JUDGMENT : Dr. Pushpendra Singh Bhati, J. 1. That the petitioner was given a memorandum of charge on 20/11/2008 issued by the Chairman of National Counsel for Teacher Education (hereinafter referred as "NCTE"). The suspension order was also passed on 19/3/2009 by the chairman of the NCTE. The dispute relating to the charge upon the petitioner was relating to a lease between the NCTE and landlord of House No. 1 (kha-8), Jawahar Nagar, Jaipur for 11 months commencing from 1/1/1998. The petitioner alongwith family members occupied the said house even after expiry of lease period as a tenant and the charge relating to occupation of the petitioner after expiry of the lease period was not in purview of misconduct under the provisions of Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 (hereinafter referred as (CCA Rules, 1965). 2. The NCTE took legal opinion and such opinion was that the petitioner was in the occupation of the said house in his personal capacity. 3. Wife of the petitioner filed a suit for permanent injunction impleading the petitioner-the landlord and NCTE as defendants. The petitioner was holding the post of Regional Director Northern Regional Committee NCTE, when he initially occupied the said premises. The suit filed by the petitioner's wife came to an end by virtue of the compromise between the parties. 4. The charge levelled against the petitioner was leading to the occupation of the said house unauthorisedly which came in the purview of misconduct so as to fail to maintain the integrity and acted in a manner unbecoming of an employee. The petitioner contravened the Rule (3) of the CCA Rules, 1965. The petitioner challenged the memorandum of 20/11/2008 as well as suspension order dated 19/3/2009. 5. The respondents filed the reply and took a preliminary objection that it was in the exceptional circumstances that a charge-sheet and show cause notice is interfered with. 6. In the reply, it was submitted that the landlord continuously approached the NCTE Office seeking the vacation of his house which was under occupation stating that the house in question has not been vacated by him despite the lapse of lease period. The matter was examined and a copy of the complaints dated 13/7/2005 was forwarded by MHRD to the NCTE. The matter was examined and a copy of the complaints dated 13/7/2005 was forwarded by MHRD to the NCTE. The MHRD conducted Preliminary Enquiry into the matter and forwarded a letter dated 30/11/2006 directing the petitioner to vacate the house in question and directing the NCTE to initiate Disciplinary Proceedings against the petitioner. 7. On the conclusion of the Enquiry Proceedings, the Enquiry Authority Shri Geeta Ram submitted his enquiry report on 8/7/2009, according to which the charge No. 1, 2, 3 and 5 contained in the Article of charge framed against the petitioner were found proved. The copy of the enquiry report was brought on record for the petitioner by filing an additional affidavit in the year 2009. 8. However, this Hon'ble Court vide order dated 8/12/2010 passed an interim order that respondents may proceed enquiry but they shall not pass final order in the enquiry initiated in pursuance to the order (OM) dated 20/11/2008. 9. The counsel for the respondents has relied upon the precedent law which clearly lays down that any interference made at the stage of charge sheet can be made on very limited grounds. The counsel for the respondents referred to the judgment in case of Divisional Forest Officer and Others Vs. M. Ramalinga Reddy in Civil Appeal No. 1872/2007 [reported in 2007 (9) SCC 286 ], the relevant paragraph of the same is as follows:- "14. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Brahm Datt Sharma and Anr., AIR (1987) SC 943 : [1987] 2 SCC 179, this Court held: "9. The High Court was not justified in quashing the show cause notice. When a show cause notice is issued to a government servant under a statutory provision calling upon him to show cause, ordinarily the government servant must place his case before the authority concerned by showing cause and the courts should be reluctant to interfere with the notice at that stage unless the notice is shown to have been issued probably without any authority of law. The purpose of issuing show cause notice is to afford opportunity of hearing to the government servant and once cause is shown it is open to the Government to consider the matter in the light of the facts and submissions placed by the government servant and only thereafter a final decision in the matter could be taken. The purpose of issuing show cause notice is to afford opportunity of hearing to the government servant and once cause is shown it is open to the Government to consider the matter in the light of the facts and submissions placed by the government servant and only thereafter a final decision in the matter could be taken. Interference by the court before that stage would be premature, the High Court in our opinion ought not have interfered with the show cause notice." 