ORDER : 1. By consent, all the writ petitions are taken up for final disposal. Since the issue involved in all these writ petitions, is similar, they are disposed of by this common order. 2. For the sake of convenience, the facts leading to the filing of W.P(MD)No.12240 of 2016, alone are narrated hereunder: 2.1. The petitioner is the Correspondent of St. John's Matric Higher Secondary School, Kochadai, Madurai. According to the petitioner, it is a recognised and Unaided Minority Educational Institution run and administered by "the Congregation of Claretian Missionaries" - a Society registered under Society Registration Act in Registration No. 33/1986 at Maduari. Later, it was transferred to central Chennai SI. No.141/1996. 2.2. It is claimed by the petitioner that the members of the said Society are all priests and they have dedicated their lives for charitable purpose by providing education to the socially and economically backward children. The Congregation is the Educational Agency of the School. The petitioner school was initially established as a Primary School in the year 2002 and thereafter, in 2005, it was upgraded as a Middle School and as Higher Secondary School in the year 2009. It is now offering education from standards LKG to XII. There are 3,547 students studying in the petitioner school. The medium of instruction is English. There are 131 teaching and 34 non-teaching staffs are working in the School. 2.3. The Congregation, in order to promote education, has established numerous educational institutions viz., two Matriculation Schools, one Higher Secondary School, two Nursing Colleges and other charitable institutions. The members of the said society are all Christians. The Congregation and the Educational Institutions have been recognised as Minority Institutions in terms of Article 30 of the Constitution of India. 2.4. According to the petitioner, they are helping the students hailing from rural background by providing quality education within their affordable reach. A meagre sum is collected from them only to meet out the salary for the staff as fixed by the Fee Determination Committee. The education is being provided as a charity without any intention to earn profits. Neither any capitation fee nor any donation or other fees is collected by the petitioner school. 2.5. The petitioner school is situated in a campus of 2 acres of land within the limits of Madurai Corporation. It has sufficient infrastructural and instructional facilities. The education is being provided as a charity without any intention to earn profits. Neither any capitation fee nor any donation or other fees is collected by the petitioner school. 2.5. The petitioner school is situated in a campus of 2 acres of land within the limits of Madurai Corporation. It has sufficient infrastructural and instructional facilities. The land and the buildings therein stand in the name of the Congregation, viz., the Educational Agency of the school. The land and school buildings are exclusively used for the purposes of the school and not for any other commercial or related purposes. Neither any rent nor any other profit is derived either from the said lands or buildings. 2.6. Since the petitioner school is located within the limits of Madurai City Municipal Corporation, it is covered under Madurai City Municipal Corporation Act, 1971 [in short 'the Act']. Sections 120 to 125 of the Act deal with the powers and procedures of levying and method of assessing property tax and building tax on various kinds of lands and buildings including the exceptions thereunder. However, the Madurai Corporation did not levy any tax on the lands and the buildings of the petitioner school eversince 2002, in view of the exemption granted to the school buildings and Charitable Institutions under Section 122 of the Act. 2.7. While so, the second respondent - Assistant Commissioner of Madurai issued a provisional Demand Notice demanding payment of Rs. 43,75,257.60/- (Rupees Forty Three Lakhs Seventy Five Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Seven and Paise Sixty only) towards property tax from the petitioner school with effect from 01.04.2008, however, without any prior notice or without providing any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. Hence, the petitioner approached the second respondent stating that the petitioner school, being an Educational and Charitable Institution, is exempted from such taxes as per Section 122 of the Act. Based on the assurance given by the second respondent that the impugned Demand Notice would be recalled, the petitioner school did not submit any reply to the said notice. 2.8. Meanwhile, the third respondent issued the impugned final Demand cum Attachment Notice dated Nil (signed on 11.03.2016) demanding the petitioner school to pay a sum of Rs. 75,25,440/- (Rupees Seventy Five Lakhs Twenty Five Thousand Four Hundred and Forty only) towards property tax from the assessment year 2008 to 2016. 2.8. Meanwhile, the third respondent issued the impugned final Demand cum Attachment Notice dated Nil (signed on 11.03.2016) demanding the petitioner school to pay a sum of Rs. 75,25,440/- (Rupees Seventy Five Lakhs Twenty Five Thousand Four Hundred and Forty only) towards property tax from the assessment year 2008 to 2016. It is also alleged by the petitioner that the said notice was issued without specification of any date and without the signature of the second respondent. Moreover, no reason has been given for such a demand, however, the third respondent threatened that drainage and water connections would be disconnected at any point of time. 2.9. While so, the first respondent issued another impugned Attachment Warrant cum Report dated 08.04.2016 demanding a payment of Rs. 75,73,068/- (Rupees Seventy Five Lakhs Seventy Three Thousand and Sixty Eight only) towards property tax from the year 2008-2009 to 2015-2016 and in the said notice, it is stated that the amount should be paid within three days, failing which, the movable properties from the petitioner's school would be seized and further, on failure to pay the amount within a period of seven days from such seizure, the seized items will be sold through auction. 