ORDER : In the instant writ application, the petitioner has inter alia prayed for quashing notification dated 04.04.2013 whereby petitioner has been imposed with a punishment of reduction of pay-scale to the minimum of his post and recovery of Rs.12,10,620.34 out of the financial loss caused to the Government and further for quashing the notification dated 19.02.2014, whereby the appeal preferred by the petitioner has been rejected. 2. The brief facts giving rise for filing of the writ petition is that the petitioner at the time of filing of the writ application has been working as Assistant Engineer and posted as Estimating Officer, Building Construction Department, Chhotanagpur Circle, Ranchi. In compliance to the order dated 30.06.2009 passed in W.P.(PIL) No. 803 of 2009, a first information report was instituted by the Central Bureau of Investigation, ACB, Ranchi being RC 13(A)/2009 (R) for offences under Sections 120(B), 420, 467, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, wherein preliminary enquiry was taken up for the alleged large scale irregularities committed by the Engineers of the Road Construction Department, Government of Jharkhand, contractors and other persons in the matter of purported procurement of Bitumen for construction of road. The Central Bureau of Investigation, after completion of investigation submitted charge-sheet against the petitioner, for the following charges:- “Shri Ajay Bahadur and Sri Manish Kumar, while working in the capacity of Assistant Engineers and looking after the work of strengthening of Parwa-Garhwa Road, KM 0 to 30, being executed by Shri Mahesh Mehra & Sri Sidhnath Mehra, both Directors of M/s. Kaushalya Infrastructure Development Corporation Ltd., dishonestly and fraudulently, counter signed on the measurement books and on Account Bills, in strict abuse of their official positions, in order to extend undue benefit to the contractor. They committed criminal misconduct while countersigning on them as no bitumen against the fake bitumen invoices was ever supplied by the Govt. Oil Company to the contractor. They, with criminal intent, did not ensure the submission of required nos. of bitumen invoices showing procurement of required quantity of bitumen. They committed criminal misconduct and did not ensure utilization of proper quantity of bitumen in the contractual work and rather facilitated illegal payment to the contractor, as no bitumen against the aforesaid twenty-six bitumen invoices was ever supplied by the Govt. Oil Company to the contractor. of bitumen invoices showing procurement of required quantity of bitumen. They committed criminal misconduct and did not ensure utilization of proper quantity of bitumen in the contractual work and rather facilitated illegal payment to the contractor, as no bitumen against the aforesaid twenty-six bitumen invoices was ever supplied by the Govt. Oil Company to the contractor. Shri Ajay Bahadur and Sri Manish Kumar, thus, in criminal conspiracy with others and in strict abuse of their official positions, allowed the use of forged documents as genuine in order to cheat the department. In the criminal case, the petitioner was released on bail by the learned Court on 06.02.2012 on depositing proportionate amount of 1/9th Share of the defalcation amount involved in the case. In the meantime, the charges were framed in the departmental proceeding against him for dereliction of duties/irregularities. By resolution dated 24.01.2012, Smt. Rajbala Verma, the then Principal Secretary, Department of Food, Public Distribution and Consumer Affairs, Jharkhand, Ranchi was appointed as conducting officer. In the departmental proceeding, the Conducting Officer vide letter dated 01.02.2012 directed the petitioner to appear before the conducting officer and to submit his written reply. Pursuant thereto the petitioner submitted his reply vide letter dated 13.02.2012. Thereafter, the departmental proceeding was conducted and the enquiry officer submitted enquiry report vide letter dated 10.04.2012. Upon submission of the enquiry report, the Deputy Secretary, Road Construction Department, Ranchi issued a second show cause to the petitioner enclosing therein the copy of the inquiry report and in pursuance thereto the petitioner submitted a detailed reply on 26.11.2012. It has been averred that thereafter, by notification dated 04.04.2013 issued under the signature of Deputy Secretary, Road Construction Department, Jharkhand, Ranchi under the orders of the Governor of Jharkhand, while rejecting the reply dated 26.11.2012 imposed the impugned punishment vide annexure-9 to the writ petition. Against which the petitioner submitted his appeal before His Excellency the Governor of Jharkhand, which was rejected vide notification dated 19.02.2014. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted with vehemence that the person who was appointed as enquiry officer to enquire into the matter and the disciplinary authority who imposed the impugned punishment is the same person. At every stage, therefore, a person became a judge of his own cause which is in teeth of the principles of natural justice. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted with vehemence that the person who was appointed as enquiry officer to enquire into the matter and the disciplinary authority who imposed the impugned punishment is the same person. At every stage, therefore, a person became a judge of his own cause which is in teeth of the principles of natural justice. Therefore, the impugned orders cannot survive the test of legal scrutiny as the decision making process has been vitiated beyond redemption. On the merit of the case, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that samples of alleged Bitumen were tested by the experts in the Laboratories at Birla Institute of Technology and as per report submitted by the Birla Institute of Technology, the quality of bitumen has been found to be satisfactory. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the entire departmental proceeding is based on the assumption that the invoices are fake. Actually, no evidence was produced in the departmental proceeding to prove that the invoices were in fact forged or any evidence is there to suggest that the petitioner was aware that the invoices were forged. Furthermore, the petitioner has not countersigned any invoice produced by the contractor. Hence, the impugned order is perverse as the same is based on surmises and conjectures and without any legal evidence. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the respondents have acted in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner in deciding the quantum of punishment by imposing punishment of reduction to the minimum of the pay scale to the post and recovery of proportionate amount of Rs.12,10,620.34 out of the financial loss caused to the government. Therefore, the order of punishment against the petitioner is grossly disproportionate. 4. In support of his submission, learned counsel for the petitioner referred to following decisions: (i). Mohd. Yunus Khan Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & others [ (2010) 10 SCC 539 ] (ii). Roop Singh Negi Vs. Punjab National Bank & others [ (2009) 2 SCC 570 ] (iii). State of Uttaranchal and others vs. Kharak Singh [ (2008) 8 SCC 236 ] 5. Lastly, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the case of the petitioner stands on similar footing with that of the order dated 23.09.2015 passed in W.P.(S) No.2298 of 2013. 6. Punjab National Bank & others [ (2009) 2 SCC 570 ] (iii). State of Uttaranchal and others vs. Kharak Singh [ (2008) 8 SCC 236 ] 5. Lastly, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the case of the petitioner stands on similar footing with that of the order dated 23.09.2015 passed in W.P.(S) No.2298 of 2013. 6. Controverting the averments made in the writ application, learned counsel for Respondent-State submits that the charges against the petitioner are of very serious nature. It has been submitted that in compliance of order passed in W.P. (PIL) No. 803 of 2009, the C.B.I enquired into the matter of irregularities committed by contractors, engineers and other persons in the matter of procurement of bitumen for various road construction works of the State. The State Government after review of the C.B.I's report decided to initiate departmental proceeding against the petitioner, in which, all the allegations levelled against the petitioner were proved. Basing on such enquiry report, the disciplinary authority imposed the impugned punishment, which has been affirmed in appeal. It has further been submitted that since the petitioner is a gazetted officer, therefore, his ultimate disciplinary authority is State Government and further the enquiry officer of the departmental proceeding has not made any comment on her findings, hence, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner has no leg to stand, as she only discharged her duty of the post held at different points of time. However, learned counsel for Respondent-State is not in a position to dispel the well settled legal proposition that a person who has been the author of the inquiry reaching to the finding of guilt against an delinquent employee could not act as the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority. 7. After hearing of the respective parties at bar and on perusal of the records, I am of the considered view that the petitioner has been able to make out a case for interference due to the following facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements: (i). It is admitted case that the same person who was appointed as inquiry officer and enquired into the matter gave her finding and she again acted in the capacity of disciplinary authority, passed the impugned order. At every stage, therefore, a person became a judge of his own cause which is in teeth of the principles of natural justice. It is admitted case that the same person who was appointed as inquiry officer and enquired into the matter gave her finding and she again acted in the capacity of disciplinary authority, passed the impugned order. At every stage, therefore, a person became a judge of his own cause which is in teeth of the principles of natural justice. Therefore, the impugned orders cannot survive the test of legal scrutiny as the decision making process has been vitiated beyond redemption. (ii). The person may be holding different designations or posts at different point of time but the identity of the person does not change by holding different posts. If that be so, then a person conducting an inquiry while posted in a different capacity would always sit in judgment over his own report as a disciplinary authority or even as an appellate authority. It is an elementary principle of the law which any officer holding such a high and responsible post is supposed to know. (iii). The principle that no man can be a Judge in his own cause is one of the facets of the Principles of Natural Justice. “Nemo debt esse judex in propria sua causa.” The exposition of law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Crawford Bayley & Co. and others vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in (2006)6 SCC Page 25 as contained para 18 is being quoted hereunder: 18. In this connection, a reference was made to Delhi Financial Corpn. v. Rajiv Anand with regard to personal bias i.e. an officer of the statutory authority has been appointed as an Estate Officer, therefore, they will carry their personal