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2017 DIGILAW 386 (RAJ)

Rameshwar Jat v. Anchi Devi Jat

2017-02-02

VEERENDR SINGH SIRADHANA

body2017
JUDGMENT Veerendr Singh Siradhana, J. - By order dated 29th July, 2011, the Additional District Judge No. 1, Sikar, while allowing the appeal of the non-appellants No. 1 to 4, remanded the matter to the trial Court for decision afresh impleading the non-appellants No. 1 to 4, as a party to the suit proceedings, who were not impleaded as party defendant. 2. Briefly, the essential skeletal material facts necessary for appreciation of the controversy are that the plaintiff-appellant-Rameshwar, instituted suit proceedings on 25th October, 2005, impleading non-appellant No. 5-Anchi Devi, Subhash and other nonappellants No. 7 to 11, for declaration of right of way and permanent injunction. Nonappellants No. 1 to 4 were not impleaded as party to the suit proceedings. It is pleaded case of the plaintiff-appellant that temporary injunction was granted on 28th March, 2006, against non-appellants No. 5 and 6 by the trial Court. Pending the proceedings before the trial Court, non-appellants No. 1 to 4 purchased the subject land from nonappellants No. 5 and 6 on 7th December, 2006, without permission of the trial Court and without knowledge of the plaintiff-appellant contrary to the mandate of section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (for short, ''the Act of 1882). The trial Court decreed the suit vide judgment and decree dated 29th May, 2010; with a declaration and an order of permanent injunction against non-appellants No. 5, and 6 and in favour of the plaintiff-appellant. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant, reiterating the pleaded facts and grounds of the memo of appeal, asserted that the rights of the plaintiff-appellant could not be transferred pending the suit proceedings in the face of contemplation under Section 52 of the Act of 1882. 4. It is further urged that non-appellants No. 5 and 6, namely Jhamri Devi and Subhash, did not file any appeal against the judgment and decree dated 29th May, 2010, within the statutory period of limitation of thirty days as contemplated under Article 116(b) of the Limitation Act, 1963 or even thereafter. Thus, in view of the contemplation under section 35 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (for short, ''the Act of 1963'') read with section 11 CPC; the judgment and decree dated 29th May, 2010, became final and binding on the parties to the suit proceedings. 5. Thus, in view of the contemplation under section 35 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (for short, ''the Act of 1963'') read with section 11 CPC; the judgment and decree dated 29th May, 2010, became final and binding on the parties to the suit proceedings. 5. Further, the non-appellants No. 1 to 4, the transferees-pendente-lite of non-appellants No. 5 and 6; are bound by the judgment and decree dated 29th May, 2010, and therefore, the appeal instituted before the Court below after expiry of period of statutory limitation, and that too after 12 months, was not maintainable. The appeal, therefore, ought to have been dismissed in the face of contemplation under section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 6. Moreover, the transferees-Pendante-lite dishonestly manipulated and obtained a wrong report from the office of the lower appellate Court to the effect that the appeal was instituted within the period of limitation. Thus, the appeal was illegally admitted for hearing without any notice to the plaintiff-appellant as to the issue of limitation. In support of his submissions, reliance is placed on the opinion in the case of Bibi Zubaida Khatoon vs. Nabi Hassan Saheb and another with Amichand Aggarwal vs. Nabi Hasan: AIR 2004 SC 173 , Narbada Devi Gupta vs. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal and another: AIR 2004 SC 175 , Shankarrao Goindrao Naik vs. Kisanlal Nagarmal and others: AIR 1950 Madhya Bharti 19, Jagdish Chandra Sinha and another vs. Maharajadhiraj Dr. Sir Kameshwar Singh Bahadur and others: AIR 1953 Patna 178 (Vol. 40, C.N. 61), Forbesganj Jagdish Mill Ltd. vs. Kaloram: AIR 1985 Patna 212, Subramania Gurukal and ors. vs. Arulmighu Thirumaleswaraswamy Deity and another: AIR 1984 Madras 217, Chothy Theyyathan vs. John Thomas and ors: AIR 1997 Kerala 249, Jitendralal Dattaroy and another vs. Bharat Loan Co., Ltd.: 1956 Assam 116 (AIR V 43 C 33 July), Rahim Bux vs. State of Rajasthan & Others: SBCWP Nos. 269 & 271/1977, decided on 23rd August, 1977, Chacko Pyll vs. Iype Varghese: 1956 TRAV-CO 147 (S) AIR V 43 C 55 June), Dhanna Singh and ors. vs. Baljinder Kaur and ors.: AIR 1997 SC 3720 , Koyappathodi M. Ayisha Umma vs. State of Kerala: AIR 1991 SC 2027 , Krishna Reddy and ors. vs. The Special Dy. Collector, Land Acquisition Unit II, LMD Karimnagar, Andhra Pradesh: AIR 1988 SC 2123 and Bechan Pandey and ors. vs. Baljinder Kaur and ors.: AIR 1997 SC 3720 , Koyappathodi M. Ayisha Umma vs. State of Kerala: AIR 1991 SC 2027 , Krishna Reddy and ors. vs. The Special Dy. Collector, Land Acquisition Unit II, LMD Karimnagar, Andhra Pradesh: AIR 1988 SC 2123 and Bechan Pandey and ors. vs. Dulhin Janki Devi and ors.: AIR 1976 SC 866 . 7. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, Transferees-Pendante-lite could not have instituted the appeal before the lower Appellate Court without association of nonappellant No. 5 and 6 as co-appellants. Neither the non-appellant No. 1 to 4, were vested with any right to institute an appeal nor the appeal was instituted within the statutory period of limitation. Further, no sufficient cause was detailed out for not instituting the appeal within the statutory period of limitation. Thus, the lower Appellate Court, without any application of mind as to the sufficient cause for the delay as well as without granting any leave to appeal; entertained and adjudicated upon the appeal vide impugned order dated 29th July, 2011, in arbitrary and illegal manner while remanding the matter to the trial Court to implead non-appellant No. 1 to 4 as defendants to the suit proceedings and made an order for re-trial of the case, thus, giving a new lease of life to the litigation. Moreover, the impugned order dated 29th July, 2011, has been made without setting aside the impugned judgment and decree made by the trial Court dated 29th May, 2010. 8. The transferees-pendante lite are neither necessary nor proper parties to the proceedings in view of the opinion of the Supreme Court in the case of Bibi Subaida Khatoon, Jagdish Chandra Sinha and Rahim Bux (Supra). Thus, there is no infraction of principles of natural justice, which may necessitate re-trial of the matter impleading nonappellant No. 1 to 4 as party defendants to the proceedings. For non-appellant No. 1 to 4, stepped into the shoes of transferrers i.e. Non-appellant No. 5 and 6, and therefore, are not entitled to lead or adduce any evidence, as has been observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Dhann Singh (Supra). 9. For non-appellant No. 1 to 4, stepped into the shoes of transferrers i.e. Non-appellant No. 5 and 6, and therefore, are not entitled to lead or adduce any evidence, as has been observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Dhann Singh (Supra). 9. Referring to the text of order under Order 41, Rule 23 and 23A CPC, learned counsel would submit that the judgment and decree made by the trial Court could be interfered with by an order of remand in case case the judgment and decree was found to be totally erroneous or un-intelligible. Hence, the order of remand made by the lower Appellate Court is bad in the eye of law on that count as well. 10. Per contra; Mr. Mohan Choudhary, Advocate, appearing for non-appellant No. 1 to 4, while supporting the impugned order dated 29th July, 2011, asserted that the appellants being lispendense transferees though not having been joined to the suit proceedings as parties; the decree and judgment made in favour of the appellant dated 29th May, 2010, could not be executed against them. The non-appellants No. 1 to 4, were within their legal right in instituting the appeal, being persons aggrieved, that has been adjudicated upon by the lower Appellate Court vide impugned judgment and decree dated 29th July, 2011. In support of his stand, he has relied upon the opinions of the Supreme Court in the case of Raj Kumar vs. Sardari Lal: 2004 (2) SCC 601 , State of Punjab (now Haryana) and Ors. vs. Amar Singh and another: AIR 1974 SC 994 and Smt. Jatan Kanwar Golcha vs. M/s. Golcha Properties Private Ltd.,: AIR 1971 SC 374 . 11. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and with their assistance perused the materials available on record as well as gave my thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions at Bar so also carefully scanned the impugned judgment and order dated 29th July, 2011. 12. Undeniably, the plaintiff-appellant-Rameshwar instituted the suit proceedings on 25th October, 2005, impleading non-appellant No. 5 to 11 as defendants to the suit proceedings. It is also not disputed that non-appellant No. 1 to 4, were not parties to the suit proceedings, which were adjudicated upon by the trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 29th May, 2010, decreeing the suit of the plaintiff/appellant. It is also not disputed that non-appellant No. 1 to 4, were not parties to the suit proceedings, which were adjudicated upon by the trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 29th May, 2010, decreeing the suit of the plaintiff/appellant. From the materials available on record, it is reflected that non-appellant No. 5 and 6, transferred the subject land involved herein to non-appellant No. 1 to 4, pending the suit proceedings on 7th December, 2006, without permission of the trial Court and without knowledge of the plaintiff/appellant in the face of a Temporary Injunction order made on 28th March, 2006, contrary to the mandate of section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (for short, ''the Act of 1882''). 