JUDGMENT : SAMBUDDHA CHAKRABARTI, J. 1. Pursuant to my order dated April 3, 2017 Mr. P. Anup Kumar, the Chairman of the respondent-Bank, is present in Court. He has also produced the Minute Book in original containing the proceedings of 206th Board meeting of the concerned Bank. Some additional documents have also been produced by Mr. Banerjee, the learned Advocate for the respondent-Bank in Court. Perused the same. Opportunity was already given to the Bank authorities to file a report in the form of an affidavit which has been done. 2. Heard the learned Advocates for the parties and perused all the documents placed before me including the minutes of the 206th Board meeting of the concerned Bank. 3. The case of the petitioner in short is that he was an employee of Uttarbanga Kshetriya Gramin Bank (the Bank, for short). He was served with a charge-sheet alleging some financial irregularities against him. This was followed by a departmental enquiry. And ultimately the Disciplinary Authority who is none but the Chairman of the Bank, i.e., the respondent no. 2 by an order, dated February 5, 2013 had passed the order of removal of the petitioner from service which shall not be a disqualification for him for future employment. 4. It appears from the writ petition that the petitioner has lots of grievances against the conduct of the enquiry by the enquiry officer as well as the subsequent steps taken by the Disciplinary Authority. According to him there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice on the part of the respondents in the conduct of the enquiry against him. 5. Being aggrieved with the order of dismissal the petitioner filed an appeal before the Appellate Authority. By a communication dated June 26, 2013, the Chairman of the concerned Bank informed the petitioner that after careful consideration of the matter the members of the Board declined the appeal and confirmed the punishment awarded by the Disciplinary Authority. This order is under challenge in the present writ petition. 6. Mr. Kali, the learned Advocate for the petitioner has assailed the order primarily on two grounds viz., the Chairman of the Bank himself is the Disciplinary Authority and he was a member of the concerned Board of the Bank which acted as the Appellate Authority, and secondly, the order is a non-speaking one. 7. 6. Mr. Kali, the learned Advocate for the petitioner has assailed the order primarily on two grounds viz., the Chairman of the Bank himself is the Disciplinary Authority and he was a member of the concerned Board of the Bank which acted as the Appellate Authority, and secondly, the order is a non-speaking one. 7. I directed the Bank to file a report in the form of an affidavit. On behalf of the Bank the General Manager, i.e. the respondent no. 4 had filed the report which does not touch on the principal points of challenge in the writ petition. The report deals with the identity of the competent authority to sign the final order of disciplinary proceeding. The final order of disciplinary proceeding was signed by the Chairman of the Bank as the competent authority. In appeal the Board after careful consideration of the "enquiry documents" along with the appeal of the appellant declined the appeal of the petitioner and confirmed the punishment awarded by the Disciplinary Authority. The said decision of the Board was conveyed by the Chairman of the Bank to the petitioner. 8. This is all that the report says. In material particulars it is not a complete reflection of the record. It does not disclose the whole of it and in such a case one has to admit that this is not the report the Court expects from the respondents. 9. Hearing of this writ petition was initially concluded and the matter was reserved for Judgment. Subsequently the matter appeared again for further hearing for seeking certain clarifications on several points which necessitated me to direct the respondents to produce the records in original. Records were somehow not produced for a pretty long time on one plea or the other. Ultimately when the records were produced the reasons for the reluctance became very obvious. 10. To the very specific case made out by the petitioner that the person who signed the order of dismissal as the Disciplinary Authority of the petitioner was a member of the Board which was the Appellate Authority. Mr. Banerjee referred to the order impugned in the writ petition and submitted that the Disciplinary Authority was not a part of the Appellate Board but he was merely communicating the order of the Appellate Authority as the Chairman. 11. This raised a suspicion of which I wanted a clarification. Mr. Banerjee referred to the order impugned in the writ petition and submitted that the Disciplinary Authority was not a part of the Appellate Board but he was merely communicating the order of the Appellate Authority as the Chairman. 11. This raised a suspicion of which I wanted a clarification. Now when the records have been produced it appears that the petitioner's appeal was initially decided at the 206th Board meeting of the concerned Bank on May 2, 2013 in presence of six Directors of whom the Chairman was Shri P. Anup Kumar who as the Disciplinary Authority had issued the order of dismissal of the petitioner from service. The appeal of the petitioner was taken up as agenda no. 17. The Chairman, i.e. the respondent no. 2 placed the Memorandum of Appeal submitted by the petitioner against the punishment awarded by him for his misconduct. It appears from the resolution taken that the members of the Board perused the report and advised to resubmit the appeal along with all related papers in the next Board meeting for a decision or suggestion of the Board members. 12. If the matter had rested at that there might not have had much to complain by the petitioner except that the person who passed the order appealed against was a part of the Appellate Board and thereby violated the basic tenets of service jurisprudence. But more surprises awaits a curious reader. 