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2017 DIGILAW 396 (HP)

Kumar Lama v. State of H. P.

2017-04-24

SANDEEP SHARMA

body2017
JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. The instant criminal revision petition filed under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Cr.PC, is directed against the judgment dated 12.3.2009, (in short ‘the impugned judgment’) passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track, Kullu, District Kullu, HP, in Criminal Appeal No. 10 of 2008, affirming the judgment of conviction and sentence dated 8.8.2008, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class, Manali, District Kullu, H.P. in Criminal Case No. 340-1/07/72-II/07, whereby the petitioner accused has been convicted and sentenced as under:- “Section 279 IPC To undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three months and to pay fine of Rs. 1000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one month. Section 304-A of the IPC To undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one year and to pay fine of Rs. 10,000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo simple imprisonment for six months under Section 304-A of the IPC.” 2. Briefly stated facts as emerge from the record are that complainant namely Ram Samuj, got his statement recorded under Section 154 of the Cr.PC (Ext.PW2/A), before the police, stating therein that on 21.6.2007, at about 4:00pm, he along with deceased Dalip Rana, Dhokhe Lal, Shiv Shankar and Shyam Lal was loading tipper bearing registration No. HP-58-1665. He further stated that deceased Dalip Rana was standing on back side of the tipper and the complainant requested the accused to slightly reverse the tipper, but cautioned him to let deceased Dalip Rana move away from there. It was also reported to the police that the labourers namely Dhokhe Lal, Shiv Shankar and Shyam Lal were standing by the side of the tipper with deceased Dalip Rana, when all of a sudden the accused reversed back the tipper, as a result of which vehicle hit deceased Dalip Rana on his neck. The complainant further reported that on his raising alarm, tipper was stopped by the accused. The complainant also reported to the police that the injured was brought to the Mission Hospital Manali where he was declared brought dead. The complainant also reported to the police that accident took place due to negligent driving of the petitioner accused. The complainant further reported that on his raising alarm, tipper was stopped by the accused. The complainant also reported to the police that the injured was brought to the Mission Hospital Manali where he was declared brought dead. The complainant also reported to the police that accident took place due to negligent driving of the petitioner accused. On the aforesaid statement having been made by the complainant under Section 154 of the Cr.PC., police registered a formal FIR against the petitioner and took into possession Tipper along with documents. After completion of investigation, accused was challaned by the police for commission of offence punishable under Sections 279 and 304 of the IPC before the competent Court of law. 3. Learned Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class, Manali, District Kullu, H.P., after satisfying itself that prima facie case exists against the accused put a notice of accusation under Sections 279 and 304-A, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. Learned trial Court on the basis of evidence adduced on record by the prosecution, found the accused guilty of having committed offence under the aforesaid Sections and accordingly, convicted and sentenced him as per description already given above. 4. The present petitioner-accused being aggrieved with the judgment of conviction passed by the learned trial Court, filed an appeal under Section 374 of Cr.PC before the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track, Kullu, District Kullu, HP, who vide judgment dated 12.3.2009, dismissed the appeal. Hence, this criminal revision petition before this Court. 5. Mr. Anup Chitkara, Advocate, representing the petitioner vehemently argued that the impugned judgment passed by the court below is not sustainable in the eye of law as the same is not based upon the correct appreciation of material made available on record by the prosecution and as such, same deserves to be quashed and set-aside. Mr. Chitkara, while inviting attention of this Court to the impugned judgment passed by the Court below argued that bare perusal of the judgments suggest that both the courts below have not read the evidence in its right perspective, as a result of which erroneous findings have come on record to the detriment of the petitioner-accused, who is otherwise an innocent person. Mr. Mr. Chitkara while inviting attention of this Court to the Section 279 IPC forcefully contended that both the courts below committed grave illegality while holding the petitioner accused guilty of having committed offence under Section 279 of the IPC because no evidence worth the name is available on record, suggestive of the fact that the accident, if any, took place on the “public way” as prescribed under Section 279 of the IPC. With a view to substantiate his aforesaid argument, Mr. Chitkara made this Court to travel through the evidence