JUDGMENT : Harish Tandon, J. 1. The present application has been filed taking advantage of the observations made by the Division Bench in the judgment and order dated 18th February, 2013 passed in APO No. 387 and 388 of 2011. Before proceeding to record the observations recorded in the said order by the Division Bench and affirmed by the Supreme Court it would be apposite to narrate the salient facts involved in the instant case. 2. Admittedly, one Bhupatish Roy Chowdhury was the owner of the tea estate known as Toonbarrie Tea Estate and entered into an agreement with Khem Chand Dhingra for sale at a consideration of Rs. 55 lacs. Apart from the various terms and conditions embodied in the said agreement Clause 4 thereof provides that the said owner would hand over the physical possession of the tea garden to the said intending purchaser upon payment of the stipulated sum. It is not in dispute that the said owner handed over the possession of the tea garden to Mr. Dhingra and also executed an irrevocable power of attorney in his favour authorizing and empowering him to run, manage and carry on the business of the said tea garden. It was further stipulated therein that Mr. Dhingra would obtain a necessary permission from the office of the Deputy Commissioner of Jalpaiguri for effecting such transfer and entire transaction shall be completed on or before 1st January, 1989. The time was thereafter extended and it was further agreed that the sale would be effected in favour of the nominee of Mr. Dhingra with the Toonbarrie Tea Company Pvt. Ltd. and the payment already made would be treated to have been made in terms of the original agreement dated 12th March, 1988. Alleging that the said owner failed and neglected to perform his part of obligation under the said agreement a suit being C.S. 486 of 1991 was filed by Mr. Dhingra as well as the said nominee company in the original side of this Court for specific performance of the said agreement. While the said suit was pending an application for addition of parties was taken out by one Santosh Kumar Agarwal and M/s. AGR Plantations Pvt. Ltd. which was eventually allowed and they were added as the defendant Nos. 2 and 3 in the said suit. 3. While the said suit was pending an application for addition of parties was taken out by one Santosh Kumar Agarwal and M/s. AGR Plantations Pvt. Ltd. which was eventually allowed and they were added as the defendant Nos. 2 and 3 in the said suit. 3. Subsequently, the said suit was compromised and the terms of settlement formed part of the said compromise decree. The salient feature of the said terms of settlement was that the original owner shall effect the sale of the tea estate in favour of the AGR Plantations Pvt. Ltd. for a consideration price of Rs. 63/- lacs out of which a sum of Rs. 1 lac was paid on or before the execution of the said terms of settlement and a further sum of Rs. 6 lacs shall be paid on the date of an order that may be passed in the said suit and a further sum of Rs. 4 lacs to be paid within 16 days from the date of the order accepting the terms of settlement and forming the part of the decree. The remaining sum was agreed to be paid simultaneously with the execution and registration of the deed of conveyance. Apart from the same, the bank dues of the original owner in relation to the tea garden shall be paid by the said nominee and also the other liabilities including the provident fund dues. The sale shall be completed by executing and registering the appropriate conveyance within ninety days from the date thereof or within such further period if the same is extended by mutual agreement of the parties. The said settlement further provides that the original owner would arrange to obtain the necessary clearance under Section 230A(1) of the Income Tax and also from the Deputy Collector, Jalpaiguri and the said Santosh Kumar Agarwal shall render all his help and assistance as may be required for such purposes. 4. The Execution Case No. 83 of 2007 is filed by M/s. AGR Plantation Pvt. Ltd. to execute the compromise decree dated 05.04.2000. It is stated in the said execution proceeding that the said intending purchaser acted in terms of the settlement not only in making the payment of Rs. 4 lacs but also paid Rs. 6 lacs within the time indicated therein but the original owner did not perform his part of an obligation. It is stated in the said execution proceeding that the said intending purchaser acted in terms of the settlement not only in making the payment of Rs. 4 lacs but also paid Rs. 6 lacs within the time indicated therein but the original owner did not perform his part of an obligation. An application being G.A. 2238 of 2007 was taken out in the said execution proceeding by the said Santosh Kumar Agarwal alleging that his brother namely Sajjan Agarwal along with his son and other associates entered into the office of the said intending purchaser company and removed all important papers therefrom and prayed for cancellation of the nomination. It further transpires therefrom that a Partition Suit No. 88 of 2016 is pending before the Civil Judge (Senior Division), 4th Court at Alipore between the aforesaid brothers. 5. During the pendency of the execution proceeding the original owner died by making and publishing his last will and testament appointing Joint Executors namely Gopal Prasad Jain and Satyajit Sikdar and an application for probate was filed before the competent Court. An objection was filed in the said probate proceeding which ultimately ended into a compromise and the heirs of the said original owner being the applicants in the instant application became the owners to the extent of half share in respect of the tea estate. 