2.10. The petitioner submitted a letter to the first respondent on 19.04.2016 seeking two weeks time to submit the reply. The petitioner also submitted another letter, dated 04.05.2016, seeking two months time to submit a reply. The impugned demand notice and attachment notices issued by the respondents 1 and 3 are wholly illegal, arbitrary, void and unconstitutional as they came to be issued in violation of principles of natural justice. Challenging the same, W.P(MD)No.12240 of 2016 has been filed. 3. The rest of the writ petitions have also been filed by the respective petitioners on similar lines. 4. The crux of the arguments put forth by Mr. Isaac Mohanlal, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Mr. T. Cibi Chakraborthy, learned Counsel for the petitioner in W.P(MD)No.12240 of 2017, etc.,, could be succinctly portrayed thus: 4.1. It is the prime contention of the petitioner that the impugned demand notices came to be issued without giving any notice nor any opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner and further, the impugned notices were issued in violation of statutory principles, as the statute grants exemption from levying property tax to the schools and the Charitable Institutions; 4.2. It is the prime contention of the petitioner that the impugned demand notices came to be issued without giving any notice nor any opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner and further, the impugned notices were issued in violation of statutory principles, as the statute grants exemption from levying property tax to the schools and the Charitable Institutions; 4.2. The act of respondents in levying property tax to the petitioner school is illegal and without any basis and thus, it would exhibit non-application of mind on the part of the respondents. 4.3. Reliance has also been placed upon Section 122(c) of the Act, which grants statutory exemption to the schools from levying tax and it reads as under: "122. General exemption from property tax.- ***** ***** ***** ***** (c) Building used for "educational purposes" including hostels attached thereto and places used for the charitable purpose of Sheltering the destitute or animals and orphanages, homes and schools for deaf and dumb, asylum for the aged and fallen women and such similar institutions run purely on philanthropic lines as are approved by the Council." 4.4. Thus, the lands and buildings of the petitioner's school are not levied with any kind of taxes since from its establishment, viz., 2002. The lands and buildings are used exclusively for educational purpose, namely, imparting education to the students of the rural areas and they are not used for any commercial or other related purposes. 4.5. The main thrust of the argument put forth by the petitioner is that the impugned notices were issued without any valid resolution passed by the Municipal Council in that regard. No property tax was levied all these years, until the impugned Demand Notice issued for the first time on 11.03.2016. 4.6. Since the education by itself is 'charitable and philanthropic' and hence, the buildings used for 'educational purposes' are obviously for charitable and philanthropic purposes. 4.7. The avoidance of the expression 'charitable' in the case of 'educational buildings' in Section 122 of the Act, is a conscious one and further, 'Fee collection' by the educational institutions will not change its character into 'non-charitable' for the reason that the fee is only for the purpose of generating funds to fulfil the object of providing education. 4.8. 4.7. The avoidance of the expression 'charitable' in the case of 'educational buildings' in Section 122 of the Act, is a conscious one and further, 'Fee collection' by the educational institutions will not change its character into 'non-charitable' for the reason that the fee is only for the purpose of generating funds to fulfil the object of providing education. 4.8. The educational institutions in the State are prohibited from making any profit and the collection of any 'capitation fee' for giving admission to the students and the levy of 'excess fee' for providing education to them are not only forbidden but also would attract to penal action. 4.9. If any tax, including property tax, being an item under 'revenue expenditure', is levied on educational institutions, it would pass on the students as part of the fee permitted to be collected and it would eventually tantamount to taxing education and also a burden on the students. 4.10. The act of the respondent Corporation in issuing demand notice for collection of property tax from the educational institutions would be without any jurisdiction. 4.11. Thus, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner in W.P(MD)No.12240 of 2016, etc., prays for allowing the writ petitions. 5. In support of his contentions, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners in W.P(MD)No.12240 of 2016, etc., relied on the following decisions: (i) Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Children Book Trust reported in (1992) 3 SCC 390 , wherein it is held as follows: "75. In CIT v. Surat Art Silk Cloth Association [ (1980) 2 SCC 31 ], it is observed: (SCC p.53, para 16): "Where an activity is carried on as a matter of advancement of the charitable purpose or for the purpose of carrying out the charitable purpose, it would not be incorrect to say as a matter of plain English grammar that the charitable purpose involves the carrying on of such activity, but the predominant object of such activity must be to subserve the charitable purpose and not to earn profit. The charitable purpose should not be submerged by the profit-making motive; the latter should not masquerade under the guise of the former." 76. In view of the above rulings it would be clear that where the predominant object is to subserve charitable purpose and not to earn profit it would be a charitable purpose. The charitable purpose should not be submerged by the profit-making motive; the latter should not masquerade under the guise of the former." 76. In view of the above rulings it would be clear that where the predominant object is to subserve charitable purpose and not to earn profit it would be a charitable purpose. However, the argument of the appellant is as per the Delhi School Education Act and the rules framed thereunder, if the society cannot utilise the fund and the school cannot be run for private gain in the absence of any profit, it would be a charitable purpose. 77. We have already seen that merely because education is imparted in the school, that by itself, cannot be regarded as a charitable object. Today, education has acquired a wider meaning. If education is imparted with a profit motive, to hold, in such a case, as charitable purpose, will not be correct. We are inclined to agree with Mr. B. Sen, learned counsel for the Delhi Municipal Corporation in this regard. Therefore, it would necessarily involve public benefit." (ii) Unni Krishnan, J.P. and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and others reported in (1993) 1 SCC 645 , wherein it is laid down as follows: "198. We are, therefore, of the opinion, adopting the line of reasoning in State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala [ 1957 SCR 874 ], that imparting education cannot be treated as a trade or business. Education cannot be allowed to be converted into commerce nor can the petitioners seek to obtain the said result by relying upon the wider meaning of "occupation"." (iii) T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka reported in (2002) 8 Supreme Court Cases 481. (iv) A.Subramanian v. The Executive Officer, III Grade Municipality reported in 2010 (4) CTC 31 , wherein it is held that 'the law laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in President, K.Vellakulam Panchayat, Kallikudi Chatram, Madurai District v. Kamaraj College of Engineering and Technology Managing Board, rep. by its Secretary, S.P.G.C.Srimurugan, Virudhunagar reported in 2009 (5) CTC 289 , cannot be made applicable to the buildings which are covered under the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, 1920.' (v) St.Lawrence Educational Society (Regd.) and another v. Commissioner of Income Tax Delhi (Central) and another reported in 2011 SCC Online Del 605. by its Secretary, S.P.G.C.Srimurugan, Virudhunagar reported in 2009 (5) CTC 289 , cannot be made applicable to the buildings which are covered under the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, 1920.' (v) St.Lawrence Educational Society (Regd.) and another v. Commissioner of Income Tax Delhi (Central) and another reported in 2011 SCC Online Del 605. (vi) Tolani Education Society v. Deputy Director of Income-tax (Exemptions)-I(2), Mumbai and others reported in 2013 SCC Online Bom 174. (vii) S.H.Medical Centre Hospital v. State of Kerala and others reported in (2014) 11 SCC 381 . (viii) Queen's Educational Society v. Commissioner of Income Tax reported in (2015) 8 SCC 47 . (ix) M/s.Lisie Medical Institutions v. The State of Kerala and others reported in 2017 SCC Online SC 660. 6. Whereas the arguments advanced on behalf of the respective learned Counsel for the petitioners in the rest of the writ petitions, could briefly, be stated thus: 6.1. The legislators having well aware of the expenses incurred by the Educational Institutions, enacted legislations to exempt the educational agencies and also buildings utilised for educational purposes from paying certain taxes, namely, Income Tax and Property Tax, only to promote good education. 6.2. While enacting municipal laws in respect of City Municipal Corporations, Cantonments, District Municipalities, Town and Village Panchayats, the clauses to exempt the property tax for educational institutions were framed in order to promote institutions to put up constructions so as to accommodate more students and also render good education to the poor and needy. 6.3. Most of the enactments exempt property tax for the buildings belonged to educational institutions and also buildings utilised for educational purposes. 6.4. In 2010, the Secretary to the Government, Municipal Administration and Water Supply Department, Tamil Nadu, by G.O.Ms. No. 220, dated 28.09.2010, passed an order extending the limits of Madurai City Municipal Corporation and thereby, merged the nearby Revenue Villages within the limits of Municipal Corporation of Madurai and on and from the said date, the petitioner school lies within the Madurai City Municipal Corporation. 6.5. Hence, the subject matter of the property in the above writ petitions, owned by the petitioner school, is an educational institution and hence, the said property has been exempted under Section 122(c) of the Act as per the amendment made in the said Act dated 01.04.1994 and hence, on and from 01.04.1994, the schools have been exempted from payment of property tax. 6.6. 6.6. The exemption granted under the said Amendment Act (Act XII of 1994), is neither repelled nor substituted and also not amended further till date. There were no hostel or any residential quarters attached thereto with the school building of the petitioner schools and hence, the petitioner schools are wholly exempted from paying property tax. 6.7. In these writ petitions, the petitioner schools are challenging the demand notices/ distraint notices issued by the Commissioner, Madurai City Municipal Corporation and Assistant Commissioner of respective Zones of the Madurai City Municipal Corporation, subsequent to the provisional assessment of property tax. 6.8. When the school buildings are for the educational purposes and the building is wholly belonged to the schools, there cannot be any assessment as the same has been exempted under the provisions of Section 122(c) of the Act. 6.9. When the statute itself exempts the property of the buildings belonged to the parent society of the petitioner school, which is specifically used for the educational purpose from assessing property tax, the act of the respondent in issuing notice of demand is not tenable. 6.10. When the assessment of the tax for the petitioner schools itself is without jurisdiction and not in accordance with law, the issuance of provisional demand notice is against the statute. 6.11. The issuance of provisional demand notices/distraint notices as per demand in a retrospective manner is unsustainable. 