JUDGMENT : Rajiv Sharma, J. This appeal is instituted against the judgment dated 08.02.2017, rendered by learned Sessions Judge, Haridwar in Sessions Trial No. 112 of 2011, whereby the respondent nos.1 to 3-accused, who were charged with and tried for the offences under Section 304-B of IPC, were acquitted. 2. The case of the prosecution, in a nutshell, is that PW1 Harendra Singh, S/o Shri Udai Singh lodged an FIR on 23.01.2011 to the effect that his daughter Priyanka Pal’s marriage was solemnized on 10.12.2009 with accused Sandeep. He has given the dowry according to his capacity. However, after few days, her husband Sandeep, father-in-law Bhundiya Singh and mother-in-law Smt. Harpali Devi started harassing his daughter for bringing insufficient dowry. After one month, his daughter and son-in-law came to his house. They stayed there for two days. His son-in-law demanded Rs.10.00 lacs for the construction of house within 10-15 days. He has shown his inability to pay the money. His daughter insisted him to pay Rs.10.00 lacs otherwise, they would kill her. He persuaded his daughter to go back. He and his relations were informed by his daughter about the demand of dowry. Thereafter, a number of times Priyanka has informed him that her husband, mother-in-law and father-in-law were harassing her and she was treated with cruelty by her in-laws and forcing her to commit suicide. He received a telephonic call from his daughter on 23.01.2011 at 9:30 AM insisting him to come to Haridwar otherwise they would kill her. Thereafter, the phone got disconnected. He reached the house of in-laws of his daughter at Shivalik Nagar. The dead body of his daughter was lying in the car bearing No. UP15 AM-7568. The body was taken to hospital. According to him, his daughter died due to poisoning and her husband, mother-in-law and father-in-law were responsible for the same. Thereafter, the body was sent for postmortem examination. The postmortem examination was carried out by PW5 Dr. Ashok Kumar. 3. The investigation was carried out and the challan was put up after completing all the codal formalities. The prosecution has examined as many as eleven witnesses in support of its case. The statements of the accused were also recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. They have denied the case of the prosecution. The accused have examined as many as four witnesses DW1 K.K. Aggarwal, DW2 Mamta Tyagi, DW3 Dr. The prosecution has examined as many as eleven witnesses in support of its case. The statements of the accused were also recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. They have denied the case of the prosecution. The accused have examined as many as four witnesses DW1 K.K. Aggarwal, DW2 Mamta Tyagi, DW3 Dr. Rajeev Kumar Sharma, DW4 Dr. Neera Chandra. The accused vide judgment dated 08.02.2017 were acquitted. Hence, this appeal. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant/complainant has vehemently argued that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. Learned counsel on behalf of the respondents has supported the judgment dated 08.02.2017. 5. We have heard learned counsel for both the parties and perused the judgment carefully. 6. PW1 Harendra Singh is the father of deceased. According to him, his daughter was married to Sandeep Kumar Pal on 10.12.2009.. He has agreed to give Alto car but they were insisting for Santro car. He accordingly gave Santro car. He spent Rs.15.00 lacs in the marriage. He has also borne the expenditure of his daughter towards her B.Ed. education. His daughter also visited his house. She told him that she was harassed for bringing insufficient dowry. He had a conversation with the in-laws of his daughter. He also received a telephonic call after 3-4 months and his daughter again told him that her in-laws were demanding Rs.10.00 lacs. He also informed PW3 Mahaveer Singh. The accused were residing in one house. One month back his son-in-law has come to his house. He has demanded Rs.10.00 lacs and told that he would return the same. He also pledged his wife’s jewllery with Goyal Jeweller and arranged Rs.1.00 lac and the same was paid to Sandeep. He received a telephonic call from his daughter on 23.1.2011 at 9:30 AM asking him to come immediately otherwise her in-laws would kill her. Thereafter, he asked his younger daughter to talk to Priyanka on landline. The phone was picked up by sister-in-law of Priyanka and she told her that Priyanka was unwell. His daughter told the sister-in-law of Priyanka to take her to the hospital. He also reached his house and went towards the in-laws house of his daughter and en-route he also informed the police. His daughter was repeatedly saying that “Papa you come, Papa you come”. His daughter told the sister-in-law of Priyanka to take her to the hospital. He also reached his house and went towards the in-laws house of his daughter and en-route he also informed the police. His daughter was repeatedly saying that “Papa you come, Papa you come”. He has denied the suggestion in his cross-examination that the car was with him and he used the same, though, admitted that he got the car released in his name. He has denied the suggestion that his daughter has committed suicide. He has categorically deposed in his examination-in-chief that the dead body was lying in Santro car. Thereafter, body was taken into possession. He signed the recovery memo. The wiper used in cleaning the vomit of Priyanka was taken into possession in his presence. 7. PW2 Sandeep Kumar has corroborated the statement of PW1 Harendra Singh. In his examination-in-chief, he has deposed that the marriage of his sister was solemnized on 10.12.2009. There was no demand of dowry at the time of marriage. However, when his sister came back to her parental house, she told that her in-laws were demanding dowry. Four months back, his brother-in-law has come to their house and demanded Rs.10.00 lacs. He arranged Rs.1.00 lac. On 23.01.2011, his sister rang up his father and asked him to come to Haridwar failing which they would kill her. The phone got disconnected. He has admitted in his cross-examination that except report dated 23.01.2011, no report was ever filed against the accused. He also deposed that the body was lying in Santro car when he reached the house of in-laws of his sister. 8. PW3 Sohanveer Singh has deposed that PW1 Harendra Singh (brother-in-law) told him that in-laws of his daughter were harassing her for bringing insufficient dowry. They were demanding Rs.10.00 lacs for the construction of house. PW1 Harendra Singh has pledged his wife’s jewellery with the Jeweller and arranged Rs.1.00 lac. He informed him on 23.01.2011 that some mishap has happened. They reached Haridwar. Accused Sandeep and his parents were not present in the house. It was apparent that poisonous substance was given to Priyanka. The body was bluish in colour. He has also seen the dead body lying on the rear seat of Santro car. 9. PW4 Monika Pal has deposed that Priyanka used to tell her that her in-laws were demanding dowry. Accused Sandeep and his parents were not present in the house. It was apparent that poisonous substance was given to Priyanka. The body was bluish in colour. He has also seen the dead body lying on the rear seat of Santro car. 9. PW4 Monika Pal has deposed that Priyanka used to tell her that her in-laws were demanding dowry. She received a telephonic call of her father on 23.01.2011 asking her to talk to Priyanka on landline. She rang up her sister at 10:00 PM. The phone was picked up by Sandeep’s sister Meenakshi. She asked her to talk to her sister. She told her that she was unwell. She (PW4 Monika Pal) asked Meenakshi to take Priyanka to hospital. Thereafter, the phone got disconnected. 10. PW5 Dr. Ashok Kumar has conducted the postmortem examination. He has categorically deposed that the internal organs were congested. The viscera was preserved. According to him, the internal organs could be congested due to poisoning. In his cross-examination, he has deposed that organs could congest due to poison and due to tuberculosis. 11. PW6 Smt. Imlesh has deposed that marriage of Priyanka with Sandeep was solemnized on 10.12.2009. The mother of Priyanka died seven year back. At the time of marriage, there was no conversation with regard to dowry. However, after 2-3 months of the marriage, Priyanka told that her husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law were harassing her for bringing insufficient dowry. In her cross-examination, she has denied the suggestion the Priyanka was under treatment of tuberculosis from Smt. Anguri Devi Nursing and Maternity Home, Meerut Road, Bhawana. She has also denied the suggestion that Priyanka was under treatment at Leelawati Hospital by Dr. Mamta Tyagi. She had no knowledge that Priyanka was under treatment of Dr. K.K. Aggarwal. She has denied the suggestion that Priyanka has died due to some disease. She deposed that when they reached at Haridwar at 3:00 PM, they saw that the dead body of Priyanka was lying in the car parked in front of in-laws house of Priyanka. 12. PW7 Constable Sanjay Kotiyal has deposed that he was posted as Constable Clerk on 23.01.2011 at P.S. Ranipur. He registered the FIR vide exhibit A-3. He also proved G.D. 13. PW8 Puran Singh Rana has deposed that he was a Tehsildar, Haridwar on 23.01.2011. He prepared the inquest report. The body was sealed. 12. PW7 Constable Sanjay Kotiyal has deposed that he was posted as Constable Clerk on 23.01.2011 at P.S. Ranipur. He registered the FIR vide exhibit A-3. He also proved G.D. 13. PW8 Puran Singh Rana has deposed that he was a Tehsildar, Haridwar on 23.01.2011. He prepared the inquest report. The body was sealed. According to opinion of Panchas, the death occurred due to poisoning. He has also deposed that the dead body of Priyanka was lying on the rear seat of Santro car bearing registration No. UP-15 AM-7568. 14. PW9 Vijay Kundliya has deposed that he was posted as SHO, P.S. Ranipur. The FIR was registered. He reached Shivalik Nagar. He noticed that the vomiting of Priyanka was washed with wiper. The same was taken into possession by him and recovery memo was signed by Harendra and Meenakshi. He arrested the accused. 15. PW10 Sunil Kumar Meena has initiated the investigation of the case. He recorded the statement of PW1 Harendra Singh Pal. In his cross-examination, he has deposed that during the course of investigation, it transpired that the accused-Sandeep has taken the deceased in different hospitals for treatment. He has deposed that the wiper was taken into possession by which the vomit of Priyanka-deceased was washed. He has also taken into possession the Santro car. 16. PW11 Pankaj Bhatt has deposed that he went to the hospital and recorded the statement of Dr. A.K. Paliwal. 17. DW1 Dr. K.K. Aggarwal has deposed that after his retirement, he started private practice at Ranipur since 1990. Priyanka has visited his clinic on 01.12.2010, complaining of dry cough. He advised her to undertake blood test. According to her blood test report, she was suffering from Eosinophil. She was under treatment w.e.f. 01.12.2010 to 19.12.2010. In his cross-examination, he has categorically admitted that Eosinophil is caused due to change in weather. Eosinophil may lead to bad cold, cough and breathlessness. Priyanka has never visited him except only once as per the record maintained by him. The disease for which he has treated Priyanka was very common. 18. DW2 Dr. Mamta Tyagi has deposed that she was working as Obstetrics and Gynecologist since 2009 at Leelawati Hospital. One lady Priyanka age 24 years has come to her for treatment. She was complaining of stomach ache and discharge of white fluid. According to her, she was old tuberculosis patient. 18. DW2 Dr. Mamta Tyagi has deposed that she was working as Obstetrics and Gynecologist since 2009 at Leelawati Hospital. One lady Priyanka age 24 years has come to her for treatment. She was complaining of stomach ache and discharge of white fluid. According to her, she was old tuberculosis patient. She remained under treatment with her w.e.f. 11.05.2010 to 14.05.2010. In her cross-examination, she has admitted that she has asked the patient to come back on 15.05.2010 at 12:00 PM but she did not come back. She has also admitted that the disease which was treated by her, the patient recovers within 4-5 days. She has further deposed that on her asking the patient, the patient told her that she was suffering from tuberculosis and she has already taken nine months treatment for the same. She has specifically said that she has not treated Priyanka for tuberculosis. She has admitted that her treatment of Priyanka was not for tuberculosis. She has also admitted that tuberculosis is cured after taking 6-9 months treatment. 19. DW3 Dr. Rajiv Kumar Sharma, Head of Education Department, has deposed that he was working as Lecturer in R.N. College, Hasthinapur since 2004. He has brought the record of academic session 2008-09. It starts from June, 2009 to April, 2010. In his cross-examination, he has admitted that Priyanka was regular till December, 2009 and thereafter her attendance graph immediately came down. 20. DW4 Dr. Neera Chandra has deposed that she was practicing since 1987. One patient came to her on 02.06.2007. She treated her. She has told her previously about tuberculosis. Thereafter, patient had come to her on 02.12.2009 and she told that her marriage was to be solemnized on 10.12.2009 and thus, wanted her menstrual period to be postponed. She gave her some medicine. Thereafter, patient came to her on 31.08.2010 for treatment and told her that she was the patient of tuberculosis. She has proved prescription slips B5, B6 and B7. She has told the patient to undergo blood test and x-ray examination on 02.06.2007, however, the patient has not brought her blood test report or x-ray report. In her cross-examination, she has admitted that she was Gynecologist and Priyanka came to her on 02.06.2007 and she was complaining only about weakness. Priyanka has told her medical history that she was suffering from tuberculosis ten years ago. In her cross-examination, she has admitted that she was Gynecologist and Priyanka came to her on 02.06.2007 and she was complaining only about weakness. Priyanka has told her medical history that she was suffering from tuberculosis ten years ago. However, she has never told of any signs of tuberculosis thereafter. She has also admitted that once a patient is completely treated ten years back for tuberculosis, there is no possibility of re-occurrence of tuberculosis. She has only prescribed her dosage of iron. On 02.12.2009, Priyanka had come to her only for postponement of her menstrual cycle. She has also admitted that even after 02.12.2009, patient has never complained of tuberculosis. She has complained of only stomachache. She has also admitted that Priyanka has visited her clinic on 02.06.2007 and 31.08.2010 but never told her about tuberculosis. She has also not diagnosed the disease during her treatment. 