13. After the Board had taken a decision advising the Chairman to resubmit the appeal on the next meeting Mr. Anup Kumar unilaterally issued a corrigendum on May 30, 2013 by which the entire resolution of the Board was altered to "the Hon'ble Board members perused the report and declined the appeal of Shri Kamal Kanti Narjary". Thereafter copies were sent to the other members of the Board. 14. The only defence of the respondent no. 2 is that this was subsequently approved by the Board in the subsequent meeting. It is true that in agenda no. 1 of 207th Board meeting the minutes of the 206th Board meeting were approved. But there is no approval to the purported corrigendum. There may be a corrigendum to any resolution taken by the Board provided the corrigendum is also collectively made. It is true that in agenda no. 1 of 207th Board meeting the minutes of the 206th Board meeting were approved. But there is no approval to the purported corrigendum. There may be a corrigendum to any resolution taken by the Board provided the corrigendum is also collectively made. A unilateral decision to alter the collective decision of the Board unless specifically approved subsequently is not to be treated as approved or adopted by the Board. The law on the point is very well settled. It needs no detailed discussion that when a Board as a collective body in a subsequent meeting approves the decisions taken in the earlier meeting it merely approves those decisions and not what may be created by way of a corrigendum subsequently by a single member of the Board. That should have been specifically approved, if at all. Because the subsequent corrigendum was not a part of the decision taken by the Board. It did not form part of the resolutions of the earlier meeting. Therefore, adopting the decision of the 206th Board meeting does not extend the same benediction to the unilateral corrigendum. I have examined the resolution taken by the Board in 207th meeting held on July 30, 2013 which nowhere says anything about the purported corrigendum. If the corrigendum is not approved it cannot form part of the original resolution at all. This is over and above the basic lacuna flowing from the lack of competence of the Chairman to prepare the corrigendum. 15. That apart a very important thing, fundamental in the present case, has to be addressed. Why a corrigendum? What was its occasion? Was it really a corrigendum per se? The lexical meaning of the word 'corrigendum' is: a thing to be corrected, especially an error in a printed book (The Concise Oxford Dictionary (OUP 1995), p. 301). Thus corrigendum is all about making a correction or an error. There was no error in the resolution taken in respect of agenda no. 17 at the 206th Board meeting of the Bank. The purported corrigendum also does not say so. All that it says is that in connection with the decision taken in respect of agenda no. 17 of the concerned Board meeting "kindly to read the following changes in taking decision by the Hon'ble Board in second paragraph of agenda no. 17". 17 at the 206th Board meeting of the Bank. The purported corrigendum also does not say so. All that it says is that in connection with the decision taken in respect of agenda no. 17 of the concerned Board meeting "kindly to read the following changes in taking decision by the Hon'ble Board in second paragraph of agenda no. 17". And the change was that the Board members "declined appeal". 16. Thus, it was a change and not a correction of any error. Why must it then be passed as a 'corrigendum'? What prompted the Chairman to describe the change as a corrigendum? And, far more importantly, if this was a change who had taken the decision to change the resolution? When was it taken, if at all? Obviously, it could not be at the 206th Board meeting. In that case the resolution would never have gone down the way it did. The change would have been reflected in the resolution itself. Thus, the change was effected subsequently by the Chairman all by himself. How can a decision be changed in between the two Board meetings? It cannot be. The so called corrigendum is silent the 'change' being effected at the instance of any other member of the Board. Thus this is an unusual case where the Chairman of the Bank was unilaterally altering a collective decision. 17. A very curious thing also surfaces from the records of the case. If the stand of the respondent no. 2 is to be accepted, which we have found to be not sustainable, that the corrigendum was subsequently approved by the Board it could not be approved before the Board met for the next meeting i.e. July 30, 2013. But the respondent no. 2 by a communication dated June 26, 2013 had intimated the petitioner that the Board had declined the appeal and confirmed the punishment awarded by the Disciplinary Authority. Thereby the respondent no. 2 not only tried to give effect to the purported corrigendum brought by himself but positively mis-communicated the decision of the Board which had not yet met to approve the corrigendum or the earlier Board decision. Such an action on the part of the Chairman of the Bank is unbecoming of him, if not unbelievable. Thereby the respondent no. 2 not only tried to give effect to the purported corrigendum brought by himself but positively mis-communicated the decision of the Board which had not yet met to approve the corrigendum or the earlier Board decision. Such an action on the part of the Chairman of the Bank is unbecoming of him, if not unbelievable. We may easily take it that this was the decision of the Chairman and he communicated it without the Board taking any decision about the appeal of the petitioner. 18. To describe the act of the respondent no. 2 as miscommunication is perhaps using an euphemism. He did a very wrong communication which was to knowledge. He had deliberately conveyed that the members of the Board had gone through the matter and declined the appeal when the truth is just the reverse. It is also not very clear from the decision taken under agenda number 1 of the 207th Board meeting whether the corrigendum at all was placed before it. At least there is no reflection of the same in the decision taken by them. 19. Thus it is a case where the Chairman of the bank passes an order, then acts as a part of the appellate authority and then contrary to the decision taken by the appellate authority has changed the decision of the Board and communicates a make-belief decision to the petitioner which was never taken by the Board. The substance of what the Board had initially resolved was to defer the consideration of the appeal. That was altered into confirmation of the order passed by the Chairman himself in his capacity as the Disciplinary Authority. 20. Various attempts have been made from the end of the respondents to justify the conduct of the respondent no. 2. Mr. Banerjee submitted that the petitioner had admitted his guilt at the enquiry proceeding. He also produced before me a copy of the petition of appeal wherein he had specifically stated that he had become repentant after the occurrence of the incident. This it was sought to be projected as the 'real reason' for altering the decision of the Board that there was hardly anything to decide in the appeal as the petitioner had admitted his involvement very clearly. I have perused the petition of appeal. I find that the petitioner was not so much challenging his conviction in the case. This it was sought to be projected as the 'real reason' for altering the decision of the Board that there was hardly anything to decide in the appeal as the petitioner had admitted his involvement very clearly. I have perused the petition of appeal. I find that the petitioner was not so much challenging his conviction in the case. He was more on the maximum sentence that was passed against him, i.e., dismissal from service. He had repeatedly mentioned his family's status, the economic condition, the career of his two daughters, so on and so forth and the prayer was for reconsidering the decision of dismissing him from service. In other words, the petitioner was pleading for a lighter punishment which is very much permissible even after admitting the involvement of a charged employee with the allegations against him. An appeal for reducing the sentence is perfectly maintainable. 21. Mr. Banerjee even tried to justify the action of the respondent no. 2 by saying that the appeal petition was addressed to the Chairman of the bank. It proves nothing. All appeal petitions have to be addressed to the highest authority who, in the present case, is the Chairman. But it does not mean that only because it is addressed to the Chairman he should either be a party to the decision or have any right to subsequently unilaterally alter the decision and make a very wrong communication about the decision taken by the Board. After all, the appellate authority was the Board before whom the appeal was placed by the Chairman. 22. The attempt on the part of the respondents to convince the court that the Chairman was just a communicating agency and not a party to the decision not only falls through but is found to be factually incorrect. He not only placed the memorandum to the other members of the Board, when the Board had decided to defer the consideration of the appeal he had altered it and without the approval of the Board had communicated his own decision giving it the appearance of a board decision. Alteration of the resolution taken by the appellate authority by one of its members and communicating it to the appellant as the decision of the Board is an act far graver than mere wrong communication. It also amounts to tampering with records. 23. Alteration of the resolution taken by the appellate authority by one of its members and communicating it to the appellant as the decision of the Board is an act far graver than mere wrong communication. It also amounts to tampering with records. 23. No detailed discussion is necessary on the point taken by the petitioner that the person passing an order cannot be a part of the appellate authority. This is a very fundamental principle of administrative law that a man cannot be a judge in his own cause. Here the cause was the order of dismissal and the appellate authority comprised, subsequently converted into a single-man committee, the disciplinary authority himself and other members of the Board. The underlying principle behind the old Latin maxim "nemo judex in re sua", i.e., one cannot be the judge in his own cause, has been flagrantly violated in the present case. There have been any number of decisions on the point starting from the celebrated case of A. K. Kraipak & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., reported in AIR 1970 SC 150 which is close to half century ago. 24. This is not a case of likelihood of bias. This was a case where bias had been established on the face of it. It is unbelievable in the 21st century with the experience of rule of law for well neigh two centuries behind us that a person would be a part of the appellate authority whose order is under challenge and that too not by mistake. And when the desired result was not given by the Board in its 206th meeting he himself altered it and conveyed his own decision as the one taken by the Board. Nothing can be more unfortunate than that. When the decision-maker is involved in some capacity in the earlier stage of the dispute he must not be a party to the decision-making process. It has been observed in A. K. Kraipak (supra) that at every stage of his participation there would be a conflict between his interest and duty. 25. Mr. Banerjee submitted that in the past also there was an incident relating to the petitioner when he was lightly treated by the respondent bank. That relates to the merit of the case. It has been observed in A. K. Kraipak (supra) that at every stage of his participation there would be a conflict between his interest and duty. 25. Mr. Banerjee submitted that in the past also there was an incident relating to the petitioner when he was lightly treated by the respondent bank. That relates to the merit of the case. The court could not reach up to that stage because of the conduct of the appeal by the Board of the bank particularly the respondent no. 2. This could be a consideration for turning down the appeal on merits or a relevant factor while deciding the merit of the appeal. But the respondent no. 2 cannot decide it by himself, particularly after the Board had deferred its decision. He had usurped the authority of the Board, taken a decision in the name of it and had communicated that to the petitioner very wrongly. 26. Much assertion to the contrary, if one looks at the communication, dated June 26, 2013 one is bound to be convinced that the Chairman was acting as someone more than a mere communicating official. 27. The second point taken by Mr. Kali that the order is a non-speaking one speaks for itself. He had relied on the judgment in the case of Deoki Nandan Sharma v. Union of India & Ors., reported in (2001) 5 SCC 340 for a proposition that it is the duty of the appellate authority to pass a reasoned order dealing with the contention of the appellants. The appellate authority is to take into consideration all the points raised in the appeal and then to dispose the same after considering the entire matter. When an appeal is disposed of without recording the reasons it should be treated as devoid of any substance. Lord Denning in Breen v. A. E. U., reported in (1971)2 QB 175observed that giving reasons constitutes a safeguard against arbitrariness on the part of the decision maker. The appellate authority in the present case was discharging a quasi judicial duty. In S. N. Mukherjee v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1990 SC 1984 , the Supreme Court held that the requirement for recording reasons should govern the decisions of an administrative authority exercising quasi judicial functions irrespective of whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. 28. In S. N. Mukherjee v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1990 SC 1984 , the Supreme Court held that the requirement for recording reasons should govern the decisions of an administrative authority exercising quasi judicial functions irrespective of whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. 28. The principle of law decided in the above case is far too well settled to be further reiterated. But the present petition is not a case of a non-speaking order only. Who will pass the speaking order? The appellate authority did not pass the order at all. It was a unilateral order of the disciplinary authority and communicated to the petitioner in the name of the appellate authority. The order is bad for various reasons, the lack of merit being the least offensive amongst them. 29. The procedure adopted and the single-minded manner in which the respondent no. 2 pursued the appeal brings out a very sorry state of affairs. A person forming part of the appellate authority whose order is under challenge is bad enough; when he passes the order it is worse and when he alters he order of the appellate authority, it is the worst. And here the worst has taken place in the present case. The respondent no. 4 who affirmed the affidavit has ignored this aspect and decided to remain silent despite a direction by the court to file a report in the form of an affidavit in response to the allegations made. If he had filed the report without consulting the records, he has committed a fundamental mistake in not discharging his duties properly. If he had consulted the records and still filed this report, he must be held to be surreptitiously secretive. In either case this was exactly not the report a court expects from a responsible officer of a bank. 30. I, therefore, am of the view that the order complained of cannot be sustained. I go a little further, the order has no authority of law as being passed by the Chairman of the Board. 31. The writ petition is allowed. The order impugned is set aside. The Board of Directors are directed to rehear the appeal of the petitioner strictly in accordance with law and the procedure laid down therefor not being influenced by his admission at the stage of enquiry. 31. The writ petition is allowed. The order impugned is set aside. The Board of Directors are directed to rehear the appeal of the petitioner strictly in accordance with law and the procedure laid down therefor not being influenced by his admission at the stage of enquiry. But the disciplinary authority shall not be on the Board of the bank while they shall consider the appeal afresh. 32. In view of what has been stated above, this is a case which should not be disposed of without directing the respondent no. 2 to pay costs to the petitioner. The petitioner, even if he had committed the offence once, had subsequently been sinned against than sinning. I direct the respondent no. 2 to pay Rs. 1 lac (rupees one lac only) as costs to the petitioner within three weeks from date. I make it clear that such amount is to be paid by the respondent no. 2 from his own money and not out of the coffers of the bank. In default, the concerned bank shall be at liberty to recover the same from the salary of the respondent no. 2 and pay it to the petitioner either in one go or in monthly instalments which shall not be spread over more than five. Over and above that, I also give liberty to the bank authorities to probe into the matter by initiating appropriate proceedings against the respondent no. 2 which includes taking all possible steps in accordance with law not only internal but before all appropriate fora. 33. Urgent photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties upon compliance of requisite formalities. Later: 34. After the judgment and order was passed the original Minutes Books, two in number, which were produced in court today are returned to the learned advocate for the respondent bank.