JUDGMENT & ORDER : In this writ petition, the petitioner is questioning the legality of the order dated 11-5-2012 issued by the Under Secretary to the Government of Tripura, Law Department under Section 10(d) of the Notaries Act, 1952 (“the Act”) removing his name as Notary Public from the Register of Notaries with immediate effect. 2. Shorn of unnecessary details, the case of the petitioner is that he was appointed as Notary Public for the Teliamura Sub-Division by the State Government in terms of the Certificate of practice dated 18-12-2008 issued by the Law Secretary, Government of Tripura for a period of 5 years. Some complaints of misconduct by the petitioner were made by one Biman Ranjan Dhar Choudhury and 8 others, Ratan Sarkar, Dilip Kumar Sarkar with respect to his functioning as Notary Public on grounds on different dates. The allegations pertained to carrying on unlawful activities such as preparation of false affidavits. Initially, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate was directed to enquire into such allegations. The inquiries were actually conducted by the Sub-Deputy Collector-cum-Magistrate, Teliamura Revenue Circle by requiring the petitioner to appear before her with all documents relating to his professional duties. After recording evidence by the Sub-Deputy Collector-cum-Magistrate, she submitted her enquiry report to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Teliamura, Khowai by making adverse findings against the petitioner. In the meantime, the Under Secretary, Law issued the Notice dated 24-2-2012 upon the petitioner by forwarding a copy of the complaint lodged by one Dilip Kumar Sarkar and asking him to submit his written statement to the Department within 14 days. The petitioner accordingly submitted his written statement denying the allegations made against him and claiming his innocence. One thing led to another and ultimately, the Under Secretary, Law Department issued the Notice dated 3-4-2012 taking cognizance of the complaint of the said Dilip Kumar Sarkar with respect to his complaint dated 16-2-2012 and decided to cause an inquiry against the petitioner. The Notice further mentioned that in the course of inquiry, witnesses would be examined and oral and documentary evidence received. The petitioner was accordingly asked to appear before the competent authority on 7-4-2012 at 4.30 PM with all the evidence he had. The oral evidence of the said Dilip Kumar Sarkar and the Sub-Deputy Collector-cum-Magistrate, Teliamura Revenue Circle were recorded. It was on 11-5-2012, the impugned order was issued by the Under Secretary, Law Department. The petitioner was accordingly asked to appear before the competent authority on 7-4-2012 at 4.30 PM with all the evidence he had. The oral evidence of the said Dilip Kumar Sarkar and the Sub-Deputy Collector-cum-Magistrate, Teliamura Revenue Circle were recorded. It was on 11-5-2012, the impugned order was issued by the Under Secretary, Law Department. In the meantime, it may be noted that the said Dilip Kumar Sarkar also lodged a complaint against the petitioner before the erstwhile Bar Council of Assam, Nagaland, Meghalaya, Manipur, Tripura, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh. The Bar Council issued the order dated 18-1-2014 of D.C. No. 28 of 2012 inflicted the punishment of removal of his name from the roll of Advocates maintained by it. The appeal preferred by the petitioner before the Bar Council of India resulted in setting aside the said order and in remanding the case to the Bar Council of Assam, etc. to decide the same afresh, and the same is still pending. The main contention of the petitioner is that the impugned order is stigmatic, arbitrary and illegal. He, therefore, filed this writ petition for quashing the inquiry report dated 24-2-2012 of the Sub-Deputy Collector cum Magistrate and the impugned order removing his name from the Register of Notaries. 3. While contesting the writ petition, the State-respondents, in their affidavit-in-opposition, admitted that the petitioner was appointed as Notary Public for Teliamura Sub-Division, but denied that he was sincerely and honestly working in that capacity. It is asserted that after his appointment, one allegation after another were received by the Law Department, while some news items against him also appeared in the local daily and that on 16-2-2012, one complaint was received by the Law Department from one Dilip Sarkar annexed with some copies of affidavits with official seal and signature of the Notary Public but without the name and signature of the deponent/declarant. The petitioner did not mention the reason for having enmity with the Gautam Debnath, who was also an Advocate by profession. He also did not mention the reason as to why the said Biman Ranjan Dhar Choudhury, eight others and one Ratan Sarkar made complaints against him. The petitioner did not mention the reason for having enmity with the Gautam Debnath, who was also an Advocate by profession. He also did not mention the reason as to why the said Biman Ranjan Dhar Choudhury, eight others and one Ratan Sarkar made complaints against him. Before initiating formal inquiry, the SDM, Teliamura was asked to conduct an inquiry on the said allegations with a view to