6. The present petitioner says that the decree holder did not discharge its obligation under the said settlement in not only paying the balance consideration money but also did not meet out the other liabilities of the tea estate viz. provident fund, interest thereupon, gratuity, labour wages, labour statutory obligation, unsecured creditors etc. It is a further stand of the applicant that the rent as agreed under the said settlement was paid till May, 2000 and therefore the aforesaid negligence attributed to the decree holder frustrates the decree inasmuch as they failed and neglected to perform their part of obligation under the said settlement. 7. Amidst the pendency of the said execution proceeding two applications came to be filed viz. G.A. 2238 of 2007 and G.A. 2239 of 2007. 7. Amidst the pendency of the said execution proceeding two applications came to be filed viz. G.A. 2238 of 2007 and G.A. 2239 of 2007. The first one is filed by the said Santosh Kumar Agarwal for an order of injunction restraining the owners from executing the conveyance in favour of AGR Plantations Pvt. Ltd. and to appoint a receiver to make an inventory of the movable and immovable assets lying therein and time to make the balance payment under the said decree be extended and the conveyance be executed in his favour. The other application is filed by the present applicant for setting aside the compromise decree declaring the same to be null and void and in executable. 8. In the midst of the hearing of the aforesaid application, the fact which emerged was that on 20th June, 2007 the agent of the applicants herein entered illegally in the garden office and took the possession thereof from the Manager. A complaint was lodged with the local police station. It is further stated that a sum of Rs. 50,000 per month was paid till May, 2001 and the original owner received the same without any demur and without disclosing that he has raised objection with the Collector of the Jalpaiguri in the month of July, 2000 alleging that he had not signed any forms or documents submitted to the said authority. 9. Both the applications were taken up together and the following points emerged for consideration - "(i) Whether a consent/compromise decree is mere recording of an agreement and/or averments of the parties to the proceeding and does not partake a character of a decree which is capable of being executed under the provision of law; (ii) Whether the terms of settlement resulting into a compromise decree is required to be stamped under the Indian Stamp Act; (iii) Whether the transferee pendente lite without obtaining a prior permission as mandated in lease deed as well as West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act invalidates the compromise decree so as to render it in executable; (iv) Whether the executing court can travel beyond the decree to consider the rights of the parties on the basis of a post decretal facts." 10. All the aforesaid points were considered and determined in a judgment dated 28.09.2011 delivered by me on the aforesaid two applications which were ultimately dismissed. All the aforesaid points were considered and determined in a judgment dated 28.09.2011 delivered by me on the aforesaid two applications which were ultimately dismissed. The resultant effect of the said order was that the claim of Santosh Kumar Agarwal in his application was not found tenable as well as the claim of the judgment debtor that the compromise decree is in executable and be declared as null and void were negatived. The said order was challenged both by the decree holder as well as the judgment debtor in separate appeals before the Division Bench of this Court which were registered as APO 387 and 388 of 2011. 11. The Division Bench categorically observed that the dismissal of the applications and the observations recorded thereupon do not require any interference and proceeded to dismiss the aforesaid appeals with a request to the executing Court to proceed with the execution application. However, leave was granted to the parties to raise the contentions of reciprocal obligations before the executing Court in the following words:- "In a decree of the like nature, where parties would have reciprocal obligation to discharge in having the complete satisfaction of the decree, the executing Court was competent to examine whether the parties in fact discharged their obligation and in case there is any lapses the executing Court is well within its power to see to it that such obligations are discharged by the defaulting parties so that the decree could reach a logical conclusion through satisfaction." "We leave it open to the parties to raise identical contentions on reciprocal obligations before the learned Judge when execution application would be taken up for hearing." 