13. Further, the judgment and decree made by the lower Appellate Court on 29th May, 2010, with the declaration an order of injunction against non-appellant No. 5 and 6 in favour of the plaintiff/appellant, was not subjected to any appeal by the original defendant non-appellant No. 5 and 6, within the period of statutory limitation of 30 days, as contemplated under section 116(b) of the Limitation Act, 1963. Moreover, the nonappellant No. 1 to 4, instituted appeal before the lower Appellate Court after the statutory period of limitation of 30 days. However, the appeal was reported to be within the statutory period of limitation by manipulation and fraud played by the non-appellant No. 1 to 4. Counsel for the appellant from the materials available on record as referred to and relied upon, substantiated that the appeal was not instituted within the statutory period of limitation of thirty days before the lower Appellate Court. 14. In the case of Forbesganj Jagdish Mill Ltd. (Supra), on a survey of opinions of Privy Council in the case of Krishnaswami Panikondar vs. Ramawami Chettiar: AIR 1917 P.C. 179 and Sunderbai vs. Collector, Balgaum: AIR 1918 PC 135 and other opinions of Patna High Court observed thus: "4. Mr. N.K. Agrawal appearing in support of the appeal contended that the order of admission of the appeal by the Court below, although ex parte, concludes the question of limitation which could not have been reopened by the Court below. He has relied on the observation in Murugappa Naicker vs. Thayammal: AIR 1923 Mad 82. Mr. N.K. Agrawal appearing in support of the appeal contended that the order of admission of the appeal by the Court below, although ex parte, concludes the question of limitation which could not have been reopened by the Court below. He has relied on the observation in Murugappa Naicker vs. Thayammal: AIR 1923 Mad 82. It cannot be denied that an order condoning delay in filing an appeal adversely affects the respondent and he has a right to be heard before a final order in this regard can be passed. To deny such a right will amount to serious violation of the principles of natural justice. With great respect, I, therefore, venture, to differ from the observation made by the Madras Court and hold that where an ex parte order has been passed admitting a time barred application without giving an opportunity to the respondent to contest the matter, the order must be deemed to be subject to the right of the respondent in this regard Relying on the observation of the Privy Council in Krishnaswami Panikondar vs. Ramasami Chettiar, AIR 1917 P.C. 179 and Sunderbai vs. Collector, Balgaum, AIR 1918 PC 135 , the Punjab High Court has in Om Sarup Nand Lal vs. Gur Narain, AIR 1965 Punj 367 expressed a similar view." 15. In the case of Shankarrao Govindrao Naik (Supra), a Division Bench of Madhya Bharat, observed that sub-lessee alone would be incompetent to institute appeal when the same became final against the lessee. It will be relevant to consider the text of Para No. 4, which reads thus: "4. In reply the learned Counsel for the Respondent contended that the present Appellant being a sub-lessee, had no right of appeal at all as there was no privity of contract as between him and the Plaintiffs. It was urged that it was the lessee (the Receiver) and not be who were adversely affected by the decree and therefore he had no right of appeal. It was further argued that the Appellant was not even a necessary party to a suit for ejectment and a decree for ejectment passed against his lessor, would have been binding on him even if he had not been impleaded. In support of this contention reliance was placed on Jethanand vs. Joint Hindu Family of Udho Das AIR 1931 Lahore 614 :(131 I.C. 121), and Yusuf vs. Jyotish Chandra, A.I.R. 1932 Cal. In support of this contention reliance was placed on Jethanand vs. Joint Hindu Family of Udho Das AIR 1931 Lahore 614 :(131 I.C. 121), and Yusuf vs. Jyotish Chandra, A.I.R. 1932 Cal. 241: (137 I.C. 139). The ruling in Jethanand vs. Joint Hindu Family of Udho Das AIR 1931 Lahore 614: (131 I.C. 121), is distinguishable as the suit therein was only for arrears of rent. In the present case the Plaintiff had sued for ejectment. The Appellant was in actual possession of the Cinema, house. It is true that according to Yusuf vs. Jyotish Chandra, A.I.R. 1932 Cal. 241 : (137 I.C. 139), a decree passed against the lessor would have been binding on the sub-lessee even if he had not been impleaded but at the same time even if the Appellant was not a necessary party to the suit, it cannot be said that be was not a proper party as he was in actual possession and the Plaintiff''s were interested in evicting him. The Plaintiffs having chosen to implead the Appellant