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2017 DIGILAW 377 (CAL)

Laxman Bagdi v. State of West Bengal

2017-04-11

ANIRUDDHA BOSE, ASHA ARORA

body2017
JUDGMENT : ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J. 1. This appeal is against a judgment of conviction of the appellant delivered by the Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Bankura finding the appellant guilty of offences under Sections 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The judgment was delivered on 31st March, 2005. The appellant had been charged with committing murder of his wife, Sumitra Bagdi in the night between 25th and 26th December, 2000 by throttling. He had also been charged with causing disappearance the dead body of the victim, in this case being an evidence of the offence of murder for screening himself, as the offender, from legal punishment. The Trial Court awarded sentence for undergoing rigorous imprisonment for life for the offence committed under Section 302 of the Code and further rigorous imprisonment for three years for committing the offence punishable under Section 201 of the Code. The Trial Court also imposed sentence of fine of Rs. 5,000/- for the former and Rs. 500/- for the latter offences, prescribing additional two years rigorous imprisonment in default of payment of fine so far as sentence under Section 302 of the Code is concerned and rigorous imprisonment for two months in respect of sentence awarded under Section 201 of the Code. The victim went missing from her matrimonial home, which was noticed by her two sons on 26th December, 2000. On 28th December 2000, the victim’s mother (Parbati Majhi) who has deposed as PW-10, had lodged a missing diary. This was registered as G.D.E. No. 645 dated 28th December 2000. It has transpired from her evidence that near relatives of the victim tried to search her out but the victim could not be traced. 2. It was on 16th January, 2001 at about 6:05 a.m. the Investigating Officer, Prabal Sengupta (PW-15) received an anonymous phone call to the effect that stench was coming out from an abandoned well of the village Bagajol. At the material point of time, the PW-15 was posted as the officer-in-charge of Joypur police station. The parental and matrimonial homes of the victim appear to be in the same village, Bagajol, over which the aforesaid police station had jurisdiction. On receiving the information, the Investigating Officer recorded the same as G.D.E. No. 417 dated 16th January, 2001 and proceeded to the said location. The parental and matrimonial homes of the victim appear to be in the same village, Bagajol, over which the aforesaid police station had jurisdiction. On receiving the information, the Investigating Officer recorded the same as G.D.E. No. 417 dated 16th January, 2001 and proceeded to the said location. Prosecution case is that the villagers had gathered near the well and found a tied jute sack inside the well. Police caused the sack to be lifted out and on untying the sack, a dead body was discovered. Near relatives of the victim, being her brother Swapan Majhi (PW-1), her mother Parbati Majhi (PW-10) and her two sons, Mithun Bagdi (PW-11) and Prasenjit Bagdi (PW-12) were among the persons who identified the body to be that of the victim. At the location itself, the Investigating Officer received a written complaint from Swapan Majhi. The scribe of the complaint was Rampada Tangi (PW-3), a co-villager. The Investigating Officer had sent that written complaint to the Joypur Police Station through a constable for instituting a case. The investigation was started at the said location. Thereafter, inquest was made and the dead body was sent to Bishnupur Sub-Divisional Hospital through a constable for post-mortem examination. The jute sack was seized at the location. Subsequently, after postmortem examination, the wearing apparels and certain other objects were also seized, and the seizure list in that regard has been made Exhibit-15. The post-mortem report has been made Exhibit-10. The autopsy surgeon opined in the report that death was due to asphyxia in a case of strangulation ante-mortem and homicidal in nature. The autopsy surgeon has deposed as PW-13 in the trial. In his evidence, he has stated that the body was decomposed but not highly decomposed. He found no ligature mark but manual strangulation was found as the cause of the death of the victim. As regards the state of the body on which he conducted autopsy, he has deposed:- “On post mortem examination I found the followings:- 1. The body was decomposed R.M. negative, muds all over the body present of prominent breast and shape of palvise clearly indicates that the sex of the deceased was female. 2. No apparent external injury mark seen all over the body. Ligature mark could not be identified as because the body was decomposed. The body was decomposed R.M. negative, muds all over the body present of prominent breast and shape of palvise clearly indicates that the sex of the deceased was female. 