JUDGMENT & ORDER : This second appeal is directed against the appellate decree dated 17-6-2013 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Court No. 5, West Tripura, Agartala in Title Appeal No. 46 of 2012 affirming the original decree dated 27-8-2012 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Court No. 1, Agartala in Title Suit No. 87 of 2008 decreeing the suit. 2. While admitting the appeal, this Court formulated the following questions as substantial questions of law for hearing: “1. Whether the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court suffers from perversity? 2. Whether the provisions embodied in Section 53-A of the T.P. Act has been wrongly construed and applied by the Courts below?” 3. Before proceeding further, the facts giving rise to this appeal may be briefly noticed. The appellant is the defendant No. 2 in the suit, while the respondent No. 1 and the respondent No. 2 are the plaintiff and the defendant No. 1 respectively. For simplification, I will refer to the appellant as the defendant No. 2 and the respondent No. 1 and 2 as the plaintiff and Defendant No. 2 respectively. According to the plaintiff (Meghnad Saha), he is the elder brother of the defendant No. 1, who offered to sell to him one of the rooms of his building situate at Sakuntala Road Extension, Agartala, West Tripura as he was badly in need of money. On getting this offer, the plaintiff consulted his other brothers. On 24-3-2008, the defendant No. 1 was called to the hut of one Jitendra Chandra Saha, who is one of the brothers, in the presence of his two other brothers and in that meeting, it was agreed that the plaintiff would purchase the suit room from the defendant No. 1 for a price of Rs.5,00,000/- and that 10% of the consideration money was to be paid by the plaintiff as earnest money (advance) for the sale. On receiving the earnest money of Rs.50,000/- from the plaintiff, the defendant No. 1 informed the plaintiff that the balance amount of Rs.4,50,000/- might be paid to him within a period of one year as the suit room was then under the occupation of a tenant, namely, ANC Trader, and he would execute a registered sale deed in his favour after the said tenant vacated the suit room. 4. 4. The plaintiff, in good faith, accepted the verbal offer of sale made by the defendant No. 1 in the presence of their other brothers. However, on 24- 9-2008, the plaintiff, much to his surprise, came across a notice published in Dainik Sambad declaring therein that the defendant No. 2 had agreed to purchase the suit room from the defendant No. 1 and, as such, any person objecting it might inform him. The plaintiff, therefore, sent a notice through his advocate on 29-9-2008 to the defendant No. 1 with a copy to the defendant No. 2 and others indicating therein the oral agreement dated 24- 3-2008 made by him with the defendant No. 1 as well as payment of Rs.50,000/- made by him to the former for the purchase of the suit room. The defendant No. 1, however, in his reply dated 3-10-2008 disputed the contents of the said notice dated 29-9-2008 whereupon the plaintiff approached him on 7-10-2008 and reminded him about the receipt by him of the earnest money of Rs.50,000/- from him (plaintiff) for the purchase of suit room. The defendant No. 1 refused to oblige the plaintiff. On the contrary, on 12-11-2008, the defendant No. 1 met the plaintiff at his residential hut, apprised him that he had agreed to sell the suit room to the defendant No. 2 for the price of Rs.7,50,000/- and was, therefore, in no mood to sell the same to him at a lower price. Aggrieved by this, the plaintiff instituted the suit in question before the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Court No. 1, Agartala against the defendant No. 1 for specific performance of the agreement made on 24-3-2008 by and between them for the sale of the suit room, for registering a sale deed in his favour and for issuing a perpetual injunction to restrain him from selling the suit room to a third party. 5. On receiving summons, the defendants appeared before the trial court and contested the suit by filing their respective written statements. 5. On receiving summons, the defendants appeared before the trial court and contested the suit by filing their respective written statements. In his written statement, the defendant No. 1 admitted that he was called to the dwelling hut of the said Jitendra Chandra Saha, one of the brothers of the plaintiff, at about 9-30 AM on 24-3-2008, and in that meeting between him and the plaintiff, two other brothers of the plaintiff, namely, Shri Gautam Saha and Shri Uttam Saha were also present and that a discussion was held for sale of the suit room. He further admitted that he had agreed to sell the suit room to the plaintiff at the negotiated price of Rs.5,00,000/- and 10% of the negotiated price amounting to Rs.50,000/- was paid by the plaintiff to and received by him, but no written agreement was executed between them so much so that there was no contract between them, which could be enforceable by law. The answering defendant also averred that he had informed the plaintiff that the balance amount of