and having got a decree of ejectment against him, it cannot be maintained that the Appellant is not adversely affected by the decree. Therefore I am of opinion that the Appellant has a right of appeal but the more important question whether the Appellant can succeed when the decree of ejectment as against his lessors (the receivers) has become final. The Appellant as the sub-lessee derived his rights from the lessors. The Receiver filed no appeal against the decree of the Courts below and the decree has, therefore, clearly become final. The Receivers lease has, in the circumstances, determined and the sub-lessee cannot, therefore any longer claim any rights, based upon that lease see Bamhissendas vs. Binjraj, 60 Cal. 419 : (A.I.R. 1923 Cal. 691). In the circumstances the Appellant must be held to be bound by the decree against the Receivers which has become final on the principle of the second part of section 115, Transfer of Property Act. As a result it also follows that the Appellant cannot now take up any defences which might have been open to the Receivers if they had appealed. According to Yusuf vs. Jyotish Chandra, A.I.R. 1932 Cal. As a result it also follows that the Appellant cannot now take up any defences which might have been open to the Receivers if they had appealed. According to Yusuf vs. Jyotish Chandra, A.I.R. 1932 Cal. 241 : (137 I.C. 139), a decree passed against the Receivers would have been binding on the Appellant even if he had not been a party and could have been executed against him under Order 21, Rule 35, Code of Civil Procedure. His position can be no better in the present case, as the decree of ejectment against the Receivers has become final." 16. Similar view was also expressed by another Division Bench of the Patna High Court in the case of Jagdish Chandra Sinha and another (Supra), wherein interest of shebaits devolving on heirs during pendency of suit-Heirs not applying to be substituted. In such circumstances, they could not subsequently take advantage of their own omission. Here text of Para No. 8 of the judgment, is relevant, which reads thus: "8. The first two contentions of Mr. Muzumdar in regard to the suit being bad for defect of parties and the non-representation of the deity or the debottar estate in the Title Suit of 1916 can be easily disposed of. The defendants alleged that some of the ''shebaits'' of the deity have not been impleaded in the present suit. The cause of title of (?) the plaint shows that only three persons have been arrayed in the category of defendants first party as ''shebaits'' of Shree Shree Ishwar Thakur Krishna Chandramajee Malik Debottar Estate, are Kumar Jagdish Chandra Singli, (sic) Arun Chandra Singh and Rani Haresh (sic) Dasi, executrix of the estate of Raja Man (sic) Chandra Singh Bahadur. The evidence (sic) Arun Chandra Singh (D. W. 1) defendant (sic) the action is that Kumar Bimal Chandra (sic) Kumar Amaresh Chandra Singh and Kumar Brindaban Chandra Singh, although shebaits were not included in the suit. It is essential that where an objection is raised to the frame of the suit on account of defect of parties it should be done at the earliest possible opportunity and the names of the persons omitted should be specifically mentioned so as to enable the other side to add those persons as parties to the suit if necessary. It is essential that where an objection is raised to the frame of the suit on account of defect of parties it should be done at the earliest possible opportunity and the names of the persons omitted should be specifically mentioned so as to enable the other side to add those persons as parties to the suit if necessary. If this is not done, the objection would be deemed to have been waived, and the fundamental rule is that suit shall be defeated by reason of the (sic) joinder or nonjoinder of the parties (see Order, Rule 1 and Rule 13, Civil P. C.)." 17. The issue of necessary parties in the case of transferee/pendente lite fell for consideration before the Apex Court of the land in the case of Bibi Zubaida Khatoon (Supra), wherein the Supreme Court under paragraphs 9 to 12, held thus: "9. It is not disputed that the present petitioner purchased the property during tendency of the suit and without seeking leave of the court as required by section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act The petitioner being a transferee pendente lite without leave of the court cannot, as of right, seek impleadment as a party in the suits which are long pending since 1983. It is true that when the application for joinder based on transfer pendente lite is made, the transferee should ordinarily be joined as party to enable him to protect his interest. But in instant case, the trial court has assigned cogent reasons for rejecting such joinder stating that the suit is long pending since 1983 and prima facie the action of the alienation does not appear to be bona fide. The trial court saw an attempt on the part of the petitioner to complicate and delay the pending suits. 