JUDGMENT : Mir Dara Sheko, J. Upon consent of both parties the appeal and the application for stay are heard together, which were filed by the appellants/respondent Nos. 1 to 8, who will be called on hereafter as the appellants, assailing the Judgment dated 18th May, 2016 in W.P. No.17807 (W) of 2015 (Priyanku Bakshi v. Indian Oil Corporation Limited and 7 Others) by which the letter dated 14th July, 2015 bearing order of withdrawal of Letter of Intent, issued by the Chief Area Manager, Kolkata Area Office to the respondent/writ petitioner was set aside and quashed with direction to revisit the issue in the light of the observations indicated in the judgment after giving an opportunity to the respondent/writ petitioner, who will be called on hereafter as the respondent, within the period, stipulated therein. 2. The admitted facts of the case are :- (i) The respondent Priyanku Bakshi (Swarnkar) was married with Sanjit Bakshi on 11th day of March, 2009 and out of their wedlock they have one son. (ii) On completion of selection process Licence dated 28.03.2012 in connection with LOA dated 29.11.2011 was issued in favour of Sanjit Bakshi awarding dealership by the Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. at the site at Itapukuria under P.S. - Chakda, District - Nadia for its commissioning in the name and style "Bakshi Filling Station". (iii) Said Sanjit Bakshi submitted resignation letter on 1st October, 2012 expressing his difficulties in commissioning the dealership. (iv) The respondent swearing one notarized affidavit as per the format on 10th October, 2012, and by disclosing herself as the "wife of Sri Sanjit Bakshi" submitted application on 11th October, 2012 before the appellant no.8 for LPG distributorship at Barrackpore within District-24 Parganas(N) under Scheduled Caste quota, since she was having such scheduled caste certificate dated 9th June, 1998 issued by the competent authority. (v) In turn the appellant No.8 issued letter dated 12th April, 2013 informing the respondent to attend the draw of lottery on 6th May, 2013 at the scheduled venue for selection of LPG Distributorship. (vi) The appellant No.8 on 19th August, 2013 issued offer letter to the respondent with all as usual conditions since she was held for selection by draw at Kolkata Area Office on 06.05.2013. (vii) The IOCL ultimately accepted resignation of Sanjit Bakshi by issuing letter dated 19th August, 2013. (vi) The appellant No.8 on 19th August, 2013 issued offer letter to the respondent with all as usual conditions since she was held for selection by draw at Kolkata Area Office on 06.05.2013. (vii) The IOCL ultimately accepted resignation of Sanjit Bakshi by issuing letter dated 19th August, 2013. (viii) The respondent obtained renewed certificate of enlistment dated 5th May, 2014 from Barrackpore Municipality for carrying Gas Supply office as the proposed proprietor/partner of Barrackpore Jagannath Indane for the year 2014- 2015, where the respondent was also described as the wife "of Sanjit Bakshi". (ix) The Additional District Magistrate (General) 24 Parganas (N) on 5th September, 2014 informed appellant No.8 about no objection in storing LPG (Liquefied Petroleum Gas) at the site at Barrackpore where also the respondent was described as the "w/o Sanjit Bakshi". (x) Pending decision of grant & issuance of LOA for commissioning LPG distributorship at Barrackpore in favour of the respondent, her husband Sanjit Bakshi submitted complaint on 18th July, 2014 before appellant No.8 to terminate the purported LPG Distributorship for which the respondent was persuading. (xi) The respondent pursued for placement of LOA for LPG distributorship in her name at her desired site at Barrackpore, which was received at the office of appellant No.8 on 23rd February, 2015, where she disclosed Sanjit Bakshi as her "exhusband". (xii) The respondent only on 15th May, 2015, obtained decree of divorce on mutual consent under Section 13-B, Hindu Marriage Act in Matrimonial Suit No.113 of 2015 (renumbered from Matrimonial Suit 1732 of 2014), which was supposed to have been filed before six months, may be expectedly sometimes prior to November, 2014. (xiii) On 22nd June, 2015 the respondent further pursued to issue LOA in respect of Letter of Intent dated 19th August, 2013 in the name & style of "Barrackpore Jagannath Indane" where she disclosed herself as "a Divorcee" preceded by earlier information sent on 15th June, 2015. (xiv) The appellant ultimately by issuing the impugned letter dated 14th July, 2015 to the respondent Priyanku Bakshi informed, "Competent authority has approved withdrawal of your LOI for the distributorship at the location Barrackpore, Dist:24 Pgs (N), under "SC" category, as per policy. Accordingly, the LOI issued to you stands withdrawn". 3. (xiv) The appellant ultimately by issuing the impugned letter dated 14th July, 2015 to the respondent Priyanku Bakshi informed, "Competent authority has approved withdrawal of your LOI for the distributorship at the location Barrackpore, Dist:24 Pgs (N), under "SC" category, as per policy. Accordingly, the LOI issued to you stands withdrawn". 