JUDGMENT : 1. This petition has been filed by the petitioners challenging the proceedings in C.C.No.174 of 2016 on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate No.I, Tiruppur and to quash the same and also seeking a direction to dispense with the personal appearance of the second petitioner/second accused herein. 2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners as well as the learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the first respondent and the learned counsel for the second respondent. 3. The petitioners herein are the son and the father. The second respondent/defacto complainant has lodged a complaint against the petitioners which culminated into filing of charges under Sections 43, 65, 67 of Information Technology Act r/w Sections 500 & 509 of IPC, insofar as the first accused/first petitioner is concerned and for the offence under Section 506(i) of IPC insofar as the second accused/second petitioner is concerned. 4. The case of the prosecution is that the second respondent is running a business in the name of 'Phoenix Apparels'. The first petitioner had offered to become a partner in the said Phoenix Apparels, owing to which, there arose a dispute between the first petitioner and the second respondent herein. Pursuant to the dispute, the first petitioner herein had posted a message on the Internet which reads as follows: “Hi Everybody. Phoenix Apparels, Tiruppur, India is a fraud company. please do not trust those people they will get money from buyers and they will not deliver goods. Here is the website of the company. Proprietor of the company is Priya she is a, No-1 culprit will cheat every body this is not a spam people try to understand the seriousness and act fast. All the sister concerns mentioned in their website are of their relatives they don't own any factory. They will never deliver goods on time people please be careful it's a kind advice.” Pursuant to the aforesaid message, it is alleged that the petitioners had spoken ill of the second respondent and had also caused threat to her over phone. Hence, charges have been framed against the petitioners. 5. Mr.S.Sathya Narayanan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that the offences under Sections 509 & 506(i) of IPC has not been made out as against the petitioners respectively. Hence, charges have been framed against the petitioners. 5. Mr.S.Sathya Narayanan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that the offences under Sections 509 & 506(i) of IPC has not been made out as against the petitioners respectively. According to him, the offence under Section 509 IPC has been falsely registered against the first petitioner, only for the purpose of making out a cognizable offence. As such, on a plain reading of the complaint given, at the most, the first petitioner can be tried for offence of defamation, for which purpose, the learned counsel also relied upon Section 199 of Cr.P.C. and submitted that only a private complaint may lie against the first petitioner for defamation. 6. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor, on the other hand, relying upon the submission made by the witnesses, submitted that both the offences under Section 509 & 506(i) of IPC have been made out against the petitioners herein respectively and therefore, no prior order of the learned Magistrate was required, since Section 509 of IPC is a cognizable offence. According to the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, pursuant to the posting of the statement in the website, there was an exchange of words between the first petitioner and the defacto complainant, during which point of time, the words and threats were made by the second petitioner, thereby attracting Section 506(i) of IPC and since the posting of the message in the website amounts to insulting the modesty of a woman, Section 509 of IPC has been made out as against the first petitioner. 7. I have given careful consideration to the submissions made by the respective counsels. 8. While the first accused has been charged for offences under Sections 43, 65 & 67 of the Information and Technology Act, 2000 r/w. Sections 500 and 509 IPC, the second accused has been charged for offence under Section 506(i) IPC alone. Among the aforesaid offences, Section 509 IPC alone is a cognizable offence. According to the second respondent, the first petitioner is alleged to have posted the defamatory allegation against her in a website. In connection with this, the second respondent claims that the second petitioner had criminally intimidated her over phone. Apart from the complaint and her statement under Section 161(3) Cr.P.C., there is no other evidence as against the second petitioner to implicate him for an offence under Section 506(i) IPC. In connection with this, the second respondent claims that the second petitioner had criminally intimidated her over phone. Apart from the complaint and her statement under Section 161(3) Cr.P.C., there is no other evidence as against the second petitioner to implicate him for an offence under Section 506(i) IPC. The witnesses examined by the respondent police are the husband, brother and employees of the complainant. All of them have stated that they only heard the complainant telling them that the second petitioner had intimidated her over phone. On an overall reading of the statements as well as the complaint, it is seen that the grievance of the second respondent seems to be against the posting of the defamatory article in the website. It is the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the offence under Section 509 IPC has been levelled against the first petitioner in order to bring the same under the jurisdiction of the first respondent police since in the absence of Section 509 IPC, there is a bar under Section 155(2) Cr.P.C., for the police to investigate into the complaint. 9. The first respondent police had relied upon certain telephonic call list in order to establish that the call for, was made by the second petitioner to the second respondent wherein alleged intimidation occurred. In the complaint made by the second respondent, the conversion amounting to criminal intimidation between the second petitioner and the second respondent has been referred to but there was no date or time mentioned therein. In her 161(3) Cr.P.C. statement, the second respondent claims that this conversion took place on 20.04.2012 when she contacted the second petitioner. The Caller-ID list relied upon by the police does not show of any such call made on 20.04.2012. In the absence of the date of the alleged intimidation in the complaint of the second respondent/defacto complainant as well as in the Caller ID list, I am unable to comprehend as to how the first respondent police had charged the second petitioner under Section 506(i) IPC. Hence, it can only be concluded that no offence has been made out as against the second petitioner. 10. Insofar as the first petitioner is concerned, he has been charged for the offences under Sections 43, 65 & 67 of the Information Technology Act r/w. Sections 500 and 509 of IPC. Hence, it can only be concluded that no offence has been made out as against the second petitioner. 