12. The order of the Division Bench was further challenged before the Supreme Court in a Special Leave to Appeal (Civil Nos. 25866 - 25868 of 2013), which was disposed of in the following terms:- "UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following ORDER We have heard learned counsel for the parties. We do not find any ground to entertain these special leave petitions except on making an observation that the finding recorded by the Division Bench in the penultimate paragraph to the following effect: "The learned Judge dismissed the application under Section 47 and, in our view, very rightly, it is now the turn of the learned Judge to dispose of the execution application by passing appropriate order on the same. We do not find any scope to interfere with the ultimate finding of the learned Judge. While recording such a finding the liberty is left to the parties to raise identical contentions on reciprocal obligation before the learned Judge when execution application would be heard. In view of the said liberty the execution Court can examine the same after hearing the parties without influenced with the finding recorded in the penultimate paragraph as extracted above while hearing and considering the execution case. With the above-said observation these special leave petitions are disposed of." 13. Having derived inspiration from the aforesaid observations, the present application is taken out by the decree holder for the following reliefs:- "a. Orders declaring that the compromise decree dated 5th April, 2000 bearing annexure "Q" hereto has been rendered inexcusable and/or the performance of the terms and/or the performance of the agreement embodied in the said decree on its original terms has been rendered impossible. b. Interim order of stay of all further proceeding of execution case No. 83 of 2007 arising out of suit No. 486 of 1991 (Khem Chand Dhengra Anr. v. Prabir Roy Chowdhury & Ors.) pending before this Hon'ble Court till disposal of this application; c. Ad-interim orders in terms of prayer (b); d. Costs including full advocate's fees be borne by the plaintiffs/decree holders;" 14. It would be a mere repetition of the facts to narrate the averments made in the instant application and the only distinguishing facts discernable therefrom are that the terms and conditions of the settlement involves reciprocal obligations and failure to perform the part of the obligation entrusted upon the judgment debtor renders the decree in executable. In essence, the decree holder wanted the dismissal of the execution application for non-performance of the part of the obligation by the judgment debtor and acting in derogation with the terms of settlement. 15. The judgment debtor namely the AGR Plantations Pvt. Ltd. denies the allegations made by the decree holder in the instant application and asserted that they performed their part of the obligation in terms of the settlement and the decree holder have acted in departure therefrom and prayed that the execution application be allowed. 15. The judgment debtor namely the AGR Plantations Pvt. Ltd. denies the allegations made by the decree holder in the instant application and asserted that they performed their part of the obligation in terms of the settlement and the decree holder have acted in departure therefrom and prayed that the execution application be allowed. It is averred therein that the decree holder settled all the liabilities of the bank who issued no objection certificate in this regard and further obtained necessary clearance certificate under the income tax and also no objection certificate from the Agricultural Income Tax Department. It is further stated that all the dues of the various departments were cleared but the application for permission from the District Magistrate, Jalpaiguri though sought for, was not granted as the original owner raised an objection in the month of July, 2000. 16. It is further averred that a sum of Rs. 50,000/- per month was paid, up to the month of May, 2001, which was received by the original owner without disclosing that he has already filed an objection with the Collector and applied for withdrawal of the said application. It is only after having brought to the notice of the decree holder that the said objection has been filed, the said amount to Rs. 50,000/- was not paid on and from the month of June, 2001 since the possession had been illegally obtained on 20th June, 2007. The decree holder cannot escape from their obligation under the compromise decree. 17. From the aforesaid facts the scope for consideration in the instant application is very limited in the sense that the determination should be restricted whether the terms of settlement constituting a compromise decree contains a reciprocal obligations and if so whether the decree holder or the judgment debtor failed and neglected to perform their part of an obligations thereunder. 18. In an earlier round of litigation, the question relating to execution, discharge and satisfaction of the decree had been decided and being affirmed by the Division Bench as well as the Apex Court and it is not open to the parties to re-agitate the said point in the instant application. 18. In an earlier round of litigation, the question relating to execution, discharge and satisfaction of the decree had been decided and being affirmed by the Division Bench as well as the Apex Court and it is not open to the parties to re-agitate the said point in the instant application. At an earlier point of time a plea was taken that the compromise decree of such nature is a mere agreement and incapable of execution, which was held against the judgment debtors and therefore this Court do not delve to enter into the said question having attained finality. 19. Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure permits the parties to the litigation to compromise their disputes and may invite the Court to pass the decree thereupon provided the terms and conditions enshrined in the compromise is lawful. Once the terms of settlement is accepted and culminated into a decree, its nature for the purpose of reciprocal performance can be seen by the executing Court and may refuse to execute the decree if its nature requires so. The terms and conditions are reproduced as under:- "Schedule above referred to Terms of Settlement After protracted discussions and negotiations the parties herein in order to avoid further litigation as also expenses have amicably settled all disputes and differences which are the subject matter of the above suit and No. 404 of 1993 and all proceedings including appeals thereunder, the following terms. (a) Shri Santosh Kumar Agarwala and M/s/A.G.R. Plantations Pvt. Ltd. both of 240B, A.J.C. Bose Road, Calcutta - 700 029 are added as party defendants. (b) Shri Bhupatish Roychoudhury agrees to sell and Shri Santosh Kumar Agarwal agrees to buy Toonbarrie Tea Estate which is the subject matter of the above litigations. (c) At the request of Shri Santosh Kumar Agarwal herein and for the consideration price of Rs. 63,00,000/- (Rupess Sixty three lacs only) to be paid to Shri Bhupatish Roy Choudhury, the defendant herein has agreed that the sale is to be made in favour of M/s. AGR Plantations Pvt. Ltd. nominee of Shri Santosh Kumar Agarwal with the consent of the party. (d) Out of the said consideration, the sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- has duly been paid to the defendant by Messrs. (d) Out of the said consideration, the sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- has duly been paid to the defendant by Messrs. AGR Plantations Pvt. Ltd. vide Bankers Cheque No. 429702 dated 11th March 2000 issued by Allahabad Bank Elgin Road Branch and it has been agreed that the balance consideration amount shall be payable in the manner following:- (i) Rs. 6 lacs on the date of the order to be passed herein. (ii) Rs. 4 lacs within 60 days from the date of the order to be passed herein. (iii) The balance sum of Rs. 52 lacs simultaneously on the execution and registration of the proposed Deed of Conveyance in respect of the said Tea Estate. (e) The liability of Vijaya Bank and any other liability including provident Fund A/C Toonbarrie Tea Estate shall be borne and paid by Shri Santosh Kumar Agarwal the plaintiff herein and his nominee company Messrs. AGR Plantations Pvt. Ltd. (f) Shri Bhupatish Roy Choudhury the defendant herein would complete the sale by executing and registering appropriate Deed of Conveyance in respect of the said Tea Estate within 90 days from the date hereof and the same may be extended for such further period as may be agreed upon between the parties. (g) Shri Bhupatish Roy Choudhury the defendant herein would arrange to obtain with the assistance of Shri Santosh Kumar Agarwal necessary clearance under Section 230 A (1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 as also necessary permission from the Deputy Collector Jalpaiguri as may be required for completion of sale of the said Tea Estate. (h) Shri Santosh Kumar Agarwal the defendant herein shall render all his help and assistance to the defendant as may be required by him in obtaining the necessary permission of the Deputy Collector of Jalpaiguri as also necessary Tax clearance certificate U/s 230A(1) to render help and assistance in obtaining necessary permission from the Commissioner of Income Tax and Deputy Collector Jalpaiguri is the essence. (i) AGR Plantations Pvt. Ltd. shall bear and pay the stamp duty on the Deed of sale in respect of the said Tea Estate the draft whereof has duly been approved and counter signed by the advocate for the petitioners and the same is annexed hereto and marked "X" until the execution of this Deed of Conveyance M/s. AGR Plantations Pvt. Ltd. shall run, manage the Tea Estate from the date of signing of this Terms of Settlement. (j) Shri Santosh Kumar Agarwala is agreeable to reimburse the legal expenses incurred through Leslie & Khettry on the basis of the Bill given by them. (k) Sri Santosh Agarwala the added defendant herein shall continue making payment of reserved monthly lease rent and/or monthly rent of Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand Only to Mr. Bhupatish Roy Chowdhury in respect of the suit property without any abatement and/or deduction whatsoever for the period until the sole in respect of the said suit property is completed by execution and registration conveyance in favour of Mr. Santosh Kumar Agarwala. (l) The shortfall on account of payment of monthly lease rent and/or monthly rent shall be made good on or before the execution of the conveyance deed. (m) Save as hereinabove stated the parties shall have no claim against each other. Each party would bear and pay their own legal costs." 