10. The decisions cited and relied on behalf of the appellant turned on the facts of each of those cases. They are distinguishable. There is no absolute rule that the transferee pendente-lite without leave of the court should in all cases be allowed to join and contest the pending suits. The decision relied on behalf of the contesting respondents of this court in the case of Savinder Singh (supra) fully supports them in their contentions. They are distinguishable. There is no absolute rule that the transferee pendente-lite without leave of the court should in all cases be allowed to join and contest the pending suits. The decision relied on behalf of the contesting respondents of this court in the case of Savinder Singh (supra) fully supports them in their contentions. After quoting section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, the relevant observations are thus :- "section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act envisages that :- ''During the pendency in any court having authority within the limits of India ..... of any suit or proceeding which is not collusive and in which any right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or proceeding so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto under the decree or order which may be made therein, except under the authority of the court and on such terms as it may impose.'' It would, therefore, be clear that the defendants in the suit were prohibited by operation of Section 52 to deal with the property and could not transfer or otherwise deal with it in any way affecting the rights of the appellant except with the order or authority of the court. Admittedly, the authority or order of the court had not been obtained for alienation of those properties. Therefore, the alienation obviously would be hit by the doctrine of lis pendens by operation of Section 52. Under these circumstances, the respondents cannot be considered to be either necessary or proper parties to the suit." 11. In case of Dhurandhar Prasad Singh(supra), observations relevant for the purpose of these appeals read thus :- "Where a party does not ask for leave, he takes the obvious risk that the suit may not be property conducted by the plaintiff on record, yet he will be bound by the result of the litigation even though he is not represented at the hearing unless it is shown that the litigation was not properly conducted by the original party or he colluded with the adversary. 12. 12. The above statement of law by this Court in the cases (supra) clearly shows that the trial court has rightly exercised its discretion in rejecting the three applications for impleadment of the transferee-pendente-lite as party to the suits and for amendment of the pleadings. The High Court was also justified in refusing to interfere with the order of the trial court. Consequently, there is absolutely no merit in any of these appeals. They are, accordingly, dismissed with costs to be borne by the petitioner of the contesting respondents." 18. The controversy raised herein may not detain by this Court for long in view of the adjudication by the Apex Court in the case of Raj Kumar (Supra), wherein the Supreme Court while examining the scope of Section 52 of the Act of 1882 and rights as well as obligations of the parties in the backdrop of the contemplation under Order 22, Rule 10 CPC observed that bringing of a lis pendens transferee on record is not as of right but in the discretion of the Court. However, though not brought on record, the lis pendens transferee remains bound by the decree. 19. The issue of limitation which has been much stressed by the counsel for the appellant has not been considered by the lower Appellate Court while making the impugned order dated 29th July, 2011, affording an opportunity to the appellant owing to the fact that the appeal was reported to be instituted within the statutory period of limitation, which appears to be a factually wrong reporting on the appeal before the lower Appellate Court. 20. In the case of Raj Kumar (Supra), the Supreme Court referring to the contemplation under Order 9, Rule 13, Order 22, Rule 10 and section 146 CPC, held that the word ''he'' in Order 9, Rule 13, cannot be rigidity construed so as to exclude the person, who has stepped into the shoes of the defendant. At this juncture, it will be relevant to take note of the text of paragraphs 8, 10 and 12, which reads thus: "8. A lis pendens transferee from the defendant, though not arrayed as a party in the suit, is still a person claiming under the defendant. At this juncture, it will be relevant to take note of the text of paragraphs 8, 10 and 12, which reads thus: "8. A lis pendens transferee from the defendant, though not arrayed as a party in the suit, is still a person claiming under the defendant. The same principle of law is recognized in a different