led on record by the prosecution to demonstrate that there is no evidence worth the name available on record suggestive of the fact that the accident occurred on public way, rather it is an admitted case of the prosecution that accident took place near crusher, which by no stretch of imagination, could be termed as public way and as such, conviction recorded under Section 279 of the IPC, is required to be quashed and setaside. Mr. Chitkara further contended that there is no evidence suggestive of the fact that at the time of accident vehicle in question was being driven rashly and negligently by the petitioner accused, rather collective reading of the evidence led on record by the prosecution itself suggests that the petitioner accused suffered injury on account of being hit by the tipper, rather he sustained injury while closing the tail gate of the tipper involved in the accident. In this regard, he invited attention of this Court to the statement of PW2, who stated before the Court that at the time of accident, tipper was being loaded and vehicle was standing and not moving and six people in all were loading the said tipper. Mr. Anup while placing reliance upon the statement of PW2 stated that it has specifically come in the statement of PW2 that tail gate of the tipper was open and as such, possibility of accident occurred on account of falling of the dalla/tail gate could not be ruled out by the court below, but unfortunately, both the court below failed to consider the aforesaid glaring aspect of the matter, which would have changed the entire complexion of the case. Mr. Mr. Chitkara, also invited attention of this court to the statement of PW8 to suggest that there are major/material contradictions in his as well as statement of PW1 because both of them have given altogether different version with regard to sustaining of injury by the deceased Dalip Rana. Mr. Chitkara further argued that otherwise also if statements of both the witnesses are read in conjunction, one thing clearly emerges that at that relevant time sand was being loaded and vehicle was stationary. In the aforesaid background, Mr. Chitkara, forcefully contended that if entire evidence, as led on record by the prosecution, is examined and analyzed, by no stretch of imagination, driver of the tipper could be held responsible for the unfortunate accident, rather entire evidence made available on record indicates that the deceased suffered injury on his head due to falling of shutter/dala. He further contended that leaving everything aside, if entire evidence adduced on record by the prosecution is examined to ascertain whether there is any rashness/negligence on the part of the accused, it can be safely concluded that there is no evidence as such, led on record by the prosecution with regard to rashness/negligence, if any, on the part of the petitioner-accused and as such, he could not be held guilty of having committed offence under Sections 279 and 304-A, of the IPC. In the aforesaid background, Mr. Chitkara, prayed that present petitioner may be acquitted of the offence punishable under Sections 279 and 304-A of the IPC after setting aside the judgment of conviction recorded by the court below. 6. Per contra, Mr. Ramesh Thakur, learned Deputy Advocate General, duly assisted by Mr. R.K. Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, representing the respondent-State supported the impugned judgments of conviction passed by the courts below. Mr. Thakur, while refuting the aforesaid contentions/submissions having been made by the learned counsel representing the petitioner, vehemently argued that bare perusal of impugned judgments passed by both the courts below suggests that there is no illegality and infirmity in the same, rather same are based upon the correct appreciation of evidence adduced on record by the prosecution and as such, there is no scope of interference, whatsoever, of this Court, especially in view of the concurrent finding of fact and law recorded by the courts below. Mr. Mr. Thakur while specifically placing reliance upon the statement of PWs 1 and 2 contended that prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased Dalip Rana suffered injuries on his head after being hit by the tipper being driven by the petitioner accused. While inviting attention of this court to the statement of PW1, Mr. Thakur, contended that it has specifically come in his statement that when the petitioner accused was asked to reverse the vehicle, he was informed that the deceased Dalip Singh is standing but despite that petitioner accused hurriedly reversed the vehicle, as a result of which, Dalip suffered injuries and finally passed away. Mr. Thakur, further contended that there is no force in the argument of Mr. Chitkara that person can only be charged under Section 279, if he drives vehicle on public way, wherever a vehicle goes and passes through, can be considered a public way and in the instant case, though crusher was not on the road head but certainly 40-50 mts. away from the road. Mr. Thakur, further contended that crusher could be reached by the tipper being driven by the accused only using same path and as such, it cannot be said that the accident, if any, did not occur on public way. Mr. Negi placed reliance on judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court titled State of Kerala Vs. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri (1999)2 SCC 452 , to suggest that this court has limited jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Cr.PC. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties as well carefully gone through the record. 8. As far as scope of power of this Court while exercising revisionary jurisdiction under Section 397 is concerned, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Krishnan and another Versus Krishnaveni and another, (1997) 4 SCC 241 ; has held that in case Court notices that there is a failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is not correct, it is salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularities/incorrectness committed by inferior criminal court in its judicial process or illegality of sentence or order. The relevant para of the judgment is reproduced as under:- 8. The relevant para of the judgment is reproduced as under:- 8. The object of Section 483 and the purpose behind conferring the revisional power under Section 397 read with Section 401, upon the High Court is to invest continuous supervisory jurisdiction so as to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularity of the procedure or to mete out justice. In addition, the inherent power of the High Court is preserved by Section 482. The power of the High Court, therefore, is very wide. However, the High Court must exercise such power sparingly and cautiously when the Sessions Judge has simultaneously exercised revisional power under Section 397(1). However, when the High Court notices that there has been failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is not correct, it is but the salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularities/incorrectness committed by inferior criminal court in its judicial process or illegality of sentence or order.” 9. In the instant case, prosecution with a view to prove its case examined as many as nine witnesses, but close scrutiny of the evidence made available on record, suggests that only two material witnesses can only be said to be the eye witnesses to the alleged accident. In his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.PC, the petitioner-accused denied the case of the prosecution in toto, and stated that accident did not take place due to negligent driving of the vehicle and he has been falsely implicated in the case. However, fact remains that no evidence was led on record by the accused in support of his case. 10. This Court solely with a view to ascertain the genuineness and correctness of the statement having been made by the learned counsel representing the petitioner accused as well as to the impugned judgments passed by the Courts below undertook an exercise to peruse the evidence led on record by the prosecution, perusal whereof suggest that there is considerable force in the arguments having been made by the learned counsel for the petitioner accused that both the courts below have failed to appreciate the evidence in its right perspective, as a result of which erroneous findings to the detriment of the petitioner have come on record. 11. 11. In the instant case, PW2 Ram Samuj, the complainant stated before the Court that in the month of June, 2007, he along with Sham Sunder, Dhoke Lal and deceased Dalip Rana was working at Stone Crusher. He further stated that at that relevant time, deceased Dalip Rana was opening the shutter of the tipper and accused reversed back the tipper, as a result of which, Dalip sustained injuries on his neck. He also stated that Dalip was rushed to the hospital, where he was declared brought dead. 12. True it is that this witness while deposing before the Court stated that accident took place due to negligence of the accused but there is no whisper, if any, that in what manner accused was negligent at the time of alleged accident. If the statement of PW2 is perused, he stated that at around 4 pm, he along with deceased Dalip Rana, Dhoke Lal and Shiv Shankar was loading the Tipper in question. He further stated that they were at the back side of the tipper and he asked the petitioner accused to reverse it a little bit. He further stated that he cautioned the accused to let Dalip Rana take side first. However, Kumar Lama (petitioner) reversed the vehicle, as a result of which accused Dalip Rana received injury on his neck having been hit by the tail gate of the tipper. PW2 in his statement further stated that Dalip Kumar deceased was opening the dala/tail gate of the tipper, then accused hit the tipper on his neck, as a result of which Dalip received injury on his neck. If the cross examination conducted on this witness is perused carefully, it suggests that at the relevant time, sand was being loaded in the tipper and it was stationary because PW2 in his cross examination has specifically stated that at the time of accident, vehicle was stationary and sand was being loaded on the tipper. He also admitted that while loading sand, shutter of the tipper is kept upon towards upper side. He further admitted that two or three people are required to open and close the shutter/dala. Though PW2 in his cross examination denied that deceased Dalip Rana suffered injury while closing the shutter but he specifically stated that at the time of accident shutter