Rs.4,50,000/- would be received by him within a period of one year as he was not then in a position to deliver possession of the suit room, which was under the occupation of a tenant, namely, ANC Traders. He had thought then that he would execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff after his tenant vacated the suit room, but when the plaintiff did not make any contact with him after payment of the said Rs.50,000/- or did not show any interest in purchasing the same for several months, he was under the bona fide impression that the plaintiff would no longer purchase the same from him. As the plaintiff is his elder brother, he did not find it decent or proper to put pressure on him to purchase the suit room on payment of the full price. On the other hand, he was in dire need of money in terms of lakhs for the admission of his second daughter in a renowned management institute of New Delhi. So, he honestly thought of refunding the said amount of Rs.50,000/- already paid to him as earnest money on 24-3-2008 and sell the suit room to a third party on the basis of the prevailing market price. So, he honestly thought of refunding the said amount of Rs.50,000/- already paid to him as earnest money on 24-3-2008 and sell the suit room to a third party on the basis of the prevailing market price. He had sincerely hoped that the plaintiff, being his elder brother, would appreciate his genuine difficulty and would not stand in the way of disposing of the suit room to a third party of his choice. It was under the aforesaid circumstances that he made an agreement with the defendant No. 2 on 26-9-2008 to sell the suit room to him by executing a registered sale deed within the period of the agreement on receipt of the full consideration money. 6. It is also averred by the defendant No. 1 that he did not enter into any written agreement with the plaintiff for sale of the suit room, whereas he made a written agreement with the defendant No. 2 for sale of the suit room and the plaintiff could not, therefore, enforce the oral agreement by canceling out the said written agreement so executed. According to the answering defendant, after filing of the instant suit, he informed the defendant No. 2 that he was ready to return the amount of Rs.3,00,000/- received by him as earnest money in view of the pending suit instituted against him. He again sent a letter to the defendant No. 2 on 3-1-2009 by a registered post with A/D reiterating his earlier offer, but he did not make any response. It is the case of the defendant No. 1 that he had no mala fide intention in the transaction and was even ready to refund the said amount of Rs.50,000/- already received by to the plaintiff if he would agree to abandon the oral sale agreement so as to avoid unnecessary family dispute and protracted litigation. He, therefore, submitted that the suit was not maintainable, and was liable to be dismissed with cost. 7. He, therefore, submitted that the suit was not maintainable, and was liable to be dismissed with cost. 7. The defendant No. 2, in his written statement, while denying the existence of any oral agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant No. 1 for sale of the suit room or of the payment of Rs.50,000/- by the plaintiff to the defendant No. 1 as earnest money, avers that he and the defendant No. 1 are close neighbors as he is doing business across the suit room under the name and style of “Amar Graphics”, and he was looking for a suitable accommodation to expand his business. When the defendant No. 1 offered to sell the suit room to him in the 2nd week of September, 2008, he found the offer quite attractive and accordingly expressed his readiness to accept the offer provided there was no impediment. He, therefore, issued a public notice through the Dainik Sambad in its issue dated 24-9-2008 notifying that he had agreed to purchase the suit room from the defendant No. 1 and if anybody has any claim over the same, he should contact his counsel, Mr. Rajib Choudhury, Advocate within seven days. The counsel for the plaintiff contacted and informed him that there was already an oral agreement for sale of the suit room to the plaintiff on 24-3-2008 by paying an earnest money of Rs.50,000/-. When he confronted the defendant No. 1 with the notice, the latter strongly denied the execution of such an agreement whereupon he executed the said written agreement with him for purchase of the suit room for a consideration of Rs.7,50,000/-, for which he paid him (defendant No. 1) a sum of Rs.3,00,000/- as advance by obtaining written acknowledgement bearing dated 26-9-2008 from him. By this written agreement, it was agreed upon that the defendant No. 1 would transfer his right, title and interest with possession of the suit room in favor of the defendant No. 2 by a registered sale deed at a consideration of Rs.7,50,000/-. It was further agreed upon that the balance of Rs.4,50,000/- would be paid by him on or before 25-3-2009 where after the defendant No. 1 would execute a registered sale deed in his favor. 8. It was further agreed upon that the balance of Rs.4,50,000/- would be paid by him on or before 25-3-2009 where after the defendant No. 1 would execute a registered sale deed in his favor. 8. It is also averred by the defendant No. 2 that on 26-9-2008, possession of the suit room was delivered to him, who has since then been possessing the same by setting up the said Graphics business and Fast Food outlet with an investment of at least Rs.30,00,000/-. He has also displayed the sign board of his business in front of the suit room. To facilitate his induction, the said ANC Traders vacated the suit room where after the same was delivered to him. The answering defendant denies that there was any cause of action for the suit. The defendant No. 1 is bound to execute a registered sale deed in his favor in terms of the said agreement of sale, for which he has already paid Rs.3,00,000/- as an advance. The plaintiff has no locus standi to challenge the transfer of the suit room by the defendant No. 1 in his favor. It is also averred by the answering defendant that apart from Rs.3,00,000/- already invested by him, he has already purchased a machine for running a fast food outlet in the suit room by incurring another sum of Rs.17,00,000/-, and without execution of sale deed by the defendant No. 1, it would be very difficult for him to run his business in the suit room. It is submitted that the relief for specific performance of contract is a discretionary relief and even if there is any oral contract for sale of the suit room to the plaintiff also, which is denied, the court may decline to grant the relief when no equity lies in his favor. However, there is no contract at all between the defendant No. 1 and the plaintiff for sale of the suit room. The suit has no merit and is liable to be dismissed. These are the sum and substance of the case of the defendant No. 2. 9. On the pleadings of the parties, the trial court framed the following issues for hearing in the suit: 1. Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form and nature? 2. The suit has no merit and is liable to be dismissed. These are the sum and substance of the case of the defendant No. 2. 9. On the pleadings of the parties, the trial court framed the following issues for hearing in the suit: 1. Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form and nature? 2. Whether the plaintiff has any oral contract with the defendant No. 1 for selling the suit property to him at a price of Rs.5,00,000/- ? 3. Whether the oral contract so claimed by the plaintiff is valid and enforceable by law and whether the defendant No. 1 suppressed the oral contract to the defendant No. 2 at the time of signing the written contract with him? 4. Whether the defendant No. 2 made any agreement for sale of the suit property suppressing the oral contract between the plaintiff and the defendant No 1? 5. Whether the plaintiff made any part payment of Rs.50,000/- to the defendant No. 1 as earnest money? 6. Whether the defendant No. 1 after taking earnest money in consideration of the agreement to sell has handed over possession of the suit land in favour of the defendant no. 2? 7. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get a decree? 8. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get any relief as prayed for? 10. In the course of trial, four witnesses were examined on behalf of the plaintiff by affidavit-in-chief and all of them were cross-examined, while some three documents were exhibited by him to prove his case. The defendant side examined five witnesses and exhibited some five documents to substantiate their defense. It may be noted that no counter-claim was filed by any of the defendants. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court decreed the suit as noticed above. The matter was carried to first appeal by the defendant No. 2, which also came a cropper: the appeal was also dismissed. Aggrieved by this, this second appeal has been preferred. 11. A number of contentions have been raised by Mr. D. Chakraborty, the learned senior counsel for the appellant, in attacking the impugned judgment, which have been duly noted. However, in my opinion, this appeal has no merit. I will now briefly discuss the findings of the trial court, which have been affirmed by the first appellate court. 11. A number of contentions have been raised by Mr. D. Chakraborty, the learned senior counsel for the appellant, in attacking the impugned judgment, which have been duly noted. However, in my opinion, this appeal has no merit. I will now briefly discuss the findings of the trial court, which have been affirmed by the first appellate court. At the outset, be it noted that I am not oblivious of the limited jurisdiction of the second appellate court for interfering with the concurrent findings of fact. In so far as Issue No. 1 is concerned, the trial court found that the suit was maintainable since the suit was filed within the period of limitation, that is, the duration of the agreement was one year with effect from 24-3-2008, whereas the suit was filed on 17-11-2008. This finding is correct, and does not call for my interference. As for Issue No. 2, the trial court decided the issue in favor of the plaintiff. It may be noted that the defendant No. 1 in his written statement has