10. Insofar as the first petitioner is concerned, he has been charged for the offences under Sections 43, 65 & 67 of the Information Technology Act r/w. Sections 500 and 509 of IPC. Among these sections, Section 509 IPC alone is a cognizable offence. 11. Section 509 IPC which pertains to acts intended to insult the modesty of a woman reads as follows: “509. Word, gesture or act intended to insult the modesty of a woman: Whoever, intending to insult the modesty of any woman, utters any word, makes any sound or gesture, or exhibits any object, intending that such word or sound shall be heard, or that such gesture or object shall be seen, by such woman, or intrudes upon the privacy of such woman, [shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, and also with fine - substituted by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013, S.10, for “shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both.”]”. 12. The insult to the modesty of a woman is an essential feature of Section 509 IPC. The only other offence which refers to the modesty of a woman is Section 354 IPC. The provisions of the Indian Penal Code does not define the word 'modesty', though Sections 354 and 509 IPC refers to the word 'modesty'. The two offences were created not only in the interest of the woman concerned but in the interest of the public morality as well. 13. The definition of modesty in the Oxford English Dictionary is referred to as “Womanly propriety of behaviour”. The 1933 Edition of Oxford English Dictionary defines 'modesty' as “Womanly propriety behaviour, scrupulous chastity of thought, speech and conduct (in man or woman)”. 14. In P.Ramanatha Aiyar's Advanced Law Lexicon, it is observed that “the essence of a woman's modesty is her sex. The culpable intention of the accused is the crux of the matter. The reaction of the woman is very relevant, but its absence is not always decisive. Modesty is an attribute associated with female human beings as a class. It is a virtue which attaches to a female owing to her sex.” 15. The culpable intention of the accused is the crux of the matter. The reaction of the woman is very relevant, but its absence is not always decisive. Modesty is an attribute associated with female human beings as a class. It is a virtue which attaches to a female owing to her sex.” 15. The word 'Modesty', as found in Section 509 IPC, is for the protection of an attribute which is peculiar to woman, as a virtue which attaches to a female on account of her sex. Acts which are outrageous to morality would be outrageous to be the modesty of a woman. Words, sounds or gesticulations done with an intention to insult the modesty or intrusion into her privacy or chastity are such acts which would be the essential ingredients to constitute an offence under Section 509 IPC. A mere insult may not attract Section 509 IPC for prosecution but there must be a definite allegation that the act had caused insult to the modesty of a woman. Slapping the posterior of a woman in a public place, winking his eye at a woman, using obscene terms against a woman in a public place, sending obscene messages and pictures over a mobile phone, threatening her in front of others, etc., can be held as instances of insulting the modesty of a woman. The above illustrations are not exhaustive but only indicative. 16. In the present case in hand, the cause of action arose from the message posted in the Internet by the first petitioner. The message was clear and explicit to defame the defacto complainant and her company, to the effect that, at the most, such posting may amount to defaming the defacto complainant or her company. None of the words or phrases in the said message amounts to insulting the modesty of a woman, in the light of my observations made above. As such, the offence of Section 509 IPC cannot be made out as against the first petitioner. 17. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioners that insofar as the offences under Sections 43, 65 & 67 of the Information Technology Act is concerned, the same has also not been made out since there is absolutely not a single allegation in the complaint to make out these allegations. 18. 17. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioners that insofar as the offences under Sections 43, 65 & 67 of the Information Technology Act is concerned, the same has also not been made out since there is absolutely not a single allegation in the complaint to make out these allegations. 18. Section 155(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure prohibits a police officer from investing into a non cognizable offence without a prior order of a Magistrate. As stated above, apart from Section 509 IPC, all other offences charged as against the petitioners are non cognizable offences. Therefore, by including Section 509 IPC, which is a cognizable offence, the Investigating Officer has been empowered to investigate into the offences in view of the enabling power under Section 155 (4) Cr.P.C., to investigate into a cognizable offence, without the prior order of the Magistrate. This raises a doubt as to whether Section 509 IPC has been purposefully included among other offences to enable the Investigating Officer to proceed with the complaint without obtaining a prior order of a Magistrate. As discussed earlier, the averment made in the complaint, the various statements of the witnesses under Section 161 Cr.P.C., as well as the charge sheet laid does not make out a case for an offence under Section 509 IPC. Therefore, in my view Section 509 IPC has been included only for the purpose of enabling the Investigating Officer to proceed against the first petitioner. 19. There is yet again one more feature by which the entire charge sheet can be rendered as illegal. Section 199 Cr.P.C., prohibits the Court from taking cognizance of an offence under Section 500 IPC except on the complaint made by the person aggrieved by the offence. In other words, the complaint of defamation cannot be directly made to a police officer but only through a private complaint under Section 200 Cr.P.C. In view of this bar and having found that no cognizable offence has been made out against the first petitioner in the compliant or in the charge sheet, it was improper on the part of the Investigation Officer to proceed against the first petitioner for an offence under Section 500 IPC, among other offences. 20. 20. To sum up, the entire investigation seems to have been done for the only offence which has been made out namely, Section 500 IPC and the offence under Section 509 of IPC was unwarranted, since the same has not been made out. Since the law requires a private complaint to be made for the offence under Section 500 IPC, the present charge sheet, as against the first petitioner, is liable to be struck down. 21. In the result, the Criminal Original Petition stands allowed. Consequently, the proceedings in C.C.No.174 of 2016 on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate No.I, Tiruppur is quashed. Connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed.