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2017 DIGILAW 398 (ORI)

Srikrishna Estate and Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. Netrananda Bhoi

2017-04-12

A.K.RATH

body2017
JUDGMENT : Dr. A.K. Rath, J. 1. This petition challenges the order dated 11.7.2016 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Sr.Division), Bhubaneswar in C.S.No.688 of 2008. By the said order, the learned trial court allowed the application of the plaintiffs to admit the photostat copy of the agreement dated 13.3.2017 as exhibit. 2. The opposite parties as plaintiffs instituted the suit for declaration that the registered sale deed no.6011 dated 30.5.2007 executed by defendant no.1 in favour of defendant no.2 is illegal, invalid, void and inoperative, declaration of right, title, interest, possession and permanent injunction impleading the petitioners as opposite parties. Pursuant to issuance of summons, the defendants entered appearance and filed a written statement denying the assertions made in the plaint. While the matter stood thus, the plaintiffs filed an application on 27.1.2016 under Order 16 Rule 6 C.P.C. read with Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act praying for a direction to defendant no.1 to produce the original agreement dated 13.3.20017, which is in his possession so as to admit the photostat copy thereof as secondary evidence. It is stated that defendant no.1 had obtained the agreement for sale. He kept the original with him and handed over a photostat copy of the same to the plaintiffs. They have filed the photostat copy in the Court. Unless the original document, which is under the custody of defendant no.1, is filed, the secondary copy thereof is not admissible. Thereafter the plaintiffs filed an application on 19.3.2016 praying to admit the photostat copy of the agreement dated 13.3.2007. It is stated that the photostat copy, which is filed in the court, being a copy obtained in mechanical process is admissible as secondary evidence. The defendants filed objection stating therein that though no agreement was executed between the defendants with plaintiff no.1, but then the plaintiffs instituted the suit basing upon the agreement which is not in existence. They denied that the Managing Director of defendant no.1 obtained the agreement for sale, kept the original with him and handed over a photostat copy to the plaintiffs. It is specifically stated that photostat copy of the so called agreement is forged one and manufactured for the purpose of this case. They denied that the Managing Director of defendant no.1 obtained the agreement for sale, kept the original with him and handed over a photostat copy to the plaintiffs. It is specifically stated that photostat copy of the so called agreement is forged one and manufactured for the purpose of this case. The learned trial court came to hold that when the plaintiffs have laid foundation to lead the secondary evidence of the agreement for sale dated 13.3.2007 by way of photostat copy, they are at liberty to mark the same as secondary evidence particularly when the signatures of the plaintiffs are admitted on it. Held so, it allowed the application. 3. Mr. Mohapatra, learned Advocate for the petitioners submitted that Section 65 of the Evidence Act permits secondary evidence to be given of the existence, condition or contents of documents under the circumstances mentioned therein. The secondary evidence of the contents of a document cannot be admitted without non-production of the original. The foundation must be laid by a party for leading secondary evidence in the shape of photostat copy. The assertion of the defendants is that the agreement for sale dated 13.3.2007 has not seen the light of the day. The photostat copy filed in the court is a fabricated one. In view of the same, the learned trial court is not justified in permitting the plaintiffs to mark the photostat copy as exhibit. 4. Per contra, Mr. Bhuyan, learned counsel for the opposite parties 2 to 4 submitted that the Managing Director of defendant no.1 obtained an agreement for sale, kept the original with him and handed the photostat copies to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed an application calling for the original, but the defendants had not produced the same. Thereafter an application was filed by the plaintiffs to mark the photostat copy of the agreement. The photostat copy of the agreement has been obtained in a mechanical process and the same is admissible in secondary evidence. Thus, the conditions enumerated in Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act has been satisfied and have been laid for leading secondary evidence. The learned trial court is justified in allowing the petition. 5. Before adverting to the contentions raised by the learned counsel for both parties, it will necessary to set out some of the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act.1872. “Sec.63. The learned trial court is justified in allowing the petition. 5. Before adverting to the contentions raised by the learned counsel for both parties, it will necessary to set out some of the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act.1872. “Sec.63. Secondary evidence.—Secondary evidence means and includes— (1) certified copies given under the provisions hereinafter contained; (2) copies made from the original by mechanical processes which in themselves insure the accuracy of the copy, and copies compared with such copies; (3) copies made from or compared with the original; (4) counterparts of documents as against the parties who did not execute them; (5) oral accounts of the contents of a document given by some person who has himself seen it.” “Sec.65. Cases in which secondary evidence relating to documents may be given. xx xx xx (a) when the original is shown or appears to be in the possession or power- of the person against whom the document is sought to be proved, or of any person out of reach of, or not subject to, the process of the Court, or of any person legally bound to produce it, and when, after the notice mentioned in section 66, such person does not produce it;” 6. An identical matter came up for consideration before the Apex Court in the case of Smt. J. Yashoda v. Smt. K. Shobha Rani, AIR 2007 SC 1721 . On an interpretation of Sec.63 & 65(a) of the Evidence Act, the apex Court held: “7. Secondary evidence, as a general rule is admissible only in the absence of primary evidence. If the original itself is found to be inadmissible through failure of the party, who files it to prove it to be valid, the same party is not entitled to introduce secondary evidence of its contents. 