Shrilal Kisku, son of late Jetha Kisku v. State of Jharkhand
2017-02-23
PRAMATH PATNAIK
body2017
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : In the captioned writ petition, the petitioner has sought for quashing the impugned notification dated 19.11.2009 (Annexure-5), whereby he has been discharged from the services, treating the letter of voluntary retirement as a letter of unconditional resignation and has further prayed for quashing the impugned order dated 12.01.2013 (Annexure-12), whereby the claim of petitioner for voluntary retirement, as upheld by the Special Secretary under delegated exercise of power vide reasoned order dated 16.08.2012 (Annexure-11), has been reviewed. The petitioner has further prayed for a direction upon the respondent-authorities to reinstate him in service with all consequential benefits including continuity in service or in alternative for a direction upon the respondents to modify the order dated 19.11.2009 into an order granting voluntary retirement with all consequential benefits by allowing the letter of request dated 19.11.2009 (Annexure-6). 2. Sans unnecessary details, the facts, as disclosed in the writ petition, are that in pursuance of advertisement published in the year 1989 for the post of Assistant Medical Officer, the petitioner applied for the said post and accordingly, he was appointed as Assistant Medical Officer vide Notification dated 07.09.1990 in the district of Singhbhum, which was subsequently changed to Dumka vide Notification dated 03.11.1990 (Annexure-2 to the writ petition). In pursuance of the said appointment, the petitioner joined the services and served the State to the best of his abilities. After bifurcation of the State of Bihar, the petitioner was allocated the State of Jharkhand and continued to work with zeal and zest and showed high degree of dedication and quality of service. During his unblemished service career, he has gained popularity in public and was inspired to contest election of Jharkhand Legislative Assembly, 2009. The petitioner being inspired by some local politician and without realizing the adverse consequences, submitted his application for voluntary retirement vide letter dated 07.11.2009 with categorical assertion to grant voluntary retirement forthwith and the said letter was followed by another letter dated 17.11.2009 because the date of nomination was extended to 20.11.2009 and the said letter was reiteration of the earlier letter, wherein it is clearly mentioned that if the consideration for voluntary retirement takes time, the interim resignation may be accepted, as is evident from Annexure-4 to this writ petition.
The respondents abruptly issued impugned order vide Notification dated 19.11.2009, whereby the letter dated 17.11.2009 was treated as unconditional resignation and the same was declared to have been allowed as per Annexure-5 to the writ petition. But to the utter misfortune, the petitioner, who contested the election as independent candidate, could not succeed and therefore, he filed an application on 19.12.2009 before the respondents for modification of the order dated 19.11.2009 converting the same as the order of voluntary retirement or else to recall the same and reinstate him in service with all consequential benefits (Annexure-6 to the writ petition). The old mother of the petitioner also submitted application before the Chief Minister on 23.01.2010 and the Secretariat of Chief Minister took cognizance of the same and forwarded the application dated 23.01.2010 with a request to the Secretary of the concerned department to consider the same. Since no action was taken, the petitioner filed writ petition being W.P.(S) no.1673 of 2012, which was disposed of on 08.05.2012 with direction upon respondent no.2-Secretary, Medical Health Education and Family Welfare Department, Govt. of Jharkhand, Ranchi to treat the writ petition as a representation and decide the grievances in accordance with law. It was further directed that the Secretary or any other competent authority, who is duly authorized and well conversant with the facts and law of the matter, shall decide the grievances in accordance with law, rules, regulations, policies and Government enforceable orders, applicable to the petitioner as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of twelve weeks, after giving an adequate opportunity of being heard to the petitioner. If the decision is taken in favour of the petitioner, the benefit of the decision was to be extended to the petitioner within four weeks thereafter. The petitioner having obtained the certified copy of the order dated 08.05.2012, represented vide letter dated 19.05.2012. Thereafter Sri Arun, IAS Officer posted as Special Secretary of the concerned department, after being delegated by the Secretary, issued notice to petitioner vide letter dated 07.07.2012 fixing the date of hearing and the petitioner accordingly appeared. Thereafter, the matter was adjourned to other dates and after protracted hearing, reasoned order dated 14.07.2012 has been passed by Sri Arun by allowing the claim of the petitioner as is evident from Annexure-11 to the writ petition.