3. Learned Writ Court set aside and quashed the letter dated 14th July, 2015 (supra) on the findings which are set out hereunder for convenience of appreciation:- (a) "I find that admittedly the petitioner's exhusband's resignation letter dated 1st October, 2012 has been accepted and the dealership agreement dated 19th March, 2012 was terminated by the oil company by issuing the letter dated 19th August, 2013 and on the self same date i.e. on 19th August, 2013 by another letter the Indian Oil Corporation awarded LOI in favour of the petitioner against the vacancy with the instruction for construction of godown and show room and for arrangement of fund". (b) "On the date of affirmation of affidavit on 10th October, 2012 and on the submission of application i.e. on 11th October, 2012 the exhusband of the petitioner was neither a licensee nor a LOI holder of retail outlet dealership as he has submitted his resignation on 1st October, 2012". (c) "It is the gross negligence on the part of the oil company to keep such resignation letter pending for about one year and only prior to issuance of LOI in favour of the petitioner, accepted that resignation on 19th August, 2013". (d) "It is also not explained by the oil company as to why the resignation letter dated 1st October, 2012/8th October, 2012 was accepted at a belated stage on 19th August, 2013 though from the record it is evident that the petitioner applied against the vacancy on 11th October, 2012 and admittedly on the 1st October, 2012 the petitioner's ex-husband submitted his resignation". "It is the deliberate negligence on the part of the oil company to accept the said resignation within the reasonable time, but unfortunately it was not done by the oil company. The oil company had the duty to act but they refrained to do so, therefore, belated acceptance of resignation letter should not adversely affect the petitioner and form a ground of withdrawal of LOI of the petitioner, the oil company could not take advantage of their prolonged inaction". The oil company had the duty to act but they refrained to do so, therefore, belated acceptance of resignation letter should not adversely affect the petitioner and form a ground of withdrawal of LOI of the petitioner, the oil company could not take advantage of their prolonged inaction". (e) "When the application for resignation of Sri Sanjit Bakshi was received by the company on 8th October, 2012 the respondent oil company could have rejected the petitioner's application on 11th October, 2012 only on the sole ground that resignation tendered by Sri Sanjit Bakshi received on 8th October, 2012 has been under process and since that has not been accepted till that date". (f) "It also creates some cloud of doubt in the mind of the Court that the oil company was sitting tight over the application of Sanjit Bakshi for a long period and only on 19th August, 2013 the petitioner's ex-husband namely Sri Sanjit Bakshi's application for resignation was accepted and on the self same date the petitioner was offered with the LOI by the oil company". (g) "On the basis of the said application lodged by Sri Bakshi on 21st July, 2014 the respondent oil company has withdrawn the petitioner's LOI inter alia on the ground that the affidavit submitted by the petitioner in respect of multiple dealership (Clause No.4) was found to be untrue. Accordingly, on the basis of the LOI condition under Column No.9.2 and 9.3 the said LOI was withdrawn. But in my considered view the affidavit submitted by the petitioner in respect of multiple dealership to some extent cannot be treated as a false one as admittedly when the petitioner applied against the said vacancy on 11th October, 2012, the petitioner's ex-husband submitted his resignation much prior to that i.e. on 1st October, 2012". (h) "Pursuant to the LOI the petitioner has already expended huge amount of fund for obtaining different licences from different authorities and also generated a huge fund for construction of godown and show room". (i) "The petitioner requires this dealership business for her livelihood, maintenance and survival, being otherwise eligible to obtain the same". 4. The lis in the matter is accordingly set out as follows:- (a) Whether in the case on hand alleged tender of resignation by Sanjit Bakshi ought to have taken effect from the date of its submission, or, from the date when it was accepted. 4. The lis in the matter is accordingly set out as follows:- (a) Whether in the case on hand alleged tender of resignation by Sanjit Bakshi ought to have taken effect from the date of its submission, or, from the date when it was accepted. (b) Whether offering candidature by the respondent to come in the selection process was in terms of norms of selection, or, the entire selection process had sufferance from violation of norms and rules applicable in the field? (c) Whether the action of the appellants in issuing letter dated 14th July, 2015 withdrawing LOI, as was issued in favour of the respondent, was perverse, or, the impugned judgment by which said letter has been quashed should sustain in appeal? 5. Mr. Yadav argued that respondent had no eligibility to apply for the impugned LPG dealership which was advertised for appointment from Scheduled Caste Category. He submitted that, by suppressing material facts before the authority that the Letter of Intent dated 2nd August, 2010, hereinafter called as LOI, followed by LOA dated 29th November, 2011 and Licence dated 28th March, 2012 were already issued by the appellants in the name of her husband Sanjit Bakshi. It is further submitted that, the proposed resignation was submitted by the respondent's husband on 1st of October, 2012 which was not readily accepted, rather the same was accepted only on 19th August, 2013 by the IOC after his failure to attend for personal hearing at the office of IOC and virtually pursuant to undertaking given by him voluntarily confirming his unconditional and irrevocable resignation on 24th June, 2013, the same was accepted on 19th day of August, 2013. Submitted, since till before acceptance of resignation the respondent was wife of said Sanjit Bakshi, who was also not a party in the writ proceeding, she had no locus standi to apply for the impugned dealership, and, suppression of facts having been detected during in-house investigation, the authority rightly had withdrawn the LOI issued in favour of the respondent in terms of the conditions of the offer letter which was also binding upon the respondent. Mr. Mr. Yadav criticized the impugned judgment as perverse since the same is in devoid of consideration of material facts, and thereby submitted to allow the appeal by setting aside the impugned judgment since the Writ Court did not take note of the conditions of offer letter in its proper perspective, and also did not consider suppression of facts by the respondent, and the documents appended with supplementary affidavit dated 29th September, 2015, copy of which has been retained on record of this appeal. In support of his contention he relied upon the following cases:- (i) Moti Ram v. Param Dev AIR 1993 Supreme Court 1662 : (1993) 2 Supreme Court Cases 725. (ii) Devendra Kumar v. State of Uttaranchal & Ors. (2013) 9 Supreme Court Cases 363. 