6.12. In view of the clear provision for exemption in Section 122(c) of the Act, the properties used for educational purposes, (even if the buildings are owned by the school or any society, which runs the school), then the said buildings are entitled for exemption from paying property tax. 6.13. Therefore, the provisional assessments made by the respondents in respect of properties belonged to petitioner school, (which are specifically utilized for educational purposes) are not correct and the consequential provisional demand notices/distraint notices issued by the respondent are illegal and therefore, prayed for allowing the writ petitions. 7. In support of their contentions, the respective learned Counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on the following decisions: (i) Christian Children Fund INC. v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and others reported in (1994) 4 JT 36 . (ii) Sophia Girls School v. Cantonment Board and another reported in (2003) 6 AWC 4986. (iii) S.C.Bhattacharji v. Meerut Cantonment Board reported in (2005) 3 AWC 2613 . v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and others reported in (1994) 4 JT 36 . (ii) Sophia Girls School v. Cantonment Board and another reported in (2003) 6 AWC 4986. (iii) S.C.Bhattacharji v. Meerut Cantonment Board reported in (2005) 3 AWC 2613 . (iv) Digamber Jain Society v. State of Haryana etc. reported in (2006) 143 PLR 421 . (v) Usha P.Panicker v. State of Kerala and others reported in (2009) 1 ILR (Ker) 7. (vi) Satna Diocesan Society v. The Municipal Corporation and another reported in (2013) ILR (MP) 367. (vii) Municipal Corporation and others v. RKDF Institute of Science and others reported in (2013) 4 MPHT 375. 8. Whereas the learned Standing Counsel for the respective respondent - Corporations made the following submissions: 8.1. The petitioners herein are all Private Educational Institutions and imparting education in a Professional Manner. The corporation demanded property tax from the petitioners in terms of section 121 of the Act and as per the said provision, all the buildings within the limits of Madurai Corporation are assessed to be taxed. 8.2. The property tax is the main source of revenue to the Corporation and with the help of said revenue, the Corporation undertook various works for the welfare of the public. 8.3. All the petitioners herein are challenging the levy of the property tax by the Corporation by taking shelter under section 122(c) of the Act. 8.4 As per Section 122(c) of the Act, it is clear that the exemption from property tax to the educational buildings is not automatic and in order to get exemption of property tax, the said institution is to run purely on philanthropic lines and is to be approved by the council of Corporation. 8.5. All the educational institutions in order to avail the exemption in terms of the provision ought to satisfy two conditions, namely, the said institutions run on pure philanthropic line and as well as approved by the Council to that effect. Unless the twin conditions are satisfied the exemption from property tax cannot be claimed as a matter right. 8.6. Apart from that, the proviso to Sections 122 of the Act makes it clear that the exemption is not applicable to the educational buildings, if they are run in a rental building. None of the petitioners herein have not satisfied the requirements of Section 122(c) of the Act. 8.7. 8.6. Apart from that, the proviso to Sections 122 of the Act makes it clear that the exemption is not applicable to the educational buildings, if they are run in a rental building. None of the petitioners herein have not satisfied the requirements of Section 122(c) of the Act. 8.7. The legislature in its wisdom has given exemption to the educational buildings which are run purely on philanthropic lines as are approved by the Council only. 8.8. The petitioners schools herein are admittedly receiving fees under various heads for imparting education and hence, they cannot claim that their institutions are purely on philanthropic line and thus, they are not entitled to the benefit of the Section 122(c) of the Act. 8.9. Further, the petitioners have not proved before this Court with materials evidence that the institutions are satisfying the requirements of the Section 122(c) of the Act and therefore, they are liable to pay the property tax to the Corporation. 8.10. The petitioners' institutions herein have not properly cooperated for measurement of the buildings and assessment of tax to the officials of Corporation. 8.11. The legislature has given exemptions to the Philanthropic Educational Institutions by way of amendment in the year 1994 and hence, the benefit of the said provision has to be reached to the genuine educational institutions and not to the institutions which are collecting fees and imparting education other than in a philanthropic manner. 8.12. The allegation that the respondents - Corporations are taking coercive steps to collect property tax from the petitioner - institutions is not correct and if there is any objection on the part of the petitioners, the same would be considered by the respondents - Corporations. 8.13. Apart from the buildings used for educational purposes, the other commercial buildings, viz., Canteens and other buildings which are commercial in nature, are not covered under the exemption provision. 8.14. The property tax is the main source of income to respondents - Corporations, from and out of which, the Corporations are providing basic amenities to the general public. 8.15. The respondents - Corporations are providing the basic amenities, viz., road and other aspects, however, they are refusing to pay property tax on technical pleas. 8.16. Unless the revenue of the Corporation is increased, the staff strength cannot be increased and the deficiency in the staff strength is ultimately affecting the administration of the Corporation. 8.17. 8.15. The respondents - Corporations are providing the basic amenities, viz., road and other aspects, however, they are refusing to pay property tax on technical pleas. 8.16. Unless the revenue of the Corporation is increased, the staff strength cannot be increased and the deficiency in the staff strength is ultimately affecting the administration of the Corporation. 