Thereafter, the matter was adjourned to other dates and after protracted hearing, reasoned order dated 14.07.2012 has been passed by Sri Arun by allowing the claim of the petitioner as is evident from Annexure-11 to the writ petition. Thereafter a reasoned order passed by the Special Secretary has been reviewed vide order dated 12.01.2013 (Annexure-12 to the writ petition). 3. Being aggrieved by the impugned Notification dated 19.11.2009 (Annexure-5) and the order dated 12.01.2013 (Annexure-12), the petitioner left with no other alternative and efficacious remedy, has approached this Court invoking extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for redressal of his grievance. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has strenuously urged before this Court that the impugned order as contained in Annexure-5 dated 19.11.2009 has been passed in gross violation of Rule-74(b)(i)(iii) of the Jharkhand Service Code, which, inter alia, mandates that for valid resignation, there must be three months' prior notice or in alternative three months' salary in lieu of notice and further to serve the period of such notice otherwise, the same cannot be considered. Learned counsel submits that none of the aforesaid ingredients exists to take the case in hand within the purview and definition of the resignation and, therefore, the impugned order of acceptance of resignation vide Annexure-5 is nonest in the eye of law. Learned counsel further submits that as per Corpus Juris Secundum, Black's Law dictionary to validate the act of resignation, there must be spontaneous relinquishment of one's own right and unconditional intent to operate as such. But in the case in hand, there has been undue haste on the part of the respondents to treat the same as letter of resignation. In this respect, learned counsel has referred the decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of 'Dr. Prabha Atri Vrs. State of U.P. & Ors.' reported in (2003) 1 SCC 701 particularly in paragraphs-7,8 & 10).
In this respect, learned counsel has referred the decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of 'Dr. Prabha Atri Vrs. State of U.P. & Ors.' reported in (2003) 1 SCC 701 particularly in paragraphs-7,8 & 10). Learned counsel for the petitioner during course of hearing has vehemently submitted that the action of the respondents in passing the impugned order vide Annexure-12 being contrary to Annexure-11 is wholly without jurisdiction since it is hit by the principles of “Delegatus Non Potest Delegare” , which mandates that if a delegatee has exercised certain power in pursuance of the authority granted by the delegate, then his/her order shall be treated as an order of delegate/Principal himself and he cannot review the same and, therefore, on that analogy, the impugned order (Annexure-12) is not legally sustainable. Learned counsel has further referred the decisions of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of 'Roop Chand Vrs. State of Punjab' reported in AIR (1963) SC 1503 (paras-11 and 21); in the case of 'Behari Kunj Sahkari Awas Samiti and another Vrs. State of U.P. and another' reported in (1997) 7 SCC 37 (paras-7 & 9) and in the case of 'Chairman Indore Vikas Pradhikaran Vrs. Pure Industrial Coke and Chemicals Ltd.' reported in (2007) 8 SCC 705 (para-90). Learned counsel further submits that the impugned orders and the entire action thereof are violative of Article-21 of the Constitution of India, inasmuch as, the same renders deprivation of fundamental right of life and personal liberty in violation of procedure established by law. 5. Controverting the averments made in this writ petition, a counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondent nos.2 to 5, wherein it has been, inter alia, submitted that there is no violation of principles of natural justice in the case of petitioner nor the petitioner was forced to tender his resignation by his employer. The petitioner has willingly tendered his resignation to contest MLA Election. Therefore, the said resignation of the petitioner cannot be termed as a conditional one and the petitioner cannot be allowed to take advantage of the content/text of his resignation letter dated 17.11.2009. The facts in the case of Dr. Prabha Atri Vrs. State of U.P. & Ors.(supra) are different and thus, the ratio therein is also not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case of the petitioner.
The facts in the case of Dr. Prabha Atri Vrs. State of U.P. & Ors.(supra) are different and thus, the ratio therein is also not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case of the petitioner. It has further been submitted that the Department of Health, Government of Jharkhand has accepted the resignation and there cannot be subsequent order for accepting the voluntary retirement. Once the resignation has been accepted, he is no more a Government servant and, as such, there is no question of accepting the voluntary retirement of the petitioner. Thus, the resignation letter dated 17.11.2009(Annexure-4) was neither a conditional letter at all nor can it be termed as an interim in nature and the petitioner cannot be allowed to blow hot and cold (i.e. Approbate and at the same time reprobate). Just because the petitioner was not declared successful in the said MLA election, he cannot be allowed to claim that his resignation letter should be treated as a letter for VRS on account of the fact that he fulfills all the criteria of Rule-74 of the Jharkhand Service Code. Therefore, the resignation of the petitioner was rightly accepted vide letter dated 19.11.2009 and thus, the impugned Notification dated 12.01.2013 has rightly been issued by the Health Department in compliance to the principles of natural justice and that has been passed in accordance with law. Further it has been submitted that there is no provision in the Jharkhand Service Code for reconsideration of resignation as it has already been accepted and also the Memo dated 28.08.1985 stipulates that those who have tendered resignation to contest election cannot subsequently request his/her employer to recall the said resignation and the same is not permissible. Further, if any employee is affiliated to any political party or has contested election then his loyalty towards his service becomes doubtful. Thus, the application dated 24.08.2013 of the petitioner addressed to Chief Minister, Jharkhand to take him back in service was rejected by letter dated 21.12.2013. Therefore, the instant writ petition is neither maintainable under law nor on facts and hence is liable to be dismissed. 6.
