JUDGMENT : U.C. Dhyani, J. 1. Present Second Appeal has been filed by the plaintiff-appellant being aggrieved against the judgment and decree dated 01.10.2015, passed by I Addl. District Judge, Dehradun, in Civil Appeal No. 50 of 2009, Smt. Lata Singh vs. U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad and Others and judgment and decree dated 14.10.2009, passed by III Addl. Civil Judge (Sr. Div.), Dehradun, in O.S. No. 966 of 2001, whereby suit for declaration, mandatory injunction, permanent injunction filed by the plaintiff-appellant has been dismissed and the first appeal arising therefrom has also been dismissed. 2. A perusal of the plaint will show that the plaintiff-appellant has sought following reliefs: “(i) A declaratory relief to the effect that the property in question which has been allotted to the respondent no. 4 by U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad is non est, illegal, unconstitutional, ineffective and has no binding upon the plaintiff. (ii) A decree of mandatory injunction be given in favour of plaintiff-appellant directing the U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad to sell plot no. 46, which is adjoining to the plot no. 47 of the plaintiff-appellant, to be sold to him on the old rates. (iii) A direction be given to the effect that plot no. 46 be given to plaintiff only and be not sold or allotted to anyone else except the plaintiff. 3. Plaintiff-appellant filed a suit for permanent prohibitory injunction against Avas Evam Vikas Parishad from allotting plot no. 46 in favour of anyone and for mandatory injunction directing the Parishad to allot the same in favour of plaintiff at the old rates. 4. During pendency of suit, Avas Evam Vikas Praishad allotted the said plot in favour of Anil Tyagi and, therefore, an amendment was carried out in the plaint seeking quashing of allotment in favour of Anil Tyagi, who was impleaded as defendant. 5. Anil Tyagi filed a counterclaim, seeking a relief for injunction against the plaintiff from interfering in his possession. 6. The trial court dismissed the suit of plaintiff and decreed the counterclaim of defendant Anil Tyagi. 7. Civil appeal no. 50 of 2009 was filed by plaintiff against dismissal of suit before District Judge, Dehradun. First Appeal no. 15 of 2010 was filed by the plaintiff against decreeing of counterclaim before this Court. 6. The trial court dismissed the suit of plaintiff and decreed the counterclaim of defendant Anil Tyagi. 7. Civil appeal no. 50 of 2009 was filed by plaintiff against dismissal of suit before District Judge, Dehradun. First Appeal no. 15 of 2010 was filed by the plaintiff against decreeing of counterclaim before this Court. Transfer application was filed by Anil Tyagi before this Court seeking transfer of appeal pending before learned District Judge to this Court, but the same stood dismissed in default on 06.05.2013. 8. First Appeal no. 15 of 2010 filed before this Court stood dismissed on merit on 19.03.2013, holding counterclaim rightly decreed and suit rightly dismissed. Special Leave Petition filed by the plaintiff against the same before Hon’ble Apex Court stood dismissed as withdrawn. Review filed against order dated 19.03.2013, stood dismissed on 04.09.2015. Civil Appeal No. 50 of 2009, pending before learned District Judge, Dehradun stood dismissed, vide judgment dated 01.10.2015, passed by learned I Addl. District Judge, Dehradun. The lower appellate court held that the civil appeal is barred by the principle of res judicata, as the appeal filed against the same decree has been dismissed in first appeal no. 15 of 2010 by Hon’ble High Court. 9. It is the submission of plaintiff-appellant that Avas Evam Vikas Parished’s own rules contained a condition that no one, who is already owner of a plot, will be allotted a new plot, hence, allotment could not be made in favour of Anil Tyagi, as he was owner of plot no. 362, of which the allotment was made to him on 27.04.2015. However, he sold plot no. 362 on 19.09.2015, i.e. after allotment of plot no. 46. Thus, according to learned counsel for the appellant, the allotment is against the rules. 10. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant further argued that appellant has a right of pre-emption over the land in suit. Secondly, as stated above, it is argued that defendant no. 4-respondent no. 4 violated the terms and conditions of the allotment rules framed by U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad, wherein one of the condition is that he does not own any other piece of land in the same area, which defendant no. 4 has. [In reply, it is the submission of learned counsel for the private respondent that defendant no. 4-respondent no. 4 violated the terms and conditions of the allotment rules framed by U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad, wherein one of the condition is that he does not own any other piece of land in the same area, which defendant no. 4 has. [In reply, it is the submission of learned counsel for the private respondent that defendant no. 4 had one such plot in the same area, which he subsequently sold.] Thirdly, it is argued that learned lower appellate court has dismissed the civil appeal of the plaintiff-appellant by applying principle of res judicata without entering into the merits of the case. 11. Dealing with the first submission first, this case is essentially a study on right of pre-emption which originated from Mohammedan law. A brief summary of right of pre-emption in India is given here-in-below for the sake of convenience: The right of pre-emption also known as “Shufaa” is a right which the owner of an immovable property possesses to acquire by purchase another immovable property which has been sold to another person. Basically this right is available to one so that a stranger is not introduced in neighbour or the family which may cause a hindrance to one’s privacy. Pre-emption has in some provinces been given by Acts of the Indian Legislature. Right of pre-emption has also