21. PW1 Harendra Singh, PW2 Sandeep Kumar, PW3 Sohan Singh, PW4 Monika Pal have categorically deposed that the accused were demanding dowry from Priyanka. PW1 Harendra Singh has deposed that at the time of marriage, there was no demand of dowry but he had arranged for Alto car but the in-laws were insisting for Santro car. He gave Santro car. According to him, as and when his daughter used to come to his house, she told him about the dowry demand raised by her in-laws. His son-in-law came to his house with his daughter. His son-in-law asked for Rs.10.00 lacs. He arranged Rs.1.00 lac by pledging his wife’s jewellery. On 23.01.2011, his daughter told him on phone to come Haridwar immediately otherwise they would kill her. The phone got disconnected. He asked his younger daughter to call Priyanka on landline. The phone was picked-up by the sister-in-law of Priyanka. She told PW4 Monika Pal that Priyanka was not well. PW4 Monika Pal asked her to take Priyanka to hospital. PW2 Sandeep Kumar has corroborated the statement of PW1 Harendra Singh. PW3 Sohan Singh also deposed that his brother-in-law (PW1 Harendra Singh) told him that his daughter’s in-laws were demanding dowry for construction of house. He received a telephonic call of PW1 Harendra on 23.01.2011, informing him that the incident has taken place with Priyanka. He went to Priyanka’s house. According to him, it was a case of poisoning. The body has turned blue. He received a telephonic call of PW1 Harendra on 23.01.2011, informing him that the incident has taken place with Priyanka. He went to Priyanka’s house. According to him, it was a case of poisoning. The body has turned blue. PW4 Monika Pal has deposed that her father asked her to talk to Priyanka on landline. The phone was picked up by sister-in-law of Priyanka. She told her that Priyanka was not well. PW4 Monika Pal asked her to take Priyanka to hospital. 22. The postmortem was conducted by PW5 Dr. Ashok Kumar Paliwal with Dr. Himanshu Singh. In his examination-in-chief, he has deposed that the internal organs were congested. The death of Priyanka has occurred between 9:30 PM to 3:00 AM on 23.01.2011. In his cross-examination, as discussed hereinabove, he has deposed that food poisoning and tuberculosis could lead the congestion in organs. 23. PW6 Imlesh has deposed that though, at the time of solemnizing of marriage, there was no discussion of dowry. However, after 2-3 months, the accused and his family members started demanding dowry from Priyanka. 24. According to PW8 Sanjay Kotiyal, the panchas opined that it was the case of poisoning. PW5 Dr. Ashok Kumar Paliwal has conducted the postmortem examination. He has sent the viscera for chemical examination. According to FSL report, no poison was detected. The cause of death was uncertain. According to FIR, the cause of death was poisoning. 25. Learned counsel on behalf of the respondents – accused has vehemently argued that it was a natural death due to tuberculosis. He has placed strong reliance on the statements of DW1 K.K. Aggarwal, DW2 Mamta Tyagi, DW3 Dr. Rajeev Kumar Sharma and DW4 Dr. Neera Chandra. 26. DW1 Dr. K.K. Aggarwal has not stated anything in his statement that Priyanka was suffering from tuberculosis. According to him, she remained under treatment with him w.e.f. 01.12.2010 to 19.12.2010 for eosinophil. In his cross-examination, he has admitted that he had no other records of patient except this prescription exhibit Kha-1. 27. The statement of DW2 Dr. Mamta Tyagi is very important. She has deposed that Priyanka visited her clinic on 11.05.2010. She was complaining only of stomachache and discharge of white fluid. She remained under treatment with her w.e.f. 11.05.2010 to 14.05.2010. She has asked the patient to visit on 15.05.2010 at 12:00 PM. The patient never came. 27. The statement of DW2 Dr. Mamta Tyagi is very important. She has deposed that Priyanka visited her clinic on 11.05.2010. She was complaining only of stomachache and discharge of white fluid. She remained under treatment with her w.e.f. 11.05.2010 to 14.05.2010. She has asked the patient to visit on 15.05.2010 at 12:00 PM. The patient never came. She has also admitted specifically that Priyanka has never told her about tuberculosis. She has also admitted that the treatment given to Priyanka was not related to tuberculosis. She has also admitted that tuberculosis gets cured after taking 6-9 months treatment. 28. Thus, it is evident from the statements of DW1 Dr. K.K. Aggarwal and DW2 Dr. Mamta Tyagi that deceased was not suffering from tuberculosis. 29. Learned counsel for the respondents-accused has placed strong reliance on the statement of DW4 Neera Chandra, R/o Smt. Anguri Devi Nursing and Maternity Home, Meerut. According to her, the patient has visited her on 02.06.2007 for treatment. Priyanka told her about tuberculosis. Thereafter, the patient visited her on 02.12.2009. She told her that her marriage was to be solemnized on 10.12.2009. She wanted to postpone her menstrual cycle. She gave her medicine. Thereafter, the patient came to her on 31.08.2010. She has proved the prescription slips dated 02.06.2007, 02.12.2009 and 31.08.2010 vide exhibit Kha, Kha and Kha. She has also admitted in her cross-examination that on 02.06.2007, Priyanka was complaining only of weakness. Priyanka never told her about tuberculosis. She has also admitted once the treatment was taken ten years back for tuberculosis, there was no question of re-occurrence of disease. She has further admitted in her cross-examination that Priyanka had come to her 02.12.2009 for the postponement of her menstrual cycle. She has also deposed that Priyanka has never told her about the symptoms of tuberculosis after 02.12.2009. She has also admitted that Priyanka never told her about the tuberculosis w.e.f 02.06.2007 till 31.08.2010. 30. It is thus, evident from the statements of DW1 Dr. K.K. Aggarwal, DW2 Dr. Mamta Tyagi and DW4 Dr. Neera Chandra that Priyanka was not suffering from tuberculosis. She was never treated by them for tuberculosis. DW1 Dr. K.K. Aggarwal has treated Priyanka for common ailment. DW2 Dr. Mamta Tyagi has admitted that the treatment given to Priyanka has nothing to do with tuberculosis. 31. DW4 Dr. K.K. Aggarwal, DW2 Dr. Mamta Tyagi and DW4 Dr. Neera Chandra that Priyanka was not suffering from tuberculosis. She was never treated by them for tuberculosis. DW1 Dr. K.K. Aggarwal has treated Priyanka for common ailment. DW2 Dr. Mamta Tyagi has admitted that the treatment given to Priyanka has nothing to do with tuberculosis. 31. DW4 Dr. Neera Chandra has deposed in her examination-in-chief that Priyanka has come to her on 02.06.2007. Thereafter, she has visited her on 02.12.2009 and told her that her marriage was to be solemnized on 10.12.2009 and she wanted postponement of her menstrual cycle. She has given her medicine. Thereafter, she came to her on 31.08.2010. She was narrating about the history of tuberculosis. She has advised her blood test and x-ray test of breast, however, the patient has never come back with blood test report and x-ray report. In her cross-examination, she has categorically admitted that Priyanka came to her on 02.06.2007. Priyanka has only told her about weakness. Priyanka has told her that she had tuberculosis ten years back but she has categorically admitted that Priyanka has never told her about the fact that she had tuberculosis ten years back till she met her. She has also admitted that once tuberculosis was cured ten years back, it could not re-occur. She has also admitted that Priyanka had visited her on 02.12.2009 only for postponement of her menstrual cycle and even after 2 ½ years, she has never told her about symptoms of tuberculosis. She has never asked for any test of tuberculosis when she visited her on 31.08.2010 nor she has even told her about the symptoms of tuberculosis. She has given her medicine for stomachache. She has also admitted that the deceased has visited her w.e.f. 02.06.2007 to 31.08.2010 for about three years but has never told her about tuberculosis nor she has found any symptoms of the same. 32. The deceased was never taken to any hospital, but according to Investigating Officer, she was taken to various hospitals, though, there is no record. 33. A specific question was put to the accused under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. how the dead body of Priyanka was recovered from the car parked in front of their house. However, a simpliciter denial was made. 34. There is ample evidence on record that the accused were demanding dowry from the deceased. 33. A specific question was put to the accused under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. how the dead body of Priyanka was recovered from the car parked in front of their house. However, a simpliciter denial was made. 34. There is ample evidence on record that the accused were demanding dowry from the deceased. The parents of the deceased were not in a position to meet the illegal demand of dowry. It has come in the FIR that it was the case of poisoning. PW3 Sohan Singh has noticed that body has turned blue. PW5 Dr. Ashok Kumar has admitted that on the opening of body, internal organs were congested, which could be due to poisoning. Merely the fact that poison was not found on the Viscera vide exhibit 55 Ka/4, it cannot be said that deceased was not administered poisoning. 35. According to Modi’s Medical Jurisprudence & Toxicology, 22nd Edition, Page No. 22 of Chapter I “Poisons and Their Medico-Legal Aspects”, it is stated as under: - “It is possible that a person may die from the effects of a poison, and yet, none may be found in the body after death if the whole of the poison has disappeared from the lungs by evaporation, or has been removed from the stomach and intestines by vomiting and purging, and after absorption has been detoxified, conjugated and eliminated from the system by the kidneys and other channels. Certain vegetable poisons may not be detected in the viscera, as they have no reliable tests, while some organic poisons, especially the alkaloids and glucosides, may, by oxidation during life or by putrefaction after death, be split up into other substances which have no characteristic reactions sufficient for their identification. Modi saw cases in which there were definite signs of death from poisoning, although the Chemical Examiner failed to detect the poison in the viscera preserved for chemical analysis. It has, therefore, been wisely held by Christison that in cases where a poison has not been detected on chemical analysis, the judge, in deciding a charge of poisoning, should weigh in evidence the symptoms, postmortem appearances and the moral evidence.” 36. It has, therefore, been wisely held by Christison that in cases where a poison has not been detected on chemical analysis, the judge, in deciding a charge of poisoning, should weigh in evidence the symptoms, postmortem appearances and the moral evidence.” 36. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in AIR 1960 SC 500 , in the case of “Anant Chintaman Lagu vs. The State of Bombay”, have held that the prosecution must establish in a case of poisoning: (a) that death took place by poisoning; (b) that the accused had the poison in his possessing: and (c) that the accused had an opportunity to administer the poison to the deceased. Though these three propositions must be kept in mind always, the sufficiency of the evidence direct or circumstantial, to establish murder by poisoning will depend on the facts of each case. If the evidence in a particular case does not justify the inference that death is the result of poisoning because of the failure of the prosecution to prove the fact satisfactorily, either directly or circumstantial evidence, then the benefit of the doubt will have to be given to the accused person. But if circumstantial proof of the three elements, is so decisive that the court can unhesitatingly hold that death was a result of administration of poison (though not detected) and that the poison must have been administered by the accused person, then the conviction can be rested on it. Their Lordships have further held that in a case of murder by administration of poison is almost always one of secrecy. The poisoner seldom takes another into his confidence, and his preparations for the commission of the offence are also secret. The circumstantial evidence in this context means a combination of facts creating a network through which there is no escape for the accused, because of the facts taken as a whole do not admit of any inference but of his guilty. Their Lordships have held as under: - “16. Ordinarily, it is not the practice of this Court to reexamine the findings of fact reached by the High Court particularly in a case where there is concurrence of opinion between the two Courts below. Their Lordships have held as under: - “16. Ordinarily, it is not the practice of this Court to reexamine the findings of fact reached by the High Court particularly in a case where there is concurrence of opinion between the two Courts below. But the case against the appellant is entirely based on circumstantial evidence, and there is no direct evidence that he administered a poison, and no poison has, in fact been detected by the doctor, who performed the post-mortem examination, or by the Chemical Analyser. The inference of guilt having been drawn on an examination of a mass of evidence during which subsidiary findings were given by the two Courts below, we have felt it necessary, in view of the extraordinary nature of this case, to satisfy ourselves whether each conclusion on the separate aspects of the case, is supported by evidence and is just and proper. Ordinarily, this Court is not required to enter into an elaborate examination of the evidence, but we have departed from this rule in this particular case, in view of the variety of arguments that were addressed to us and the evidence of conduct which the appellant has sought to explain away on hypotheses suggesting innocence. These arguments, as we have stated in brief, covered both the factual as well as the medical aspects of the case, and have necessitated a close examination of the evidence once again, so that we may be in a position to say what are the facts found, on which our decision is rested. 