JUDGMENT : Vivek Singh Thakur, J. Respondent No. 1 in present appeal (herein after referred to be as plaintiff) has filed a civil suit against appellant Municipal Corporation, Shimla and proforma respondent No. 2 Divisional Forest Officer, Forest Division Shimla (herein after referred to be as defendants/defendants No. 1 and 2) seeking permanent prohibitory injunction restraining defendants from taking away timber or any part of converted from deodar tree felled illegally from his land comprised in Khasra No. 1164 situated in Mauja Khalini Shimla. The suit was dismissed by the trial Court however, in appeal, learned District Judge decreed the suit with costs by passing a decree for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining defendants from removing wood from the suit land either themselves or through their agents. 2. In present appeal, defendant No. 1, Municipal Corporation, Shimla assailed judgment and decree passed by learned District Judge (Forest), Shimla. Appeal was admitted on following substantial questions of law:- “1. Whether after taking over the management of Divisional Forest Office of the Municipal Corporation by the H.P. State Govt. vide Notification dated18.4.2006, the impugned judgment and decree could legally be passed? 2. Whether decree for permanent prohibitory injunction can be passed without there being positive finding regarding possession of the suit property?” 3. Plaintiff is owner in possession of land comprised in Khasra No. 1164 situated in Mauja Khalini, District Shimla, H.P. as recorded in Intkhab Jamabandi Missal Haquit for the year 1999-2000 (Ex. PW-1/A). On 20.12.2000 he submitted an application (Ex. PW-1/B) to defendant No. 2 for felling permission of two dried deodar trees situated in his land which were endangering life and property of plaintiff and others. Defendant No. 2 vide letter dated 3.3.2001 (Ex. PW-1/C), informed plaintiff that trees in question were in forest No. 28 and had been duly marked by the department and plaintiff was directed to get the spot demarcated through revenue officers on any working day to clarify the position on spot. On application of plaintiff for demarcation, PW-2 Krishan Lal Kanungo carried out demarcation on the spot in presence of DW-1 Mela Ram, Deputy Ranger of Municipal Corporation, Shimla and found the trees in question in land comprised in Khasra No. 1164, owned and possessed by plaintiff. He submitted his demarcation report dated 27.3.2001 (Ex. PW-2/A). On application of plaintiff for demarcation, PW-2 Krishan Lal Kanungo carried out demarcation on the spot in presence of DW-1 Mela Ram, Deputy Ranger of Municipal Corporation, Shimla and found the trees in question in land comprised in Khasra No. 1164, owned and possessed by plaintiff. He submitted his demarcation report dated 27.3.2001 (Ex. PW-2/A). However, defendants did not accept the said report for the reason that PW-2 Krishan Lal Kanungo was not competent to demarcate the land in question, as there was a boundary dispute about land owned by Government. 4. Plaintiff was out of station from 1.8.2002 to 12.8.2002 and during that period defendants felled trees in question, which were noticed by plaintiff on 13.8.2002 on his return, whereupon plaintiff filed present suit for permanent prohibitory injunction against defendants for restraining them to remove the timber from the spot. On 19.8.2002, timber of trees was converted into logs in presence of plaintiff and list was prepared. 5. During pendency of appeal, on application dated 8.10.2003, submitted by defendants, demarcation of land in question was again carried out by Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Shimla in presence of plaintiff, Sh. Laiq Ram, Range Officer and DW-2 Sh. Mela Ram Deputy Ranger, representatives of defendants. Report of this demarcation is Ex. PX, according to which trees in question were found inside Khasra No. 1164 owned and possessed by plaintiff. Satisfaction of representatives of defendants and also that of plaintiff Mathu Ram was also recorded in the said report. This demarcation report was not questioned by parties at any point of time. 6. Defendants disputed ownership of trees by claiming those trees in forest area and disputing demarcation report Ex. PW-2/A for want of competence of PW-2 Krishan Lal Kanungo to demarcate the land abutting to Government land and contended that demarcation was required to be carried out by Tehsildar or Naib Tehsildar and it was also claimed in written statement that timber in question was in safe custody of Forest Corporation and on 19.8.2002 at the time of conversion of trees in question, a list of total converted timber was prepared in presence of plaintiff on the spot. 7. During pendency of appeal before learned District Judge, defendants produced a copy of notification dated 28.4.2006, whereby control of forest present within jurisdiction of Municipal Corporation, Shimla was resumed by the State of Himachal Pradesh. 7. During pendency of appeal before learned District Judge, defendants produced a copy of notification dated 28.4.2006, whereby control of forest present within jurisdiction of Municipal Corporation, Shimla was resumed by the State of Himachal Pradesh. On the basis of this notification, defendants claimed that after taking over management of forests vide this notification learned District Judge would not have passed impugned judgment and decree against defendants. 8. Notification dated 28.4.2006 has not been proved on record in accordance with law. Even if judicial notice of this notification is taken, then also it relates to resumption of control of forests from Municipal Corporations to the Government of Himachal Pradesh, whereas in present case issue involved is that whether defendants are entitled for taking timber of the trees felled by Municipal Corporation after receiving application of plaintiff which were found in land owned and possessed by plaintiff. 