6. Per contra Mr. Saha Roy taking aid also of the case of Moti Ram (supra) submitted that the impugned vacancy was for Scheduled Caste category. The respondent having such caste certificate, and she being a divorcee, her candidature was considered while her ex-husband submitted resignation of LOA and licence connected with the LOI dated 2nd August, 2010 without commissioning the same at the scheduled site at Itapukuria within District-Nadia. Submitted that, ex-husband of the respondent having tendered resignation on 1st October, 2012, its effect ought to have been given immediately from that date. Canvassing thereby about submission of new application for LPG dealership on 11th October, 2012 i.e. after ten days of tendering resignation by her ex-husband, and the respondent having complied with one after another all formalities in terms of the offer letter by accumulating fund through different sources, the alleged letter dated 14th July, 2015 of withdrawal of LOI having been issued in favour of the respondent on the basis of complaint dated 14th July, 2014 of her ex-husband wherein so many uncouth and inaudible sexual allegations were made against the respondent. Mr. Saha Roy submitted that the Writ Court rightly set aside and quashed said letter dated 14th July, 2015 bearing order of withdrawal of LOI. Mr. Saha Roy submitted thereby to dismiss the appeal and application of the appellants and he cited the dictum of the Supreme Court in Union of India & Ors. v. Gopal Chandra Misra & Ors. reported in (1978) 2 Supreme Court Cases 301. 7. Mr. Saha Roy submitted thereby to dismiss the appeal and application of the appellants and he cited the dictum of the Supreme Court in Union of India & Ors. v. Gopal Chandra Misra & Ors. reported in (1978) 2 Supreme Court Cases 301. 7. We noticed that the brochure on guidelines for selection of Regular LPG Distributors have all indications about method of selection, eligibility criteria of the candidate offering candidature for appointment under different categories, be it individual or non-individual, field verification of credentials (shortly called as FVC), mandate of undertaking where to make spouse as co-owner, and also effect of suppression of fact, or, false information which are applicable wherever it would be necessary. 8. We also took note of the offer letter dated 19th August, 2013 issued to the respondent, which was conditional and subject to withdrawal of LOI if there would be any violation of the norms detailed under clause 9.2 and 9.3 of said offer letter. It was made clear in clause 9.1 that the LOI, so issued was merely a letter of intent and would not be construed as a 'firm offer' of LPG Distributorship to the respondent. The text of clauses of 9.2 and 9.3 are set out hereunder:- 9.2 "Our offer will stand automatically cancelled in case you or any member of your 'family unit' have received Letter of Intent for any other Dealership/Distributorship/RGGLV either from this Corporation or any other Oil Company, in your/their individual capacity or in partnership with any other individual". 9.3 "If any statement made in the application or in the documents enclosed therewith or subsequently submitted by you in pursuance of the application at any stage, is found to have been incorrect or false or any material suppressed/misrepresented affecting eligibility, then the LOI is liable to be withdrawn without assigning any reason. In case of such evidence coming to light after you have been appointed as a distributor, the distributorship is liable to be terminated and in such cases you shall have no claim whatsoever against this Corporation". 9. In case of such evidence coming to light after you have been appointed as a distributor, the distributorship is liable to be terminated and in such cases you shall have no claim whatsoever against this Corporation". 9. Perusal of the Licence dated 28th March, 2012 following LOA dated 29th November, 2011 and LOI dated 2nd August, 2010 indicate that those were issued in favour of Sanjit Bakshi appointing him "A" Site Retail outlet dealer at Itapukuria, District - Nadia in the name and style of M/s. Bakshi Filling Station on execution of a bilateral Dealership agreement dated 19th March, 2012 between said Sanjit Bakshi and IOCL. 10. The attempt of Mr. Saha Roy was to persuade the Bench to accept his contention that, since there was no indication in the brochure or norms about the date or period of enforcing the act of resignation, the Writ Court had rightly held that "on 11th October, 2012 the ex-husband of the petitioner was neither a licence nor LOI holder of retail outlet dealership as he has submitted his resignation on 1st October, 2012". Since Mr. Saha Roy in support of above contention relied on the case Moti Ram(supra) relating to applicability of 3rd category situation, to justify his submission as to which should be the date of acceptance of resignation. We found that in that cited case resignation was submitted by the incumbent from membership and Chairmanship of Himachal Pradesh Khadi and Village Industries where the text of said 3rd category out of three possible situations involving resignation were made applicable. Relevant text of said 3rd category from paragraph 23 and paragraph 24 are accordingly set out below for ready reference :- Para 23. (i)........ (ii)....... (iii) "He may resign both from the office of Chairman of the Board as well as from the office of member of the Board. In such a case, his resignation from the office of Chairman of the Board would take effect from the date of communication to the Head of the Department in the Government of Himachal Pradesh if it is in present or from the date indicated therein, or if it is prospective to be operative from a future date. In such a case, his resignation from the office of Chairman of the Board would take effect from the date of communication to the Head of the Department in the Government of Himachal Pradesh if it is in present or from the date indicated therein, or if it is prospective to be operative from a future date. He would, however, continue to be a member of the Board till his resignation from the office of member is notified in the Official Gazette by the Government of Himichal Pradesh under Section 7 of the Act". Para 24. "The instant case falls in the third category because Shri Karam Singh, by his letter dated January 31, 1990, resigned from the office of member as well as the office of Chairman of the Board and wanted the resignation to be accepted with effect from the same day, i.e. January 31, 1990. By notification dated February 12, 1990, it was notified that the resignation of Shri Karam Singh Thakur, as Chairman of the Board has been accepted by the Governor of Himachal Pradesh with immediate effect. In our opinion, the said notification dated February 12, 1990, proceeds under a misconception of the correct legal position. The resignation of Shri Karam Singh as Chairman of the Board was not required to be accepted by the Government of Himachal Pradesh. It became effective on January 31, 1990 when the letter of resignation was received by the Financial Commissioner-cum-Secretary (Industries) to the Government of Himachal Pradesh who was the Head of the Department dealing with the Board and to whom it was addressed. Since there is no requirement in the Act that the resignation of the Chairman of the Board should be notified in the Official Gazette as in the case of a member of the Board, it cannot be said that the resignation of Shri Karam Singh did not take effect till it was notified in the Official Gazette, vide notification dated February 12, 1990." 11. The other case of Union of India & Ors. v. Gopal Chandra Misra & Ors. (supra) relied upon by him relates to resignation submitted by a Judge. In that case the judge submitted in his resignation letter as follows :- "I beg to resign my office as Judge, High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. I will be on leave till July 31, 1977. v. Gopal Chandra Misra & Ors. (supra) relied upon by him relates to resignation submitted by a Judge. In that case the judge submitted in his resignation letter as follows :- "I beg to resign my office as Judge, High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. I will be on leave till July 31, 1977. My resignation shall be effective on August 1, 1977". The Apex Court held that such a letter was merely an intimation or notice of the writer's intention to resign on a future date, which itself did not severe the writer from his office. The Apex Court observed that had the first part, quoted above, stood alone, or would be the only content of said resignation letter, it would operate as a complete resignation in presently involving immediate relinquishment of the office and termination of his tenure as Judge. 12. Though the fact of cases, cited above, are not identical to the case on hand, even then, taking its ratio into consideration how far the same may be applicable to appreciate submissions of Mr. Saha Roy, let us look into the relevant text of the Resignation letter dated 1st October, 2012 submitted by Sanjit Bakshi, which is set out hereunder:- "I have been facing a lot of problems i.e. Financial, Family, Mental etc. At this juncture, I have to resign from the awarded dealership...... Therefore, you are requested to accept my resignation from the Awarded Dealership......" The above text shows that Sanjit Bakshi expressed intention to resign for his personal problems, both fiscal and otherwise. He did not indicate about any prospective date or to accept the date of submission of said letter as his date of resignation with immediate effect. Further the licence having been issued on the basis of bilateral agreement dated 19th March, 2012 on completion of entire selection process the act of submission of resignation by Sanjit Bakshi unilaterally, under whatever circumstances it was done, could not get completion to come into effect so long it was not decided for acceptance at the other end. Otherwise, execution of a bilateral agreement is meaningless, i.e. any bilateral agreement shall not be enforceable if it is not executed by both the parties, and equally it shall not come to an end until intended act of its severance is not acted upon till it is accepted or otherwise at the other end. 13. Otherwise, execution of a bilateral agreement is meaningless, i.e. any bilateral agreement shall not be enforceable if it is not executed by both the parties, and equally it shall not come to an end until intended act of its severance is not acted upon till it is accepted or otherwise at the other end. 13. The dealership, as was issued in favour of Sanjit Bakshi, was held obviously for the benefit of the locality and public at large who would be in the use of the road stretched both ways from the site. Such selection of Sanjit Bakshi was also held after completion of entire process right from its advertisement in newspaper. Therefore, to avoid falling of vacancy and again the time taking hazards to go for fresh selection process as a consequence of proposed