Thus, the application dated 24.08.2013 of the petitioner addressed to Chief Minister, Jharkhand to take him back in service was rejected by letter dated 21.12.2013. Therefore, the instant writ petition is neither maintainable under law nor on facts and hence is liable to be dismissed. 6. Before adverting to the rival submissions of the respective parties, it would be apposite to refer to the relevant provision of Jharkhand Service Code i.e. Rule-74(b)(i)(iii), which is as follows: “74(b)(i) Notwithstanding anything contained in the proceeding sub-rule a Government servant may, after giving at least three months previous notice, in writing, to the appointing authority concerned retire from service on the date on which such a Government servant completes thirty years of qualifying service or attains fifty years of age or on any date thereafter to be specified in the notice: Provided that no Government servant under suspension shall retirement from service except with the specific approval of the State Government: Provided further that in case of the officers and servants of the Patna High Court including those of Circuit Bench at Ranchi) under the rule making authority of the Chief Justice, no such officer and servant under suspension shall retire from service except with the specific approval of the Chief Justice. xxx xxx xxx (iii) A Government servant who retires voluntarily is required to retire in public interest under this rule on attaining the age of 50 years, or completing qualifying service of 30 years, shall be entitled to retiring pension and death-cum-retirement gratuity.” 7. Having bestowed my anxious consideration to the rival submissions and on perusal of the records, I am of the considered view that the petitioner has been able to make out a case for interference due to the following facts and reasons: In pursuance of the order of this Court dated 08.05.2012 passed in W.P.(S) no.1673 of 2012, Sri Arun, Special Secretary, Department of Health, Govt. of Jharkhand has come to the categorical finding Vide Annexure-11 to the writ petition that the petitioner fully qualifies to the condition for availing voluntary retirement. Accordingly, the delegated authority has passed order vide Annexure-11, which has been sought to be reviewed by the impugned order dated 12.01.2013 (Annexure-12 to the writ petition).
of Jharkhand has come to the categorical finding Vide Annexure-11 to the writ petition that the petitioner fully qualifies to the condition for availing voluntary retirement. Accordingly, the delegated authority has passed order vide Annexure-11, which has been sought to be reviewed by the impugned order dated 12.01.2013 (Annexure-12 to the writ petition). Since a reasoned order as contained in Annexure-11 has been passed relying on Rule-74(b)(i)(iii) of the Jharkhand Service Code, under the delegated exercise of power, as delegated by the Secretary himself in pursuance of order dated 08.05.2012 passed in W.P.(S) no.1673 of 2012(Annexure-8), the same cannot be reviewed by the Secretary and, therefore, the impugned order (Annexure-12) is not legally sustainable in the eye of law and liable to be set aside. The impugned order vide Annexure-12 to the writ petition is also in express violation of the order passed by this Court dated 08.05.2012 in W.P.(S) no. 1673 of 2012. Moreover, view of this Court gets fortified by the decisions of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of 'State of Orissa Vrs. Commr. Of Land Records & Settlement' reported in (1998)7 Supreme Court Cases 162, wherein Hon'ble Apex Court has been pleased to inter alia reiterate that so far as delegation of power is concerned, the order of delegatee is to be treated as the order of principal itself and the revision of exercise of power by delegatee by the principal is not permissible. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of 'Ishwar Singh Vrs. State of Rajasthan' reported in (2005) 2 Supreme Court Cases 334, has been further pleased to hold that the above principle is equally applicable in respect of orders of review passed by quasi-judicial authorities. 8. In view of the reasons stated herein above and as a logical sequitur to the factual and legal matrix, the impugned Notification dated 19.11.2009 (Annexure-5) and order dated 12.01.2013 (Annexure-12) being not legally sustainable are hereby quashed and the matter is remitted to the respondents to take a decision afresh in accordance with Annexure-11 as well as in accordance with law within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order. 9. With the aforesaid observation, this writ petition stands allowed.