JUDGMENT : Mary Joseph, J. 1. This Rent Control Revision filed by the tenant is directed against the judgment dated 23.3.2016 of the Rent Control Appellate Authority, Palakkad in R.C.A.No.4/2014. The R.C.A. was filed by the petitioner/landlord against the order dated 29.01.2014 in R.C.P. No. 31/2012 of the Rent Control Court (Additional Munsiff), Palakkad. The respondent herein is the landlord. 2. For the sake of convenience, the parties to this revision are referred to in accordance with their original status in the R.C.P. as the landlord and the tenant. 3. The R.C.P. was filed before the Rent Control Court, Palakkad by the landlord seeking for an order of eviction of the tenant from the premises rented out and specifically described in the schedule to the said petition, on the grounds under Section 11(2)(b) and 11(4)(iii) of the Kerala Buildings(Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (Act 2 of 1965) (for short 'the Act'). 4. The pleadings of the landlord in the Rent Control Petition are to the following effect:- The petition scheduled property comprised in Door Nos.26/322 and 26/323 was let out to the respondent by the petitioner's father for a monthly rent of Rs.3000/-, agreed by the former to be paid on the first of every month and the defaulted rent arrears with interest at the rate of 12% annually. The tenant kept the rent in arrears from 1.8.1991 and therefore, as per the terms agreed upon he is liable to pay the defaulted arrears of rent with annual interest at the rate of 12% on the same from the date of default. Arrears of rent demanded by the landlord through lawyer notice dated 15.5.2012 was refuted by the tenant in his reply notice sent on 30.5.2012 alleging falsity and frivolousness. The shop rooms bearing Door Nos.40/489, 31/401, 26/315, 26/317, 30/631 and 31/632 were owned by the tenant and different businesses were run by him in those rooms. The said shop rooms are sufficient for the tenant to conduct the vegetable business run by him in the scheduled premises. The landlord refuted the allegations raised by the tenant in his reply notice regarding the terms agreed in the agreement originally executed by the parties and the agreement for sale entered by them subsequently. Accordingly, he pressed for an order of eviction on the twin grounds under Section 11(2)(b) and 11(4)(iii) of the Act. 5. The landlord refuted the allegations raised by the tenant in his reply notice regarding the terms agreed in the agreement originally executed by the parties and the agreement for sale entered by them subsequently. Accordingly, he pressed for an order of eviction on the twin grounds under Section 11(2)(b) and 11(4)(iii) of the Act. 5. The petition was resisted by the tenant refuting the averments of the landlord as false and raising contentions that the buildings referred to as owned by him are not in his possession or enjoyment, that the petition scheduled premises occupied by him comprised of two portions with 26/322 as the door number, that the premise was mortgaged to him by the landlord and his mother for a sum of Rs.35,000/- with 3% interest agreed as payable annually on the said sum,, that the interest on payment was agreed to be appropriated towards monthly rent, that an agreement was entered among the landlord, his mother Sarojini and sister Remadevi on 29.7.1991 agreeing to sell the petition scheduled premises to him for a sum of Rs.4,00,000/-, that Rs. 1,50,000/- was paid to the landlord as advance at the time of execution of the agreement itself; that a. sum of Rs.75,000/- was paid on 4.10.1991 and a sum of Rs.35,000/- thereafter, that altogether a sum of Rs.2,85,000/- was paid, that he is holding the petition scheduled premises now in part performance of the agreement for sale and accordingly, the petition seeking eviction is not maintainable due to extinction of the landlord-tenant relationship. Statutory defence of dependency of the tenant mainly on the income derived from the petition scheduled premises for his livelihood and non-availability of other suitable shop rooms to shift his business were also taken. 6. The Rent Control Court raised the following issues from the rival pleadings:- "1. Whether there is landlord-tenant relationship between the petitioner and the respondent? 2. Whether the petition scheduled premises are situated in Survey (sic Door) Nos.26/322 and 26/323? 3. Whether the petitioner is entitled to an order of eviction under Section 11(2)(b) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act? 4. Whether the petitioner is entitled to an order of eviction under Section 11(4)(3) (sic 11(4)(iii)] of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act? Order and costs?" 7. 3. Whether the petitioner is entitled to an order of eviction under Section 11(2)(b) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act? 4. Whether the petitioner is entitled to an order of eviction under Section 11(4)(3) (sic 11(4)(iii)] of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act? Order and costs?" 7. Before the Rent Control Court, the landlord tendered evidence as PW1 and his documentary evidence got marked as Exts.A1 to A5. Ext.A5 alone was marked with opposition that the authority, who had issued, was not examined. The court below overruled the opposition raised while marking Ext.A5 on cogent reasons. The tenant and a witness of his had also entered the box before the court below to testify as RW1 and RW2. Documentary evidence was also let in as Exts.B1 to B10. 8. The Rent Control Court had gone into the issue of existence of landlord tenant relationship among the parties in detail and after an elaborate discussion on point No.1 arrived at a finding in the negative. Having been convinced of lack of relationship among parties as landlord and tenant, the court below did not venture to consider the other four points raised. 9. The Rent Control Court found the initial entrustment of the property to be a mortgage and the holding of the property by the possessor of it after execution of Ext.B3 agreement for sale to be in part performance of an agreement for sale. Consequently, the eviction petition was dismissed. 10. The aggrieved landlord approached the Rent Control Appellate Authority in R.C.A.No.4 of 2014 challenging the order of the Rent Control Court. After re-appreciation of the evidence on record and hearing the rival arguments put forth by the respective counsel, the Rent Control Appellate Authority set aside the finding of the Rent Control Court that the jural relationship of landlord-tenant does not exist among them. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed in part and eviction was ordered under Section 11 (4)(iii) of the Act. Eviction sought on the ground of arrears of rent was declined. The judgment of the Rent Control Appellate Authority is under challenge before us in revision. 