2. No apparent external injury mark seen all over the body. Ligature mark could not be identified as because the body was decomposed. Thiroid and Hyood cartilage broken, preserved and handed over to the I.O. Pale blood clot present inside the tre chea and lrynx. Skull and scalp was intact and cover with hair. Membranes pale, brain and spinal cord pale, Chest wall s and cartilage intact pleurae pale larynx and trechea as mentioned above. Lungs pale, Paricardim pale, heart empty on both sides, Paritonium, mouth and oesophagus pale, Stomach empty intestines pale, liver splin kidney all are pale, bladder empty Female genital organs pale. Opinion: The death in my opinion is due to asphyxia in case of strangulation ante mortem and homicidal in nature.” 3. The appellant was arrested from the location at which the body of the victim was discovered on 16th January, 2001 only. This has transpired from the evidence of the Investigating Officer as also certain other witnesses of fact, in particular, co-villagers PW-5 (Nabakumar Majhi) and PW-7 (Kaltu Majhi). The F.I.R. was registered on the same day on the basis of the written complaint forwarded from the place of discovery of the body and on that basis Joypur P.S. Case No. 3/2001 dated 16th January 2001 was started. On completion of investigation, charge-sheet was submitted under the provisions of the Code in which the appellant was eventually convicted and charges were also framed under those two Sections. In trial, on behalf of the prosecution, two sets of witnesses of facts, apart from the police witnesses and the autopsy surgeon were examined. The first set comprised of near relatives of the victim and the second set comprised of co-villagers. Among the near relatives of the victim who examined were the de facto complainant, being the brother of the deceased (PW-1), Nayan Majhi (PW4) an uncle of the victim, Urmila Bagdi (PW-9) an aunt of the victim. PW-10 the mother of the victim, and two sons of the victim being PW-11 and PW-12. PW-2, PW-3, PW-5, PW-6, PW-7 and PW-8 were co-villagers, of both the victim and the appellant/accused. There were two police witnesses. A.K. Mukherjee, an S.I. of Police was the PW-14. PW-10 the mother of the victim, and two sons of the victim being PW-11 and PW-12. PW-2, PW-3, PW-5, PW-6, PW-7 and PW-8 were co-villagers, of both the victim and the appellant/accused. There were two police witnesses. A.K. Mukherjee, an S.I. of Police was the PW-14. He had received the information from the PW-15 on 16th January, 2001 and instituted Joypur P.S. Case No. 03/2001 upon registering the formal F.I.R. The other police witness was the Investigating Officer Prabal Sengupta (PW-15). The written complaint has been made Exhibit-5 and had been proved by the scribe PW-3 (Rampada Tangi) as also the PW-1, who was the defacto complainant. 4. There is no eyewitness to the incident or offence which resulted in death of the victim, but PW Nos. 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8 were witnesses to the discovery of the body of the victim. The prosecution sought to make out a case before the Trial Court that the appellant had made extra-judicial confession before the villagers who had gathered at the said location at the material point of time. These witnesses had given their own account of confession by the appellant. Mr. Subir Banerjee, learned Additional Public Prosecutor has sought to justify conviction of the appellant on the basis of circumstantial evidence, which formed the basis of the appellant’s conviction before the Trial Court. On this point, evidence of two sons of the victim (and the appellant) was relied upon by him, to apply the principle of “last seen together.” Mithun (PW-11) had deposed that in the morning of 10 Pous of 1407 BS, he found his mother missing. Prasenjit (PW-12) had been more specific in his evidence on “last seen together.” He stated in his deposition that on the night preceding 14th Pous 1407 (as per Bengali calendar), his parents had slept in a room in their house. Relevant part of his deposition, as recorded, on this aspect reads:- “1. On 14th day of Pous of 1407 B.S. I went to the hut along with my mother in the morning. I thereafter went to my School and came back to our house. In the night we two brothers, father, took our dinner. But my mother did not take her dinner. Thereafter I slept along with my dada Mithun Bagdi in one room and our parent slept in another room. I thereafter went to my School and came back to our house. In the night we two brothers, father, took our dinner. But my mother did not take her dinner. Thereafter I slept along with my dada Mithun Bagdi in one room and our parent slept in another room. In the next morning we could not see our mother.” In evidence, dates have been used referring to Bengali calendar in some cases by the witnesses of facts, whereas the police witnesses and the autopsy surgeon has referred to dates by the Gregorian calendar. In this judgment, while referring to dates while dealing with depositions of witnesses, we have referred to the dates interchangeably. For instance, witnesses of facts have mostly referred to the date of discovery of the body as 2nd day of the month of Magh 1407 as per the Bengali calendar, whereas the police witnesses have identified the day as 16th January 2001. There has been some mismatch of dates on the part of some witnesses of facts vis-à-vis the Bengali and the Gregorian calendar, but the Trial Court found those to be minor discrepancies. On this count, we concur with the Trial Court. In our opinion, such discrepancies on their own ought not to have any major impact on the prosecution’s case. 5. The judgment