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Gauhati High Court · body

2017 DIGILAW 400 (GAU)

New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Biju Devi

2017-03-29

KALYAN RAI SURANA

body2017
JUDGMENT AND ORDER : Heard Mr. R.K. Bhatra, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. J. Mollah, the learned counsel for the Respondents No.1 and 3 and Mr. V.K. Boruah, the learned counsel for the Respondent No.4. None appears on call for the Respondent No.6. The name of the Respondent No.5 and Respondent No.2 have been struck-off by order dated 21.11.2016 and 20.01.2017 respectively. 2. All these 5 matters are connected cases, which arise out of the same accident involving the same vehicle. In MC 1619/13, the appeal is filed 246 days beyond the period of limitation. In MC 1617/2013, the appeal is filed 260 days beyond the period of limitation. In MC 1658/13, the appeal is filed 261 days beyond the period of limitation. In MC 1603/13, the appeal is filed 246 days beyond the period of limitation. In MC 1562/13, the appeal is filed 256 days beyond the period of limitation. The relevant dates are same and the explanations for the delay are also similar in all cases. All these applications are all filed by the same petitioner. Hence, all the applications are taken up together. 3. By filing these applications under Second Proviso to Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 read with section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the petitioner has prayed for condoning the herein before mentioned delay beyond the period of limitation in filing the connected MAC Appeal. 4. The learned counsel for all the parties are ad-idem at the Bar that all the relevant dates (except one or two) are common in all the said cases. Hence, the relevant dates referred herein below in this order are from MC 1619/13. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner by referring to the statements made in the said application i.e. MC 1619/13 as well as the affidavit for placing additional facts dated 25.03.2014, has submitted that although the impugned judgment and award was passed on 26.03.2012, but the counsel for the petitioner came to know about it on 02.04.2012 and on the same date, he applied for the certified copy. The certified copy was ready on 04.04.2012, but the same was collected on 26.04.2012. However, the said copy was furnished to the petitioner only on 28.05.2012, but as it was not accompanied with his opinion, he was asked to give his opinion. The learned counsel conducting the case gave his opinion on 11.06.2012. The certified copy was ready on 04.04.2012, but the same was collected on 26.04.2012. However, the said copy was furnished to the petitioner only on 28.05.2012, but as it was not accompanied with his opinion, he was asked to give his opinion. The learned counsel conducting the case gave his opinion on 11.06.2012. On receiving the same, the matter was deliberated and as no decision could be taken, the matter was referred to another of their panel counsel for opinion on 14.06.2012, which was received on the same day. The Regional Office required copies of deposition of the witness before taking a decision and, as such, a request for the same was made on 10.07.2012, but being unable to procure the same as the files could not be traced out in the office of the learned Tribunal, the conducting counsel by his letter dated 21.11.2012, informed about his inability to get the same. Thus, on 19.12.2012, the matter was placed for approval of the Chief Regional Manager, and the same was granted on 21.12.2012. However, as there were five connected appeals to be filed arising out of the same accident, the office took some time to prepare the files to be sent to their counsel. However, due to Bihu Vacation of the High Court, the files could be handed over to their counsel only on 18.01.2013 and their counsel took about 60 days time to prepare and file the appeal. The requisite statutory deposits were provided on 18.03.2013 and the connected appeal was filed on 20.03.2013. The copies of relevant correspondences have been annexed by the petitioner in their additional affidavit. 6. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents No.1 and 2/ Claimants vehemently opposed the said prayer and submitted that the additional affidavit was filed only to cover up the deficiencies that were exposed by their Affidavit-in-opposition filed on 10.02.2014 and, as such, the affidavit is required to be ignored. He strenuously argued to project that there was delay and laches at every stage of handling the matter and the explanation was absolutely vague. In order to buttress his stand, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the following case citations:- a. Popat Bahiru Govardhane & ors. V. Special Land Acquisition Officer & anr., (2013) 10 SCC 765 . b. Amalendu Kumar Bera & ors. V. State of West Bengal, (2013) 4 SCC 52 . In order to buttress his stand, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the following case citations:- a. Popat Bahiru Govardhane & ors. V. Special Land Acquisition Officer & anr., (2013) 10 SCC 765 . b. Amalendu Kumar Bera & ors. V. State of West Bengal, (2013) 4 SCC 52 . c. Maniben Devraj Shah V. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, ( 2012 5 SCC 157 . d. P.K. Ramachandran V. State of Kerela, (1997) 7 SCC 556 . e. The State of W.B. V. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality, AIR 1972 SC 749 . f. State of Mizoram & anr. V. V.S. Pillai & anr, (2006) 2 GLR 640 (DB). g. State of Assam & ors. V. S. Rai, 2004 (1) GLT 344 (DB). 7. In the case of Popat Bahiru Govardhane (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court was dealing with the issue that whether the provisions of Limitation Act was applicable before the Land Acquisition Officer and it was held that the provisions of Limitation Act applied to courts and not to quasi judicial authorities, as such, the said decision does not help to supplement the argument made by the learned counsel for the respondents No.1 and 2. In the case of Amalendu Kumar Bera (supra), the delay was of 13 months after the applications under section 47 was dismissed on the second occasion and no sufficient cause was shown and, as such, the appeal was allowed and order condoning the delay was set aside. In the case of Maniben Devraj Shah (supra), the delay was 7 years 108 days and the explanation was found to be non- specific and conspicuously remaining absent about dates, events, persons involved in causing delay, etc. Hence, the appeal was allowed and order condoning the delay was set aside. In the case of P.K. Ramachandran (supra), there was a delay of 565 days and in that case the limitation was condoned by the court without recording its satisfaction and, as such, the appeal was allowed and order condoning the delay was set aside. In the Case of The State of W.B. (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court had allowed the appeal by condoning the delay of 1 year 7 months 22 days. In the Case of The State of W.B. (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court had allowed the appeal by condoning the delay of 1 year 7 months 22 days. In the case of State of Mizoram (supra), the explanation was vague as it was mentioned that during the period from 19.11.2004 to 07.02.2005, there were 50 working days with 31 Gazetted holidays, while explaining 103 days delay, but it is not so in the present case in hand, where references to specific dates has been mentioned. In the case of State of Assam & ors. (supra), the delay was of 312 days and no proper explanation of delay was made. Moreover, the order appears to be an interlocutory order, directing the Inspector General Of Police (Administration) to conduct an enquiry against the officers involved in filing of appeal and no decision was given as to whether the delay was condoned or not. Hence, it does not lay down any ratio in the matter of condoning delay. 8. Thus, the present case in hands is distinguishable on facts as against the facts involved the cases cited above. From explanation as narrated hereinbefore, the petitioner is found to have provided the relevant dates and have also annexed the relevant correspondence in their additional affidavit. The explanation are not found to be vague or bereft of material particulars. Thus, none of the cases referred by the learned counsel for the respondents No.1 and 2 come to the aid of the said respondents. Hence, the causes shown are acceptable to this court as good and sufficient cause which prevented the petitioner from filing the connected appeal on time. Hence, the said delay of 246 days, beyond the period of limitation is hereby condoned. 9. Consequently, the present application i.e. MC 1619/13 is allowed. 10. As stated herein above, in MC 1617/2013, the appeal is filed 260 days beyond the period of limitation. In MC 1658/13, the appeal is filed 261 days beyond the period of limitation. In MC 1603/13, the appeal is filed 246 days beyond the period of limitation. In MC 1562/13, the appeal is filed 256 days beyond the period of limitation. Hence, all the said applications, which are taken up together, stand allowed for reasons as stated above. 11. In MC 1658/13, the appeal is filed 261 days beyond the period of limitation. In MC 1603/13, the appeal is filed 246 days beyond the period of limitation. In MC 1562/13, the appeal is filed 256 days beyond the period of limitation. Hence, all the said applications, which are taken up together, stand allowed for reasons as stated above. 11. The Registry may now register all the connected appeal and list the same in admission column and while doing so the names of the learned counsels appearing for the contesting parties shall be shown in the causelist.