resignation we noticed that the IOCL as counterpart of said bilateral agreement had persuaded Sanjit Bakshi to ensure his personal appearance at their office for hearing on 25th March, 2013 and 22nd April, 2013 (vide Resignation acceptance letter dated 19th August, 2013). But since the IOCL failed to secure attendance for personal hearing, rather since Sanjit Bakshi submitted further an undertaking on 24.06.2013 on a non-judicial stamp paper of Rs.20/- confirming his proposed resignation requesting the IOCL to accept the same as it was unconditional, voluntary and irrevocable, the authority acceding to his request then approved the termination of the bilateral dealership agreement dated 19.03.2012 executed between him and the corporation "with immediate effect" ceasing him to be their dealer at Itapukuria forthwith with direction to hand over all goods, equipments, properties including RO premises belonging to and/or owned by the Corporation to their authorized representative on 31.08.2013 at 11:00 hours. 14. We find that the tenor of the unilateral act of proposed resignation by Sanjit Bakshi became complete only after the co-lateral action of the IOCL pursuant to the said bilateral agreement (supra) only on 19th day of August, 2013 by keeping him under actionable clause if he would fail to hand over all properties of IOCL on 31st August, 2013. 15. In view of this matter even the ratio of cases of Moti Ram (supra) and Union of India & Ors. 15. In view of this matter even the ratio of cases of Moti Ram (supra) and Union of India & Ors. (supra) are found to be not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case on hand, so far as giving effect to the date of resignation, we failed to accept the arguments of Mr. Saha Roy that the date of submission of letter of resignation by ex-husband of the respondent ought to have been held enforceable with immediate effect, and thereby there was no bar on the part of the respondent to apply for dealership in her name. 16. Though this matter is being considered and decided behind back of said Sanjit Bakshi, who was not a party in the writ petition, though a part of merit of the respondent's case was ventilated claiming herself as his divorced wife and on other counts, and according to her claim, her LOI was valid since it was issued on acceptance of her exhusband's resignation, but non-impleading of Sanjit Bakshi, also is a fatal blow as against transparency and fairness of the respondent in filing the case. However, still according to the admitted case, we find no difficulty at least to hold that till before 19th August, 2013 Sanjit Bakshi was holding the licence of dealership as a Retail outlet under IOCL at Itapukhuria on which day only the resignation was accepted by the authority by giving immediate effect thereto by termination of the bilateral agreement executed between the IOCL and Sanjit Bakshi. Therefore, we hold that the finding of the Writ Court quoted in paragraph 3(b) as perverse and is accordingly set aside, since the same cannot sustain even in ordinary common parlance for the reasons discussed above. 17. We took note of the facts that in all documents, either created at the instance of the respondent herself, or received from different establishments upto 5th September, 2014 for commissioning of her LOI pertaining to her intending distributorship, the respondent was described as the wife of Sanjit Bakshi, and of course, not as the divorcee. In effect, her marital tie with Sanjit Bakshi having been dissolved by the decree of divorce on mutual consent on 15th May, 2015 [vide Paragraph 2(XII) above] presumption would be available under Section 114(d) of the Indian Evidence Act that, the respondent remained legally wedded wife of Sanjit Bakshi till before 15th May, 2015. In effect, her marital tie with Sanjit Bakshi having been dissolved by the decree of divorce on mutual consent on 15th May, 2015 [vide Paragraph 2(XII) above] presumption would be available under Section 114(d) of the Indian Evidence Act that, the respondent remained legally wedded wife of Sanjit Bakshi till before 15th May, 2015. But, till before that day she would not be permitted to mention anywhere the name of Sanjit Bakshi as her "Ex-husband". She did not even hesitate to persuade the IOCL authority for placement of LOA in terms of LOI in her favour by communicating letter on 23rd February, 2015 [vide Paragraph 2(XI) above] where she curiously described Sanjit Bakshi as her "ex-husband" to materialize her long drawn plan of securing LPG dealership since October, 2012 by hook or by crook. 18. We therefore found that the depiction of Sanjit Bakshi as her "ex-husband" till before the decree of divorce was false and frivolous to her knowledge, which is evident from her further communication dated 22nd June, 2015 where she had correctly described herself as divorcee presumably as a consequence of the decree of divorce (Supra). It is very difficult to swallow that the falsity in the claim of the respondent and suppression of facts about her marital status were not known to the concerned officers of IOCL dealing with her matter. What a surprising co-incidence it is that despite of dependency on such falsehood the respondent again was qualified "for draw for selection of LPG Distributorship" on 6th May, 2013. The Writ Court failed to appreciate the existence of legal marital status as was subsisting between the respondent and Sanjit Bakshi till before the date of dissolution of their marriage by the decree of divorce. 