58. Our findings thus substantially accord on all the relevant facts with those of the two Courts below, though the arrangement and consideration of the relevant evidence on record is somewhat different. It is now necessary to consider the arguments which have been advanced on behalf of the appellant. The first contention is that the essential ingredients required to be proved in all cases of murder by poisoning were not proved by the prosecution in this case. Reference in this connection is made to a decision of the Allahahad High Court in Mst. Gujrani v. Emperor and two unreported decisions of this Court in Chandrakant Nyalchand Seth v. State of Bombay decided on February 19, 1958, and Dharambir Singh v. State of Punjab decided on November 4, 1958. Reference in this connection is made to a decision of the Allahahad High Court in Mst. Gujrani v. Emperor and two unreported decisions of this Court in Chandrakant Nyalchand Seth v. State of Bombay decided on February 19, 1958, and Dharambir Singh v. State of Punjab decided on November 4, 1958. In these cases, the court referred to three propositions which the prosecution must establish in a case of poisoning: (a) that death took place by poisoning; (b) that the accused had the poison in his possession; and (c) that the accused had an opportunity to administer the poison to the deceased. The case in Dharambir Singh v. State of Punjab turned upon these three propositions. There, the deceased had died as a result of poisoning by potassium cyanide, which poison was also found in the autopsy. The High Court had disbelieved the evidence which sought to establish that the accused had obtained potassium cyanide, but held, nevertheless, that the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict the accused in that case. This Court did not, however, accept the circumstantial evidence as complete. It is to be observed that the three propositions were laid down not as the invariable criteria of proof by direct evidence in a case of murder by poisoning, because evidently if after poisoning the victim, the accused destroyed all traces of the body, the first proposition would be incapable of being proved except by circumstantial evidence. Similarly, if the accused gave a victim something to eat and the victim died immediately on the ingestion of that food with symptoms of poisoning and poison, in fact, was found in the viscera, the requirement of proving that the accused was possessed of the poison would follow from the circumstance that the accused gave the victim something to eat and need not be separately proved. There have been cases in which conviction was maintained, even though the body of the victim had completely disappeared, and it was impossible to say, except on circumstantial evidence, whether that person was the victim of foul play, including poisoning. There have been cases in which conviction was maintained, even though the body of the victim had completely disappeared, and it was impossible to say, except on circumstantial evidence, whether that person was the victim of foul play, including poisoning. Recently, this Court in Mohan v. State of U.P. decided on November 5, 1959, held that the proof of the fact of possession of the poison was rendered unnecessary, because the victim died soon after eating pedas given by the accused in that case, and he had not partaken any other food likely to contain poison. In Dr Palmer case, strychnine was not detected, and the accused was convicted by the jury after Lord Chief Justice Campbell (Cresswell, J. and Mr. Baron Alderson, concurring) charged the jury that the discovery of the poison on autopsy, was not obligatory, if they were satisfied on the evidence of symptoms that death had been caused by the ministration of the strychnine. The conduct of Palmer, which was also significant, was stressed inasmuch as he had attempted to thwart a successful chemical analysis of the viscera, and had done suspicious acts to achieve that end. In Dr Crippen case, the conduct of the accused after the death of Mrs. Crippen in making the friends and relatives believe that Mrs. Crippen was alive was considered an incriminatory circumstance pointing to his guilt. No doubt, in Dr Crippen case, the body was found and poison was detected, but there was no proof that Dr Crippen had administered the poison to her, that being inferred from his subsequent conduct in running away with Miss Le Neve. In the second case of this Court, the poison was available to the victim, and it was possible that she had taken it to end an unhappy life. 59. The cases of this Court which were decided, proceeded upon their own facts, and though the three propositions must be kept in mind always, the sufficiency of the evidence, direct or circumstantial, to establish murder by poisoning will depend on the facts of each case. If the evidence in a particular case does of not justify the inference that death is the result of poisoning because of the failure of the prosecution to prove the fact satisfactorily, either directly or by circumstantial evidence, then the benefit of the doubt will have to be given to the accused person. If the evidence in a particular case does of not justify the inference that death is the result of poisoning because of the failure of the prosecution to prove the fact satisfactorily, either directly or by circumstantial evidence, then the benefit of the doubt will have to be given to the accused person. But if circumstantial evidence, in the absence of direct proof of the three elements, is so decisive that the court can unhesitatingly hold that death was a result of administration of poison (though not detected) and that the poison must have been administered by the accused person, then the conviction can be rested on it. 74. If Laxmibai died in circumstances which prima facie admit of either disease or homicide by poisoning, we must look at the conduct of the appellant who brought her to the hospital, and consider to what conclusion that conduct unerringly points. If the appellant as an honest medical man had taken Laxmibai to the hospital and she had died by reason of disease, his conduct would have been entirely different. He would not have taken her to the hospital bereft of property with which she started from home; he would not have given a wrong or misleading name to cover her identity; he would not have given a wrong age and wrong history of her ailments; he would not have written a letter suggesting that she had a brother in Calcutta, which brother did not exist; he would not have abandoned the corpse to be dealt with by the hospital as an unclaimed body; he would not have attempted to convince the world that she was alive and happily married; he would not have obtained her property by forgeries, impersonation and other tricks indulged in both before and after her death; but he would have informed her relatives and done everything in his power to see that she was properly treated and stayed on to face whatever inquiry the hospital wished to make into the cause of death and not tried to avoid the post-mortem examination and would not have disappeared, never to reappear. His prevarications about where Laxmibai was, make a big and much varied list, and his forgeries cover scores of documents. In the words of Baron Parke in Towell case: “Circumstantial evidence is the only evidence which can in cases of this kind lead to discovery. His prevarications about where Laxmibai was, make a big and much varied list, and his forgeries cover scores of documents. In the words of Baron Parke in Towell case: “Circumstantial evidence is the only evidence which can in cases of this kind lead to discovery. There is no way of investigating them except by the use of circumstantial evidence; but it most frequently happens that great crimes committed in secret leave behind them some traces, or are accompanied by some circumstances which lead to the discovery and punishment of the offender.... Direct evidence of persons who saw the fact, if that proof is offered upon the testimony of men whose veracity you have no reason to doubt is the best proof; but, on the other hand, it is equally true with regard to circumstantial evidence, that the circumstances may often be so clearly proved, so closely connected with it, or leading to one result in conclusion, that the mind may be as well convinced as if it were proved by eyewitnesses.” 76. These arguments, however, are of no avail, in view of the appellant’s entire conduct now laid bare, which conduct has been proved to our satisfaction to have begun not after the death of Laxmibai but much earlier. This conduct is so knit together as to make a network of circumstances pointing only to his guilt. The case is one of extreme cunning and premeditation. The appellant, whose duty it was to care for this unfortunate lady as a friend and as her medical adviser, deliberately set about first to ingratiate himself in her good opinion, and becoming her confidant, found out all about her affairs. All this time he was planning to get at her property after taking her life. He did not perpetrate his scheme at Poona, where the death might have brought a host of persons to the hospital. He devised a diabolical scheme of unparalleled cunning and committed an almost perfect murder. But murder, though it hath no tongue, speaks out sometimes. His method was his own undoing; because even the long arm of coincidence cannot explain the multitude of circumstances against him, and they destroy the presumption of innocence with which law clothed him. He devised a diabolical scheme of unparalleled cunning and committed an almost perfect murder. But murder, though it hath no tongue, speaks out sometimes. His method was his own undoing; because even the long arm of coincidence cannot explain the multitude of circumstances against him, and they destroy the presumption of innocence with which law clothed him. In our judgment, the two Courts below were perfectly correct in their conclusion that the death of Laxmibai was the result of the administration of some unrecognised poison or drug which would act as a poison, and that the appellant was the person who administered it. We, accordingly, confirm the conviction.” 37. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in AIR 1960 SC 659 , in the case of “Mohan vs. State of Uttar Pradesh”, have held that thus, where the evidence in the case shows that the accused gave the deceased three “peras” and within half an hour, he became ill and died within two hours. Their Lordships have further held that in the case of murder by administering poison, the prosecution has, along with the motive, also to establish that the deceased died of a particular poison said to have been administered, that the accused was in possession of that poison and that he had the opportunity to administer the same to the deceased. 38. In the present case, the motive to administer poison was that the Priyanka’s family was not in a position to give the dowry, demanded from time to time. The demand of dowry can be demanded before and after the marriage. 39. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in 1972 (1) SCC 748 , in the case of “Mahabir Mandal & others vs. State of Bihar”, have held that lack of positive evidence would not result in throwing out the entire prosecution case, if the other circumstances clearly point out the guilt of the accused. Their Lordships have further held that the heart of the deceased at the time of postmortem examination was found to be empty would not rule out asphyxia death as a result of poisoning. There are several poisons particularly of the synthetic hypnotics and vegetable alkaloids groups, which do not leave any characteristic signs as can be noticed on post-mortem examination. Their Lordships have quoted para from page 847 of the book of Lambert namely “The Medico-Legal Post-Mortem in India”. There are several poisons particularly of the synthetic hypnotics and vegetable alkaloids groups, which do not leave any characteristic signs as can be noticed on post-mortem examination. Their Lordships have quoted para from page 847 of the book of Lambert namely “The Medico-Legal Post-Mortem in India”. Their Lordships have also referred the contest of book “Legal Medicine Pathology and Toxicology”, by Gonzales and Others, Second Edition as under: - “The post-mortem appearances in cases of morphine poisoning are not particularly characteristic. There is a congestion of the viscera, cyanosis and abundant dark fluid blood. When crude opium is taken by mouth the stomach may contain fragments of poppy, but nothing characteristic is found if morphine is injected.” Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court have held as under: - “37. The circumstances of the present case taken in their entirety clearly point to the conclusion that the death of Indira was not natural but was due to foul-play. In a number of cases where the deceased dies as a result of poisoning, it is difficult to successfully isolate the poison and recognise it. Lack of positive evidence in this respect would not result in throwing out the entire prosecution case if the other circumstances clearly point to the guilt of the accused. Reference in this context may be made to the following observations of Hidayatullah, J., (as he then was) who spoke for the majority in the case of Anant Chintaman Lagu v. State of Bombay: “A case of murder by administration of poison is almost always one of secrecy. The poisoner seldom takes another into his confidence, and his preparations to the commission of the offence are also secret. He catches his opportunity and administers the poison in a manner calculated to avoid its detection. The greater his knowledge of poisons, the greater the secrecy, and consequently the greater the difficulty of proving the case against him. What assistance a man of science can give he gives, but it is too much to say that the guilt of the accused must, in all cases, be demonstrated by the isolation of the poison, though in a case where there is nothing else such a course would be incumbent upon the prosecution. There are various factors which militate against a successful isolation of the poison and its recognition. There are various factors which militate against a successful isolation of the poison and its recognition. The discovery of the poison can only take place either through a post-mortem examination of the internal organs or by chemical analysis. Often enough, the diagnosis of a poison is aided by the information which may be furnished by relatives and friends as to the symptoms found on the victim, if the course of poison has taken long and others have had an opportunity of watching its effect. Where, however, the poison is administered in secrecy and the victim is rendered unconscious effectively, there is nothing to show how the deterioration in the condition of the victim took place and if not poison but disease is suspected, the diagnosis of poisoning may be rendered difficult.” 38. Reliance in the above context was placed in the cited case on the books on medical jurisprudence by different authors wherein it has been stated that the pathologist’s part in the diagnosis of poisoning is secondary and that several poisons particularly of the synthetic hypnotics and vegetable alkaloids groups do not leave any characteristic signs which can be noticed on post-mortem examination. The following dictum was laid down in the case: “The cases of this Court which were decided, proceeded upon their own facts, and though the three propositions must be kept in mind always, the sufficiency of the evidence, direct or circumstantial, to establish murder by poisoning will depend on the facts of each case. If the evidence in a particular case does not justify the inference that death is the result of poisoning because of the failure of the prosecution to prove the fact satisfactorily, either directly or by circumstantial evidence, then the benefit of the doubt will have to be given to the accused person. But if circumstantial evidence, in the absence of direct proof of the three elements, is so decisive that the Court can unhesitatingly hold that death was a result of administration of poison (though not detected) and that the poison must have been administered by the accused person, then the conviction can be rested on it.” 39. The case against Mahabir accused, in our opinion, is covered by the latter part of the above observation. We, therefore, find no cogent ground to interfere with the findings of the two courts that the death of the deceased was not natural but homicidal. The case against Mahabir accused, in our opinion, is covered by the latter part of the above observation. We, therefore, find no cogent ground to interfere with the findings of the two courts that the death of the deceased was not natural but homicidal. 43. It may be mentioned that, according to the confessional statement of Mahadeo, which was recorded by Shri Rastogi Magistrate on September 21, 1963 and upon which reliance was placed by the prosecution, no one was present in the house when Mahabir took Mahadeo inside the house to bring out the dead body of Indira for being placed in the taxi on the night of occurrence. The confessional statement of Mahadeo thus rules out the presence of Dasrath accused at his house on the fateful night.” 40. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in 1984 (4) SCC 116 , in the case of “Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra”, have held in the case of poisoning or a suicide for proving murder the standard tests for murder by poisoning must be satisfied, circumstantial evidence should be conclusive. Their Lordships have held that to prove death by poisoning the Court must carefully scan the evidence and determine the four important circumstances which alone can justify a conviction:- (i) there is a clear motive for the accused to administer poison to the deceased, (ii) that the deceased died of poison said to have been administered, (iii) that the accused had to poison in his possession. (iv) that he had an opportunity to administer the poison to the deceased. 41. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme in 1984 (4) SCC 116 , in the case of “Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra”, have further held false plea or false defence taken by accused when can constitute an additional link in the chain of circumstances against the accused. Their Lordships have held as under: - “153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established: (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may be” established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may be” established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between “may be proved” and “must be or should be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra where the observations were made: [SCC para 19, p. 807: SCC (Cri) p. 1047] “Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions.” (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency, (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. 159. It will be seen that this Court while taking into account the absence of explanation or a false explanation did hold that it will amount to be an additional link to complete the chain but these observations must be read in the light of what this Court said earlier viz. before a false explanation can be used as additional link, the following essential conditions must be satisfied: (1) various links in the chain of evidence led by the prosecution have been satisfactorily proved, (2) the said circumstance points to the guilt of the accused with reasonable definiteness, and (3) the circumstance is in proximity to the time and situation. 160. If these conditions are fulfilled only then a court can use a false explanation or a false defence as an additional link to lend an assurance to the court and not otherwise. On the facts and circumstances of the present case, this does not appear to be such a case. 160. If these conditions are fulfilled only then a court can use a false explanation or a false defence as an additional link to lend an assurance to the court and not otherwise. On the facts and circumstances of the present case, this does not appear to be such a case. This aspect of the matter was examined in Shankarlal case where this Court observed thus: [SCC para 30, p. 43: SCC (Cri) p. 322] “Besides, falsity of defence cannot take the place of proof of facts which the prosecution has to establish in order to succeed. A false plea can at best be considered as an additional circumstances, if other circumstances point unfailingly to the guilt of the accused.” 165. So far as this matter is concerned, in such cases the court must carefully scan the evidence and determine the four important circumstances which alone can justify a conviction: (1) there is a clear motive for an accused to administer poison to the deceased, (2) that the deceased died of poison said to have been administered, (3) that the accused had the poison in his possession, (4) that he had an opportunity to administer the poison to the deceased. 166. In the instant case, while two ingredients have been proved but two have not. In the first place, it has no doubt been proved that Manju died of potassium cyanide and secondly, it has also been proved that there was an opportunity to administer the poison. It has, however, not been proved by any evidence that the appellant had the poison in his possession. On the other hand, as indicated above, there is clear evidence of PW 2 that potassium cyanide could have been available to Manju from the plastic factory of her mother, but there is no evidence to show that the accused could have procured potassium cyanide from any available source. We might here extract a most unintelligible and extraordinary finding of the High Court— “It is true that there is no direct evidence on these two points, because the prosecution is not able to lead evidence that the accused had secured potassium cyanide poison from a particular source. Similarly there is no direct evidence to prove that he had administered poison to Manju. However, it is not necessary to prove each and every fact by a direct evidence. Similarly there is no direct evidence to prove that he had administered poison to Manju. However, it is not necessary to prove each and every fact by a direct evidence. Circumstantial evidence can be a basis for proving this fact.(p.160) 176. This now brings us to the fag end of our judgment. After a detailed discussion of the evidence, the circumstances of the case and interpretation of the decisions of this Court the legal and factual position may be summarised thus: (1) That the five golden principles enunciated by this Court in Hanumant1 decision have not been satisfied in the instant case. As a logical corollary, it follows that it cannot be held that the act of the accused cannot be explained on any other hypothesis except the guilt of the appellant nor can it be said that in all human probability, the accused had committed the murder of Manju. In other words, the prosecution has not fulfilled the essential requirements of a criminal case which rests purely on circumstantial evidence. (2) That, at any rate, the evidence clearly shows that two views are possible — one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other leading to his innocence. It may be very likely that the appellant may have administered the poison (potassium cyanide) to Manju but at the same time a fair possibility that she herself committed suicide cannot be safely excluded or eliminated. Hence, on this ground alone the appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt resulting in his acquittal. (3) The prosecution has miserably failed to prove one of the most essential ingredients of a case of death caused by administration of poison i.e. possession of poison with the accused (either by direct or circumstantial evidence) and on this ground alone the prosecution must fail. (4) That in appreciating the evidence, the High Court has clearly misdirected itself on many points, as pointed out by us, and has thus committed a gross error of law. (5) That the High Court has relied upon decisions of this Court which are either inapplicable or which, on closer examination, do not support the view of the High Court being clearly distinguishable. (5) That the High Court has relied upon decisions of this Court which are either inapplicable or which, on closer examination, do not support the view of the High Court being clearly distinguishable. (6) That the High Court has taken a completely wrong view of law in holding that even though the prosecution may suffer from serious infirmities it could be reinforced by additional link in the nature of false defence in order to supply the lacuna and has thus committed a fundamental error of law. (7) That the High Court has not only mis-appreciated the evidence but has completely overlooked the well established principles of law and in view of our findings it is absolutely clear that the High Court has merely tried to accept the prosecution case based on tenterhooks and slender tits and bits. (8) We entirely agree with the High Court that it is wholly unsafe to rely on that part of the evidence of Dr Banerjee (PW 33) which shows that poison was forcibly administered by the process of mechanical suffocation. (9) We also agree with the High Court that there is no manifest defect in the investigation made by the police which appears to be honest and careful. A proof positive of this fact is that even though Rameshwar Birdhichand and other members of his family who had practically no role to play had been arrayed as accused but they had to be acquitted by the High Court for lack of legal evidence. (10) That in view of our finding that two views are clearly possible in the present case, the question of defence being false does not arise and the argument of the High Court that the defence is false does not survive.” 42. In the instant case, the prosecution has proved the case based on entirely circumstantial evidence. The chain is complete from the date of telephonic call received by PW1 Harendra Singh from his daughter till the recovery of body in Santro car on 23.01.2011. The plea taken by the accused is false and it is a vital link to prove circumstantial evidence on which the present case rests. 43. The chain is complete from the date of telephonic call received by PW1 Harendra Singh from his daughter till the recovery of body in Santro car on 23.01.2011. The plea taken by the accused is false and it is a vital link to prove circumstantial evidence on which the present case rests. 43. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme in 1988 (3) SCC 513 , in the case of “Bhupinder Singh vs. State of Punjab”, have held that there should not be acquittal on the failure of the prosecution to prove the possession of poison with the accused. Murder by poison is invariably committed under the cover and cloak of secrecy and the person who commits such murder would naturally take care to eliminate and destroy the evidence against him. Therefore, the insistence on proof of possession of poison with the accused invariably in every case is neither desirably nor practicable. Their Lordships have further held that the poison murder cases are not to be put outside the rule of circumstantial evidence, and direct evidence not being available; the court can legitimately draw from the circumstances an inference on any matter one way or the other. Their Lordships have held as under: - “25. We do not consider that there should be acquittal or the failure of the prosecution to prove the possession of poison with the accused. Murder by poison is invariably committed under the cover and cloak of secrecy. Nobody will administer poison to another in the presence of others. The person who administers poison to another in secrecy will not keep a portion of it for the investigating officer to come and collect it. The person who commits such murder would naturally take care to eliminate and destroy the evidence against him. In such cases, it would be impossible for the prosecution to prove possession of poison with the accused. The prosecution may, however, establish other circumstances consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. The court then would not be justified in acquitting the accused on the ground that the prosecution has failed to prove possession of the poison with the accused. 26. The poison murder cases are not to be put outside the rule of circumstantial evidence. The court then would not be justified in acquitting the accused on the ground that the prosecution has failed to prove possession of the poison with the accused. 26. The poison murder cases are not to be put outside the rule of circumstantial evidence. There may be obvious very many facts and circumstances out of which the court may be justified in drawing permissible inference that the accused was in possession of the poison in question. There may be very many facts and circumstances proved against the accused which may call for tacit assumption of the factum of possession of poison with the accused. The insistence on proof of possession of poison with the accused invariably in every case is neither desirable nor practicable. It would mean to introduce an extraneous ingredient to the offence of murder by poisoning. We cannot, therefore, accept the contention urged by the learned counsel for the appellant. The accused in a case of murder by poisoning cannot have a better chance of being exempted from sanctions than in other kinds of murders. Murder by poisoning is run like any other murder. In cases where dependence is wholly on circumstantial evidence, and direct evidence not being available, the court can legitimately draw from the circumstances an inference on any matter one way or the other.” 44. In the present case, the deceased was in the house of accused at the time of her death. It was for the accused to explain satisfactorily the circumstances under which the victim died on 23.01.2011. PW3 Sohan Singh has also deposed that the accused ran away from the spot. It was a case of homicide by poisoning. The accused were required to explain under Section 106 of Cr.P.C., the circumstances in which the death of Priyanka was caused and her dead body was recovered from the rear set of the car parked in front of their house. It has also come on record that the husband of Priyanka-deceased and other family members were residing in the same house. 45. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in 1988 (4) SCC 302 , in the case of “State of U.P. vs. Krishna Gopal and another”, have held that where the eye witnesses’ account is found credible and trustworthy, medical opinion pointing to alternative possibilities is not accepted as conclusive. 45. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in 1988 (4) SCC 302 , in the case of “State of U.P. vs. Krishna Gopal and another”, have held that where the eye witnesses’ account is found credible and trustworthy, medical opinion pointing to alternative possibilities is not accepted as conclusive. Importance and primacy should be given to the morality of the trial process. Their Lordships have held as under: - “24. It is trite that where the eyewitnesses’ account is found credible and trustworthy, medical opinion pointing to alternative possibilities is not accepted as conclusive. Witnesses, as Bentham said, are the eyes and ears of justice. Hence the importance and primacy of the morality of the trial process. Eyewitnesses’ account would require a careful independent assessment and evaluation for their credibility which should not be adversely prejudged making any other evidence, including medical evidence, as the sole touchstone for the test of such credibility. The evidence must be tested for its inherent consistency and the inherent probability of the story; consistency with the account of other witnesses held to be creditworthy; consistency with the undisputed facts; the “credit” of the witnesses; their performance in the witness box; their power of observation etc. Then the probative value of such evidence becomes eligible to be put into the scales for a cumulative evaluation.” 46. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in 1995 Supp. (1) SCC 547, in the case of “Ram Dev and another vs. State of U.P.”, have held that medical opinion is only opinion and it is not decisive, where oral testimony of eyewitnesses found to be truthful, reliable and trustworthy vague opinion of doctor cannot affect their value and credibility of the prosecution case. Their Lordships have held as under: - “4. We are in agreement with the above view of the High Court. That apart, since our analysis of the evidence of PW 1, Ram Saran and PW 2, Ram Bharose has created an impression on our minds that both these witnesses are truthful, reliable and trustworthy, as has also been found by the trial court and the High Court, the argument that the statement of Dr R.C. Gupta, PW 3 with regard to the injuries of PW 1 Ram Saran has belied the oral testimony does not appeal to us. The medical witness did not rule out the possibility of injuries having been caused to Ram Saran, PW 1 from the grazing of pellets from the gunshot. It is well settled that medical evidence is only opinion evidence. It is hardly decisive and is often inconclusive. Since the oral testimony of PW 1 Ram Saran and PW 2 Ram Bharose suffer from no infirmity whatsoever, the vague opinion given by Dr Gupta cannot in any way affect the value of oral testimony and cannot affect the credibility of the prosecution case at all.” 47. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in 1998 (6) SCC 50 , in the case of “State of U.P. vs. Harban Sahai & others”, have held that testimony of eyewitness would be preferable unless medical evidence is so conclusive as to rule out even the possibility of eyewitness’s version to be true. Their Lordships have held as under: - “9. The second reason put forth by the High Court for disbelieving the version of the eyewitnesses is this: PW 1 (Shashi Bhushan) and PW 2 (Shiv Sagar Lal) said that two accused had fired the gun simultaneously, but the deceased sustained only one gunshot injury which is described in the post-mortem certificate as Injury 2. The Public Prosecutor in the trial court endeavoured to show that Injury 7 would possibly have been the result of a gunshot. Dr R.S. Pandey (PW 7) answered to the said query saying that there is a possibility of that injury being caused in a gunshot if pellets have touched that part of the face and deflected therefrom. Injury 7 is described as “multiple abrasions in an area of 7 cm × 6 cm on the right side of the face 2.5 cm below the right eye”. But the High Court ruled out the possibility of the said injury having been caused in gunshot on the following reasoning: “But in the cross-examination the doctor has denied the possibility of such injury being caused while the deceased was being chased from behind and that is exactly what the prosecution case is, that while the deceased was running away the two appellants armed with guns, fired from behind. Consequently Injury 7, even if it is said to be a gunshot injury, would not go to corroborate the prosecution case in any manner.” The High Court has thus knocked out an eyewitness on the strength of an uncanny opinion expressed by a medical witness. Overdependence on such opinion evidence, even if the witness is an expert in the field, to checkmate the direct testimony given by an eyewitness is not a safe modus adoptable in criminal cases. It has now become axiomatic that medical evidence can be used to repel the testimony of eyewitnesses only if it is so conclusive as to rule out even the possibility of the eyewitness’s version to be true. A doctor who conducted post-mortem examination or examined an injured person is usually confronted with such questions regarding different possibilities or probabilities of causing those injuries or post-mortem features which he noticed in the medical report. But the answers given by the witness to such questions need not become the last word on such possibilities. After all he gives only his opinion regarding such questions. But to discard the testimony of an eyewitness simply on the strength of such opinion expressed by the medical witness is not conducive to the administration of criminal justice. (Vide Piara Singh v. State of Punjab, Mange v. State of Haryana, Ram Dev v. State of U.P.)” 48. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in 2003 (12) SCC 606, in the case of “Ramanand Yadav vs. Prabhu Nath Jha & others”, have held that oral evidence has to get primacy and medical evidence is basically opinionative. Their Lordships have held as under: - “17. So far as the alleged variance between medical evidence and ocular evidence is concerned, it is trite law that oral evidence has to get primacy and medical evidence is basically opinionative. It is only when the medical evidence specifically rules out the injury as is claimed to have been inflicted as per the oral testimony, then only in a given case the court has to draw adverse inference. 18. The High Court has thus knocked out an eyewitness on the strength of an uncanny opinion expressed by a medical witness. Overdependence on such opinion evidence, even if the witness is an expert in the field, to checkmate the direct testimony given by an eyewitness is not a safe modus adoptable in criminal cases. 18. The High Court has thus knocked out an eyewitness on the strength of an uncanny opinion expressed by a medical witness. Overdependence on such opinion evidence, even if the witness is an expert in the field, to checkmate the direct testimony given by an eyewitness is not a safe modus adoptable in criminal cases. It has now become axiomatic that medical evidence can be used to repel the testimony of eyewitnesses only if it is so conclusive as to rule out even the possibility of the eyewitness version to be true. A doctor usually confronted with such questions regarding different possibilities or probabilities of causing those injuries or postmortem features which he noticed in the medical report may express his views one way or the other depending upon the manner the question was asked. But the answers given by the witness to such questions need not become the last word on such possibilities. After all, he gives only his opinion regarding such questions. But to discard the testimony of an eyewitness simply on the strength of such opinion expressed by the medical witness is not conducive to the administration of criminal justice.” 49. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in AIR 2009 SC 2013 , in the case of “Chhotanney & others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & others”, have held that eye witnesses’ evidence was found to be credible and trustworthy, medical evidence pointing to alternative possibilities was not accepted as conclusive. Their Lordships have held as under:- “6. Coming to the plea that the medical evidence is at variance with ocular evidence, it has to be noted that it would be erroneous to accord undue primacy to the hypothetical answers of medical witnesses to exclude the eyewitnesses’ account which had to be tested independently and not treated as the ‘variable’ keeping the medical evidence as the ‘constant’. 7. It is trite that where the eyewitnesses’ account is found credible and trustworthy, medical opinion pointing to alternative possibilities is not accepted as conclusive. Witnesses, as Bentham said, are the eyes and ears of justice. Hence the importance and primacy of the quality of the trial process. Eyewitnesses’ account would require a careful independent assessment and evaluation for their credibility which should not be adversely prejudged making any other evidence, including medical evidence, as the sole touchstone for the test of such credibility. Witnesses, as Bentham said, are the eyes and ears of justice. Hence the importance and primacy of the quality of the trial process. Eyewitnesses’ account would require a careful independent assessment and evaluation for their credibility which should not be adversely prejudged making any other evidence, including medical evidence, as the sole touchstone for the test of such credibility. The evidence must be tested for its inherent consistency and the inherent probability of the story; consistency with the account of other witnesses held to be creditworthy; consistency with the undisputed facts; the ‘credit’ of the witnesses; their performance in the witness box; their power of observation, etc. Then the probative value of such evidence becomes eligible to be put into the scales for a cumulative evalution.” 50. Their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court in (2010) 13 SCC 689 , in the case of Satya Narayan Tiwari @ Jolly and another vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, have explained the term “soon before” the marriage which reads as under : 28. There can be no quarrel with the proposition that the proximity test has to be applied keeping in view the facts and circumstances of each case. Regarding the aforesaid decision, the facts were somewhat different in that the deceased was not shown to have been subjected to cruelty by her husband for at least 15 months prior to her death. On the fact of that case, it was held that Section 304-B IPC was not attracted. 