ascertain the genuineness of the same as well as to identify the complainants, and the petitioner was requested to appear before the Sub-Deputy Collector-cum-Magistrate, Teliamura Revenue Circle. It is further averred by the answering respondents that in compliance with Rule 13 of the Notaries Rules, 1956 (“the Rules” for short), the petitioner was sent a copy of the complaint together with its enclosures requiring him to submit his written statement of defense within 14 days. After perusing the written statement of the petitioners and other materials on record, the respondent authorities found a prima facie case against him and accordingly caused an inquiry to be conducted by the Law Secretary; the petitioner, the complainants and witnesses were asked to appear in person before the competent authority on 7-4-2012, which was adjourned to 18-4-2012 to enable all the parties and witnesses to participate in the hearing. The inquiry was initiated ultimately confined to the complaint of Dilip Kumar Sarkar and the same was conducted by the competent authority in accordance with the Rules. After the inquiry, the competent authority submitted his report. It is denied that reasonable opportunity was not given to the petitioner to defend himself; he was heard at length, was allowed to adduce documents/evidence in support of his defence and was given the scope to cross-examine the complainant and other witnesses. Therefore, there is no infirmity in the inquiry proceedings as well as the impugned order, which was passed after following the procedures prescribed by the Act and the rules made thereunder. It is pointed out that the petitioner is an Advocate having not less than 10 years of practice and, being a legal practitioner, is expected to know the procedures prescribed. He should not have kept affidavits/declarations, which are signed and sealed by him without the signatures of the deponents, in his custody; normal presumption being those unexecuted affidavits would be used for some illegal purposes. He should not have kept affidavits/declarations, which are signed and sealed by him without the signatures of the deponents, in his custody; normal presumption being those unexecuted affidavits would be used for some illegal purposes. As he was found grossly negligent and irresponsible in his discharging his Notarial functions, his name was removed from the Register of Notaries. These are the principal contentions of the State-respondents. The respondent No. 4, who is the main complainant, also filed his affidavit which endorsed the stance taken by the state-respondents in their affidavit and the same, for the sake of brevity, need not be reproduced. 4. To appreciate the rival contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, it will be useful to straightaway refer to the important provisions of the Act. “10. Removal of names from Register.—The Government appointing any notary may, by order, remove from the Register maintained by it under Section 4, the name of the notary if he— (a) makes a request to that effect; or (b) has not paid any prescribed fee required to be paid by him; or (c) is an undischarged insolvent; or (d) has been found, upon inquiry in the prescribed manner, to be guilty of such professional or other misconduct as, in the opinion of the Government, renders him unfit to practise as a notary; or (e) is convicted by any court for an offence involving moral turpitude; or (f) does not get his certificate of practice renewed. 5. Rule 13 of the said Rules contemplates the procedure to be followed before removing the name of the notary in the Register of Notaries maintained by the Government. Under sub-rule (1) of Rule 13, the appropriate Government may initiate enquiry into the misconduct of a notary either suo motu or on a complaint received in Form-XIII. We are concerned in this writ petition with the initiation of the action taken by the Government on the complaint of the respondent No. 4. When an enquiry is initiated by the appropriate Government, the appropriate Government under Rule 13 of the Rules shall send to the notary a statement specifying the charge or charges against him together with particulars of the oral and documentary evidence relied upon in support of such charge or charges. When an enquiry is initiated by the appropriate Government, the appropriate Government under Rule 13 of the Rules shall send to the notary a statement specifying the charge or charges against him together with particulars of the oral and documentary evidence relied upon in support of such charge or charges. Sub-rule (6) contemplates that on perusal of the written statement, if any, of the notary concerned and other relevant documents and papers, the appropriate Government considers that there is prima facie case against such notary, the appropriate Government shall cause an inquiry to be made in the matter by the competent authority. If the appropriate Government is of the opinion that there is no prima facie case against the notary concerned, the complaint shall be filed and the complainant and the notary concerned shall be informed accordingly. Sub-rule (7) postulates that every notice issued to a notary under this rule shall be sent to him by registered post with acknowledgment due. If any