perspective by Rule 16 of Order 21 of the CPC which speaks of transfer or assignment inter vivos or by operation of law made by the plaintiff-decree-holder. The transferee may apply for execution of the decree of the Court which passed it and the decree will be available for execution in the same manner and subject to the same conditions as if the application were made by the decree-holder. It is interesting to note that a provision like section 146 of the CPC was not to be found in the preceding Code and was for the first time incorporated in the CPC of 1908. In Order 21, Rule 16 also an explanation was inserted through amendment made by Act No. 104 of 1976 w.e.f. 1.2.1977 whereby the operation of section 146 CPC was allowed to prevail independent of Order 21, Rule 16 CPC. 10. The law laid down by a four-Judges Bench of this Court in Saila Bala Dassi vs. Nirmala Sundari Dassi is apt for resolving the issue arising for decision herein. A transferee of property from defendant during the pendency of the suit sought himself to be brought on record at the stage of appeal. The High Court dismissed the application as it was pressed only by reference to Order 22, Rule 10 of the CPC and it was conceded by the applicant that, not being a person who had obtained a transfer pending appeal, he was not covered within the scope of Order 22, Rule 10. In an appeal preferred by such transferee this Court upheld the view of the High Court that a transferee prior to the filing of the appeal could not be brought on record in appeal by reference to Order 22, Rule 10 of the CPC. However, the Court held that an appeal is a proceeding for the purpose of Section 146 and further the expression "claiming under" is wide enough to include cases of devolution and assignment mentioned in Order 22, Rule 10. However, the Court held that an appeal is a proceeding for the purpose of Section 146 and further the expression "claiming under" is wide enough to include cases of devolution and assignment mentioned in Order 22, Rule 10. Whoever is entitled to be but has not been brought on record under Order 22, Rule 10 in a pending suit or proceeding would be entitled to prefer an appeal against the decree or order passed therein if his assignor could have filed such an appeal, there being no prohibition against it in the Code. A person having acquired an interest in suit property during the pendency of the suit and seeking to be brought on record at the stage of the appeal can do so by reference to section 146 of the CPC which provision being a beneficent provision should be construed liberally and so as to advance justice and not in a restricted or technical sense. Their Lordships held that being a purchaser pendente lite, a person will be bound by the proceedings taken by the successful party in execution of decree and justice requires that such purchaser should be given an opportunity to protect his rights. 12. In Sardar Govindrao Mahadik vs. Devi Sahai, this Court held that an application not falling under Order 22, Rule 10 of the CPC stricto sensu could yet be held to be maintainable by having recourse to section 146 of the CPC." 21. From the factual matrix and materials available on record, it is not in dispute that the non-appellant No. 1 to 4, purchased the suit property pending the suit proceedings; and therefore, they are bound by the judgment and decree made by the trial Court dated 29th May, 2010, subject to the rights and obligations, which would be available to them as a consequence of they stepped into the shoes of the original defendants i.e. non appellant No. 5 and 6. 22. The lower Appellate Court has not gone into the issues specifically raised before this Court including the fact that the appeal instituted was not within the statutory period of limitation though it was reported to the contrary. Further, an application for condonation of delay being available on record, which has been annexed with the instant appeal as Annexure-2, substantiate this fact. Further, an application for condonation of delay being available on record, which has been annexed with the instant appeal as Annexure-2, substantiate this fact. The lower Appellate Court by a cryptic order remanded the matter for hearing afresh with a direction to implead non-appellant No. 1 to 4, as party to the suit proceedings, giving a new lease of life to the litigation. 23. For the reasons and discussions aforesaid, this misc. appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned order dated 29th July, 2011, is quashed and the matter is remanded back to the lower Appellate Court for decision afresh, in accordance with law. 24. Since the matter is old; the lower Appellate Court would expedite the disposal of the appeal, as expeditiously as possible, preferably within six months from the date a certified copy of this order is presented. 25. The parties are directed to appear before the lower Appellate Court on 27th February, 2017. 26. No costs.