JUDGMENT & ORDER : This is an application filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issuance of a writ in the nature of Habeas Corpus and/or any other appropriate writ, order or direction for release of the detenue namely Shri Chingi Phom who has been under detention following the order of detention passed by the District Magistrate No.LLG/CON-33(Pt-1)/2009-10/92, dated 29/9/2016 which was approved by the Government of Nagaland vide order No. CON/NSA/47/2016/345, dated 5/10/2016 issued by the Special Secretary to the Government of Nagaland and confirmed on the advice of the NSA board by the same Government vide confirmation order No.CON/NSA/47/2016/366, dated 2/11/2016. 2. As submitted by Mr. Thiba Phom, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. K. Wotsa, learned Sr. Government Advocate, the detenue was arrested on 19/9/2016 at 1.00 AM from his residence by personnel of 44th Assam Rifles and handed over to the Longleng police station the next day i.e.20/9/2016 along with seizure memo which shows seizure of one AK-47, 48 live rounds of 7.62 mm, 3 magazines of AK-47 rifles, 30 metres of flexible wires, extortion slip, one notice/letter of FGN. The Longleng police then registered Longleng P.S. case No.17/16, under section 384 IPC, section 7/8 of NSR read with section 25(1A) Arms Act and produced him before the Chief Judicial Magistrate Longleng who remanded him to police custody and to judicial custody after the period of police custody was over. While he was in jail, the District Magistrate Longleng vide his detention order mentioned above ordered for his detention for 12 days under sub section 1(a) and (2) (4) of section 3 of NSA 1980 and to be kept in Central Jail Dimapur. Thereafter on 5/10/2016, the detention order issued by the District Magistrate Longleng was approved by the State Government and to that effect the order, No. CON/NSA/47/2016/345, dated 5/10/2016 was issued by the Special Secretary to the Government of Nagaland. As per the provisions of the NSA Act, the case of the petitioner was referred to the Advisory Board constituted under the Act and following the Board’s advice, the Government of Nagaland ordered detention of the detenue for a period of one year from the date of detention vide order No.CON/NSA/47/2016/366 dated 2/11/2016 issued by the Special Secretary to the Government of Nagaland. 3. 3. The grounds on which the petitioner has prayed for release of the detenue are as follows:- (i) That the District Magistrate as required under the Act, before he issued the detention order under the Act must form a subjective satisfaction but in this case, the detention order issued by the District Magistrate Longleng shows that by simply relying on the report of the SP the impugned detention order was passed therefore, the same is illegal and cannot be sustained in law. In support of his submission, the learned counsel for the petitioner cited a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in the case of Huidrom Konungjao Singh vs. State of Manipur and Others reported in (2012) 7SCC 1810. (ii) That a copy of the detention order along with grounds of detention as per section 8 of the NSA Act should be furnished or handed over to the detenue within 5 days but not later than 10 days from the date of detention. In this case as per the acknowledgement slip filed as Annexure-E to the writ petition, the detention order along with grounds of detention were received by the detenue only on 20/10/2016, therefore, the detaining authority have violated the provisions of section 8 of the NSA Act. In support of his submission, the learned counsel cited the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of A.K. Roy vs. Union of India reported in AIR 1982 SC 710 , paragraph 76. The relevant portion is reproduced herein below:- “76.The objection of the petitioners against the provision contained in S.8 (1) is that it unreasonably allows the detaining authority to furnish the grounds of detention to the detenue as late as five days and in exceptional cases 10 days after the date of detention. This argument overlooks that the primary requirement of S.8 (1) is that the authority making the order of detention shall communicate the grounds of detention to the detenue “as soon as may be”. The normal rule therefore is that the grounds of detention must be communicated to the detenue without avoidable delay. It is only in order to meet the practical exigencies of administrative affairs that the detaining authority is permitted to communicate the grounds of detention not later than five days ordinarily, and not later than 10 days if there are exceptional circumstances. It is only in order to meet the practical exigencies of administrative affairs that the detaining authority is permitted to communicate the grounds of detention not later than five days ordinarily, and not later than 10 days if there are exceptional circumstances. If there are any such circumstances, the detaining authority is required by S.8 (1) to record its reason in writing. We do not think that this provision is open to any objection.” The learned counsel also cited the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Alam vs. State of West Bengal reported in AIR 1974 SC 917 paragraph 19. The relevant portion is given herein below:- “19. Nobody is born a criminal, much less a habitual or “veteran” criminal. It takes time for one to become so. The adjective “veteran” which is synonymous with “habitual” implies a long course of recurring or persistent criminal behavior or repeated commission of crime. Surely all the information received by the District Magistrate/the Government, about the repeated criminal activities of the detenue had contributed towards the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. It will not be extravagant to say that but for the detenue being in the opinion of the detaining authority a “veteran” or habitual copper write criminal, the District Magistrate/the Government, about the repeated criminal activities of the detenu had contributed towards the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. It will not ne extravagant to say that but for the detenu being in the opinion of the detaining authority a “veteran” or habitual copper wire criminal, the District Magistrate might not have taken the impugned action. Admittedly, the whole of (his material or ‘reliable information” about the “antisocial” and “prejudicial activities” of the detenu that led to his detention, was not communicated to him. This information which was withheld was not claimed to be privileged under Clause (6) of Article of Article 22. The non-communication of that material was violative of Article 22(5) of the Constitution and the Act inasmuch as it did not intimate to the detenu the full grounds or material to enable him to make an effective representation. The detention is thus illegal. We, therefore, allow this petition, set aside the detention order and direct that the petitioner be set at liberty forthwith.” 4. Mr. K. Wotsa, learned Sr. The detention is thus illegal. We, therefore, allow this petition, set aside the detention order and direct that the petitioner be set at liberty forthwith.” 4. Mr. K. Wotsa, learned Sr. Government Advocate submits that the acknowledgment receipt pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner was for receipt of confirmation order passed by the Government after the Advisory Board’s recommendation. The detenue was served a copy of the order of detention along with grounds of detention on the day the detention order itself was passed and the same would be evident from Annexure-C of the writ petition i.e. the detention order passed by the District Magistrate Longleng wherein the signature of the detenue can be seen on the left side of the same. The learned Sr. Government Advocate also submitted that there is no violation of the NSA Act while passing the detention order and the orders approving and confirming the same. Therefore, there is no reason for setting aside the detention order of the detenue as prayed for. 5. Mr. Yangerwati learned C.G.C. submits that no representation was made to the Union of India therefore, there is nothing much to submit on his part except reiterating what the learned Government Advocate has submitted. 6. From the facts and circumstances narrated by the learned counsel regarding the detention of the detenue, it is clear that he was in judicial custody in connection with Longleng P.S. Case No.17/16 when the detention order was passed by the District Magistrate, Longleng. In such cases, the settled principle of law is that the District Magistrate must record in his order that the detenue is already in jail but there are/is cogent and reasonable ground/grounds to apprehend that he is likely to be released on bail. This principle of law has been enunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rameshwar Shaw vs. District Magistrate, Burdwan and the same has been consistently followed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and High Courts in the country. In the case of N. Meera Rani Vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Anrs., reported in (1989) 4 SCC 418 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court followed the same principle of law and the relevant portion of the judgment is given here below:- “12. In the case of N. Meera Rani Vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Anrs., reported in (1989) 4 SCC 418 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court followed the same principle of law and the relevant portion of the judgment is given here below:- “12. The real question, therefore, is: whether after the above satisfaction reached by the detaining authority and when the detenu was already in custody being arrested in connection with the Bank dacoity, could there be any reasonable basis for making the detention order and serving it on the detenu during his custody? 13. We may now refer to the decisions on the basis of which this point is to be decided. The starting point is the decision of a Constitution Bench in Rameshwar Shaw v. District Magistrate, Burdwan1. All subsequent decisions which are cited have to be read in the light of this Constitution Bench decision since they are decisions by benches comprised of lesser number of judges. It is obvious that none of these subsequent decisions could have intended taking a view contrary to that of the Constitution Bench in Rameshwar Shaw case, (1964) 4 SCR 921: AIR 1964 SC 334 : (1964) 1 CrLJ 257. 14. The detention order in Rasmeshwar Shaw case1 was made and also served on the detenu while he was in jail custody. The detenu was then in jail where he had been kept as a result of the remand order passed by the competent court which had taken cognizance of criminal complaint against him. The Constitution Bench considered the effect of the detenu’s subsisting detention at the time making of the order of preventive detention and held that the effect thereof had to be decided on the facts of the case; and that this was a material factor to be considered by the detaining authority while reaching the satisfaction that an order of preventive detention was necessary to prevent the detenu from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order after his release. It was indicated that the detenu’s subsisting custody did not by itself invalidate the detention order but facts and circumstances justifying the order of preventive detention notwithstanding his custody were necessary to sustain such an order. 15. The position of law was summarised by their Lordships as under: (SCR pp. It was indicated that the detenu’s subsisting custody did not by itself invalidate the detention order but facts and circumstances justifying the order of preventive detention notwithstanding his custody were necessary to sustain such an order. 15. The position of law was summarised by their Lordships as under: (SCR pp. 929-31) ''As an abstract proposition of law, there may not be any doubt that Section 3(1)(a) does not preclude the authority from passing an order of detention against a person whilst he is in detention or in jail; but the relevant facts in connection with the making of the order may differ and that may make a difference in the application of the principle that a detention order can be passed against a person 10 jail. Take for instance, a case where a person has been sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for ten years. It cannot be seriously suggested that soon after the sentence of imprisonment is pronounced on the person, the detaining authority can make an order directing the detention of the said person after he is released from jail at the end of the period of the sentence imposed on him. In dealing with this question, again the considerations of proximity of time will not be irrelevant. On the other hand, if a person who is undergoing imprisonment, for a very short period, say for a month or two or so, and it is known that he would soon be released from jail, it may be possible for the authority to consider the antecedent history of the said person and decide whether the detention of the said person would be necessary after he is released from jail, and if the authority is bona rule satisfied that such detention is necessary, he can make a valid order of detention a few days before the person is likely to be released. The antecedent history and the past conduct on which the order of detention would be based would, in a such a case, be proximate in point of time and would have a rational connection with the conclusion drawn by the authority that the detention of the person after his release is necessary.... The antecedent history and the past conduct on which the order of detention would be based would, in a such a case, be proximate in point of time and would have a rational connection with the conclusion drawn by the authority that the detention of the person after his release is necessary.... Therefore, we are satisfied that the question as to whether an order of detention can be passed against a person who is in detention or in jail, will always have to be determined in the circumstances of each case. The question which still remains to be considered is: can a person in jail custody, like the petitioner, be served with an order of detention whilst he is in such custody? .... We have already seen the logical process which must be followed by the authority in taking action under Section 3(1)(a). The first stage in the process is to examine the material adduced against a person to show either from his conduct or his antecedent history that he has been acting in a prejudicial manner. If the said material appears satisfactory to the authority, then the authority has to consider whether it is likely that the said person would act in a prejudicial manner in future if he is not prevented from doing so by an order of detention. If this question is answered against the petitioner, then the detention order can be properly made. It is obvious that before an authority can legitimately come to the conclusion that the detention of the person is necessary to prevent him from acting in a prejudicial manner, the authority has to be satisfied that if the person is not detained, he would act in a prejudicial manner and that inevitably postulates freedom of action to the said person at the relevant time. If a person is already in jail custody, how can it rationally be postulated that if he is not detained, he would act in a prejudicial manner? At the point of time when an order of detention is going to be served on a person, it must be patent that the said person would act prejudicially if he is not detained and that is a consideration which would be absent when the authority is dealing with a person already in detention. At the point of time when an order of detention is going to be served on a person, it must be patent that the said person would act prejudicially if he is not detained and that is a consideration which would be absent when the authority is dealing with a person already in detention. The satisfaction that it is necessary to detain a person for the purpose of preventing him from acting in a prejudicial manner is thus the basis of the order under Section 3(1)(a), and this basis is clearly absent in the case of the petitioner. Therefore, we see no escape from the conclusion that the detention of the petitioner in the circumstances of this case, is not justified by Section 3(1)(a) and is outside its purview.” (emphasis supplied)” 7. In recent time also the same principle has been followed in the case of Union of India Vs Paul Manickam & Anrs., reported in (2003) 8 SCC 342 . The relevant portion of the said judgment is also given herein below:- “14. So far as this question relating to the procedure to be adopted in case the detenue is already in custody is concerned, the matter has been dealt with in several cases. Where detention orders are passed in relation to persons who are already in jail under some other laws, the detaining authorities should apply their mind and show their awareness in this regard in the grounds of detention, the chances of release of such person on bail. The necessity of keeping such persons in detention under the preventive detention laws has to be clearly indicated. Subsisting custody of the detenue by itself does not invalidate an order of his preventive detention, and the decision in this regard must depend on the facts of the particular case. Preventive detention being necessary to prevent the detenue from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or to the maintenance of public order or economic stability etc. ordinarily, it is not needed when the detenue is already in custody. The detaining authority must show its awareness to the fact