20. Section 51 of the Contract Act deals with the reciprocal promises. The said provision contemplates where a contract consists of reciprocal promises to be simultaneously performed, it is not obligatory on the promisor to perform his part of the promise unless the promisee is ready and willing to perform his reciprocal promise. The terms of a promise may be expressed or implied varying in degrees and may in some cases be an additional one. Though such conditions may not be in express terms but must be capable of being ascertained from its very existence and substance. The word "simultaneously" used in Section 51 connotes concurrent conditions and gives security to such performance and the later part of the Section contains unique feature where the promisor need not perform his promise unless the promisee is ready and willing to perform his part of the obligation or promise. The word "simultaneously" used in Section 51 connotes concurrent conditions and gives security to such performance and the later part of the Section contains unique feature where the promisor need not perform his promise unless the promisee is ready and willing to perform his part of the obligation or promise. The first and the foremost feature for ascertaining whether the contract contains a reciprocal promise is to read the various terms thereof in its entirety and to find out whether any of such terms can be separated and/or segregated from each other. In other words, where such terms and conditions or any one of them are independent or dependent or mutual so that the non-performance of mutual obligation may not be a bar to an action for breach thereof. In case of an independent covenant in the settlement, the action under the reciprocal promise may not be available under the aforesaid section. On the other hand, the covenants constituting promises are so intertwined or related to one another that the performance on one side is a condition precedent to claim for performance on the other. 21. The learned Advocate for the applicant argues on many points including that the decree is incapable of execution and whether the compromise decree can be varied at the execution stage. Several judgments have been cited in this regard which this Court feels need not to be gone into in view of the restrictions imposed by the Division Bench and a leave in this regard is granted, which was affirmed by the Apex Court. The applicant relies two judgments on reciprocal obligations viz. AIR 1956 SC 359 and AIR 1972 SC 726 and submits that the terms of settlement, in effect, constitutes a reciprocal promises and the decree holder having failed to perform his part of an obligation the execution application deserves dismissal. 22. It is further submitted the decree holder did not liquidate all the statutory dues pertaining to the provident fund, gratuity and of like nature and also failed to pay a sum of Rs. 50,000/- per month. According to the learned Advocate such failure constitutes default in performance of his obligation and therefore the execution application is incompetent. 23. 22. It is further submitted the decree holder did not liquidate all the statutory dues pertaining to the provident fund, gratuity and of like nature and also failed to pay a sum of Rs. 50,000/- per month. According to the learned Advocate such failure constitutes default in performance of his obligation and therefore the execution application is incompetent. 23. On the other hand, the learned Advocate appearing for the decree holder also traveled beyond the limited scope indicated in the order of the Division Bench in arguing that the time was not the essence of the contract and there was no default in performing his part of the obligation. It is sought to be contended before this Court that the judgment debtor has violated the terms of the settlement not only in obtaining the forcible possession but also putting a third party in possession which necessitated the amendment in the reliefs indicated in the tabular statement and to such effect a supplementary affidavit has been affirmed and filed in the suit and the executing Court should allow the execution application by molding the relief on the subsequent events. 24. In case of Jai Narain Ram Lundia v. Kedar Nath Khetan & Ors. reported in AIR 1956 SC 359 the Apex Court was considering a case arising from an execution proceeding where the decree for specific relief of a contract was sought to be executed. The nature of the decree as it appears therefrom was the direction to sale certain shares in the private limited company together with 5 annas share in a partnership firm on a payment of Rs. 2,45,000/-. The said decree was sought to be executed by the appellant therein and an objection was raised that the judgment debtors were not in a position to implement the conditions imposed upon them by the decree because the said partnership firm was dissolved by an agreement between the parties therein. Since, the property was within the territorial jurisdiction of another Court, the decree was transferred to the said Court and the transferee Court declined to enter into such objection as it had no jurisdiction. 25. The aggrieved person challenged the said order before the Supreme Court by filing an appeal and took out an application for adducing additional evidence. Certain documents were sought to be relied upon by way of an additional evidence, which was rejected by the High Court. 