such notice is refused, the notice shall be deemed to have been served. If the notice is returned with an endorsement indicating that the addressee cannot be found at the address given, the appropriate Government shall, if the inquiry was initiated on complaint, ask the complainant to supply to it the correct address of the notary. A fresh notice shall be served upon the notary at the address so supplied. Sub-rule (8) says that it shall be duty of the appropriate Government to place before the competent authority all facts brought to its knowledge which are relevant for the purpose of an inquiry by the competent authority. Sub-rule (9) provides that a notary shall have a right to defend himself before the competent authority either in person or through a legal practitioner or any other notary. Sub-rule (10) says that the competent authority shall have the power to regulate his procedure relating to the inquiry in such manner as he considers necessary and during the course of inquiry, may examine witnesses and receive any other oral or documentary evidence. Sub-rule 12(a) provides that the appropriate Government shall consider the report of the competent authority, and if in its opinion a further inquiry is necessary, may cause such further inquiry to be made and a further report submitted by the competent authority. Sub-rule 12(a) provides that the appropriate Government shall consider the report of the competent authority, and if in its opinion a further inquiry is necessary, may cause such further inquiry to be made and a further report submitted by the competent authority. After considering the report of the competent authority the appropriate Government is of the opinion that action should be taken against the notary, the appropriate Government may make an order- (i) cancelling the certificate of practice and perpetually debarring the notary from practice, or (ii) suspending him from practice for a specified period, or (iii) letting him off with a warning, according to the nature and gravity to the misconduct of the notary proved. Sub-rule (13) provides for issuance of the Notification of removal. The removal of the name of any notary from the Register of Notaries or his suspension from practice, as the case may be, shall be notified in the Official Gazette and shall also be communicated in writing to the notary concerned. 6. Thus, even a cursory look at Rule 13 will show that a full-fledged enquiry has to be conducted before initiating any action by the appropriate Government on suo motu or on the basis of the complaint. It is forcefully submitted by Mr. P. Roy Barman, the learned counsel for the petitioner, that it is a well settled proposition of law that any administrative action having civil consequences can be taken against an individual only after affording him reasonable opportunity, which must include not only personal hearing but also the right to cross-examine witnesses produced by the other side. According to the learned counsel, though sub-rule (10) of Rule 13 does not expressly say so, it can be reasonably said that the conferment of the right to defend confers upon the individual, by necessary implication, the right to cross examine such witnesses as may be produced by his adversary as otherwise such right will only be rendered illusory. He contends that in the instant case, the petitioner was never given any right to cross examine the complainant or the other witnesses examined by the Department before issuing the impugned order. He contends that in the instant case, the petitioner was never given any right to cross examine the complainant or the other witnesses examined by the Department before issuing the impugned order. It is also his contention that the impugned order is also illegal as it is not issued by the competent authority since the same was issued by the Under Secretary to the Government, Law Department; the competent authority to issue the removal order is the Secretary to Government of Tripura. He, therefore, submits that the impugned order is liable to be quashed for this reason alone. Mrs. A.S. Lodh, the learned State counsel, however, supports the impugned order and submits that the inquiry was initiated by the competent authority in accordance with Rule 13 of the Rules on the complaint lodged by the said Dilip Kumar Sarkar, who conducted the inquiry according to the provisions of Rule 13 of the Rules and submitted his report after concluding the inquiry. She contends that the petitioner was reasonable opportunity to defend himself and he never asked an opportunity to cross-examine the complainant and his witnesses even though he is an expert in law; no prejudice could possibly be caused to him when he himself never sought for cross-examining the witnesses. She, therefore, submits that the impugned order or the enquiry report submitted by the Sub-Deputy Collector-cum-Magistrate does not suffer from any infirmity warranting the interference of this Court. 