8.17. Since the petitioners - schools are in huge arrears towards property tax, the respondents - Corporations are unable to contribute to the welfare schemes for the public and hence, they prayed for the dismissal of all these writ petitions. 9. In support of his contentions, the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent – Corporations relied upon the following judgments: (i) Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Children Book Trust reported in (1992) 3 SCC 390 . (ii) Liberty Oil Mills (P) Ltd. Bombay v. Collector of Central Excise, Bombay reported in (1995) 1 SCC 451 . (iii) Grasim Industries Ltd., and another v. State of Madhya Pradesh and another reported in (1999) 8 SCC 547 . (iv) Oxford University Press v. Commissioner of Income Tax reported in (2001) 3 SCC 359 . (v) Commissioner of Central Excise, New Delhi v. Hari Chand Shri Gopal and others reported in (2011) 1 SCC 236 . (vi) S.H. Medical Centre Hospital v. State of Kerala and others reported in (2014) 11 SCC 381 . (vii) Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited v. Commissioner of Income Tax and another reported in (2015) 10 SCC 621 . (viii) Society of Seva Missionaries, St. Anthony's Matriculation School, rep. by the Correspondent v. The Government of India rep. by its Secretary [W.P.No.32143 of 2015, decided on 30.11.2016]. (ix) M/s. St. Peter's Church, Board of Trustees, rep. by its President v. The Commissioner, Chennai Corporation, Revenue Department, Rippon Building, Chennai [W.P.No.19044 of 2010, decided on 07.07.2017]. 10. I have considered the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. 11. The core issue involved in all these writ petitions is, whether the petitioners-schools are eligible to be exempted from paying the property taxes as demanded by the respective respondent - Corporations, or not? 12. Paramount, it is, for this Court, before delving deep into the issue that has arisen for consideration, to refer to the relevant provisions of Madurai City Municipal Corporation Act, 1971 as under: Section 120: "120. 12. Paramount, it is, for this Court, before delving deep into the issue that has arisen for consideration, to refer to the relevant provisions of Madurai City Municipal Corporation Act, 1971 as under: Section 120: "120. Description of property tax.- (1) If the council by resolution determines that a property tax for general purposes shall be levied, such tax shall be levied on all buildings and lands within the city save those exempted by or under this Act or any other law." Section 122(c): "122. General exemption from property tax.- The following buildings and lands shall be exempt from the property tax:- (a) ***** ***** (b) ***** ***** (c) Buildings used for educational purpose including hostels attached thereto and places used for the charitable purpose of sheltering the destitute or animals, and orphanages, homes and schools for the deaf and dumb, asylum for the aged and fallen women and such similar institutions run purely on philanthropic lines as are approved by the council;" In some of the writ petitions, the concerned respondent - Corporation is governed by Tirunelveli City Municipal Corporation Act, 1994 and it is useful to refer hereunder Section 8(1) of the said Act: Section 2(h): "2. Definitions.- In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, - ***** ***** ***** ***** (h) all words and expressions used in this Act, and not defined but defined in the Coimbatore City Municipal Corporation Act, 1981 (Tamil Nadu Act 25 of 1981) (hereinafter referred to as the 1981 Act), shall have the meanings, respectively, assigned to them in the 1981 Act." Section 8(1): "8. Application of the provisions of the 1981 Act to the corporation.- (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided herein, all the provisions of the 1981 Act including the provisions relating to the levy and collection of any tax or fee, are hereby extended to, and shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to the corporation and the 1981 Act shall, in relation to the corporation, be read and construed as if the provisions of this Act had formed part of the 1981 Act." Thus, on a plain reading of Section 8(1) of the Tirunelveli City Municipal Corporation Act, 1981, the claim of the respective petitioners herein for exemption of property tax before Tirunelveli City Municipal Corporation, is, therefore, governed by Section 123(c) of the Coimbatore City Municipal Corporation Act, 1981 and hence, it is extracted hereunder for ready reference: Section 123(c): "123. General exemption from property tax.- The following buildings and lands shall be exempt from the property tax- ***** ***** ***** ***** (c) Buildings used for educational purpose including hostels attached thereto and places used for the charitable purpose of sheltering the destitute or animals, and orphanages, homes and schools for the deaf and dumb, asylum for the aged and fallen women and such similar institutions run purely on philanthropic lines as are approved by the council;" 13. This Court, is, therefore, prima facie, of the view that the impugned demand notices were issued by the respective Corporations in all these writ petitions claiming property tax from the petitioners – schools for various assessment years, but, however, the petitioners – schools contended that they, being educational institutions, are purely exempted from paying property tax as per Section 122(c) of Madurai City Municipal Corporation Act, 1971 as well as Section 123(c) of Coimbatore City Municipal Corporation Act, 1981, as the case may be. 14. Mr. Isaac Mohanlal, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners – schools would vehemently contend that education by itself is a charitable and philanthropic one and thus, the buildings used for educational purposes are obviously not only for charitable, but also for philanthropic purpose and the demand made by the respondent – Corporation against the petitioners – schools is baseless and contrary to the provisions of Section 122(c) of Madurai City Corporation Act, 1971. 15. 