19. The respondent's letter in the format supported by affidavit was received at the office of appellant No.8 on 11.10.2012 i.e. after 10 days of tendering resignation letter by her husband and not "Ex-husband" Sanjit Bakshi. Paragraph 4 of said affidavit bearing her declaration, which were claimed by her allegedly to be true and correct, is set out:- 4. "That I am married and name of my spouse is Sri Sanjit Bakshi. That neither I nor my spouse, unmarried son(s)/unmarried daughter(s) have dealership/distributorship or hold Letter of Intent for Retail Outlet or SKO - LDO dealership or LPG distributorship or RGGLV of any Oil Company". "That I am married and name of my spouse is Sri Sanjit Bakshi. That neither I nor my spouse, unmarried son(s)/unmarried daughter(s) have dealership/distributorship or hold Letter of Intent for Retail Outlet or SKO - LDO dealership or LPG distributorship or RGGLV of any Oil Company". The respondent in the affidavit dated 10th October, 2012 had given an undertaking in Paragraph 8 as under :- 8. "That if any information/declaration given by me in my application or in any documents submitted by me in support of application for the award of the LPG Distributorship or in this affidavit shall be found to be untrue or incorrect or false, the Indian Oil Corporation/Bharat Petroleum Corporation/Hindustan Petroleum Corporation would be within its rights to withdraw the Letter of Intent/terminate the distributorship (if already appointed) and that I would have no claim, whatsoever, against the Corporation for such withdrawal/termination". 20. In the Brochure (Supra) the norms for fulfilling multiple dealership/distributorship has specified the term "Family Unit" in case of married person/applicant which shall consist of individual concerned, his/her spouse(s) and their unmarried son(s)/daughter(s). Therefore, till before the date of decree of divorce the respondent obviously was within family unit of Sanjit Bakshi who had lawful licence in connection with LOA in terms of LOI relating to Retail Outlet dealer at Itapukhuria within District - Nadia under IOCL till before the date of acceptance of his resignation. Relevant extract of the norm reads the term "Multiple Dealership/Distributorship norms" means that the applicant or any other member of 'family unit' should not hold a dealership/distributorship/RGGLV or Letter of Intent (LOI) for a dealership/distributorship/RGGLV of a PSU Oil Company i.e. only one Retail Outlet/SKO - LDO dealership/LPG distributorship/RGGLV of PSU Oil Company will be allowed to a 'Family Unit'. In view of above norm it can be safely deduced that the respondent, despite of giving declaration to submit all correct information, had submitted the application in the form supported by Notarian affidavit suppressing the then existing valid LOA for dealership of retail outlet under IOCL of her husband Sanjit Bakshi. In view of above norm it can be safely deduced that the respondent, despite of giving declaration to submit all correct information, had submitted the application in the form supported by Notarian affidavit suppressing the then existing valid LOA for dealership of retail outlet under IOCL of her husband Sanjit Bakshi. The effect of suppression of such material fact and giving false information misrepresenting Sajjit Bakshi as her "Ex-husband" wherever she thought to mention before dissolving marriage also have been specified in Clause 22 as under:- "If any statement made in the application or in the documents enclosed therewith or subsequently submitted in pursuance of the application by the candidate at any stage is found to have been suppressed/misrepresented/incorrect or false affecting eligibility, then the application is liable to be rejected without assigning any reason and in case the applicant has been appointed as a distributor, the distributorship is liable to be terminated. In such cases, the candidate/distributor shall have no claim whatsoever against the respective Oil Company". 21. Though it was ventilated by Mr. Saha Roy that the appellants on the basis of complaint of the respondent's exhusband ultimately had withdrawn the LOI issued in favour of the respondent, we have also examined the text of the said complaint though Sanjit Bakshi was not a party to such proceeding. From the impugned order of withdrawal dated 14.07.2015, we find that though the complaint letter was referred to therein, but apart from the text of the said letter pertaining to the dealership through inhouse investigation the authority found that:- "So, affidavit submitted by you in respect of multiple dealerships (Clause No.4) was found to be untrue. Accordingly, in line with LOI condition vide column No.9.2 & 9.3 it is stated that "9.2. our offer will stand automatically cancelled in case you or any member of your 'family unit' have received Letter of Intent for any other Dealership/Distributorship/RGGLV either from this Corporation or any other Oil Company, in your/their individual capacity or in partnership with any other individual. 9.3. If any statement made in the application or in the documents enclosed therewith or subsequently submitted by you in persuance of the application at any stage, is found to have been incorrect or false or any material suppressed/misrepresented affecting eligibility, then the LOI is liable to be withdrawn without assigning any reason. 9.3. If any statement made in the application or in the documents enclosed therewith or subsequently submitted by you in persuance of the application at any stage, is found to have been incorrect or false or any material suppressed/misrepresented affecting eligibility, then the LOI is liable to be withdrawn without assigning any reason. In case of such evidence coming to light after you have been appointed as a distributor, the distributorship is liable to be terminated and in such cases you shall have no claim whatsoever against this Corporation". In view of the above, competent authority has approved withdrawal of your LOI for the distributorship at the location Barrackpore, Dist.24 Pgs. (N), under "SC" category, as per policy. Accordingly, the LOI issued to you stands withdrawn. 