was being opened by Dhoke Lal and deceased Dalip Rana. 13. He further admitted that two or three people are required to open and close the shutter/dala. Though PW2 in his cross examination denied that deceased Dalip Rana suffered injury while closing the shutter but he specifically stated that at the time of accident shutter was being opened by Dhoke Lal and deceased Dalip Rana. 13. PW8 Dhoke Lal stated that he along with Shyam Lal, Shankar, deceased Dalip Rana and Ram Samuj was loading the sand in the tipper. He further stated that accused was driver of the tipper. It has also come in his statement that there should be a distance of 5ft. and Deceased Dalip Rana was opening the shutter of the Tipper. Rather PW2 in his statement stated that at that relevant time, shutter/dala of the tipper was opened by Dhoke Lal as well as deceased Dalip Rana. PW8 in his statement stated that all of a sudden, accused revesred back the tipper as a result of which Dalip was crushed and his neck sustained injury. It is not understood that if at that time, as per version put forth by the prosecution, shutter/dala of the tipper was open, how deceased could be hit by the vehicle which was being reversed, as claimed by the prosecution. It has also come in the statement of PW8 that at the time of accident, deceased Dalip Rana was standing 5 ft. away from the vehicle and was opening the shutter. Aforesaid version put forth by PW2 also could not be accepted simply for the reason that if Dalip Singh was standing 5 ft. away from the vehicle, how he could open the shutter/dala of the vehicle. PW8 in his cross examination admitted that at the time of accident, vehicle was in start condition and he was also standing behind the vehicle. If the statement of PWs 2 and 8 are read juxtaposing each other, it can be safely inferred that version putforth by them could not have been believed merely on its face value by the courts below, especially in view of the material contradictions in their statements. PW8 Dhoke Lal stated that Dalip Rana was standing 5 ft. behind the tipper and was opening its dala/tail gate of the tipper, but if the statement of PW2 is seen there is no mention of standing of Dalip Kumar 5ft. PW8 Dhoke Lal stated that Dalip Rana was standing 5 ft. behind the tipper and was opening its dala/tail gate of the tipper, but if the statement of PW2 is seen there is no mention of standing of Dalip Kumar 5ft. away from the vehicle, rather PW2 only stated that deceased Dalip Rana was at the back side of the tipper and he asked the petitioner accused to reverse it a little bit. There is no corroboration, to the version put forth by the PW2 in the statement of PW8 and PW8 stated that he was all alone at the time of the accident. 14. PW2 has specifically stated in his cross-examination that at the time of incident shutter/dala/tail gate of the tipper was being opened by PW8 namely Dhoke Lal and deceased Dalip Rana. If aforesaid version put forth by PW2 is taken to be correct, version put forth by PW8, cannot be accepted at all that deceased Dalip suffered injury on his neck after being hit by the tipper. Similarly, perusal of Ext.PW2/A (statement) recorded under Section 154 of the Cr.PC suggests that PW2 reported that on 21.6.2007 at about 4pm, he along with Shyam Lal, Dhoke Lal, deceased Dalip Rana and Shiv Shankar, was loading the tipper. In his statement under Section 154 of the Cr.PC, the complainant i.e. PW2 stated that the deceased Dalip was on the back side of the tipper, whereas in his statement before the Court, he stated that Dalip Rana was opening the dala gate of the tipper and then, he was hit by the tipper, as a result of which, he suffered injury on his neck. 15. This Court after carefully examining the statements of PW2 and PW8 sees substantial force in the argument having been made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that there are material contradictions in the statements of PW2 and PW8 and no conviction, if any, could be recorded by the courts below on the statement of these so called eye witnesses i.e. PW2 & PW8. 16. 16. Leaving everything aside, this Court was unable to lay its hand to any evidence worth the name led on record by the prosecution suggestive of the fact that there was act of rashness and negligence on the part of the petitioner accused while loading sand at the stone crusher because none of the witnesses stated anything specific with regard to the negligence on the part of the accused. Both the PWs as referred above, merely stated that accident occurred due to rashness and negligence of the petitioner accused but I am afraid that merely this statement was sufficient to hold the petitioner guilty of having committed offence under Section 279 and 304-A IPC. Rather, this Court after carefully examining the entire evidence led on record, has reason to believe/infer that the deceased Dalip Rana suffered injury on his neck while opening the dala/tail gate or closing the same. Both the aforesaid material prosecution witnesses have stated altogether differently with regard to positioning of deceased Dalip Rana at the spot of the accident. But interestingly, if the statements made by both the witnesses are seen/perused carefully, it may be easily inferred that at that relevant time, vehicle was stationary and sand was being loaded on the same. True it is, that at that relevant time, there was no conductor, as stood proved, alongwith Tipper but if the statement of PW 1 is read, he specifically stated that he asked the petitioner accused to reverse it a little bit and as such, it cannot be stated that petitioner-accused without ascertaining whether person is standing behind or not, reversed the vehicle rashly and negligently. PW2 though in his statement stated that at the time of reversing of the vehicle he asked the petitioner accused to let Dalip Rana get aside first, however his aforesaid version was nowhere corroborated by PW8, who admittedly, as per evidence led on record by the prosecution was, with the deceased Dalip Rana at the back of the tipper. 