of conviction is primarily based on circumstantial evidence. The Trial Court did not find extra-judicial confession of the appellant to be reliable enough to convict the appellant. There are inconsistencies in the versions of the witnesses of facts as to whether the appellant had confessed before he was arrested or after his arrest at the location from which the lifeless body of the victim was discovered. There is evidence that the appellant was trying to flee when the body was discovered, and after being apprehended, he confessed his guilt. The PW-2 has stated in his evidence that police had asked the accused person and then the accused person had confessed his guilt. There is overwhelming evidence however of the appellant being at that location, and of his being arrested from there. The PW-2 has stated in his evidence that police had asked the accused person and then the accused person had confessed his guilt. There is overwhelming evidence however of the appellant being at that location, and of his being arrested from there. The appellant in his answer to questions put to him under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 sought to set up a case that he was detained earlier, and was in police custody for seven days prior to the date on which the body of the victim was discovered, and had remained in custody on that date as well. But there is no corroborative evidence to this plea and we do not believe the appellant’s version of being in police custody having regard to uniform version of several witnesses of facts that the appellant-accused was at the location near the well from where the body of the victim discovered. His own sons, PW-11 and PW-12 have given a different version in their evidence on whereabouts of the appellant. Both of them have deposed that after their mother went missing, the appellant initially kept silent when enquired about the victim and thereafter the appellant had escaped. Mithun (PW-11) stated that the appellant resurfaced in their residence after some days. The prosecution also projected souring of relationship between the appellant and the victim as the motive for murder. PW-1 has stated that the appellant used to quarrel with the victim repeatedly and he also used to assault the victim after consuming liquor. PW-10, the mother of the victim has also deposed in the same line. The appellant’s (and the victim’s) own sons, being PW-11 and PW-12 have also stated in their evidence about liquor addiction of their father and that he used to assault the victim. 6. Mr. Bakshi, learned counsel for the appellant assailed the judgment of conviction on several grounds. He pointed out that the body was decomposed and no ligature mark was found on the body by the autopsy surgeon. In the seizure list made by the investigation officer after post-mortem examination, apart from wearing apparels and the certain types bracelets which a married Hindu Bengali woman usually wears as symbol of her marital status-commonly referred to as “noah, sankha and paulaa” broken hyoid and thyroid cartilages were also seized. Mr. In the seizure list made by the investigation officer after post-mortem examination, apart from wearing apparels and the certain types bracelets which a married Hindu Bengali woman usually wears as symbol of her marital status-commonly referred to as “noah, sankha and paulaa” broken hyoid and thyroid cartilages were also seized. Mr. Bakshi brought to our notice that these were not shown to the autopsy surgeon at the time of trial. This seizure list has been marked Exhibit “15”. The autopsy surgeon also did not conclusively establish time of death of the victim. This argument, in our opinion, cannot negate the evidence of the autopsy surgeon that death of the victim was homicidal and ante-mortem and was caused by throttling. Moreover, in his deposition the autopsy surgeon stated that if the body remains under water for twenty or twenty-two days “ligature marks of that body is to be abolished.” This period matches with the range of time between the date the victim went missing and the date of discovery of her body. The autopsy surgeon, in his cross-examination, had remained stuck to his opinion on cause of death. No evidence on the part of defence has been adduced to contradict the autopsy surgeon on this point. 7. As we have already observed, prosecution has relied on circumstantial evidence to demonstrate complicity of the appellant in the offences alleged and to establish his guilt. The starting point of the chain through which the appellant has sought to link the circumstances to establish the complicity of the appellant in the offences alleged is the appellant and the victim being seen together last. On this fact, there is no dispute. But Mr. Bakshi’s submission is that to treat that fact as the starting point of chain, actual time of death must be proved. We have already analyzed the evidence on this aspect of the defence case. What is relevant here is that the victim could not be traced after being seen together with her husband, being the appellant, till her lifeless body which was discovered after about twenty days. Specific opinion of the autopsy surgeon on actual time of death was not necessary to link the circumstances. Next comes the question of conduct of the appellant. There is no evidence that he tried to trace out