29. On the other hand, the present case fully answers the test of “soon before”. There is the testimony of demand of Maruti car being pressed by the two accused persons after about six months of the marriage of the deceased (which took place about three years before the incident) and of her being pestered, nagged, tortured and maltreated on non-fulfilment of the said demand which was conveyed by her to her parents from time to time on her visits to her parental home and on telephone. Things had reached to such a pass that on getting a message from her about three months before the incident, Surya Kant Dixit PW1 accompanied by Jaideo Awasthi PW 2 had to go to her sasural in Farrukhabad in an attempt to dissuade the two accused from pressing such demand, but they (the two accused) humiliated them and turned them out of the house with the command not to enter their house again without meeting the demand of a Maruti car. He did not take any action on the consolation offered by the father-in-law of his daughter and also on the advice of his daughter. It was natural that the victim also did not want her father to take any extreme step against the two accused. She might have thought that things would improve with the passage of time but it seems that that did not happen. 30. Surya Kant Dixit PW 1 was in a helpless state after suffering humiliation at the hands of the accused persons about three months before the actual incident. He could simply wait and watch in the hope of things to improve, but the 24 situation did not improve at all. It, however, cannot be taken to mean that the demand made by the two accused persons had subsided or was given up by them. It can justifiably be inferred from what happened subsequently that they continued to torture the unfortunate lady because of non-fulfilment of the demand of Maruti car. In our opinion, the test of “soon before” is satisfied in the facts, evidence and circumstances of the present case. 55. We are of the view that the presumption of Section 113-B of the Evidence Act is attracted in this case and the discussion that we have made hereinabove makes it abundantly clear that the defence could not displace the said presumption. The culpability of the two accused in committing this crime is established to the hilt by the facts and circumstances proved by the prosecution. They undoubtedly are the authors of this crime. 57. To sum up, the prosecution has been able to prove the following: (1) The death of the deceased was caused by strangulation and burning within seven years of her marriage. They undoubtedly are the authors of this crime. 57. To sum up, the prosecution has been able to prove the following: (1) The death of the deceased was caused by strangulation and burning within seven years of her marriage. (2) The deceased had been subjected to cruelty by her husband and mother-in-law (the two appellant-accused) over the demand of Maruti car in dowry raised and persistently pressed by them after about six months of the marriage and continued till her death. (3) The cruelty and harassment was in connection with the demand of dowry i.e. Maruti car. (4) The cruelty and harassment is established to have been meted out soon before her death. (5) The two accused were the authors of this crime who caused her death by strangulation and burning on the given date, time and place. 58. In our opinion, the trial Judge recorded an acquittal adopting a superfluous approach without in depth analysis of the evidence and circumstances established on record. On thoroughly cross-checking the evidence on record and circumstances established by the prosecution with the findings recorded by the trial court, we find that its conclusions are quite inapt, unjustified, unreasonable and perverse. Proceeding on a wrong premise and irrelevant considerations, the trial court has acquitted the accused. The accused are established to have committed the offences under Sections 498-A and 304-B IPC and under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and the findings of the High Court are correct. 51. Their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court in (2011) 4 SCC 427 , in the case of “Bachni Devi and another Vs. State of Haryana”, have reiterated the principle and explained the term “demand for dowry’ under Section 304 B IPC and presumption. Their Lordships have held that as under:- “12. For making out an offence of “dowry death” under Section 304B, the following ingredients have to be proved by the prosecution: (a) death of a woman must have been caused by any burns or bodily injury or her death must have occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances; (b) such death must have occurred within seven years of her marriage; (c) soon before her death, she must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband; and (d) such cruelty or harassment must be in connection with the demand for dowry. 19. 19. In the backdrop of the above legal position, if we look at the facts of the case, it is clearly established that Kanta died otherwise than under normal circumstances. There is no dispute of fact that death of Kanta occurred within seven years of her marriage. That Kanta was subjected to harassment and ill-treatment by A-1 and A-2 after PW 8 refused to accede to 26 their demand for purchase of motorcycle is established by the evidence of PW 8 and PW 9. Then there is evidence of PW 10 that PW 8 had called him and DW 1 to his house where A-1 had made demand of motorcycle. PW 10 stated that he sought to reason to A-1 about inability of PW 8 to give motorcycle at which A-1 got angry and warned that Kanta would not be allowed to stay in her matrimonial home. It is true that the appellants produced DW 1 in defence and he did state in his examination-in-chief that he did not meet A-1 at the house of PW 8 but in the cross-examination when he was confronted with his statement under Section 161 CrPC (portion A to A) where it was recorded that he and PW 10 had gone to the house of PW 8 and both of them (PW 10 and DW 1) counselled A-1 to desist from demanding motorcycle but she stuck to her demand, DW 1 had no explanation to offer. The evidence of DW 1 is, therefore, liable to be discarded. 20. In the light of the evidence let in by the prosecution, the trial court cannot be said to have erred in holding that it was established that unlawful demand of motorcycle was made by A-1 and A-2 from PW 8 and Kanta was harassed on account of his failure to provide the motorcycle and that led Kanta to commit suicide by hanging. Pertinently, the demand of motorcycle by A-1 from PW 8 was for A-2 and when PW 8 showed his inability to meet that demand, A-2 started harassing and ill-treating Kanta. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that there was no demand by A-2. 21. Pertinently, the demand of motorcycle by A-1 from PW 8 was for A-2 and when PW 8 showed his inability to meet that demand, A-2 started harassing and ill-treating Kanta. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that there was no demand by A-2. 21. The High Court has also examined the matter thoroughly and reached the finding that A-1 and A-2 had raised a demand for purchase of motorcycle from PW 8; this demand was made within two months of the marriage and was a demand towards “dowry” and when this demand was not met, Kanta was maltreated and harassed continuously which led her to take extreme step of finishing her life. We agree with the above view of the High Court. There is no merit in the contention of the counsel for the appellants that the demand of motorcycle does not qualify as a “demand for dowry”. All the essential ingredients to bring home the guilt under Section 304-B IPC are established against the appellants by the prosecution evidence. As a matter of law, the presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, 1872 is fully attracted in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The appellants 27 have failed to rebut the presumption under Section 113-B. 22. For the foregoing reasons, we find no merit in the appeal and it is dismissed accordingly. Two months’ time is given to A-1 to surrender for undergoing the sentence awarded to her. 52. In the present case, respondents/accused have failed to rebut presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. 33. Their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court in (2011) 11 SCC 733 , in the case of “Sanjay Kumar Jain Vs. State of Delhi”, have held that in order to bring home the guilt under Section 304-B IPC, the prosecution must prove that victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives. Such cruelty or harassment was for, on in connection with any demand for dowry. Such cruelty or harassment was done within seven years of the marriage. Their Lordships have held that as under :- “48. In State of Punjab v. Iqbal Singh, this Court observed that crimes are generally committed in the privacy of residential homes and in secrecy and it is difficult to get independent direct evidence in such cases. Such cruelty or harassment was done within seven years of the marriage. Their Lordships have held that as under :- “48. In State of Punjab v. Iqbal Singh, this Court observed that crimes are generally committed in the privacy of residential homes and in secrecy and it is difficult to get independent direct evidence in such cases. That is why the legislature has, by introducing Sections 113-A and 113-B in the Evidence Act, tried to strengthen the prosecution hands by permitting a presumption to be raised if certain foundational facts are established that the unfortunate event has taken place within seven years of the marriage. 49. On proper analysis of Section 304-B of the Penal Code and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, it shows that there must be material to show that soon before her death the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment. The prosecution is under an obligation to rule out any possibility of natural or accidental death. Where the ingredients of Section 304-B of the Penal Code are satisfied, the section would apply. If death is unnatural, either homicidal or suicidal, it would be death which can be said to have taken place in unnatural circumstances and the provisions of Section 304-B would be applicable. 50. The death, otherwise than under normal circumstances, under Section 304-B of the Penal Code would mean the death not in usual course either natural or accidental death. Section 304-B creates a substantive offence. The necessity for insertion of the two provisions has been amply enumerated by the Law Commission of India in its 21st Report, dated 10-8-1988 on “Dowry Deaths and Law Reform”. This has been primarily done because of the pre-existing law in securing evidence to prove dowry-related deaths. 51. In order to bring home the guilt under Section 304-B of the Penal Code the following ingredients are necessary: (1) The victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives. (2) Such cruelty or harassment was for, or in connection with any demand for dowry. (3) Such cruelty or harassment was done within seven years of the marriage. In the present case, deceased died within seven years of marriage. She was subjected to cruelty and harassment by her husband and relatives for bringing insufficient dowry.” 53. (2) Such cruelty or harassment was for, or in connection with any demand for dowry. (3) Such cruelty or harassment was done within seven years of the marriage. In the present case, deceased died within seven years of marriage. She was subjected to cruelty and harassment by her husband and relatives for bringing insufficient dowry.” 53. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in 2012 (10) SCC 476 , in the case of “Darbara Singh vs. State of Punjab”, have reiterated, unless oral evidence available is totally irreconcilable with medical evidence, oral evidence would have primacy. It is only when contradiction between two is so extreme that medical evidence completely rules out all possibilities of ocular evidence being true at all, that ocular evidence is liable to be disbelieved. Their Lordships have held as under:- “10. So far as the question of inconsistency between the medical evidence and the ocular evidence is concerned, the law is well settled that, unless the oral evidence available is totally irreconcilable with the medical evidence, the oral evidence would have primacy. In the event of contradictions between medical and ocular evidence, the ocular testimony of a witness will have greater evidentiary value vis-à-vis medical evidence and when medical evidence makes the oral testimony improbable, the same becomes a relevant factor in the process of evaluation of such evidence. It is only when the contradiction between the two is so extreme that the medical evidence completely rules out all possibilities of the ocular evidence being true at all, that the ocular evidence is liable to be disbelieved. (Vide State of U.P. v. Hari Chand and Bhajan Singh v. State of Haryana.)” 54. In (2015) 4 SCC Page 393, in the case of ‘Ashok v. State of Maharashtra’ their Lordships of Hon. Supreme Court have held that initial burden of proof is on prosecution to adduce sufficient evidence pointing towards guilt of accused. However, in case it is established that accused was last seen together with deceased, prosecution is exempted to prove exact happening of incident as accused himself would have special knowledge of incident and thus, would have burden of proof as per Section 106 of the Evidence Act. Their Lordships have held as under: - “12. However, in case it is established that accused was last seen together with deceased, prosecution is exempted to prove exact happening of incident as accused himself would have special knowledge of incident and thus, would have burden of proof as per Section 106 of the Evidence Act. Their Lordships have held as under: - “12. From the study of abovestated judgments and many others delivered by this Court over a period of years, the rule can be summarised as that the initial burden of proof is on the prosecution to bring sufficient evidence pointing towards guilt of the accused. However, in case of last seen together, the prosecution is exempted to prove exact happening of the incident as the accused himself would have special knowledge of the incident and thus, would have burden of proof as per Section 106 of the Evidence Act. Therefore, last seen together itself is not a conclusive proof but along with other circumstances surrounding the incident, like relations between the accused and the deceased, enmity between them, previous history of hostility, recovery of weapon from the accused, etc. non-explanation of death of the deceased, may lead to a presumption of guilt.” 