7. I have carefully gone through the record produced by the learned State counsel, and perusal of the record reveals that in the Notice dated 3-4-2012, the receipt whereof the petitioner admitted, the State-respondents informed him that he had “the right to defend himself before the Competent Authority (L.R & Secretary, Law) through a Legal Practitioner or any other Notary”. The record also reveals that no application was made by the petitioner in the course of inquiry that he would like to cross-examine the complainant or the witnesses. His evidence was taken on 18-4-2012. What is now as clear as daylight that though he participated in the inquiry, he never engaged any legal practitioner to defend him and that he never complained of denial of right to cross-examine the witnesses though he was apparently aware of the recording the statements of witnesses deposing against him. His evidence was taken on 18-4-2012. What is now as clear as daylight that though he participated in the inquiry, he never engaged any legal practitioner to defend him and that he never complained of denial of right to cross-examine the witnesses though he was apparently aware of the recording the statements of witnesses deposing against him. That apart, he himself is a legal practitioner who could be said to be reasonably capable of understanding the consequence of the failure to cross-examine the witnesses deposing against him. It cannot also be lost sight of the glaring fact that it took the petitioner about two years to challenge the impugned order even though he is a legal practitioner who is deemed to be well conversant with the law of laches. Perhaps, this reinforces the submission made by Mr. D.K. Biswas, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 4, who stated that it was only after his bar licence was cancelled by the Bar Council of Assam, etc. that he, like Rip Van Winkle, woke up from his slumber and suddenly decided that the removal of his name from the Register of Notaries would also affect his continuance as a legal practitioner. He was apparently not so much bothered about his removal from the Register of Notary Public as the prospect of losing his membership in the Bar. It is now too late in the day for him to make a grievance against the alleged denial of the right to cross-examine the witness when no complaint of prejudice was apparently made by him at the time the impugned order was passed. In my opinion, it can be stated that when there is an oral hearing, and witnesses are examined against a person, the person concerned may demand a right to cross-examine witnesses. If he demands such a right and the same is refused to him, it may amount to violation of principles of natural justice. The principles have been, with due respect, lucidly explained by the Apex Court in K.L. Tripathi v. State Bank of India and others, (1984) 1 SCC 43 in the following manner : “31. Wade in his Administrative Law, 5th Edn. at pages 472-475 has observed that it is not possible to lay down rigid rules as to when the principles of natural justice are to apply: nor as to their scope and extent. Wade in his Administrative Law, 5th Edn. at pages 472-475 has observed that it is not possible to lay down rigid rules as to when the principles of natural justice are to apply: nor as to their scope and extent. Everything depends on the subject-matter, the application of principles of natural justice, resting as it does upon statutory implication, must always be in conformity with the scheme of the Act and with the subject-matter of the case. In the application of the concept of fair play there must be real flexibility. There must also have been some real prejudice to the complainant; there is no such thing as a merely technical infringement of natural justice. The requirements of natural justice must depend on the facts and the circumstances of the case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject-matter to be dealt with, and so forth. 32. The basic concept is fair play in action administrative, judicial or quasi-judicial. The concept of fair play in action must depend upon the particular lis, if there be any, between the parties. If the credibility of a person who has testified or given some information is in doubt, or if the version or the statement of the person who has testified, is, in dispute, right of cross-examination must inevitable form part of fair play in action but where there is no lis regarding the facts but certain explanation of the circumstances there is no requirement of cross-examination to be fulfilled to justify fair play in action. When on the question of facts there was no dispute, no real prejudice has been caused to a party aggrieved by an order, by absence of any formal opportunity of cross-examination per se does not invalidate or vitiate the decision arrived at fairly. This is more so when the party against whom an order has been passed does not dispute the facts and does not demand to test the veracity of the version or the credibility of the statement. 33. The party who does not want to controvert the veracity of the evidence from record or testimony gathered behind his back cannot expect to succeed in any subsequent demand that there was no opportunity of cross-examination specially when it was not asked for and there was no dispute about the veracity of the statements. 