the victim after she went missing. He did not lodge any missing diary, which conduct Mr. Specific opinion of the autopsy surgeon on actual time of death was not necessary to link the circumstances. Next comes the question of conduct of the appellant. There is no evidence that he tried to trace out the victim after she went missing. He did not lodge any missing diary, which conduct Mr. Bakshi wants to be inferred in favour of the appellant. Mr. Bakshi’s argument is that if he had apprehension of being implicated in the offence, then he would have had lodged a missing diary. This part of his submission also has to be rejected. The appellant’s conduct in not reporting the factum of missing of his wife was unnatural, and did not indicate reasonable behaviour on his part. The reason given by Mr. Bakshi for not reporting appears to us to be an afterthought, and not plausible. Thereafter, the appellant himself escaped from his home, which is also reflection of unusual behaviour in such circumstances. The circumstances have been linked by the Trial Court in the chain narrated in the judgment under appeal in the following manner:- “1. On the night between 25.12.2000 and 26.12.2000 the deceased and the accd.person being husband and wife resided in one room of their house and their two minor sons resided in another room. 2. Both their minor sons (PW-11 and 12) saw the deceased lastly at that night with the accd. person to reside at their bed room. 3. On expiry of that fateful night the deceased was found missing from the morning. 4. PW-10, 11 and 12 enquired before the accd.persons about the whereabouts of the deceased but the accd.person dazed them and could not satisfactorily explain. 5. The accd.person did not take any step to report before the police or any other places about the missing of his deceased wife rather he fled away and came back after some days. This conduct assumes that the accd.person knew very well that his wife is no more in this world. 6. There was no chance for any outsider to intrude inside the bed room of the accd.person at that relevant night. 7. The dead body was not recovered in the normal course in the morning of 16.1.01 from the abandoned well of their village but because of coming out the bad smell from that well. 8. 6. There was no chance for any outsider to intrude inside the bed room of the accd.person at that relevant night. 7. The dead body was not recovered in the normal course in the morning of 16.1.01 from the abandoned well of their village but because of coming out the bad smell from that well. 8. The accd.person attempted to flee away in the morning of 16.1.01 when the dead body was recovered and identified. 9. The accd.person raised a false plea of having in police lock-up since before 7 days of the day of recovery of the dead body which also provided the additional link in the chain of circumstance. 10. The accd.person also fails to prove the special knowledge about his wife in view of sec.106 of the Indian Evidence Act which also have provided another missing link in the chain of circumstances. 11. The motive of torture and to finish off the deceased by the accd.person as alleged also has been proved by the prosecution. 12. The medical evidence is found matching the span between the night of murder and the day of recovery of the dead body. The medical evidence is also found suited with the other circumstances of this case. 13. No impossibility is found for the accd.person to throw the dead body of the deceased into the abandoned well which is situated nearby his house. 14. The accd.person concealed the dead body with a view to exonerate the visibility of the common villagers and kith and kin for the purpose of getting rid of the criminal liability of murder. 15. The accd.person also did not take any step to file a written complaint before the police even after the dead body is recovered and he did not explain satisfactorily as to why he attempted to flee away at the time when the dead body was recovered.” 8. Mr. Bakshi has relied on three judgments of the Supreme Court cases of Shambhu Nath Mehra vs. The State of Ajmer, AIR 1956 SC 404 , Murlidhar and Others vs. State of Rajasthan, (2005) 11 SCC 133 , Vikramjit Singh vs. State of Punjab, (2006) 12 SCC 306 , to assail the judgment of the Trial Court to the extent the Court had relied on the principle incorporated in Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872 for convicting the appellant. In Shambhu Nath Mehra (supra), referring to the provisions of Sections 101 and 106 of the 1872 Act, it has been held by the Supreme Court:- “This lays down the general rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and S. 106 is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or any rate disproportionately difficult, for the prosecution to establish facts which are “especially” within the knowledge of the accused and which he could prove without difficulty or inconvenience. The word “especially” stresses that It means facts that are pre-eminently to exceptionally within his knowledge. If the section were to be interpreted otherwise, it would lead to the very startling conclusion that in a murder case the burden lies on the accused to prove that he did not commit the murder because who could know better than he whether he did or did not. It is evident that that cannot be the intention & the Privy Council has twice refused to construe this section, as reproduced in certain other Acts outside India, to mean that the burden lies on an accused person to show that he did not commit the crime for which he is tried. These cases are Attygalle vs. The King, 1936 PC 169 (AIR V 23) (A) and Seneviratne vs. R, 1936 (3) All ER 36 at p.49.” 