55. In 2015 (6) SCC 477 , in the case of “Rajinder Singh vs. State of Punjab”, their Lordships of Hon. Supreme Court have held that any money or property or valuable security demanded by any of the persons mentioned in Section 2 of Dowry Prohibition Act, at or before or at any time after the marriage which is reasonable connected to the death of a married woman, would necessarily be in connection with or in relation to the marriage. Such giving or agreeing to give of any property or valuable security can be at any time – it can be at, before, or at any time after the marriage. Their Lordships have held as under: - “1. The facts of this case raises questions relating to one of the two great social evils practised against the women of this country for centuries. In the facts presented before us, a young woman consumes pesticide having been driven to do so by repeated demands being made on her for money by the family into which she is supposed to merge her identity. Sati and dowry deaths have plagued this nation for centuries. In the facts presented before us, a young woman consumes pesticide having been driven to do so by repeated demands being made on her for money by the family into which she is supposed to merge her identity. Sati and dowry deaths have plagued this nation for centuries. Sati—the practise of sending a widow to her husband’s funeral pyre to burn in it—was first outlawed under British Rule in 1829 and 1830 under the Governor Generalship of Lord William Bentinck in the Bengal, Madras and Bombay Presidencies. General Sir Charles Napier, the Commander-in-Chief of the British Forces in India between 1859 and 1861, is supposed to have said to the Hindu priests who complained to him about the prohibition of Sati that “the burning of widows is your custom but in my country, when a man burns a woman alive, we hang them and confiscate all their property. Let us both, therefore, act in accordance with our national customs.” 2. It took free India many years before the Commission of Sati (Prevention) Act, 1987 was passed by Parliament setting down various offences relating to the commission of Sati and the trial of such offences by special courts. In this appeal, however, we are confronted with the other major problem, namely, dowry deaths. Parliament responded much earlier so far as the prohibition of dowry is concerned by enacting the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 under which minimum sentences were prescribed as penalty for the giving or taking of dowry. The specific menace of dowry deaths, however, was tackled by the introduction of a new provision in 1986 — Section 304-B in the Penal Code together with another new provision Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. These two sections read as follows: “304-B. Dowry death.—(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called ‘dowry death’, and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Explanation.—For the purpose of this sub-section, ‘dowry’ shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961). Explanation.—For the purpose of this sub-section, ‘dowry’ shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961). (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.” *** “113-B. Presumption as to dowry death.—When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, ‘dowry death’ shall have the same meaning as in Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).” 8. A perusal of Section 2 shows that this definition can be broken into six distinct parts: (1) Dowry must first consist of any property or valuable security— the word “any” is a word of width and would, therefore, include within it property and valuable security of any kind whatsoever. (2) Such property or security can be given or even agreed to be given. The actual giving of such property or security is, therefore, not necessary. (3) Such property or security can be given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly. (4) Such giving or agreeing to give can again be not only by one party to a marriage to the other but also by the parents of either party or by any other person to either party to the marriage or to any other person. It will be noticed that this clause again widens the reach of the Act insofar as those guilty of committing the offence of giving or receiving dowry is concerned. (5) Such giving or agreeing to give can be at any time. It can be at, before, or at any time after the marriage. Thus, it can be many years after a marriage is solemnised. (6) Such giving or receiving must be in connection with the marriage of the parties. Obviously, the expression “in connection with” would in the context of the social evil sought to be tackled by the Dowry Prohibition Act mean “in relation with” or “relating to”. 13. Thus, it can be many years after a marriage is solemnised. (6) Such giving or receiving must be in connection with the marriage of the parties. Obviously, the expression “in connection with” would in the context of the social evil sought to be tackled by the Dowry Prohibition Act mean “in relation with” or “relating to”. 13. In order to arrive at the true construction of the definition of dowry and consequently the ingredients of the offence under Section 304-B, we first need to determine how a statute of this kind needs to be interpreted. It is obvious that Section 304-B is a stringent provision, meant to combat a social evil of alarming proportions. Can it be argued that it is a penal statute and, should, therefore, in case of ambiguity in its language, be construed strictly? 20. Given that the statute with which we are dealing must be given a fair, pragmatic, and common sense interpretation so as to fulfil the object sought to be achieved by Parliament, we feel that the judgment in Appasaheb case followed by the judgment of Vipin Jaiswal do not state the law correctly. We, therefore, declare that any money or property or valuable security demanded by any of the persons mentioned in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, at or before or at any time after the marriage which is reasonably connected to the death of a married woman, would necessarily be in connection with or in relation to the marriage unless, the facts of a given case clearly and unequivocally point otherwise. 24. We endorse what has been said by these two decisions. Days or months are not what is to be seen. What must be borne in mind is that the word “soon” does not mean “immediate”. A fair and pragmatic construction keeping in mind the great social evil that has led to the enactment of Section 304-B would make it clear that the expression is a relative expression. Time-lags may differ from case to case. All that is necessary is that the demand for dowry should not be stale but should be the continuing cause for the death of the married woman under Section 304-B. 25. At this stage, it is important to notice a recent judgment of this Court in Dinesh v. State of Haryana, in which the law was stated thus: (SCC p. 537, para 15) 15. At this stage, it is important to notice a recent judgment of this Court in Dinesh v. State of Haryana, in which the law was stated thus: (SCC p. 537, para 15) 15. “The expression ‘soon before’ is a relative term as held by this Court, which is required to be considered under the specific circumstances of each case and no straitjacket formula can be laid down by fixing any time of allotment. It can be said that the term ‘soon before’ is synonymous with the term ‘immediately before’. The determination of the period which can come within term ‘soon before’ is left to be determined by the courts depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case.” We hasten to add that this is not a correct reflection of the law. “Soon before” is not synonymous with “immediately before”. 56. In 2016 (4) SCC Page 604, in the case of ‘Gajanan Dashrath Kharate v. State of Maharashtra’, their Lordships of Hon. Supreme Court have held that the initial burden to establish the case would undoubtedly be upon the prosecution. In view of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, there will be a corresponding burden on the inmates of the house to give cogent explanation as to how the crime was committed. The inmates of the house cannot get away by simply keeping quiet and offering no explanation on the supposed premise that the burden to establish its case lies entirely upon the prosecution and there is no duty at all on the accused to offer explanation. In paragraph no.13, their Lordships have held as under:- “13. As seen from the evidence, appellant Gajanan and his father Dashrath and mother Mankarnabai were living together. On 7-4-2002, mother of the appellant-accused had gone to another Village Dahigaon. The prosecution has proved presence of the appellant at his home on the night of 7-4-2002. Therefore, the appellant is duty-bound to explain as to how the death of his father was caused. When an offence like murder is committed in secrecy inside a house, the initial burden to establish the case would undoubtedly be upon the prosecution. In view of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, there will be a corresponding burden on the inmates of the house to give cogent explanation as to how the crime was committed. When an offence like murder is committed in secrecy inside a house, the initial burden to establish the case would undoubtedly be upon the prosecution. In view of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, there will be a corresponding burden on the inmates of the house to give cogent explanation as to how the crime was committed. The inmates of the house cannot get away by simply keeping quiet and offering no explanation on the supposed premise that the burden to establish its case lies entirely upon the prosecution and there is no duty at all on the accused to offer. On the date of the occurrence, when the accused and his father Dashrath were in the house and when the father of the accused was found dead, it was for the accused to offer an explanation as to how his father sustained injuries. When the accused could not offer any explanation as to the homicidal death of his father, it is a strong circumstance against the accused that he is responsible for the commission of the crime.” 57. In AIR 1968 Bombay 127, in the case of “Palaiswamy Vaiyapuri vs. State”, the Division Bench of Hon. Bombay High Court has held that contention that medical evidence alone should be considered in deciding whether the death is violent or unnatural and further held that the conduct of accused and other circumstantial evidence were also held relevant in proving the guilt of the accused. The Division Bench has held as under: - “(9) The case for the prosecution solely rests upon circumstantial evidence. The principles relating to appreciation and evaluation of circumstantial evidence are well settled. In the first place, each of the circumstances on which the prosecution relies, must be affirmatively established. In the second place, these circumstances considered in their totality must be consistent and consistent only with the guilt of the accused. In the third place, the circumstances must be incompatible with the hypothesis of the innocence of the accused. In the first place, each of the circumstances on which the prosecution relies, must be affirmatively established. In the second place, these circumstances considered in their totality must be consistent and consistent only with the guilt of the accused. In the third place, the circumstances must be incompatible with the hypothesis of the innocence of the accused. The cases in which these principles have been propounded are legends and it is enough to cite a passage from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Govinda Reddy v. State of Mysore, AIR 1960 S.C. 28 : "In cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established, and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused." Before we deal with the circumstantial evidence led in this case, the first question for our consideration is whether the deceased, Palaniammal met with an unnatural death. If the prosecution fails to prove that Palaniammal died by unnatural causes, then it would be an end of the prosecution case. The question as to whether the deceased died an unnatural or a violent death is to be decided mainly with reference to the medical evidence and the medical authorities. Mr. Kode contended that the question as to whether the deceased met with a violent or unnatural death can only be decided with reference to the medical evidence. We are not prepared to accept this proposition as an absolute proposition of law. Wills in his famous book on the Principles of Circumstantial Evidence, 1912 edition, page 333 states: "In cases of homicide three propositions must be made out in order to establish the corpus delicti: (1) That a death has taken place. (2) That the deceased is identified with the person alleged to have been killed. Wills in his famous book on the Principles of Circumstantial Evidence, 1912 edition, page 333 states: "In cases of homicide three propositions must be made out in order to establish the corpus delicti: (1) That a death has taken place. (2) That the deceased is identified with the person alleged to have been killed. (3) That the death was due to unlawful violence or criminal negligence." "In the great majority of cases, the moral conduct of the person accused or suspected has little or nothing to do with the investigation of death, identity, or foul play, but it would be going too far to say that moral conduct of an accused or suspected person can have no bearing upon any of these questions". Again at page 401 the