17. True it is that in the unfortunate incident one person lost his life but after carefully examining the evidence adduced on record by the prosecution, this court has no hesitation to conclude that the prosecution was not able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner committed offence punishable under Section 279 of the IPC. 17. True it is that in the unfortunate incident one person lost his life but after carefully examining the evidence adduced on record by the prosecution, this court has no hesitation to conclude that the prosecution was not able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner committed offence punishable under Section 279 of the IPC. To constitute an offence under Section 279 IPC, it is/was the bounden duty of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was driving the vehicle on a “public way”. Apart from above, prosecution while proving its case under Sections 279 IPC is/was also expected to prove that the petitioner accused was driving rashly or negligently that it endangered human life or caused hurt or injury to any other person. But unfortunately in the instant case, all the aforesaid ingredients/factors, which were required to be weighed/considered at the time of ascertaining whether the offence under Section 279 of the IPC, has been committed by the petitioner accused or not, have been not proved. It would be apt to reproduce Section 279 of the IPC, herein below:- ”Rash driving or riding on a public way Whoever drives any vehicle, or rides, on any public way in a manner so rash or negligent as to endanger human life, or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.” Aforesaid provision of law clearly suggests that the person/individual, who drives the vehicle rashly and negligently on public way can be charged under Section 279 IPC. 18. It has specifically come in the statement of PW2 (complainant) that the accident occurred at stone crusher, which was at the distance of 40/50 fts., away from the highway, otherwise apart from above, evidence available on record clearly suggests that at that relevant time sand was being loaded on the vehicle and tipper was just standing near to the crusher as is clearly evident from the photographs (Ext.PA/12 to 15). In this regard, the Hon’ble Apex Court, in case titled Braham Dass v. State of H.P., AIR 2009 SC 3181 , has held that Section 279 IPC deals with rash driving or riding on a public way and it must be established that the accused was driving any vehicle on a public way which endangered human life or was likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person. But in the instant case, there is no evidence led on record by the prosecution to prove that at that relevant time, vehicle in question was being driven by the petitioner accused on public way as provided under Section 279 of the IPC and as such, aforesaid provision could not be attracted in the present case, where the petitioner-accused was not admittedly driving tipper on the public way at that relevant time. The relevant para of the judgment referred supra, is being reproduced herein below:- “6. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that there was no evidence on record to show any negligence. It has not been brought on record as to how the accused-appellant was negligent in any way. On the contrary what has been stated is that one person had gone to the roof top and driver started the vehicle while he was there. There was no evidence to show that the driver had knowledge that any passenger was on the roof top of the bus. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand submitted that PW1 had stated that the conductor had told the driver that one passenger was still on the roof of the bus and the driver started the bus. 7. In the cross-examination PW1 categorically stated that he does not know who the driver was. It is of relevance that the conductor was not examined as a witness. 8. Section 279 deals rash driving or riding on a public way. A bare reading of the provision makes it clear that it must be established that the accused was driving any vehicle on a public way in a manner which endangered human life or was likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person. Obviously the foundation in accusations under Section 279 IPC is not negligence. Similarly in Section 304-A the stress is on causing death by negligence or rashness. Obviously the foundation in accusations under Section 279 IPC is not negligence. Similarly in Section 304-A the stress is on causing death by negligence or rashness. Therefore, for bringing in application of either Section 279 or 304-A it must be established that there was an element of rashness or negligence. Even if the prosecution version is accepted in toto, there was no evidence led to show that any negligence was involved.” 