor he was a witness to substantiate the revenue entries in favour of father-in-law of the plaintiff nor the husband of the plaintiff inasmuch as those revenue entries were not made at the instance of the said power of attorney holder. It is also submitted that in fact there is a categorical finding recorded by the trial Court in para 12 that the plaintiff was not in possession of the suit property and, therefore, rightly the trial Court has rejected the relief of grant of permanent injunction. It is also submitted that since the plaintiff could neither prove her possession over the suit property nor she could prove her case about title over the suit property, therefore, the trial Court has rightly dismissed the suit and this finding of fact has been affirmed by the first appellate Court. It is further submitted that in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin and another, as reported in (2012)8 SCC 148 , since admittedly the appellant was not in possession of the suit property, then the suit seeking declaration of title of the ownership of the property without seeking relief of possession was not maintainable and, therefore, the suit has been rightly dismissed. It is also submitted that in the light of the law laid down in the case of Mohanlal v. Nihal Singh, as reported in (2001)8 SCC 584 , since the question of possession of the suit land is essentially one of fact and the trial Court on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record declined to accept the case of the plaintiff that the plaintiff was in possession of the suit property, there was no scope for the High Court to interfere with the finding of possession concurrently recorded by the Courts below within the limited parameters of section 100, CPC and, therefore, it cannot be said that any substantial question of law is involved in the present appeal. Learned counsel for the respondent No.1 has also placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and others v. Vasavi Cooperative Housing Society Limited and others, as reported in (2014)2 SCC 269 , to submit that khasra entries are not the documents of title. There is no quarrel about this proposition inasmuch as in the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mahant Ram Khilawan Das (supra), the only presumption to be drawn on the basis of khasra entries is of the possession and not about the title. 6. There is no quarrel about this proposition inasmuch as in the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mahant Ram Khilawan Das (supra), the only presumption to be drawn on the basis of khasra entries is of the possession and not about the title. 6. As far as the judgment in the case of Mahant Ram Khilawan Das (supra), on which the reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the appellant, is concerned, it is laid down that the khasra entries raise presumption of possession, but that presumption is to be supported by cogent evidence. After appreciation of the evidence, it has come on record that the suit property was no more in possession of the plaintiff. A perpetual power of attorney was executed in favour of a third person. 7. Similarly, the the ratio in the case of Ramswarup Tripathi (supra), is not applicable inasmuch as it was not the Municipal Corporation which was claiming the land as a park land and asserting its title over it, but the onus was on the plaintiff to prove her title over it and therefore the weakness in the case of the Municipal Corporation could not have been used as a plea to establish her possession. She was expected to stand on her own. In this regard, she could not prove the relationship between Kamruddin and Karimuddin nor prove the Nikahnama, on the basis of which she was claiming to have receive the land in Mehar. In fact, the inconsistent plea of receiving the land in question in Mehar and then claiming herself to be the legal heir upon death of her husband, have not been supported by any documentary or other evidence, therefore, since the plaintiff has failed to prove her suit, she is not entitled to take advantage of weakness of the Municipal Corporation in not producing the Register, which is required to be maintained under section 83 of the Municipal Corporation Act or the failure of the Municipal Corporation to exhibit the document of 1939 vide which Karimuddin and his brother had alienated the land in favour of a third party and wherein in the boundaries of the said property, it is mentioned that there is Municipal property on North of the property which was subject matter of the deed dated 10.8.1939. In fact, this factual position has not been disputed. In fact, this factual position has not been disputed. Thus, when there existed a Park in the year 1939, onus was on the appellant to establish that she came in possession of the said land shown as Park in the 1939 sale deed. 8. In view of the aforesaid, this Court is of the opinion that since the plaintiff has failed to prove and establish her title either through succession or through Mehar, she is not entitled to any relief and no substantial question of law arises for decision in this second appeal and therefore this second appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. Parties to bear their own costs.