9. Ownership of land and trees is concerned, that stands proved to be that of plaintiff, as in demarcation conducted by Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Shimla, on request of defendants, it has specifically reported that trees in question were found in the land belonging to plaintiff. From evidence on record, it stands proved that Khasra No. 1164 is owned and possessed by plaintiff and trees in question were standing on the said land, which were felled by defendants in the month of August, 2002 and converted into timbers. 10. The suit of plaintiff is for restraining defendants from taking away timber from his land on the basis of ownership of trees belonging to his land. There is nothing on record to show that management of private land or trees standing thereon have also been resumed by Government. In present case no tree or land of forest is involved. Therefore, issuance of notification dated 18.4.2006 has no effect on the present lis. Consequently, substantial question No. 1 is decided accordingly. 11. Trees in question were in the land owned and possessed by plaintiff. Plaintiff had filed an application for permission of felling these trees apprehending danger for life and property from those trees. Those trees were felled by defendants, but claiming right over them by stating that these trees were standing in forest land. However, the stand of defendants was shattered by demarcation report Ex. PA, which was accepted and not assailed by defendants. Those trees were felled by defendants, but claiming right over them by stating that these trees were standing in forest land. However, the stand of defendants was shattered by demarcation report Ex. PA, which was accepted and not assailed by defendants. DW-1 in his statement in the Court has admitted the said demarcation was conducted by competent authority and as per said demarcation trees in dispute were found belonging to plaintiff. Therefore, plaintiff’s ownership and possession upon trees stands duly established on record. 12. After felling of trees converted timber was also lying in the land of plaintiff. In para 7 of plaint, plaintiff claimed that converted timber were lying on the spot. In written statement or in statement of DW-1, it was no where stated that converted timber was shifted from the spot. In reply to the said para, defendants have only stated that contents of para 7 were wrong and hence denied. In replication, corresponding para of the plaint was reaffirmed by plaintiff. In para 9 of plaint, plaintiff had stated that defendants were bent upon to take the timber for their own use and irreparable loss and injury was likely to be caused to plaintiff unless defendants are restrained. In para 9 of written statement, defendants replied that timbers were in safe custody of Forest Corporation and at the time of conversion of the said trees, defendants prepared a list of total converted timber in presence of plaintiff on the spot. In replication, plaintiff admitted the preparation of list on the spot, but claimed right on the extracted timber. In written statement, it was also not stated that converted timber was shifted or taken in possession by defendants or their agents. Defendants had examined only one witness DW-1 Sh. Mela Ram Deputy Ranger who remained completely silent on this issue. In cross-examination, he only stated that these trees were handed over to Forest Corporation in the year 2002. He is silent about physical possession of converted timber. Definitely, trees were handed over to Forest Department for felling on the spot, but they were removed and/or taken in possession from the spot after filing of the suit or at any point of time, has not come on record. There is no pleading, much less, evidence on record led by defendants to rebut the claim of plaintiff regarding possession of converted timber lying on spot. 13. There is no pleading, much less, evidence on record led by defendants to rebut the claim of plaintiff regarding possession of converted timber lying on spot. 13. Handing over tress by Municipal Corporation to Forest Corporation for felling on its behalf did not transfer ownership and possession of trees or timber in favour of Forest Corporation. Forest Corporation was acting on behalf of defendants and trees and land was belonging to plaintiff. Therefore, until extracted timber is removed from spot, the plaintiff had right to seek permanent prohibitory injunction against defendants and their agents. Forest Corporation was an agent of defendants, nothing more or nothing less. 14. Learned counsel for the defendants submits that in para 9 of written statement, it has been specifically stated that timber in question was in safe custody of Forest Corporation, which is sufficient to show that possession of timber is with the Forest Corporation. The claim of defendants was not admitted by plaintiff in replication, rather it was denied. 15. It is settled law that pleadings in absence of proof cannot be made basis for deciding an issue in favour of a party. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anvar P.V. Vs. P.K. Basheer and others (2014) 10 SCC 473 has held as under:- “1. Construction by plaintiff, destruction by defendant. Construction by pleadings, proof by evidence; proof only by relevant and admissible evidence. Genuineness, veracity or reliability of the evidence is seen by the court only after the stage of relevancy and admissibility. These are some of the first principles of evidence. What is the nature and manner of admission of electronic records is one of the principal issues arising for consideration in this appeal.” 