19. Similarly perusal of medical evidence led on record nowhere gives specific details/description of the injury suffered by the deceased Dalip Rana in the alleged accident. PW4 Dr. Alka Walter, Medical Officer, Mission Hospital, Manali, stated that when the patient was brought to the hospital, he had no pulse, recordable blood pressure, cardiac activity or spontaneous respiration and she issued MLC Ext.PW3/A. However, there is nothing in MLC Ext.PW3/A from where, something can be inferred with regard to the alleged injury suffered by the deceased Dalip Rana. PW7 Dr. Sishu Pal, Regional Hospital Kullu, who had conducted the post-mortem of the body, issued postmortem report Ext.PW7/A and according to him, cause of the death was head injury, which ultimately resulted into coma and death of deceased Dalip Rana. He further stated that injury could be sustained due to hitting of vehicle while being reversed but definitely, there is no positive statement of him, if any, with regard to injury caused to the deceased. Since in the instant case, prosecution has miserably failed to prove on record that the deceased suffered injury on his head after being hit by the vehicle, aforesaid medical evidence adduced on record by the prosecution is/was of no help. Hence, finding returned by the courts below that medical evidence led on record is also in consonance with the oral evidence adduced on record by the prosecution qua the accident is totally irrelevant. 20. This court was unable to lay its hand to any evidence led on record by the prosecution to prove the negligence, if any on the part of the petitioner-accused. It is well settled by now that for the purpose of criminal law, high degree of negligence is required to be proved before the felony is established. 20. This court was unable to lay its hand to any evidence led on record by the prosecution to prove the negligence, if any on the part of the petitioner-accused. It is well settled by now that for the purpose of criminal law, high degree of negligence is required to be proved before the felony is established. But in the instant case, there is hardly any evidence suggestive of the fact that the petitioner accused was negligent at the time of alleged accident, rather, evidence available on record, especially, statements of PW2 and 8 compel this Court to agree with the contention having been made by the learned counsel representing the petitioner that the deceased Dalip Rana suffered injury on his neck due to fall of shutter/tail gate of the tipper. Prosecution with a view to prove negligence, if any, on the part of the petitioner accused ought to have proved on record gross negligence on the part of the accused petitioner. In such like cases, there should be evidence to prove on record the amount of recklessness or negligence and same should be more than normal or ordinary. Though, in the instant case, prosecution made an attempt to prove on record that the deceased Dalip Rana suffered injury due to the negligence of the accused but statements of PWs 2 and 8 nowhere prove the case of prosecution because none of the aforesaid witnesses stated something specific with regard to the negligent act, if any, committed by the petitioner at the time of the alleged incident. Mere bald statement that the petitioner accused was negligent, by no stretch of imagination, could be termed to be sufficient to hold the petitioner accused guilty of having committed offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304 of the IPA. In the instant case, it has come on record that at the time of accident, tipper was stationary and it was not being driven by its driver. Hence, this Court has no hesitation to conclude that prosecution has failed to prove reckless or careless driving of the petitioner accused beyond reasonable doubt. A person cannot be held criminally accountable for his rashness and negligence merely because evil consequences flow from his act, rather rashness must be such as to endanger human life or personal safety of others. Hence, this Court has no hesitation to conclude that prosecution has failed to prove reckless or careless driving of the petitioner accused beyond reasonable doubt. A person cannot be held criminally accountable for his rashness and negligence merely because evil consequences flow from his act, rather rashness must be such as to endanger human life or personal safety of others. Similarly, for criminal liability, the rashness or negligence must show a disregard for human life or personal safety of others. Question whether an act is criminally rash or negligent is question of fact depending upon the circumstances of particular case and as such, needs to be elucidated minutely and with certain degree of precision. In the instant case, PW2 himself stated that he had asked the petitioner to reverse the vehicle a little bit and as such, it cannot be said that vehicle if at all reversed by the petitioner-accused, was a sheer act of negligence because the petitioner-accused reversed the vehicle on being asked by PW2. 