of subsisting custody of the detenue and take that factor into account while making the order. ordinarily, it is not needed when the detenue is already in custody. The detaining authority must show its awareness to the fact of subsisting custody of the detenue and take that factor into account while making the order. If the detaining authority is reasonably satisfied with cogent materials that there is likelihood of his release and in view of his antecedent activities which are proximate in point of time, he must be detained in order to prevent him from indulging in such prejudicial activities, the detention order can be validly made. Where the detention order in respect of a person already in custody does not indicate that the detenue was likely to be released on bail, the order would be vitiated. The point was gone into detail in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India. The principles were set out as follows: even in the case of a person in custody, a detention order can be validly passed: (1) if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody; (2) if he has a reason to believe on the basis of reliable material placed before him (a) that there is a real possibility of his release on bail, and (b) that on being released, he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activities; and (3) if it is felt essential to detain him to prevent him from so doing. If an order is passed after recording satisfaction in that regard, the order would be valid. In the case at hand the order of detention and grounds of detention show an awareness of custody and/or a possibility of release on bail. 15. Article 21 of the Constitution having declared that no person shall be deprived of life and liberty except in accordance with the procedure established by law, a machinery was definitely needed to examine the question of illegal detention with utmost promptitude. The writ of habeas corpus is a device of this nature. Blackstone called it “the great and efficacious writ in all manner of illegal confinement.” The writ has been described as a writ of right, it is not a writ of course. The applicant must show a prima facie case of his unlawful detention. Once, however, he shows such a cause and the return is not good and sufficient, he is entitled to this writ as of right.” 8. The applicant must show a prima facie case of his unlawful detention. Once, however, he shows such a cause and the return is not good and sufficient, he is entitled to this writ as of right.” 8. In fact in one of the cases cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner i.e. Huidrom Konungjao Singh vs. State of Manipur and Others reported in (2012) 7SCC 181, the Hon’ble Supreme Court followed the same principle as may be seen in paragraph 9. The relevant portion of the judgment is given herein below:- 9. In view of the above, it can be held that there is no prohibition in law to pass the detention order in respect of a person who is already in custody in respect of criminal case. However, if the detention order is challenged the detaining authority has to satisfy the Court the following facts: (1) The authority was fully aware of the fact that the detenu was actually in custody. (2) There was reliable material before the said authority on the basis of which it could have reasons to believe that there was real possibility of his release on bail and further on being released he would probably indulge in activities which are prejudicial to public order. (3) In view of the above, the authority felt it necessary to prevent him 'from indulging in such activities and therefore, detention order was necessary. In case either of these facts does not exist the detention order would stand vitiated. The present case requires to be examined in the light of the aforesaid settled legal proposition. In case either of these facts does not exist the detention order would stand vitiated. The present case requires to be examined in the light of the aforesaid settled legal proposition.” 9. The present case requires to be examined in the light of the aforesaid settled legal proposition. In case either of these facts does not exist the detention order would stand vitiated. The present case requires to be examined in the light of the aforesaid settled legal proposition.” 9. From the principle of law enunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court which still holds the field till today, it is very clear that while considering the detention of a person who is already in custody in connection with other cases or case, the District Magistrate who is passing the detention order must first acknowledge and reflect the same in his order the fact that the person intended to be detained under NSA is under custody and there are reasonable and cogent reasons to believe that he is likely to be released on bail, and if he is release he is likely to disturb public order, peace and tranquillity of the State because of his illegal activities in the approximate past. In this case as stated above, the District Magistrate in his order did not mention that he was aware of the fact that the detenue was already in judicial custody. He also did not mention that he has reason or reasons to apprehend that the detenue is likely to be released on bail and if release he is in all probability likely to disturb public order, peace and tranquility of the State. Viewing the detention order and the orders that followed in this case through the principle of law settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court it is clearly seen that they have fallen short of the requirement of law therefore, they are liable to be set aside. Accordingly the detention order dated 29/9/2016, the approval order 5/10/2016 and the confirmation order dated 2/11/2016 are set aside. The respondents are directed to release the detenue namely, Chingi Phom forthwith if he is not required in any other case pending against him.