15. The learned Senior Counsel would further contend that the term 'charity' means an assistance given to those in need and it also includes an organisation established to provide such an assistance. By imparting education to the student community, the petitioners - schools are ultimately rendering the charitable purposes and hence, no specification with regard to its purpose for which the petitioners - schools are established, he argued. Moreover, he would also point out that the expression 'charitable' in the case of 'educational buildings' under Section 122 of the Act has been consciously avoided by the legislature and therefore, it is crystal clear that education by itself is always charitable in nature and thus, the respondent Corporation could not read between the lines and demand property tax for the educational buildings of the petitioners - schools. 16. Insofar as the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent – Corporation that since the petitioners – schools are collecting fees from the students, they are not running the schools on charitable and philanthropic lines, it is the submission of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners – schools that they are collecting fees only for the purpose of generating funds to fulfil the object of providing education to the students and further, the educational institutions have the fundamental right to collect the fees from the students to achieve the object of imparting education to the students. 17. In support of the above submission, the learned Senior Counsel relied on the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka reported in (2002) 8 SCC 481 , wherein the Eleven Judges Bench of the Honourable Supreme Court held as follows: “56. An educational institution is established for the purpose of imparting education of the type made available by the institution. Different courses of study are usually taught by teachers who have to be recruited as per qualifications that may be prescribed. It is no secret that better working conditions will attract better teachers. More amenities will ensure that better students seek admission to that institution. One cannot lose sight of the fact that providing good amenities to the students in the form of competent teaching faculty and other infrastructure costs money. It is no secret that better working conditions will attract better teachers. More amenities will ensure that better students seek admission to that institution. One cannot lose sight of the fact that providing good amenities to the students in the form of competent teaching faculty and other infrastructure costs money. It has, therefore, to be left to the institution, if it chooses not to seek any aid from the Government, to determine the scale of fee that it can charge from the students. One also cannot lose sight of the fact that we live in a competitive world today, where professional education is in demand. We have been given to understand that a large number of professional and other institutions have been started by private parties who do not seek any governmental aid. In a sense a prospective student has various options open to him/her where, therefore, normally economic forces have a role to play. The decision on the fee to be charged must necessarily be left to the private educational institution that does not seek or is not dependent upon any funds from the Government. 57. We, however, wish to emphasize one point, and that is that inasmuch as the occupation of education is, in a sense, regarded as charitable, the Government can provide regulations that will ensure excellence in education, while forbidding the charging of capitation fee and profiteering by the institution. Since the object of setting up an educational institution is by definition "charitable", it is clear that an educational institution cannot charge such a fee as is not required for the purpose of fulfilling that object. To put it differently, in the establishment of an educational institution, the object should not be to make a profit, inasmuch as education is essentially charitable in nature. There can, however, be a reasonable revenue surplus, which may be generated by the educational institution for the purpose of development of education and expansion of the institution.” 18. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the collection of fees by the petitioners - schools would not change its character from that of charitable into a non-charitable one. There can, however, be a reasonable revenue surplus, which may be generated by the educational institution for the purpose of development of education and expansion of the institution.” 18. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the collection of fees by the petitioners - schools would not change its character from that of charitable into a non-charitable one. In the event of any school is collecting capitation fee and other fees other than the prescribed ones, there is a Committee to regulate the fees to be paid by the students to the schools and if there is any violation in this regard, penal action would be attracted and thus, the respondent - Corporation cannot be heard to say that the petitioners - schools are not established to render charitable purposes and hence, the stand taken by the respondent - Corporation lacks merit. 19. Further, he also pointed out that the surplus that remains at the end of the year could not be taken as 'profit' or 'personal income', as making profit or earning income through educational institutions is strictly prohibited under the law, however, at the same time, a 'reasonable revenue surplus' is permitted for the development of education and expansion of the educational institutions and thus, he argued that 'reasonable surplus' is only to meet the cost of expansion and augmentation of facilities and hence, such 'surplus' would not amount to profiteering. To support the same, he relied on the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka reported in (2002) 8 SCC 481 and therefore, the demand made by the respondent-Corporation is invalid in the eye of law. 20. The learned Senior Counsel has drawn the attention of this Court to the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in Queen's Educational Society v. Commissioner of Income Tax reported in (2015) 8 Supreme Court Cases 47, to drive home the point that after meeting the expenditures, if a surplus arises incidentally from the activity carried on by the educational institutions, it will not cease to be one existing solely for educational purposes and thus, he submitted that the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent - Corporation that since the petitioners - schools are collecting fees from the students, they are no longer imparting education as a charitable or philanthropic purpose, does not merit acceptance. 