21. Reliance is placed on judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled State of Karnataka v. Satish, 1998 (8) SCC 493 . The relevant paras of which are being reproduced herein below:- “1. Truck No. MYE-3236 being driven by the respondent turned turtle while crossing a "nalla" on 25-11-1982 at about 8.30 a.m. The accident resulted in the death of 15 persons and receipt of injuries by about 18 persons, who were travelling in the fully loaded truck. The respondent was charge-sheeted and tried. The learned trial court held that the respondent drove the vehicle at a high speed and it was on that account that the accident took place. The respondent was convicted for offences under Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304A IPC and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. The respondent challenged his conviction and sentence before the Second Additional Sessions Judge, Belgaum. While the conviction and sentence imposed upon the respondent for the offence under Section 279 IPC was set aside, the appellate court confirmed the conviction and sentenced the respondent for offences under Sections 304A, 337 and 338 IPC. On a criminal revision petition being filed by the respondent before the High Court of Karnataka, the conviction and sentence of the respondent for all the offences were set aside and the respondent was acquitted. On a criminal revision petition being filed by the respondent before the High Court of Karnataka, the conviction and sentence of the respondent for all the offences were set aside and the respondent was acquitted. This appeal by special leave is directed against the said judgment of acquittal passed by the High Court of Karnataka. 2. We have examined the record and heard learned counsel for the parties. 3. Both the trial court and the appellate court held the respondent guilty for offences under Sections 337, 338 and 304A IPC after recording a finding that the respondent was driving the truck at a "high speed". No specific finding has been recorded either by the trial court or by the first appellate court to the effect that the respondent was driving the truck either negligently or rashly. After holding that the respondent was driving the truck at a "high speed", both the courts pressed into aid the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to hold the respondent guilty. 4. Merely because the truck was being driven at a "high speed" does not bespeak of either "negligence" or "rashness" by itself. None of the witnesses examined by the prosecution could give any indication, even approximately, as to what they meant by "high speed". "High speed" is a relative term. It was for the prosecution to bring on record material to establish as to what it meant by "high speed" in the facts and circumstances of the case. In a criminal trial, the burden of providing everything essential to the establishment of the charge against an accused always rests on the prosecution and there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused until the contrary is proved. Criminality is not to be presumed, subject of course to some statutory exceptions. There is no such statutory exception pleaded in the present case. In the absence of any material on the record, no presumption of "rashness" or "negligence" could be drawn by invoking the maxim "res ipsa loquitur". There is evidence to show that immediately before the truck turned turtle, there was a big jerk. It is not explained as to whether the jerk was because of the uneven road or mechanical failure. The Motor Vehicle Inspector who inspected the vehicle had submitted his report. There is evidence to show that immediately before the truck turned turtle, there was a big jerk. It is not explained as to whether the jerk was because of the uneven road or mechanical failure. The Motor Vehicle Inspector who inspected the vehicle had submitted his report. That report is not forthcoming from the record and the Inspector was not examined for reasons best known to the prosecution. This is a serious infirmity and lacuna in the prosecution case. 5. There being no evidence on the record to establish "negligence" or "rashness" in driving the truck on the part of the respondent, it cannot be said that the view taken by the High Court in acquitting the respondent is a perverse view. To us it appears that the view of the High Court, in the facts and circumstances of this case, is a reasonably possible view. We, therefore, do not find any reason to interfere with the order of acquittal. The appeal fails and is dismissed. The respondent is on bail. His bail bonds shall stand discharged. Appeal dismissed.” 22. After having carefully perused the record and the statements of the witnesses and applying ratio of law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this court is of the view that the judgments passed by the courts below are not based upon correct appreciation of the evidence adduced on record and as such, same deserve to be quashed and set-aside. 23. Consequently, in view of the detailed discussion made herein above, the present petition is allowed and the judgments passed by the courts below are quashed and set-aside. Accordingly, petitioner-accused is acquitted of the charges so framed against him. Bail bonds are ordered to be discharged and interim order, if any, is vacated. All applications, if any, also stand disposed of.