22. Therefore, paragraph 3 of affidavit of the respondent bearing clear undertaking submitted on 10th of October, 2012, quoted hereinbefore, she cannot get rid of the fact that the department after thorough investigation found the respondent to have acted in violation of the norms, rules and regulations for which consequence shall be followed. The appellants did not take the decision of withdrawal in capricious or whimsical manner or in deviation of norms and rules. Eventually, the respondent had to suffer from the consequence of her undertaking, as quoted above in paragraph 19, particularly when, the respondent was found at fault on two counts involving suppression of material facts and providing misrepresentation, which, of course, tantamounts to giving false information. 23. The Writ Court taking note of so called investment by the respondent and need of her maintenance by earning livelihood captioned the act and action of the authority of IOCL as "deliberate negligence". We observe that the Writ Court persuaded itself mostly by sympathy and emotion against the norms and rules in the field which were violated by the respondent herself to materialize her desperate attempt to obtain the purported LOA persuading the then officers of the authority to believe and rely on her act and contention. The Writ Court thus failed to take note of those palpable violation of the norms by the respondent herself, examination of which would be mostly needed to arrive at the just conclusion as to whether the decision making authority had committed really any lapses or not, or, acted illegally or beyond jurisdiction in withdrawing the impugned LOI. The Writ Court thus failed to take note of those palpable violation of the norms by the respondent herself, examination of which would be mostly needed to arrive at the just conclusion as to whether the decision making authority had committed really any lapses or not, or, acted illegally or beyond jurisdiction in withdrawing the impugned LOI. Of course, the Writ Court in the aforesaid circumstances observed in the judgment under challenge, as mentioned in paragraph 3(g) above, that in its considered view, the affidavit submitted by the petitioner (i.e. respondent) in respect of multiple dealership "to some extent" could not be treated as false one, meaning thereby, to some other extent the text of that affidavit was false and false to the knowledge of the respondent. In view of own observations of the Writ Court in not relying upon the entire text of the affidavit of the respondent as true, the finding by shifting of burden upon the IOCL in the matter of undoing on their part cannot be sustained in appeal. Particularly when the respondent had sought for redress before the Court on ground of equity for which she herself also ought to have come with clean hands. 24. On the contrary, we find that in all material particulars the respondent had taken resort of falsehood by suppressing the material fact though she had undertaken that all of her statement/information/declaration were true, and, if any part thereof would be found untrue, or, incorrect, or, false, the IOCL within its rights would be able to withdraw the Letter of Intent or terminate distributorship, even if she would be appointed, and, she would have no claim whatsoever against the corporation in respect of said withdrawal. The respondent cannot be allowed to blow hot and cold at the same time. Violation of the conditions affecting eligibility must be followed with consequences. The respondent might have spent a lot of fund for her desired dealership. But spending a lot of fund depending on falsehood and taking illegal advantage cannot be a savior of her own misdeed. A building cannot be raised in the air having no foundation on terra-firma. Violation of the conditions affecting eligibility must be followed with consequences. The respondent might have spent a lot of fund for her desired dealership. But spending a lot of fund depending on falsehood and taking illegal advantage cannot be a savior of her own misdeed. A building cannot be raised in the air having no foundation on terra-firma. While there was falsehood and suppression of material facts at the very inception as discussed above, spending of a lot of fund, requirement of her maintenance etc., for which the respondent was able to earn some sympathy from the Writ Court does not call for any favourable consideration or approval on merit in appeal. When the purported unilateral resignation of Sanjit Bakshi was yet to be accepted by the authority, and dehors the norms and procedure the respondent at that stage having no locus standi or eligibility even to offer her candidature for LPG dealership under IOCL, and as also the Writ Court rightly having observed that it would be very difficult to believe that the entire matter was not within the knowledge of the authority of IOCL, nonetheless, we find that the then concerned officers of IOCL having allowed to go the prayer of the respondent on process for favourable disposal, either with idiotic innocence, or, corrupted collusion, said attempt would not be fit and qualified for getting sanction as legal in the decision making process. Because the decision making process must be fair and transparent following the norms and rules applicable in the field and not making violation thereof, having no scope of being driven out by any uncalled for sympathy and emotion. Otherwise in doing so, the legal institution would be encouraging the party at fault to perpetuate his/her misrepresented act coated with falsehood. 