21. 21. The Honourable Supreme Court in Queen's Educational Society v. Commissioner of Income Tax reported in (2015) 8 SCC 47 , while dealing with the scope of applicability of the exemption for educational institutions under Section 10(23-C)(iii-ad) and Section 10(23- C)(vi) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, has laid down as follows: "11. Thus, the law common to Sections 10(23-C)(iii-ad) and (vi) may be summed up as follows: (1) Where an educational institution carries on the activity of education primarily for educating persons, the fact that it makes a surplus does not lead to the conclusion that it ceases to exist solely for educational purposes and becomes an institution for the purpose of making profit. (2) The predominant object test must be applied-the purpose of education should not be submerged by a profit-making motive. (3) A distinction must be drawn between the making of a surplus and an institution being carried on "for profit". No inference arises that merely because imparting education results in making a profit, it becomes an activity for profit. (4) If after meeting expenditure, a surplus arises incidentally from the activity carried on by the educational institution, it will not cease to be one existing solely for educational purposes. (5) The ultimate test is whether on an overall view of the matter in the assessment year concerned the object is to make profit as opposed to educating persons." 22. Relying upon the dictum laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision, the learned Senior Counsel contended that in the event of an educational institution carries on the activity of education primarily for educating persons, the fact that it makes a surplus does not lead to the conclusion that it ceases to exist solely for educational purposes and becomes an institution for the purpose of making profit and hence, the fees collected by the educational institutions would not change the purpose of the petitioners - schools from that of charitable one and therefore, the plea of the respondent - Corporation is not tenable in law. 23. 23. Whereas the respondent Corporation relied on the judgment of the Honourable Full Bench of this Court in The President, K. Vellakulam Panchayat, Kallikudi Chatram, Madurai District v. Kamaraj College of Engineering and Technology reported in 2009 (5) CTC 289 and while considering the plea of the respondent - College therein as to the grant of exemption from levy of house tax as per Rule 15 of the Tamil Nadu Village Panchayats (Assessments and Collection of Taxes) Rules, 1999, it is held as follows: "17. We have already noticed that Rule 15 is a subordinate legislation which cannot override the substantive provisions of the Act such as Sections 171(1), 172 and 176. Section 171(1) mandates the Village Panchayat to levy house tax on all the houses of the Village Panchayat. The mandate is also clear from Section 172, wherein the basis of levy of house tax has been prescribed. There is a prohibition from grant of exemption of surcharge or tax under Section 176 except in accordance with the rules. Therefore, if Rule 15 is read with the aforesaid Sections 171, 172 and 176, it is to be held that under Rule 15 it is not mandatory to grant exemption from the house tax, but is an enabling provision allowing the Village Panchayat to grant exemption to a class of buildings as specified therein, if it so chooses. Rule 15 cannot be held to be mandatory to exempt a class of buildings from payment of house tax, which otherwise will run counter to Sections 171, 172 and 176 of the Act and may render Rule 15 ultra vires. Therefore, the word "shall" used in Rule 15 has to be read as "may" to give effect to the said rule of exemption. 18. We, accordingly, hold that the exemption prescribed under Rule 15 is not mandatory and is an enabling provision empowering the Village Panchayat or Panchayat Union to grant exemption to a class of buildings as specified therein. The corollary is that it is open for the Village Panchayat or Panchayat Union not to grant such exemption in favour of one or other class of such buildings. The Court cannot force the Panchayat to exercise its discretionary power to grant exemption to one or other class off buildings in absence of any decision taken by the Village Panchayat or Panchayat Union to grant such exemption. The Court cannot force the Panchayat to exercise its discretionary power to grant exemption to one or other class off buildings in absence of any decision taken by the Village Panchayat or Panchayat Union to grant such exemption. Once a Village Panchayat or Panchayat Union takes a decision to grant exemption in favour of one or other class of buildings, only in that case no discrimination can be made between two similarly situated persons and no order can be passed in an arbitrary manner. Learned Single Judge, in the present case, and the Division Bench in Sriram Educational Trust (supra) having failed to notice the aforesaid aspect, we hold that the Division Bench in Sriram Educational Trust (supra) has not laid the correct law. 19. In view of our finding in the present case and as we find that the appellant has not decided to grant exemption to any of the educational institutions or other buildings under Rule 15, the respondent college having knowledge of the same and having paid the house tax since 2001-02, we hold that the respondent-College was not entitled for grant of exemption nor it is entitled for refund of the house tax already paid." 24. Keeping in mind the dictum laid down by the Honourable Full Bench of this Court in the aforesaid decision and also taking into account the provisions of Section 122(c) of Madurai City Municipal Corporation Act, 1971 as well as Section 123(c) of Coimbatore City Municipal Corporation Act, 1981, as the case may be, this Court finds that the said provisions are very clear with regard to exemption of property tax for the buildings used for educational purpose, however, as are approved by the Council. 