admitted that there was an oral agreement between him and the plaintiff for sale of the suit room at a consideration of Rs.5,00,000/- and that out of which, he received a sum of Rs.50,000/- from the plaintiff as an earnest money. Once the existence of oral agreement is admitted, the same is enforceable in the absence of any evidence that the contract ceased to have any effect in the meantime. If any authority is need, I may cite the decision of the Privy Council in Shankarlal Narayandas Mundade v. The New Mofussil Co. Ltd. and others, AIR (33) 1946 Privy Council 97 where it was held that where after entering into an oral contract for the sale of certain property with the plaintiff, the vendor subsequently contracts to sell the same property to the defendant, then in a suit by the plaintiff under Section 27 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 for specific performance of the contract in his favor, the burden of proving good faith and lack of notice of the contract lies upon the defendant. In Mohd. Abdul Hakeem(D)by L.rs. Vs.. Naiyaz Ahmed and others : AIR 2004 AP 299 , the agreement was signed only by the vendor and not by the vendee. In Mohd. Abdul Hakeem(D)by L.rs. Vs.. Naiyaz Ahmed and others : AIR 2004 AP 299 , the agreement was signed only by the vendor and not by the vendee. Though the facts therein are somewhat at variance with the facts of this case where there was no written agreement at all, the following observations of the Andhra Pradesh High Court are, with due respect, instructive: “….. I am not inclined to accept with the said view since it is the consensus ad idem between the parties which may have to be established for the purpose of enforcing a contract or an agreement of sale as well. It is also pertinent to note that a suit for specific performance of contract can be maintained even on the strength of an oral agreement. When that being so, in law it cannot be said that merely because the plaintiff had not signed the agreement of sale, the same cannot be enforced and a suit for specific performance itself cannot be maintained on the strength of such agreement on the ground that it is not a concluded contract. Hence, I am not inclined to accept with the view expressed by the learned single Judge of Madras High Court in the decision referred supra.” (Underlined for emphasis) 12. Thus, in my considered view, in the light of the admission made by the defendant No. 1 in his written statement, it can be truly said that there was consensus ad idem between him and the plaintiff for sale of the suit room for a price of Rs.5,00,000/- even though the agreement was not reduced into writing. As for Issue No. 3, the trial court rejected the plea taken by the defendant No. 2 that since the oral agreement is silent about the fate of the agreement after the lapse of one year, the same is a void agreement. According to the trial court, though one year was stipulated, the suit was filed on 17-11-2008 whereas the cause of action arose on 26-9-2008; there is no evidence to show that there was no readiness or willingness on the part of the plaintiff to perform the contract. According to the trial court, though one year was stipulated, the suit was filed on 17-11-2008 whereas the cause of action arose on 26-9-2008; there is no evidence to show that there was no readiness or willingness on the part of the plaintiff to perform the contract. Quoting from the observation of the Gauhati High Court in Bibhash Ranjan Paul v. Dipak Paul, 2005 (2) GLT 341, the trial court held that the provisions of Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act are not applicable to the facts of this case as there was already a valid oral agreement of sale before any written agreement of sale was executed by and between the defendants. This finding also does not warrant the interference of this Court. 13. In so far as the second limb of Issue No. 3 is concerned, the trial court found that upon publication of notice of purchase of the suit room made by the defendant No. 2 from the defendant No. 1 in the local daily “Dainik Sambad”, the plaintiff through his letter dated 29-9-2008 raised his objection against the purchase being made by the defendant No. 2 by informing him of the oral agreement made by him with the defendant No. 1. The trial court also found that the defendant No. 2 came to know about the said oral agreement executed by and between the defendant No. 1 and the defendant No. 2 before he entered into an agreement with the defendant No. 1 for purchase of the suit room. The trial court, therefore, held that the said oral agreement is a valid one and enforceable by law. It also recorded the finding that there was no suppression of the said oral contract by the defendant No. 1 to the defendant No. 2. As for Issue No. 5, the trial court found from the contents of the written statement of the defendant No. 1 that there was admission on his part about the receipt of Rs.50,000/- from the plaintiff as earnest money for sale of the suit room. Coming now to Issue No. 5, the trial court found that on 26-9-2008, there was delivery of possession in favor of the defendant No. 2 upon execution of the said