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2017 DIGILAW 381 (ALL)

KRISHNA NARAYAN KUSHWAHA v. STATE OF U. P.

2017-01-31

NAHEED ARA MOONIS

body2017
Naheed Ara Moonis, J. 1. Heard the learned counsel for the revisionist, the learned A.G.A. for the State and perused the record. 2. The instant revision has been preferred against the judgment and order dated 25.10.2016 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Jalaun at Orai whereby the complaint filed by the revisionist as Complaint Case No. 1463 of 2012, under Sections 499 and 500 I.P.C., police station Kotwali Orai, district Jalaun has been rejected under Section 203 Cr.P.C. 3. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the revisionist that a complaint was filed by the revisionist against the then Chief Judicial Magistrate hereinafter referred to as the Presiding Officer that the latter has dictated a letter in an open court to the District Magistrate and a copy of which was forwarded to the Forest Department on 4.9.2012 which has lowered the reputation of the complainant who is practising Advocate of District Jalaun and also representing the cases of Forest Department. Hence the then Chief Judicial Magistrate, the Presiding Officer, is guilty of offence punishable under Sections 499 and 500 I.P.C. It is further submitted that for the prosecution of a government servant the complainant had followed the procedure for taking permission from the Hon'ble Chief Justice who was pleased to direct the District Judge, Jalaun at Orai to pass appropriate order and thereafter after holding an enquiry sanction was obtained for prosecuting the then Chief Judicial Magistrate. The statement of the applicant was recorded under Section 200 Cr.P.C. while Narain Das and Jairam were examined in support of the complaint under Section 202 Cr.P.C. The complaint has been dismissed in a collusive manner under the pressure of his colleague when from the contents of the complaint prima facie a case under Section 500 I.P.C. is made out as the ingredient of Section 499 I.P.C. pertaining to the definition of deformation clearly makes out a case against the then Chief Judicial Magistrate for punishable under Section 500 I.P.C. and as the complaint has wrongly been rejected intentionally without applying judicious mind, which is illegal and is liable to be set aside. 4. 4. The learned A.G.A. has opposed vehemently and has contended that the basis of the complaint filed by the revisionist is a letter dated 4.9.2012, which has been addressed to the District Magistrate as well as to the Forest Department as the revisionist was representing as a standing counsel for the Forest Department before the court concerned only with regard to the work, conduct and legal knowledge of the complainant. The said letter cannot be termed that it was dictated in open court to malign the image or to undermine the reputation of the revisionist. 5. The Judicial Magistrate has also committed no error in rejecting the complaint filed by the revisionist by the order impugned holding that the letter was never addressed to the public and there was no intention to harm his reputation in the eye of public at large rather it was given to the District Magistrate and the Forest Department to apprise them about the work and conduct of the revisionist, which comes within the ambit of the exception clauses to the defamation defined under Section 499 I.P.C. 6. I have considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the applicant and as well as have perused the record, the letter dated 4.9.2012, which forms the basis of the complaint contains substantially correct facts and the person in authority in good faith has communicated to the District Magistrate and the Forest Department, which comes within the purview of exception to Section 499 I.P.C. and according to which it is no defamation to express in any good faith any opinion respecting the merits of any case or conduct of any person. "Third Exception of Section 499 I.P.C. reads as follows; Conduct of any person touching any public question. It is not defamation to express in good faith any opinion whatever respecting the conduct of any person touching any public question, and respecting his character, so far as his character appears in that conduct, and no further." "Eight Exception of Section 499 I.P.C. reads as follows; "Accusation preferred in good faith to authorized person. It is not defamation in good faith an accusation against any person to any of those who have lawful authority over that person with respect to the subject matter of accusation." 7. From the above conspectus Law, it may be noted, is not meant for the protection of the hyper sensitive. It is not defamation in good faith an accusation against any person to any of those who have lawful authority over that person with respect to the subject matter of accusation." 7. From the above conspectus Law, it may be noted, is not meant for the protection of the hyper sensitive. In this context Section 95 I.P.C. describes acts, which cause only slight harm and enunciates the principle of "de minimis non curat lex" may be alluded to. Section 95 I.P.C. may be usefully extracted here; "Act causing slight harm-Nothing is an offence by reason that it causes, or that it is intended to cause, or that it is known to be likely to cause, any harm, if that harm is so slight that no person or ordinary sense and temper would complaint of such harm." 8. In this view of the matter, in my view permitting prosecution of the then Presiding Officer to continue in the present case would amount to be an abuse of the process of court. It appears that a mountain appears to have been made of a mole hill and averments, which would not to be significantly damaging or defamatory and which could only cause slight harm, if at all and which may have been substantially true for the reasons picked up for the purpose of launching this malicious prosecution. 9. In this view of the matter, there is no error, which cannot be termed as defamatory to bring down the image of the applicant. Hence, this court is not inclined to interfere with the order passed by the court below. 10. Accordingly the revision lacks any merit and is dismissed in limine.