25. Though the case of Devendra Kumar (supra) relates to termination of service of an employee by the employer due to furnishing false information while seeking appointment, but ratio of said decision, specially paragraph 13 and 18 thereof is very much applicable in this case and is set out hereunder as ready reference:- Paragraph 13:-It is a settled proposition of law that where an applicant gets an office by misrepresenting the facts or by playing fraud upon the competent authority, such an order cannot be sustained in the eye of the law. "Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal." (Vide S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath.) In lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley the Court observed without equivocation that: (QB p.712) "...No judgment of a court, no order of a Minister can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud, for fraud unravels everything." Paragraph 18:- The ratio laid down by this Court in various cases is that dishonesty should not be permitted to bear the fruit and benefit those persons who have frauded or misrepresented themselves. In such circumstances the court should not perpetuate the fraud by entertaining petitions on their behalf. In Union of India v. M. Bhaskaran this Court, after placing reliance upon and approving its earlier judgment in Vizianagaram Social Welfare Residential School Society v. M. Tripura Sundari Devi, observed as under: (M. Bhaskaran case, SCC p. 104, para 6) If by committing fraud any employment is obtained, the same cannot be permitted to be countenanced by a court of law as the employment secured by fraud renders it voidable at the option of the employer. Hence, suppressing the then existing licence of retail outlet dealership in the name of her husband Sanjit Bakshi under IOCL at the time of submission of offering candidature by the respondent, and, her act of obtaining LOI by remaining silent about her prevalent marital status with Sanjit Bakshi, rather by asserting Sanjit Bakshi as her ex-husband wherever it was required for persuading her purported LOA and Licence of LPG dealership, during the period from 10th October, 2012 till before receipt of impugned letter of withdrawal dated 14th July, 2015 we found that the action of IOCL by withdrawing the LOI had been rightly enforced for violation of the norms and rules by the respondent. 26. We are now to deal with the findings of Writ Court as mentioned in paragraph 3(c) to (i) above. We find that one supplementary affidavit was filed by the appellants before the Writ Court annexing the note sheets bearing the inhouse investigation before issuing the impugned termination letter by the appellant. We failed to find out even a single sentence in consideration of the same in the body of impugned judgment. We find that one supplementary affidavit was filed by the appellants before the Writ Court annexing the note sheets bearing the inhouse investigation before issuing the impugned termination letter by the appellant. We failed to find out even a single sentence in consideration of the same in the body of impugned judgment. Note sheets of the proceedings attached with the supplementary affidavit (Supra) show that before acceptance of the resignation submitted by Sanjit Bakshi there was repeated attempts made by the authority of IOCL, so that, Mr. Bakshi could be persuaded to reconsider his resignation letter, and to start commissioning the dealership of the retail outlet. But he by subsequent confirmation letter reaffirmed the fact of his resignation and thereby it was accepted only on 19th August, 2013. Therefore, till before that date the respondent, who was still then legally married wife of Sanjit Bakshi had no locus standi even to apply, far to speak of persuading for fresh licence by offering fresh site seeking dealership under IOCL. We believe that if the Writ Court would not have omitted or failed to consider the supplementary affidavit so submitted by the appellants annexing the documents before the Writ Court, it would not give the above perverse observations as mentioned in paragraph 3(c) onwards. Therefore the findings of the Writ Court shifting fault and liability upon the IOCL are set aside and quashed being led by the provisions under Order 41, Rule 24 read with Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure to pronounce the effective judgment determining the lis, since materials on record are sufficient to answer keeping aside any other fallacy, emotion or sympathy by which the Writ Court had swayed by picking up the fault and negligence wrongly with the IOCL, who after detecting violation of rules and norms by the respondent, though belated, pursuant to the terms and conditions had taken the lawful and correct decision in withdrawing the impugned LOI, as was issued in reality might be in a got up manner collusively with the then concerned personals, be it was of IOCL, or, of other establishments, by making desperate attempt in keeping the material facts suppressed under the carpet. 27. We therefore do not accept the very initiation of the process of LPG dealership in question on the basis of letter dated 11th October, 2012 as legal. 27. We therefore do not accept the very initiation of the process of LPG dealership in question on the basis of letter dated 11th October, 2012 as legal. Therefore, any further question of revisiting the issue by the IOCL on opportunity of hearing of the respondent over the subject vacancy is not permissible. The appellants are thereby free to take steps in accordance with law, if so advised. Therefore said action by letter dated 14th July, 2015 by the IOCL being neither perverse, nor illegal, since the entire process of the respondent upto issuance of LOI as took place in violation of norms and rules the judgment impugned is set aside and quashed. The judgment dated 18th May, 2016 under challenge is thus set aside. Stay order if any passed on prayer of the appellants is made absolute. 28. The appeal is hereby dismissed, and as a consequence thereof the application being CAN 9999 of 2016 is disposed. 29. No order as to costs. 30. Urgent certified Photostat copy be supplied to the parties, if applied for. Appeal dismissed.