State of U. P. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Haridwar
2017-01-12
RAJIV SHARMA
body2017
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : Rajiv Sharma, J. This petition is instituted against the award dated 09.10.2009, rendered by learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Haridwar in Adjudication Case No.06 of 2009 (old adjudication No.80 of 2004). 2. Key facts, necessary for adjudication of this petition, are that the respondent No.2 was engaged as Beldar with the petitioners’ department on 03.05.1991. He was retrenched on 02.05.1992. Respondent No.2 raised an industrial dispute. Thereafter, the dispute was referred for adjudication before learned Labour Court, Haridwar by the State Government. The workman/respondent No.2 filed a claim petition under the U.P. Industrial Dispute Act, 1947. The employer/petitioners filed the written statement in the matter. The case of the workman before the learned Labour Court was that he had worked with the employer/petitioners and completed 240 days in a calendar year. The learned Labour Court passed an award dated 09.10.2009 whereby it was held that the retrenchment of workman from service was illegal and in violation of provisions of Section 6-N of U.P. Industrial Disputes Act and declared him to be in service throughout but without any back wages. Hence, the present writ petition. 3. Smt. Beena Pandey, learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of State of U.P./petitioners has vehemently argued that workman has raised industrial dispute belatedly. She also argued that employer has never retrenched the service of the respondent No.2, rather he himself had abandoned the job. However, the fact of the matter is that the employer/petitioners had not challenged the reference made by the State Government. Moreover, the question of delay can be seen at the time of moulding the relief. 4. Mr. Pankaj Miglani, Advocate appearing on behalf of workman/respondent No.2 supported the award dated 09.10.2009 passed by learned Labour Court, Haridwar. Workman also categorically deposed that he had completed more than 240 days but the employer has not taken into consideration the Sundays and paid holidays. He has completed 240 days by adding Sundays and paid holidays. Moreover, the employer has not led any evidence to rebut the evidence led by the workman. 5.
Workman also categorically deposed that he had completed more than 240 days but the employer has not taken into consideration the Sundays and paid holidays. He has completed 240 days by adding Sundays and paid holidays. Moreover, the employer has not led any evidence to rebut the evidence led by the workman. 5. The Workman has also relied upon the proviso of Rule 12(9) of the U.P. Industrial Rules, 1957 which is as under :- “Rule 12(9) – If the affidavit accompanying the written statement of the union or the workman is not rebutted by the employers, the Labour Court or the Tribunal, as the case may be, shall presume the contents of the affidavit to be true and make an award accepting the facts stated in the written statement.” 6. It is settled law that all the Sundays and paid holidays are to be taken into consideration for the purpose of calculating the number of days on which the employee actually worked. He has also placed reliance upon AIR 1986 SC 458 (Workman of American Expresses International Banking Corporation Vs. Management of American Express International Banking Corporation). 7. The question of abandonment is required to be proved like any other fact, as held by their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in AIR 1979 SC 582 in the case of “G.T. Lad & others vs. Chemicals and Fibres India Ltd”, as under :- “6. From the connotations reproduced above it clearly follows that to constitute abandonment, there must be total or complete giving up of duties so as to indicate an intention not to resume the same. In Buckingham Co. v. Venkatiah and Ors. : (1964)4 SCR 265 : ( AIR 1964 SC 1272 ) it was observed by this Court that under common law an inference that an employee has abandoned or relinquished service is not easily drawn unless from the length of absence and from other surrounding circumstances an inference to that effect can be legitimately drawn and it can be assumed that the employee intended to abandon service. Abandonment or relinquishment of service is always a question of intention, and normally, such an intention cannot be attributed to an employee without adequate evidence in that behalf.