16. In Manager, Reserve Bank of India, Bangalore Vs. S. Mani and others (2005) 5 SCC 100 , Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under:- “19. Pleadings are no substitute for proof. No workman, thus, took an oath to state that they had worked for 240 days. No document in support of the said plea was produced. It is, therefore not correct to contend that the plea raised by the respondents herein that they had worked continuously for 240 days was deemed to have been admitted by applying the doctrine of non-traverse. In any event the contention of the respondents having been denied and disputed, it was obligatory on the part of the respondents to add new evidence. In any event the contention of the respondents having been denied and disputed, it was obligatory on the part of the respondents to add new evidence. The contents raised in the letters of the union dated 30-5-1988 and 11-4-1990 containing statements to the effect that the workmen had been working continuously for 240 days might not have been replied to, but the same is of no effect as by reason thereof, the allegations made therein cannot be said to have been proved, particularly in view of the fact that the contents thereof were not proved by any witness. Only by reason of non-response to such letters, the contents thereof would not stand admitted. The Evidence Act does not say so.” 17. In present case, plaintiff in his deposition in Court, specifically stated that timber, lying in his land, be handed over to him. In his cross-examination, no question has been put to him disputing his statement that timber was not laying in his land. Further DW-1 also remained silent about taking possession of converted timber from the spot. He only stated that trees, marked by Forest Corporation, were felled. What happened thereafter, he is silent. Nowhere, he denied possession of plaintiff or claimed possession of converted timber. Therefore, there is nothing on record to establish that possession of converted timber was handed over to Forest Corporation. Felling trees and conversion of timber on the spot, does not establish possession of timber in question with defendants particularly when trees and obviously timber thereof belonged to plaintiff and also lying on spot in the land owned and possessed by plaintiff. Therefore, averments made in para 9 of written statement, in absence of proof, are not sufficient to infer handing over of possession of timber to Forest Corporation. 18. On the contrary plaintiff, in his plaint claimed that timber was lying on the spot and also stated in his examination-in-chief in Court that he was entitled for timber lying in his land and the plaintiff was not questioned on this issue in cross-examination. 19. 18. On the contrary plaintiff, in his plaint claimed that timber was lying on the spot and also stated in his examination-in-chief in Court that he was entitled for timber lying in his land and the plaintiff was not questioned on this issue in cross-examination. 19. Dealing with effect of not cross-examining a witness on a particular point/circumstance, the Apex Court, after considering various judgments, in case Laxmibai and another versus Bhagwantbuva and others reported in (2013) 4 Supreme Court Cases 97, has observed as under: “40 Furthermore, there cannot be any dispute with respect to the settled legal proposition, that if a party wishes to raise any doubt as regards the correctness of the statement of a witness, the said witness must be given an opportunity to explain his statement by drawing his attention to that part of it, which has been objected to by the other party, as being untrue. Without this, it is not possible to impeach his credibility. Such a law has been advanced in view of the statutory provisions enshrined in Section 138 of the Evidence Act, 1872, which enable the opposite party to cross-examine a witness as regards information tendered in evidence by him during his initial examination in chief, and the scope of this provision stands enlarged by Section 146 of the Evidence Act, which permits a witness to be questioned, inter-alia, in order to test his veracity. Thereafter, the unchallenged part of his evidence is to be relied upon, for the reason that it is impossible for the witness to explain or elaborate upon any doubts as regards the same, in the absence of questions put to him with respect to the circumstances which indicate that the version of events provided by him, is not fit to be believed, and the witness himself, is unworthy of credit. Thus, if a party intends to impeach a witness, he must provide adequate opportunity to the witness in the witness box, to give a full and proper explanation. The same is essential to ensure fair play and fairness in dealing with witnesses. (See: Khem Chand v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1994 SC 226 ; State of U.P. v. Nahar Singh (dead) & Ors., AIR 1998 SC 1328 ; Rajinder Pershad (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Darshana Devi (Smt.), AIR 2001 SC 3207 ; and Sunil Kumar & Anr. The same is essential to ensure fair play and fairness in dealing with witnesses. (See: Khem Chand v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1994 SC 226 ; State of U.P. v. Nahar Singh (dead) & Ors., AIR 1998 SC 1328 ; Rajinder Pershad (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Darshana Devi (Smt.), AIR 2001 SC 3207 ; and Sunil Kumar & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2005 SC 1096 ).” 20. In instant case, pleading in plaint are duly supported by evidence in statement of plaintiff and not specifically denied in written statement and also not questioned in cross-examination. Therefore, possession of timber with plaintiff can safely be considered. 21. In view of above observation, plaintiff has proved his ownership and possession over the disputed timber and the defendants have failed to prove any right, title and interest thereupon. Ownership and possession of plaintiff over Khasra No. 1164 and trees standing there upon is undisputed, thus on the basis of evidence on record, converted timber of those trees lying on the spot in premises of plaintiff after felling of trees, unless contrary proved, is to be presumed in possession of plaintiff. Therefore, learned District Judge has not committed any mistake in passing impugned judgment and decree in favour of plaintiff. 22. In view of above discussion, present appeal fails and judgment and decree passed by learned District Judges for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants either themselves or through their agents from removing the timber in question from the land of the plaintiff is upheld and appeal is dismissed with costs.