33. The party who does not want to controvert the veracity of the evidence from record or testimony gathered behind his back cannot expect to succeed in any subsequent demand that there was no opportunity of cross-examination specially when it was not asked for and there was no dispute about the veracity of the statements. Where there is no dispute as to the facts, or the weight to be attached on disputed facts but only an explanation of the acts, absence of opportunity to cross-examination does not create any prejudice in such cases.” 8. Thus, ultimately, the paramount consideration is whether any prejudice has been caused to a party in the event of denying the right to cross-examine the witnesses produced by the opposite party. If no prejudice is caused to him by denial of such right, the interference of courts will not be justified. In this context, it will be beneficial to quote from the decision of the Apex Court in A.S. Motors (P) Ltd. v. Union of India and others, (2013) 10 SCC 114 , which is as follows : “8. Rules of natural justice, it is by now fairly well settled, are not rigid, immutable or embodied rules that may be capable of being put in straitjacket nor have the same been so evolved as to apply universally to all kind of domestic tribunals and enquiries. What the courts in essence look for in every case where violation of the principles of natural justice is alleged is whether the affected party was given reasonable opportunity to present its case and whether the administrative authority had acted fairly, impartially and reasonably. The doctrine of audi alteram partem is thus aimed at striking at arbitrariness and want of fair play. Judicial pronouncements on the subject have, therefore, recognised that the demands of natural justice may be different in different situations depending upon not only the facts and circumstances of each case but also on the powers and composition of the tribunal and the rules and regulations under which it functions. A court examining a complaint based on violation of rules of natural justice is entitled to see whether the aggrieved party had indeed suffered any prejudice on account of such violation. To that extent there has been a shift from the earlier thought that even a technical infringement of the rules is sufficient to vitiate the action. A court examining a complaint based on violation of rules of natural justice is entitled to see whether the aggrieved party had indeed suffered any prejudice on account of such violation. To that extent there has been a shift from the earlier thought that even a technical infringement of the rules is sufficient to vitiate the action. Judicial pronouncements on the subject are legion. We may refer to only some of the decisions on the subject which should in our opinion suffice. 9. I am also tempted to quote from para 14 of the same report, which is in the following terms : 14. We may finally refer to the decision of this Court in Aligarh Muslim University v. Mansoor Ali Khan, (2000) 7 SCC 529 where this Court with approval quoted the following observations of Sir William Wade (Administrative Law, 5th Edn., pp. 472-75) : “24. … ‘31. … it is not possible to lay down rigid rules as to when the principles of natural justice are to apply, nor as to their scope and extent. … There must also have been some real prejudice to the complainant; there is no such thing as a merely technical infringement of natural justice. The requirements of natural justice must depend on the facts and circumstances of the case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject-matter to be dealt with, and so forth.‘*” 10. On the question of the competence of the Under Secretary, Law Department to issue the impugned order, I have no hesitation to observe that the petitioner is unable to make out the difference between the authority taking the decision and the official who communicates the decision. As pointed out by the State-respondents in para 12 of their counter, under Rule 12 of the Rules of Executive Business of the Government of Tripura, 1972 framed under Article 166(2) of the Constitution, the Under Secretary, Law is authorized to sign an order or instrument of the Government of the State. On perusal of the record produced by the learned State counsel, it is evident that the actual decision was taken by none other than the Secretary, Law Department and the Under Secretary merely acted as the channel of communication.—See AP Khadi and Village Industries Board, Hyderabad and others v. R. Radhakrishnamurthy, (1997) 3 SCC 230 . On perusal of the record produced by the learned State counsel, it is evident that the actual decision was taken by none other than the Secretary, Law Department and the Under Secretary merely acted as the channel of communication.—See AP Khadi and Village Industries Board, Hyderabad and others v. R. Radhakrishnamurthy, (1997) 3 SCC 230 . Under the circumstances, there is no infirmity in communicating the impugned order or of issuing the same in the name of the Under Secretary, Law Department, more so, when the impugned decision was actually taken by the Secretary, Law Department. Viewed from all angles, I am of the considered view that the impugned order and the inquiry report do not suffer from any illegality calling for the interference of this Court. 11. The result of the foregoing discussion is that there is no merit in this writ petition, which is, accordingly, dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.