been created by contract between the sharers in a village. But in al cases the object is, as far as possible, to prevent strangers to a village from becoming sharers in the village. Right of pre-emption when they exist are valuable rights, and they depend upon a custom or upon a contract. The custom or the contract, as the case may be, must, if disputed, be proved. What was the effect of this? In course of time, pre-emption became adopted by the Hindus as a custom. It was adopted by Islam, in general, to prevent the introduction of a stranger among co-sharers and neighbours likely to cause both inconvenience and vexation. The pre-emption must be the owner of immovable property; (ii) there must be sale of certain property not his own; (iii) the pre-emptor must stand in a certain relationship to the vendor in respect of the property sold. In Agra, under the Agra Pre-emption Act, 1922, and in Oudh, under the Oudh Laws Act, 1876, the statutory law of pre-emption applies to both Muslims and non-Muslims. In Agra, under the Agra Pre-emption Act, 1922, and in Oudh, under the Oudh Laws Act, 1876, the statutory law of pre-emption applies to both Muslims and non-Muslims. In Bihar, Sylhet and certain parts of Gujarat, it was the Muslim law of pre-emption which applies to Hindus except in so far as it was modified by custom. The question whether the right of pre-emption is violative of Article 19(1)(b) of the Constitution of India has come up before Hon’ble Supreme Court in two cases, viz. Bhan Ram vs. Baij Nath, AIR 1962 SC 1976 and Sant Ram vs. Labh Singh, AIR 1965 SC 314 . In one the statutory right of pre-emption and in another the customary right of pre-emption was challenged. Both cases related to the right of pre-emption on the basis of vicinage. In Avadh Behari vs. Gujadhar, AIR 1954 SC 417 , the Supreme Court gave effect to the right of pre-emption based on co-ownership in joint property. In Bishan Singh vs. Khazan Singh, AIR 1958 SC 838 , Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the right of pre-emption is not a right to the thing sold but a right to the offer of a thing about to be sold. This right is called the primary or inherent right. This is a right of pre-emption on the basis of neighbourhood, or the right of the owner of the adjoining immoveable property. Where the parties to a transaction which given rise to a case of pre-emption are governed by different personal laws, it is necessary to lay down the principles upon which the court would act. In India all religions are treated with equality and, therefore, in this branch of the law of principle of reciprocity should be logically applied. Hence, on general principles, it would be unfair to apply the law of pre-emption and to create rights in favour of persons who would not be subject to corresponding obligations. No person is entitled to pre-empt unless he takes proper steps at the proper time and conforms strictly to the necessary formalities. These formalities or ceremonies are known as the Three Demands. The first Demand is taleb-e-muwasabat. The pre-emptor must assert his claim immediately on hearing of the sale, but not before. Witnesses are not necessary, as in the second demand; nor in is any particular form essential. The Second Demand is taleb-e-ishhad. These formalities or ceremonies are known as the Three Demands. The first Demand is taleb-e-muwasabat. The pre-emptor must assert his claim immediately on hearing of the sale, but not before. Witnesses are not necessary, as in the second demand; nor in is any particular form essential. The Second Demand is taleb-e-ishhad. The pre-emptor must, with the least practicable delay, make a second demand. The Third Demand is not really a demand but, is taking legal action and is not always necessary. The object of pre-emption, in the words of Mulla, is “The right of shufaa or pre-emption is a right which the owner of an immoveable property possesses to acquire by purchase another immoveable property which has been sold to another person.” The foundation of the right of pre-emption is the human desire to avoid the inconvenience and disturbance which is likely to be caused by the introduction of a stranger into the land. The Muslim law of pre-emption is to be looked at the light of the Muslim law of succession. Under Muslim law, death of a person results in the division of his property into fractions. If any heir is allowed to dispose of his share without offering it to other co-heirs, then it is likely to lead to the introduction of strangers into a part of the estate with resultant difficulties and inconveniences. In view of this, the law of pre-emption imposes a limitation or disultant difficulties and inconveniences. In view of this the law of pre-emption imposes a limitation or disability upon the ownership of property to the extent that it restricts the owner’s unfettered right of transfer of property and compels him to sell it to his co-heir or neighbour, as the case may be. The person, who is a co-sharer in the property, or owes property in the vicinity, gets an advantage corresponding to the burden with which the owner of the property is saddled, even though it does not amount to an actual interest in the property sold.” 12. Since the suit has been filed essentially on the right of pre-emption, which prima-facie does not exist in favour of the plaintiff-appellant, therefore, first submission of learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant is answered in the negative. 13. Since the suit has been filed essentially on the right of pre-emption, which prima-facie does not exist in favour of the plaintiff-appellant, therefore, first submission of learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant is answered in the negative. 