25. The specific stand taken by the respondent - Corporation for issuing demand notice claiming property tax from the petitioners - schools is that the exemption in respect of the educational buildings is not automatic rather the same is subject to two rider conditions, namely, (i) such institutions ought to be run purely on philanthropic lines and (ii) they must be approved by the Corporation Council. In the absence of compliance of these two conditions, the petitioners - schools could not claim any exemption under Section 122(c) of Madurai City Municipal Corporation Act, 1971 [within the limits of Madurai Corporation] or Section 123(c) of Coimbatore City Municipal Corporation Act, 1981 [within the limits of Tirunelveli Corporation], as the case may be. 26. Further, it is contended on behalf of the respondents - Corporations that none of the petitioners - schools has been run purely on philanthropic lines as they are collecting fees from the students for imparting education to them. Moreover, the petitioners - schools failed to produce any documentary evidence to prove their claim for exemption of property tax to the respondents - Corporations. 27. To the risk of repetition, Section 122(c) of the Madurai City Municipal Corporation Act, 1971, is once again reproduced hereunder: Section 122(c): "122. General exemption from property tax.- The following buildings and lands shall be exempt from the property tax:- (a) ***** ***** (b) ***** ***** (c) Buildings used for educational purpose including hostels attached thereto and places used for the charitable purpose of sheltering the destitute or animals, and orphanages, homes and schools for the deaf and dumb, asylum for the aged and fallen women and such similar institutions run purely on philanthropic lines as are approved by the Council ;" (emphasis supplied.) 28. A mere poring over the above provision would throw light on the clear position that the buildings used for educational purpose including hostels attached thereto and places used for the charitable purpose of sheltering the destitute or animals, and orphanages, homes and schools for the deaf and dumb, asylum for the aged and fallen women and such similar institutions run purely on philanthropic lines as are approved by the Council. It means, any building that is used for educational purposes and also places used for charitable purposes, could be exempted from payment of property tax, however, such building should be approved by the Council of the Corporation that they are being used exclusively for the educational purposes/charitable purposes as mandated under Section 122(c) of Madurai City Municipal Corporation Act. 29. Admittedly, the petitioners - schools are not purely philanthropic institutions and it is also not the case of the petitioners - schools that they are running the school without receiving any fees or running the schools totally free to all the students. 29. Admittedly, the petitioners - schools are not purely philanthropic institutions and it is also not the case of the petitioners - schools that they are running the school without receiving any fees or running the schools totally free to all the students. In the opinion of this Court, Section 122(c) of Madurai City Municipal Corporation Act, 1971, made it explicitly clear that in respect of educational purpose buildings, the places used for charitable purposes can be exempted. Thus, the persons seeking for exemption should satisfy that it is only for charitable purpose and it is used in philanthropic lines and that should be approved by the Council and only in such an event, the exemption can be sought for. 30. Considering all the facts and circumstances of the case and also taking into account the clear provisions with regard to exemptions from property tax, this Court holds that the petitioners - schools are entitled to claim such exemption only in the event of they being approved by the respective Corporation Council. 31. For the foregoing reasons, all the writ petitions are disposed of, with the following directions: (i) The petitioners - schools are at liberty to approach the respective respondent - Corporation within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, seeking approval of the Corporation Council that the petitioners - schools would come within the purview of claiming exemption under Madurai City Municipal Corporation Act, 1971/Coimbatore City Municipal Corporation Act, 1981, as the case may be; (ii) On such filing of the applications seeking approval in that regard, the respective respondent - Corporation shall consider the same on merits and in accordance with law and place them before the Corporation Council for its consideration as per the provisions of the Madurai City Municipal Corporation Act, 1971/Coimbatore City Municipal Corporation Act, 1981, as the case may be; (iii) The petitioners - schools are also at liberty to produce documentary evidence in support of their claims before the respondent - Corporation claiming exemption of property tax; (iv) Such exercise be completed by the respective respondent - Corporation after affording due opportunity of hearing to all the petitioners, within a period of six weeks thereafter. (v) In the event of the Corporation Council approving the respective petitioners - schools as per the above provisions, the petitioners - schools are entitled to claim exemption from payment of property tax. Otherwise, it is for the respective respondent - Corporation to take appropriate action to see that the property tax as demanded by them are collected from the petitioners - schools without any further delay. (vi) There shall be no order as to costs; and (vii) Consequently, the connected writ miscellaneous petitions are also closed.