written agreement of sale. Coming now to Issue No. 5, the trial court found that on 26-9-2008, there was delivery of possession in favor of the defendant No. 2 upon execution of the said written agreement of sale. However, the trial court took the view that under Section 17(1-A) of the Registration Act as amended in 2001, any contract for transfer of immovable property shall have to be registered so as to avail of the benefit of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, and when the agreement for sale of the suit room which was executed by the defendant No. 1 in favor of the defendant No. 2 with delivery of possession was not registered, the defendant No. 2 cannot invoke the provision of Section 53-A of the said Act. Moreover, such protection, even if the agreement for sale was registered also, cannot be resorted to by the defendant No. 2 vis-à-vis the defendant No. 1 vis-à-vis the plaintiff. In my opinion, the view taken by the trial court cannot be said to be an irrational view. In fact, such view can be the only possible view to be taken. There is, therefore, no infirmity in the interpretation by the trial court with respect to the provision of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act or, for that matter, to Section 17(1-A) of the Registration Act as amended in 2001. 14. The scope of interference by the second appellate court with the concurrent findings of fact while exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC is very limited, and reappreciation of evidence is not permissible except where the trial court and/or the first appellate court misdirected themselves in appreciating the question of law or placed the onus on the wrong party, in which case, certainly, there is scope for interference under Section 100 CPC after formulating a substantial question of law. The legal principles have been succinctly summarized by The Apex Court in Hero Vinoth(Minor) v. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545 , after reviewing several authorities, held: “24. The principles relating to Section 100 CPC relevant for this case may be summarised thus: (i) An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a document is a question of fact. But the legal effect of the terms of a document is a question of law. The principles relating to Section 100 CPC relevant for this case may be summarised thus: (i) An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a document is a question of fact. But the legal effect of the terms of a document is a question of law. Construction of a document involving the application of any principle of law, is also a question of law. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law. (ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. A question of law having a material bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a question, answer to which affects the rights of parties to the suit) will be a substantial question of law, if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal principle emerging from binding precedents, and, involves a debatable legal issue. A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, where the legal position is clear, either on account of express provisions of law or binding precedents, but the court below has decided the matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In the second type of cases, the substantial question of law arises not because the law is still debatable, but because the decision rendered on a material question, violates the settled position of law. (iii) The general rule is that High Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well-recognised exceptions are where (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. When we refer to “decision based on no evidence”, it not only refers to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to any case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding.” 15. When we refer to “decision based on no evidence”, it not only refers to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to any case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding.” 15. On reading and re-reading the impugned judgments of the trial court as well as the first appellate court in the light of the aforesaid principles, I am of the firm view that there is no scope for interference in the concurrent findings of the trial court and that of the first appellate court. Both the courts below are right in holding that the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 is entitled to a decree of specific performance of contract on the basis of the oral agreement dated 24-3-2008, in directing the defendant No. 1 (respondent No. 2) to execute a registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff, in directing the appellant (defendant No. 2) and the respondent No. 2 (defendant No. 1) to hand over vacant possession of the suit room to the plaintiff and in restraining the defendant No. 1 from executing any sale deed in respect of the suit room to any third party. 16. The offshoot of the foregoing discussion is that there is no merit in this appeal, which is, accordingly, dismissed. Transmit the LC record forthwith.