10. The counsel for the respondents further referred to the judgment in case of Union of India and Another Vs. Kunisetty Satyanarayana in Civil Appeal No. 5145 of 2006 [reported in 2006 (12) SCC 28 ], the relevant paragraphs of the judgment are as follows:- "13. It is well settled by a series of decisions of this Court that ordinarily no writ lies against a charge sheet or show-cause notice vide Executive Engineer, Bihar State Housing Board vs. Ramdesh Kumar Singh and others, JT 1995 (8) SC 331, Special Director and another vs. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse and another, AIR 2004 SC 1467 , Ulagappa and others vs. Divisional Commissioner, Mysore and others, 2001 (10) SCC 639 , State of U.P. vs. Brahm Datt Sharma and another. 16. No doubt, in some very rare and exceptional cases the High Court can quash a charge-sheet or show-cause notice if it is found to be wholly without jurisdiction or for some other reason if it is wholly illegal. However, ordinarily the High Court should not interfere in such a matter." 11. The counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgment in the case of Vaidhya Dev Shankar Sharma Vs. The State of Rajasthan in SB CWP No. 6654/1993 [reported in 1994 (2) WLC 632], in which the relevant portion is as follows:- "9. Second preliminary objection is equally untenable. It is too late in the day to argue that a charge-sheet issued on a Government Servant cannot be made subject matter of judicial review merely because it is an administrative act. Jurisdiction of the ordinary courts in India can be excluded by statutory enactment but so far as the High Court is concerned, its jurisdiction can be excluded only by a Constitutional amendment. Jurisdiction of the ordinary courts in India can be excluded by statutory enactment but so far as the High Court is concerned, its jurisdiction can be excluded only by a Constitutional amendment. Wide reach of jurisdiction of the High Court has been aptly recognised in M/s. Dwarkanath v. Income tax Officer ( AIR 1966 SC 81 ) and in host of other decisions. In Manoj Kumar Bansal v. State of Raj. And Anr. [1993 (2) WLC 751], I have dealt with a similar preliminary objection and held that except on the basis of Parliamentary enactments framed under Arts. 323-A and 323-B of the Constitution. I wish to reiterate that all administrative actions are within the reach of the powers of judicial review vested in the High Court under Art. 226. Of course, in what case the Court will exercise jurisdiction and grant or refuse relief to an aggrieved person will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. Thus, I have no hesitation in over-ruling the first preliminary objection also." 12. This Court is of the opinion that though the interference in charge-sheet under Article 226 of the Constitution, is within the powers of judicial review vested in the High Court but the rare grant of relief to an aggrieved person will depend upon the facts of the case. A mere charge-sheet does not give cause of action to the employee as it does not amount to passing adverse order which effects the rights of a party unless the same is issued by a person having no jurisdiction to do so. 13. This Court is further of the opinion that the Disciplinary Authority has all the powers to drop the proceedings and hold that charges are not established. The precedent law given by both the counsel also lays down the parameters that the interference of this Court in the matter of charge-sheet is very limited and if at all the same is made then it could be on account of the charge sheet being without jurisdiction. The counsel for the petitioner has failed to point out any illegality in the jurisdiction and, therefore, this Court refuses to invoke the jurisdiction of article 226 for quashing of the charge-sheet in the given facts and circumstances. 14. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. 15. The counsel for the petitioner has failed to point out any illegality in the jurisdiction and, therefore, this Court refuses to invoke the jurisdiction of article 226 for quashing of the charge-sheet in the given facts and circumstances. 14. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. 15. The petitioner shall have complete liberty to challenge and defend himself against any adverse proceedings arising out of the charge-sheet.