Abandonment or relinquishment of service is always a question of intention, and normally, such an intention cannot be attributed to an employee without adequate evidence in that behalf. Thus, whether there has been a voluntary abandonment of service or not is a question of fact which has to be determined in the light of the surrounding circumstances of each case. Re.-Question No. 2: This takes us to the consideration of the second question, namely, whether in the circumstances of the instant case, it could be said that the appellants had voluntarily abandoned the service of the Company. It may be recalled that the appellants had along with 229 other workmen gone on indefinite and peaceful strike which ended on October 22, 1972) in response to the strike notice given by the union to the Company to press its demand for re-instatement of its three dismissed leaders and had not only by their letters dated September 21, 1972 and September 26, 1972 unequivocally intimated to the Company that they did not intend to abandon the service but had also returned the cheques sent to them by the Company on account of their leave salary gratuity etc. The appellants stand that the letter of the Company dated September 7, 1972 was received by them on September 20, 1972 and not earlier was never denied or refuted by the Company in the correspondence that passed between the parties. Thus, there was nothing in the surrounding circumstances or the conduct of the appellants indicating or suggesting an intention on their part to abandon service which in view of the ratio of Gopal Chandra Misra’s case (1978) 2 SCC 301 : ( AIR 1978 SC 548 ), can be legitimately said to mean to detach, unfasten, undo or untie the binding knot or link which holds one to the office and the obligations and privileges that go with it. Their absence from duty was purely temporary and could by no stretch of imagination be construed as voluntary abandonment by them of the Company’s service. In Express Newspaper (P) Limited v. Michael Mark (1963) 3 SCR 405 : ( AIR 1963 SC 1141 ) which is on all fours with the present case, it was held that if the employees absent themselves from the work because of strike in enforcement of their demands, there can be no question of abandonment of employment by them.
In Express Newspaper (P) Limited v. Michael Mark (1963) 3 SCR 405 : ( AIR 1963 SC 1141 ) which is on all fours with the present case, it was held that if the employees absent themselves from the work because of strike in enforcement of their demands, there can be no question of abandonment of employment by them. In the present case also the appellant’s absence from duty was because of their peaceful strike to enforce their demand. Accordingly, we are of the view that there was no abandonment of service on the part of the appellants. Re.-Question No. 3: Let us now advert to the last but the most crucial question, namely, whether the action of the Company in removing the names of the appellants from its rolls during the pendency of the proceedings before the Labour Court in respect of the industrial dispute on the presumption that they had abandoned Company’s service constituted an alteration in the conditions of service applicable to them immediately before the commencement of the said proceedings which pre-judiciously affected them. Although the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent has taken us through the certified standing orders as applicable to the appellants, he has not been able to point out anything therein to indicate that the company could terminate the services of the appellants on the ground of abandonment of service because of their going on strike in enforcement of their demands. Thus, their being no provision in the certified standing orders by virtue of which the Company would have terminated the services of the appellants in the aforesaid circumstances, the impugned action on the part of the Company clearly amounted to a change in the condition of service of the appellants during the admitted pendency of the industrial dispute before the Labour Court which adversely affected them and could not be countenanced. We are fortified in this view by the aforesaid decision of this Court in Express Newspapers (P) Limited v. Michael Mark and Anr. (Supra) where repelling an identical contention to the effect that the failure of the workmen to return to work by a notified date clearly implied abandonment of their employment, it was held that the management cannot by imposing a new term of employment unilaterally convert the absence of work into abandonment of employment.
(Supra) where repelling an identical contention to the effect that the failure of the workmen to return to work by a notified date clearly implied abandonment of their employment, it was held that the management cannot by imposing a new term of employment unilaterally convert the absence of work into abandonment of employment. It was further held in that decision that if the strike was in fact illegal, the management could take disciplinary action against the employees under the standing orders and dismiss them. If that were done, the strikers would not have been entitled to any compensation under standing orders but that was not what the appellants purported to do and the respondents were, therefore, entitled to relief.” 8. Since the workman had completed 240 days at the time of his retrenchment, the employer was required to issue a notice and pay the compensation under Section 6-N of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Dispute Act, 1947. Since, the employer has not complied with Section 6-N of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Dispute Act, 1947, the retrenchment of the workman/respondent No. 2 was void ab initio, hence the workman was entitled for reinstatement. 9. Smt. Beena Pandey, learned Standing Counsel for the State, has also argued that there is delay in raising the industrial dispute. However, the fact of the matter is that the employer/petitioners had not challenged the reference made by the State Government to the Labour Court. Moreover, the question of delay can be seen at the time of moulding the relief. 10. Learned Labour court has correctly appreciated evidence as well as law while declaring the retrenchment of the workman as void ab initio. 11. Accordingly, there is no merit in the petition and the same is hereby dismissed.