bias. However, this Court in the aforesaid case held that the doctrine “no man can be a judge in his own cause” can be applied only to cases where the person concerned has a personal interest or has himself already done some act or taken a decision in the matter concerned. Merely because an officer of a corporation is named to be the authority, does not by itself bring into operation the doctrine, “no man can be a judge in his own cause”. Merely because an officer of a corporation is named to be the authority, does not by itself bring into operation the doctrine, “no man can be a judge in his own cause”. For that doctrine to come into play it must be shown that the officer concerned has a personal bias or connection or a personal interest or has personally acted in the matter concerned and/or has already taken a decision one way or the other which he may be interested in supporting. Such view has also been taken by the Apex court in the case of Mohd. Yunus Khan-Vs.-State of Uttar Pradesh and others reported in (2010) 10 SCC 539 . Paragraphs 26, 28 and 29 of the report are quoted hereunder for better appreciation. “26. This Court in A.U. Kureshi v. High Court of Gujarat placed reliance upon the judgment in Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana and held that no person should adjudicate a dispute which he or she has dealt with in any capacity. The failure to observe this principle creates an apprehension of bias on the part of the said person. Therefore, law requires that a person should not decide a case wherein he is interested. The question is not whether the person is actually biased but whether the circumstances are such as to create a reasonable apprehension in the minds of others that there is a likelihood of bias affecting the decision. 28. In Arjun Chaubey v. Union of India a Constitution Bench of this Court dealt with an identical case wherein an employee serving in the Northern Railway had been dismissed by the Deputy Chief Commercial Superintendent on a charge of misconduct which concerned himself, after considering by himself the explanation given by the employee against the charge and after thinking that the employee was not fit to be retained in service. It was also considered whether in such a case, the Court should deny the relief to the employee, even if the Court comes to the conclusion that the order of punishment stood vitiated on the ground that the employee had been guilty of habitual acts of indiscipline/misconduct. This Court held that the order of dismissal passed against the employee stood vitiated as it was in utter disregard of the principles of natural justice. This Court held that the order of dismissal passed against the employee stood vitiated as it was in utter disregard of the principles of natural justice. The main thrust of the charges against the employee related to his conduct qua the disciplinary authority itself, therefore, it was not open to the disciplinary authority to sit in judgment over the explanation furnished by the employee and decide against the delinquent. No person could be a judge in his own cause and no witness could certify that his own testimony was true. Anyone who had a personal stake in an enquiry must have kept himself aloof from the enquiry. The Court further held that in such a case it could not be considered that the employee did not deserve any relief from the Court since he was habitually guilty of acts subversive of discipline. The illegality from which the order of dismissal passed by the authority concerned suffered was of a character so grave and fundamental that the alleged habitual misbehaviour of the delinquent employee could not cure or condone it. 29. Thus, the legal position emerges that if a person appears as a witness in disciplinary proceedings, he cannot be an enquiry officer nor can he pass the order of punishment as a disciplinary authority. This rule has been held to be sacred. An apprehension of bias operates as a disqualification for a person to act as adjudicator. No person can be a judge in his own cause and no witness can certify that his own testimony is true. Anyone who has personal interest in the disciplinary proceedings must keep himself away from such proceedings. The violation of the principles of natural justice renders the order null and void.” (iv). By a strange quirk of decision taken by respondent authorities the same officer became an inquiry officer and conducted the departmental inquiry against the petitioner for the alleged charges relating to purchase of bitumen and defalcation of government money on submission of fake invoices by contractor, without verification. Not only that, the same officer acted as the disciplinary authority and passed the impugned order. In that way, the person had taken a decision one way or other which he/she may be interested in supporting while taking a decision as a disciplinary authority. The inference that can be easily drawn is that the entire decision making process has suffered. 8. In that way, the person had taken a decision one way or other which he/she may be interested in supporting while taking a decision as a disciplinary authority. The inference that can be easily drawn is that the entire decision making process has suffered. 8. For the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order passed by the disciplinary authority as well as by the appellate authority is hereby quashed and set aside. However, liberty is reserved with the respondent authorities to proceed afresh against the petitioner on the charges aforesaid, as this Court has not made any comment on charges, in accordance with law and after observance of principles of natural justice in a time bound manner. 9. Resultantly, the writ petition stands disposed of.