9. In the case of Murlidhar (supra), paragraphs 22 and 23 of the report has been referred to by Mr. Bakshi. In these paragraphs, it has been observed and held:- “22. In our judgment, the High Court was not justified in relying on and applying the rule of burden of proof under Section 106 of the Evidence Act to the case. As pointed out in Mir Mohd. Omar and Shambu Nath Mehra the rule in Section 106 of the Evidence Act would apply when the facts are “especially within the knowledge of the accused” and it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult for the prosecution to establish such facts, “especially within the knowledge of the accused.” In the present case, the prosecution did not proceed on the footing that the facts were especially within the knowledge of the accused and, therefore, the principle in Section 106 could not apply. On the other hand, the prosecution proceeded on the footing that there were eyewitnesses to the fact of murder. The prosecution took upon itself the burden of examining Babulal (PW-5) as eyewitness. Testimony of Ramratan (PW-7) and Isro (PW-10) shows that their agricultural land was situated in a close distance from the house of Khemaram. As rightly pointed out by the High Court, it is highly unlikely and improbable that their kith and kin Ramlal would have been given beating resulting in his death by the accused-appellants while keeping lights of their house on and door of the room opened. It is also unlikely that the accused-appellants would have taken the risk of dragging Ramlal to the house of Khemaram, which was situated in the vicinity of agricultural land and well of Isro (PW-10), the father of Ramlal. The evidence of Govind (PW-13) are wholly unreliable as their evidence is replete with contradiction and inherent improbabilities. 23. In the result, we are of the view that the prosecution having put forward a case that, what transpired after Ramlal was dragged away by the assailants was within the knowledge of witnesses, utterly failed in proving the said facts. Once this is established, it was not open for the High Court to have fallen back on the rule of burden of proof under Section 106 of the Evidence Act. In fact, as we notice, it was nowhere the case of the prosecution that Section 106 of the Evidence Act applied to the facts on record. The High Court seems to have brought it out on its own, but without any justification.” 10. In the case of Vikramjit Singh (supra), Mr. Bakshi relied on the following passages from that judgment:- “14. Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not relieve the prosecution to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt. Only when the prosecution case has been proved the burden in regard to such facts which was within the special knowledge of the accused may be shifted to the accused for explaining the same. Of course, there are certain exceptions to the said rule e.g. where burden of proof may be imposed upon the accused by reason of a statute. 15. Of course, there are certain exceptions to the said rule e.g. where burden of proof may be imposed upon the accused by reason of a statute. 15. It may be that in a situation of this nature where the court legitimately may raise a strong suspicion that in all probabilities the accused was guilty of commission of heinous offence but applying the well-settled principle of law that suspicion, however, grave may be, cannot be a substitute for proof, the same would lead to the only conclusion herein that the prosecution has not been able to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt.” 11. In our opinion, the ratio of these three judgments do not apply in the facts of the case, out of which the present appeal arises. The prosecution in this case has not come forward with its own version specifically on how the offence was committed, barring the linking circumstances, on the strength of which the appellant could be independently convicted. The circumstances forming parts of the chain have been proved by the prosecution. There was no eyewitness of the crime. The circumstances leading to disappearance of the victim through the incidents revealed from witness testimonies as also conduct of the appellant have been linked by the prosecution. The gap which was left to be established was what had happened to the victim between the night of 25th December 2000 and morning of 26th December, 2000. This could be explained only by the appellant. He could have had explained this without difficulty or inconvenience. No other person could have had a better or for that matter any knowledge or explanation on that count. The facts of the case of Murlidhar (supra) were different. In that case, the prosecution proceeded on the footing that there were eyewitnesses to the fact of murder. Thus in that case prosecution had its own version as to what and how the offence occurred, which it failed to establish. In such circumstances the Supreme Court held that it was not open to the High Court to have had fallen back on the rule of burden of proof under Section 106 of the Evidence Act. Thus in that case prosecution had its own version as to what and how the offence occurred, which it failed to establish. In such circumstances the Supreme Court held that it was not open to the High Court to have had fallen back on the rule of burden of proof under Section 106 of the Evidence Act. In the case of Vikramjit Singh (supra), again there were two versions and the Supreme Court found that the learned Sessions Judges on weighing the probabilities of the rival versions had opined that the accused having not been able to prove its case, the prosecution case ought to be accepted. 