13. If two plots could not be legally kept by Anil Tyagi, it was for the respondent Parishad to cancel the same, but the appellant is hardly benefited by Anil Tyagi’s retaining two plots of Avas Evam Vikas Parishad at one point of time (subsequently the other plot was disposed of by him). Had the appellant been allotted adjoining plot, which is being occupied by Anil Tyagi at the moment, the Avas Evam Vikas Parishad would have committed the same mistake in respect of the appellant as was committed in relation to Anil Tyagi. Had present appellant been allotted two plots, owned by Avas Evam Vikas Parisahd, the same would have been hit by its policy that no one, who is already owner of a plot, will be allotted a new plot. Thus, this argument of learned counsel for the appellant does not help the appellant. 14. It has been held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sri Gangai Vinayagar Temple and Another vs. Meenakshi Ammal and Others, (2015) 3 SCC 624 , that on the issue of applicability of res judicata in cases where two or more suits have been disposed of by one common judgment but separate decrees and where the decree in one suit has been appealed against but no appeal has been filed against the others, the following principles are clear: (i) The phraseology “suit” in Section 11 CPC is not limited to the court of first instance or trial court but encompasses within its domain proceedings before the appellate courts. (ii) Non-applicability of res judicata may lead to inconsistent decrees and conflicting decrees, not only due to multiplicity of decrees but also due to multiplicity of the parities, and thereby, creating confusion as to which decree has to be given effect to in execution. (iii) A decree is valid unless it is a nullity and the same cannot be overruled or interfered with in appellate proceedings initiated against another decree. (iv) The issue of res judicata has to be decided with reference to decree, which are appealable under Section 96 CPC and not with reference to the judgment (which has been defined differently), but with respect to decrees in CPC. (iv) The issue of res judicata has to be decided with reference to decree, which are appealable under Section 96 CPC and not with reference to the judgment (which has been defined differently), but with respect to decrees in CPC. (v) Non-confirmation of a decree in appellate proceedings has no consequence as far as it reaching finality upon elapsing of the limitation period is concerned in view of Explanation II of Section 11 CPC, which provides that the competence of a court shall be determined irrespective of any provisions as to right of appeal from the decision of such court. (vi) Section 11 CPC is not exhaustive of the doctrine of res judicata, which springs up from the general principles of law and public policy. Procedural norms, technicalities and processual law evolve after years of empirical experience, and to ignore them or give them short shift inevitably defeats justice. The raison d'etre and public policy on which res judicata is predicated is that the party who has raised any aspect in a litigation and has had an issue cast thereon, has lead evidence in that regard, and has argued on the point, remains bound by the curial conclusions once they attain finality. No party must be vexed twice for the same cause; it is in the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation; a judicial decision must be accepted as correct in the absence of a challenge. Thus, where a common judgment has been delivered in cases in which consolidation orders have specifically been passed, the filing of a single appeal leads to the entire dispute becoming sub judice once again. Consolidation orders are passed by virtue of a bestowal of inherent powers on the courts by Section 151 CPC. In the instance of suits in which common issues have been framed and a common trial has been conducted, the losing party must file appeals in respect of all adverse decrees founded even on partially adverse or contrary speaking judgments. However, the appeals are not expected to be filed against every judgments. However, the appeals are not expected to be filed against every inconvenient or disagreeable or unpropitious or unfavourable finding or observation contained in a judgment, but this can be done by way of cross-objections if the occasion arises. However, the appeals are not expected to be filed against every judgments. However, the appeals are not expected to be filed against every inconvenient or disagreeable or unpropitious or unfavourable finding or observation contained in a judgment, but this can be done by way of cross-objections if the occasion arises. The decree not assailed thereupon metamorphoses into the character of a “former suit” as occurring in Section 11 CPC. If this is not to be so viewed, it would be possible to set at naught a decree passed in Suit A by only challenging the decree in Suit B. The law considers it an anathema to allow a party to achieve a result indirectly when it has deliberately or negligently failed to directly initiate proceedings towards this purpose. Laws of procedure have picturesquely been referred to as handmaidens to justice, but this does not mean that they can be wantonly ignored because, if so done, a miscarriage of justice inevitably and inexorably ensues. The substantive law and the processual law are two sides of the judicial drachma, each being the obverse of the other. 15. In view of the aforesaid dictum of Hon’ble Apex Court, since the F.A. No. 15 of 2010, against the trial court’s judgment stood dismissed on merits by this Court on 19.03.2013, review there against too has been dismissed and thus the same judgment passed by trial court, which has been confirmed in F.A. No. 15 of 2010 by this Court, could not have been interfered into by the lower appellate court, as has rightly been refused by it. This Court feels that the Civil Appeal No. 50 of 2009 has rightly been dismissed by the lower appellate court as being barred by principle of res judicata. This Court is unable to take a view contrary to what was taken by the court below. 16. Since no substantial question of law arises, therefore, present second appeal is dismissed at the admission stage without formulating any substantial question of law.