8. Essentially, secondary evidence is an evidence which may be given in the absence of that better evidence which law requires to be given first, when a proper explanation of its absence is given. The definition in Section 6 3is exhaustive as the Section declares that secondary evidence “means and includes" and then follow the five kinds of secondary evidence. 9. Essentially, secondary evidence is an evidence which may be given in the absence of that better evidence which law requires to be given first, when a proper explanation of its absence is given. The definition in Section 6 3is exhaustive as the Section declares that secondary evidence “means and includes" and then follow the five kinds of secondary evidence. 9. The rule which is the most universal, namely that the best evidence the nature of the case will admit shall be produced, decides this objection that rule only means that, so long as the higher or superior evidence is within your possession or may be reached by you, you shall give no inferior proof in relation to it. Section 65 deals with the proof of the contents of the documents tendered in evidence. In order to enable a party to produce secondary evidence it is necessary for the party to prove existence and execution of the original document. Under Section 64, documents are to be provided by primary evidence. Section 6 5, however permits secondary evidence to be given of the existence, condition or contents of documents under the circumstances mentioned. The conditions laid down in the said Section must be fulfilled before secondary evidence can be admitted. Secondary evidence of the contents of a document cannot be admitted without non-production of the original being first accounted for in such a manner as to bring it within one or other of the cases provided for in the Section. In Ashok Dulichand v. Madahavlal Dube and Another [ 1975(4) SCC 664 ], it was inter alia held as follows: “After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that the order of the High Court in this respect calls for no interference. According to clause (a) of Section 6 5of Indian Evidence Act, Secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition or contents of a document when the original is shown or appears to be in possession or power of the person against whom the document is sought to be proved or of any person out of reach of, or not subject to, the process of the Court of any person legally bound to produce it, and when, after the notice mentioned in Section 66 such person does not produce it. Clauses (b) to (g) of Section 6 5 specify some other contingencies wherein secondary evidence relating to a document may be given, but we are not concerned with those clauses as it is the common case of the parties that the present case is not covered by those clauses. In order to bring his case within the purview of clause (a) of Section 65, the appellant filed applications on July 4, 1973, before respondent No. 1 was examined as a witness, praying that the said respondent be ordered to produce the original manuscript of which, according to the appellant, he had filed Photostat copy. Prayer was also made by the appellant that in case respondent no. 1 denied that the said manuscript had been written by him, the Photostat copy might be got examined from a handwriting expert. The appellant also filed affidavit in support of his applications. It was however, nowhere stated in the affidavit that the original document of which the Photostat copy had been filed by the appellant was in the possession of Respondent No. 1. There was also no other material on the record to indicate the original document was in the possession of respondent no.1. The appellant further failed to explain as to what were the circumstances under which the Photostat copy was prepared and who was in possession of the original document at the time its photograph was taken. Respondent No. 1 in his affidavit denied being in possession appeared to the High Court to be not above suspicion. In view of all the circumstances, the High Court came to the conclusion that no foundation had been laid by the appellant for leading secondary evidence in the shape of the Photostat copy. We find no infirmity in the above order of the High Court as might justify interference by this Court.” 7. The instant case may be examined on the anvil of the decision cited supra. 8. There is no whisper in the plaint that the plaintiffs entered in to an agreement for sale of the suit schedule property with the defendant no.1 on 13.3.2007. It is pleaded that an agreement was executed between the plaintiffs and defendant no.1 on 13.3.2007 by which the plaintiffs had granted exclusive right of development to the later over the suit land. It is pleaded that an agreement was executed between the plaintiffs and defendant no.1 on 13.3.2007 by which the plaintiffs had granted exclusive right of development to the later over the suit land. The defendants assert that the agreement for sale dated 13.3.2007 has not seen the light of the day. The same is a fabricated one and has been manufactured for the purpose of this case. The so-called agreement dated 13.3.2007 is not an agreement for sale. In view of the same, the conditions enumerated in clause (a) of Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act have not been satisfied. No foundation has been laid by the plaintiffs to lead the secondary evidence. 9. In the wake of the aforesaid, the order dated 11.7.2016 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Sr.Division), Bhubaneswar C.S.No.688 of 2008 is quashed. The petition is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.