12. Before us, this is not how the prosecution has sought to prove its case. Through cogent evidence, before the Trial Court the prosecution has proved the circumstances. There was no direct evidence of commission of the offence of murder of the victim followed by concealing her body in a jute sack. We have referred to in the earlier parts of this judgment the circumstances as to what transpired subsequent to the morning of 26th December 2000, from which point of time the fact that victim was missing from her matrimonial home came to light. As to what happened to the victim after she retired for the night on 25th December 2000 with her husband, those facts pre-eminently or exceptionally were within the knowledge of the appellant. The appellant behaved in a manner not expected of a husband, whose wife goes missing. 13. In his answer to examination under Section 313 of the 1973 Code, the appellant sought to explain his conduct by stating that members of his side of the family also sought to search for his missing wife. His answer was:- “My mother in-law was also searching her and we too were searching.” It is not clear from his answer in respect of whom the appellant used the pronoun “we” in his answer. There is no independent evidence that the appellant in any way tried to search for is missing wife. The fact that the appellant used to assault the victim has been proved by the prosecution witnesses. There is also evidence of repeated quarreling, from which motive for committing the offence can be inferred. Prosecution thus had discharged its burden to prove complicity of the appellant in the offences he was charged with through well-defined circumstances. 14. The fact that the appellant used to assault the victim has been proved by the prosecution witnesses. There is also evidence of repeated quarreling, from which motive for committing the offence can be inferred. Prosecution thus had discharged its burden to prove complicity of the appellant in the offences he was charged with through well-defined circumstances. 14. The other factor through which the prosecution sought to convict the appellant was extra-judicial confession, which has been rejected by the Trial Judge. But that feature of the prosecution case cannot be treated to be a parallel version, the reason for which application of the principle of Section 106 of the Evidence Act was rejected by the Supreme Court in the cases of Vikramjit Singh (supra), Murlidhar (supra). The extra- judicial confession of the appellant was in any event a post-occurrence incident, but prosecution’s case on that count was rejected as the Trial Court found such confession was not admissible as there was evidence that it was made before a police officer. But by relying on confession, the prosecution did not attempt to make out a new or independent version. It was meant to be supporting the version of prosecution on which the appellant was convicted by the Trial Court. The prosecution case constructed on circumstantial evidence does not fail because the prosecution’s case of confession was rejected. 15. We do not otherwise find any flaw in the reasoning of the Trial court in convicting the appellant in the offences with which the appellant was charged in this case. Mr. Bakshi has also submitted that proper investigation was not done, as inquest was made only at the location from where the lifeless body of the victim was discovered and not at the residential house of the appellant. But this shortcoming in investigation does not dilute the quality of evidence otherwise adduced by the prosecution. On the basis of medical evidence, the victim’s death was found to be homicidal and ante-mortem and the circumstances prove beyond reasonable doubt the appellant’s complicity in the offences he was charged with. He also failed to explain how the body was concealed in a tied jute sack and dropped in an abandoned well. This was obviously done to cause evidence of commission of the offence of murder disappear with the intention of screening the offender, being himself in this case, from legal punishment. 16. He also failed to explain how the body was concealed in a tied jute sack and dropped in an abandoned well. This was obviously done to cause evidence of commission of the offence of murder disappear with the intention of screening the offender, being himself in this case, from legal punishment. 16. We accordingly confirm his conviction both under Section 302 and Section 201 of the Indian Penal Code. 17. The appeal is dismissed. 18. Let the lower Court records with a copy of this judgment be sent down to the learned Court below immediately by the department.