25. The aggrieved person challenged the said order before the Supreme Court by filing an appeal and took out an application for adducing additional evidence. Certain documents were sought to be relied upon by way of an additional evidence, which was rejected by the High Court. This is how the matter approached to the Supreme Court and the arguments were advanced on the reciprocal obligation. The Apex Court held that the reciprocal obligation must be inter-linked having incapable of separation and if the right of one party seeking performance from the another is an additional one and cannot be segregated from each other, the executing Court shall not order for execution unless the party seeking execution performed his obligation under the decree. The observations recorded in paragraph 19 of the said judgment is quoted herein below:- "19. The relevant part of the decree has already been quoted. It directs that "against payment or tender by the plaintiffs...the said defendants...do execute in favour of the plaintiffs proper deed or deeds of transfer of...five annas share in the Marwari Brothers...." This is not a case of two independent and severable directions in the same decree but of one set of reciprocal conditions indissolubly linked together so that they cannot exist without each other. The fact that it is a decree for specific performance where the decree itself cannot be given unless the side seeking performance is ready and willing to perform his side of the bargain and is in a position to do so, only strengthens the conclusion that that was the meaning and intendment of the language used. But the principle on which we are founding is not confined to cases of specific performance. It will apply whenever a decree is so conditioned that the right of one party to seek performance from the other is conditional on his readiness and ability to perform his own obligations. The reason is, as we have explained, that to hold otherwise would be to permit an executing court to go behind the decree and vary its terms by splitting up what was fashioned as an indivisible whole into distinct and divisible parts having separate and severable existence without any interrelation between them just as if they had been separate decrees in separate and distinct suits." 26. The ratio deducible from the above report is that in case of reciprocal obligation the party applying for execution must show that he has performed his part of obligation and is ready and has ability to perform and the judgment debtor has failed to perform his part of an obligation. 27. The scope of the executing Court is limited and must confine to the terms of the decree. Any interpretation which would frustrate the tenet of the decree should be avoided as the executing Court cannot travel beyond the same. The segregation and/or splitting up of various terms of the settlement by an executing Court would amount to a voyage beyond the periphery of the decree and it would not be wrong to say that the terms thereof shall get varied. 28. In the instant case, the salient feature is that the original owner agreed to sale the tea garden to AGR Plantations Pvt. Ltd., the nominee of the decree holder for a consideration of Rs. 63,00,000/- out of which Rs. 1,00,000/- was already paid and a further sum of Rs. 6,00,000/- and Rs. 4,00,000/- are required to be paid on the date of the acceptance of the terms and conditions while decreeing the suit and within 60 days from the date of such decree. The balance consideration was agreed to be paid simultaneously with the execution and registration of the proposed Deed of Conveyance. The liability of the Vijaya Bank and the other liabilities including the provident fund of the said tea estate were to be borne by the said nominee and such Deed of Conveyance was agreed to be executed within 90 days from the date of the decree or within such extended period as may be mutually agreed. 29. The decree further provides that so long the Deed of Conveyance is not executed the decree holder shall continue to pay a monthly rent or a lease rent at the rate of Rs. 50,000/- per month without any deductions and/or abatement. The other term which could be seen from the said settlement is that the said decree holder would provide all assistance in getting the necessary clearance required under the Income Tax Act, 1961 and also from the Deputy Collector of the Jalpaiguri. 50,000/- per month without any deductions and/or abatement. The other term which could be seen from the said settlement is that the said decree holder would provide all assistance in getting the necessary clearance required under the Income Tax Act, 1961 and also from the Deputy Collector of the Jalpaiguri. It is not in dispute that the objection was raised by the judgment debtor when an application seeking permission from the Deputy Collector of Jalpaiguri was filed under his signage yet the judgment debtor accepted the monthly rent in respect thereof. The sum and substance of the said settlement is that the judgment debtor would sale the property to the decree holder upon acceptance of the consideration money and in order to facilitate such sale would assist the judgment debtor in obtaining the necessary permission. 30. The reciprocal obligation, which could be seen therefrom is that the payment of the sum within the time indicated therein which had in fact been paid by the decree holder. It is also not in dispute that the decree holder continued to pay the monthly rent till the time the judgment debtor with his associates illegally and forcibly took the possession of the tea estate and deprived the decree holder to enjoy the usufructs therefrom. 31. It is manifest from the aforesaid facts that the decree holder all along performed his part of an obligation and none of the terms and conditions would be said to be reciprocal that such performance is dependant upon the performance of the other being so intertwined and/or interrelated that it cannot be separated and/or segregated therefrom. 32. This Court therefore does not find that the objections of the petitioner that terms and conditions are reciprocal in nature and dependent upon the performance of the other. 33. The application is thus dismissed. 34. However, there shall be no order as to costs. 35. Let the execution case be listed.