following passage appears: "The Lord Chief Justice, Lord Campbell, in his charge to the jury said that: 'in cases of this sort the evidence had often been divided into medical and normal evidence; the medical being that of the scientific men, and the moral the circumstantial facts which are calculated to prove the truth of the charge against the party accused. They cannot "be continued", be finally separated in the minds of the jury, because it is by the combination of the two species of evidence that their verdict ought to be found. . . . His Lordship also said; 'It is impossible that you should not pay attention to the conduct of the prisoner, and there are some instances of his conduct as to which 'you' will say whether they belong to what might be expected from an innocent or a guilty man.'" The propositions enunciated by Wills have been accepted by the Supreme Court in Anant Lagu v. State of Bombay,1960 CriLJ 682 Hidayatullah J., who delivered the judgment for the majority of the Court, stated; "Circumstantial evidence in this context means a combination of facts creating a net-work through which there is no escape for the accused, because the facts taken as a whole do not admit of any inference but of his guilt. To rely upon the findings of the medical man who conducted the post-mortem and of the chemical analyser as decisive of the matter is to render the other evidence entirely fruitless. While the circumstances often speak with unerring certainty the autopsy and the chemical analysis taken by themselves may be most misleading. To rely upon the findings of the medical man who conducted the post-mortem and of the chemical analyser as decisive of the matter is to render the other evidence entirely fruitless. While the circumstances often speak with unerring certainty the autopsy and the chemical analysis taken by themselves may be most misleading. No doubt, due weight must be given to the negative findings at such examinations. But, bearing in mind the difficult task which the man of medicine performs and the limitations under which he works his failure should not be taken as the end of the case, for on good and probative circumstances, an irresistible inference of guilt can be drawn". Indeed, there may be cases where the corpus delicti may not be forthcoming at all. To quote Wills again, at page 326 the learned author observes: "It is clearly established law that it is not necessary that the corpus delicti should be proved by direct and positive evidence, and it would be most unreasonable to require such evidence. Crimes, and especially those of the worst kinds, are naturally committed at chosen times, and in darkness and secrecy; and human tribunals must act upon such indications as the circumstances of the case present, or society must be broken up. Nor is it very often that adequate evidence is not afforded by the attendant and surrounding facts, to remove all mystery, and to afford such a reasonable degree of certainty as men are daily accustomed to regard as sufficient in the most important concerns of life; to expect more would be equally needless and absurd. Again, at page 328 the author observes: "It is enough if its existence the highly probable, particularly if the opposite party has it in his power to rebut it by evidence, and yet offers none; for then we have something like an admission that the presumption is just." It would thus be clear that the Court would be entitled to raise an inference about the unnaturalness of death on the basis of only circumstantial evidence. In this connection, the case of Mary Anna Nash reported in Criminal Appeal Reports, Vol. VI page 225, edited by Herman Cohen (Stevens and Haynes, Law Publishers), gives us a proper perspective. In this connection, the case of Mary Anna Nash reported in Criminal Appeal Reports, Vol. VI page 225, edited by Herman Cohen (Stevens and Haynes, Law Publishers), gives us a proper perspective. The facts of that case were as follows: On the 27th of June 1907 the appellant was charged with the murder of her illegitimate son, aged five years and nine months. The body was discovered in a well at Burbage in April 1908; an inquest was then held, quite close to the scene of the alleged murder and to the place where the appellant was then living. The features were unrecognisable, and decomposition was advanced. At that time, no evidence was forthcoming and no suggestion was made against the appellant. In October 1906, appellant removed the child from care of her father and placed him with Mrs. Mary Stagg, at Pewsey. She got behind in her payments, and on May 29, 1907, he was removed to a Mrs. Emma Stagg at Aughton, with whom appellant was herself then living. On the way the child was taken for a rest to the cottage of a Mrs. Taken for a rest to the cottage of a Mrs. Sherwood, which overlooks the field where the well is in which the body was afterwards found. Mr. Stagg objected to keeping the child, and one or two days after June 26, 1907, appellant took him away, saying she was going to the house of a Mrs. Hiller, near Marlborough. She returned the same evening without him, after an absence of about twelve hours; and then on several other occasions stated, untruly, as was admitted at the trial, that the boy was at Mr. Hiller's alive and well. Mrs. Sherwood, which overlooks the field where after the child was at her house she met him walking on the Aughton side of her cottage' i.e. going for Mrs. Stagg's house towards the well, and beyond that in the direction of Marlborough, and that he was accompanied by a woman whom she could not identify, but who was tall. . . . . . . In December 1907, two workmen, looking in to the well, saw something floating, which they took to be a dog; they could touch the water with a stick. They saw nothing else; no doubt the well was wider down below than at the aperture, which was 18 inches in diameter. . . . . . . In December 1907, two workmen, looking in to the well, saw something floating, which they took to be a dog; they could touch the water with a stick. They saw nothing else; no doubt the well was wider down below than at the aperture, which was 18 inches in diameter. The remains of dog were afterwards found in the well. The evidence was that if the body of the child was put in the well in June 1907 it must have been floating by December. In April, 1908, it was found by two other workmen, although a doctor was called in, he made no post mortem or other careful examination. There was no evidence even as to sex except from the general appearance and dress. There was nothing to show whether death was natural or violent, nor whether it occurred before or after the body was put into the well. It was conceded that a child of five or six years could lift the well cover, and might therefore, have fallen in accidentally. The Lord Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Darling and Mr. Justice Banker held: but we cannot accept that Mr. Goddard cannot have meant that there must be proof from the body itself of a violent death" In the famous Palmer's case where there was conflicting expert evidence on both the sides, Lord Campbell said that circumstantial evidence is all that can be reasonably expected and he pointed out that of the various heads of evidence in charges of poisoning that of moral conduct is of most general interest (see page 374 of Wills). At page 375 Wills says: "In most criminal charges, the evidence of the corpus delicti is separable from that which applies to the indication of the offender; but in cases of poisoning, it is often impossible to obtain conclusive evidence of the corpus delicti, irrespectively of the explanatory evidence or moral conduct: and Mr. Justice Buller, in Donnellan's case told the Jury that: If there was a doubt upon the evidence of the physical witnesses, they must take into their consideration all the other circumstances, either to show that there was some poison administered, or that there was not, and that every part of the prisoner's conduct was material to be considered" (Vide page 376 of Wills). Again at pages 376 and 377 Wills observes: "It is indeed, obvious that where the medical evidence is not conclusive as to the cause of death, evidence of facts tending to show that the accused person knew that poison had been administered is relevant to the question whether the deceased did in fact die of poison". It would thus be clear that even for the purpose of finding out as to whether death was unnatural, we can, and have got to take into account the conduct of the accused.” 58. The prosecution has duly proved that the deceased-Priyanka was killed due to cruelty and harassment for dowry. 59. The prosecution has proved the ingredients of cruelty and harassment in connection with demand of dowry immediately before the death of Priyanka. Section 113(3) of the Evidence Act is also applicable in the case. The deceased has died within seven years of her marriage. 60. The dead body of Priyanka was recovered from the rear seat of Santro car, as per the statements of PW1 Harendra Singh, PW2 Sandeep, PW3 Sohan Singh and PW8 Puran Singh Rana. The accused have not given any explanation why the dead body of Priyanka was lying in the car. The accused have not explained the circumstance why the dead body was lying in the car, even, in the statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. 61. Learned Trial Judge has overlooked this very vital fact that the dead body of Priyanka was recovered from the rear seat of the car and to which no explanation whatsoever has been given by the accused. 62. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused-respondent nos.1 to 3 has also argued that no independent witness was produced. However, it is settled law that statement of close-relatives can be relied upon but with due caution. 63. Their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court in (2017) 3 SCC 247 in the case of Arjun and another vs. State of Chhattisgarh, have held that where prosecution case rests upon evidence of related witness, court shall scrutinise evidence with care as a rule of prudence and not as a rule of law. The fact of witness being related to victim or deceased does not by itself discredit the evidence. Their Lordships have held as under :- “10. Shivprasad PW 6 is the real brother of the deceased. The fact of witness being related to victim or deceased does not by itself discredit the evidence. Their Lordships have held as under :- “10. Shivprasad PW 6 is the real brother of the deceased. PW 6 has deposed in his evidence that on 19-11-2006 at about 8.45 a.m., his brother Ayodhya Prasad alias Rahasu had gone to the field for cutting of trees along with four labourers who are eyewitnesses i.e. PWs 1, 2, 7 and 8 and at that time A-1 Lalaram, A-2 Padumlal and A-3 Arjun came there with katta and gandasa and surrounded the deceased, quarrelled with him and prevented him from cutting the tree. The accused told the deceased that they are the owners of the land and questioned him as to why he was cutting the tree. When the deceased replied that he was the owner of the tree and he had the right to cut the tree, there was wordy altercation between the accused and the deceased and the accused attacked him with the weapons they had, namely, katta, gandasa and a stone. The deceased sustained injuries on his head, neck, back and abdomen and fell down on the field. He further deposed that he witnessed the incident from near the shop and the distance between the shop and the place of occurrence is 15 to 20 ft and due to fear, he did not go near. 12. In Mano Dutt v. State of U.P., this Court held as under: (SCC p. 92, para 33) “33. The court can convict an accused on the statement of a sole witness, even if he was a relative of the deceased and thus, an interested party. The condition precedent to such an order is that the statement of such witness should satisfy the legal parameters stated by this Court in a catena of judgments. Once those parameters are satisfied and the statement of the witness is trustworthy, cogent and corroborated by other evidence produced by the prosecution, oral or documentary, then the court would not fall in error of law in relying upon the statement of such witness. It is only when the courts find that the single eyewitness is a wholly unreliable witness that his testimony is discarded in toto and no amount of corroboration can cure its defect. It is only when the courts find that the single eyewitness is a wholly unreliable witness that his testimony is discarded in toto and no amount of corroboration can cure its defect. Reference in this regard can be made to the judgment of this Court, in Anil Phukan v. State of Assam.” 64. In the present case, the statements of DW1 Dr. K.K. Aggarwal, DW2 Mamta Tyagi and DW4 Dr. Neera Chandra does not inspire confidence. They have issued false certificates to save the accused. Priyanka-deceased was never suffering from tuberculosis. This tendency on the part of private practitioners to issue false certificate is required to be curbed. 65. Consequently, the accused are found guilty under Section 304-B of IPC read with Sections 498-A and 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. 66. Accordingly, in view of the observations and discussion made hereinabove, the appeal is allowed. The judgment dated 08.02.2017 is set-aside. The accused-respondents, namely, Sandeep Kumar, Bhundiya Singh and Smt. Harpali Devi are convicted under Section 304(B) of IPC, Section 498-A of IPC and 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. 67. Let the convicts be produced before the Court for hearing on the quantum of sentence on July 21, 2017. Production warrant be accordingly prepared by the Registry of the Court ensuring the presence of the convicts for hearing on the quantum of sentence on the next date fixed. 68. Put up on July 21, 2017 for further orders. 69. However before parting with the judgment, it is directed that all the medical certificates and information supplied by the private practitioners throughout the State of Uttarakhand shall be countersigned by the respective CMO of the District to be relied/proved upon during the criminal as well as civil trials.