11. Sri. T. Sethumadhavan, the learned Senior counsel appearing for the revision petitioner and Sri. Jacob Sebastian appearing for the respondent were heard on their rival contentions. 12. Sri. Eviction sought on the ground of arrears of rent was declined. The judgment of the Rent Control Appellate Authority is under challenge before us in revision. 11. Sri. T. Sethumadhavan, the learned Senior counsel appearing for the revision petitioner and Sri. Jacob Sebastian appearing for the respondent were heard on their rival contentions. 12. Sri. T. Sethumadhavan urged that the appellate authority erred in not deciding the question of exclusive ownership of the rooms by the tenant referred to in Ext.A5 and the reasonable sufficiency of those rooms to suit his requirement. 13. Sri. T. Sethumadhavan, the learned Senior Counsel urged that though the recital in Ext.B1. is to the effect that Rs.35,000/- was advanced for the business purpose of the landlord, the court below failed to construe the terms in Ext.B2 accordingly and thus, erred in arriving at the finding that the transaction was a rental arrangement. According to the counsel, the original transaction as evidenced from Ext.B1 being an advancement of Rs. 35,000/- for business purpose of the landlord, the recitals in Ext.B2 that the amount of Rs.35,000/- was given as advance towards a rental arrangement will not change the character of the transaction. According to him, the appellate authority went wrong in construing the terms in Ext.B2 independently against those in Ext.B1I. It is contended that had the court below considered things in the true perspective, the transaction involved in Ext.B2 ought to have been found to be a mortgage. The counsel also tried his level best to convince us that with the execution of an agreement for sale, whatever be the relationship among the parties, the same got transformed to that of seller-purchaser and thereby, the obligation to pay rent, if any, that was there under Ext.B2, was put to an end. He tried his level best to apprise us that by entering into an agreement for sale, the tenant's status was changed to that of a person holding the scheduled property in part performance under an agreement for sale and the appellate authority totally erred in overlooking that aspect. 14. The learned counsel has also drawn our attention to the fact that with the termination of the landlord-tenant relationship, the future rights of the parties could only be governed by the terms of the agreement for sale to which they are signatories. 14. The learned counsel has also drawn our attention to the fact that with the termination of the landlord-tenant relationship, the future rights of the parties could only be governed by the terms of the agreement for sale to which they are signatories. According to him, the word 'tenant' is defined under Section 2(5) of the Act and a reading of it would make it clear that the court below went wrong in understanding it correctly and the judgment under challenge suffers such erroneous understanding. The appellate authority, according to the counsel, failed to take note, based on Exts.B1 to B3 that the material issue to be considered is the landlord-tenant relationship and not the other issues. The counsel also invited our attention to the fact that rent was neither paid nor demanded from 1.8.1991 by the respective parties and that the same is a circumstance showing the change of relationship of the parties from 29-07-1991, the date on which Ext.B3, the agreement for sale was executed. 15. Lastly, the counsel contended that the landlord in order to get an order of eviction of the tenant under Section 11(4)(iii) of the Act must establish that the tenant had acquired possession of a building and that it was reasonably sufficient to meet his requirements. According to him, the landlord in the case on hand failed to establish the same. According to him, the tenant must have been afforded with opportunity to establish by evidence that the building, possession of which was acquired by him was not reasonably sufficient for the conduct of his business. Such an opportunity having not been afforded to the tenant, the order of eviction under challenge would not sustain legally and needs to be interfered with in the revision. 16. The aforesaid contentions have been stoutly refuted by Sri. Jacob Sebastian. It is urged by the counsel that a transaction alleged as entered as per Ext.B3 is unknown to him and that payment as alleged by the tenant were not made to him at any point of time. 17. In the context, what looms large for our consideration is the nature of the transaction that was existing originally. Indisputably, the original transaction was entered into by the tenant with the landlord's father. The transaction as per Ext.B2 was entered into between the tenant and the landlord on 7.7.1990. 17. In the context, what looms large for our consideration is the nature of the transaction that was existing originally. Indisputably, the original transaction was entered into by the tenant with the landlord's father. The transaction as per Ext.B2 was entered into between the tenant and the landlord on 7.7.1990. A look at the recitals in Ext.B2 would give a picture about the mind set of the parties thereto. The relevant portion of the recitals in Ext.B2 are extracted hereunder:- ‘…………MALAYALAM’ The stipulation in Ext.B2 was to adjust interest at the rate of 3% per annum accrued on the sum of Rs.35,000/- towards monthly rent, when paid by the tenant. Rs.35,000/- was advanced by the tenant to the landlord in lumpsum and the stipulation incorporated in Ext. B2 was that the interest accrued on the said sum annually when paid would be adjusted towards the monthly rent payable for the building, the possession of which is given to the tenant. Indisputably, the transaction partakes the character of a rental arrangement. If the intention of the parties while executing Ext.B2 was to create a transaction of mortgage as alleged by the tenant, a stipulation to adjust the interest accrued on the advance payment towards monthly rent ought not to have been incorporated therein. Question of adjustment of interest towards rent does not arise in a transaction of mortgage. Payment of rent is a characteristic of rental arrangement. The words in Ext.B2 convey to a reader in unambiguous terms that the transaction is a rental arrangement. Therefore, we have no doubt on the nature of the transaction as a rental arrangement and the argument of the leaned counsel for the revision petitioner that it was a mortgage and accordingly a petition for eviction under the Act would not sustain is totally devoid of merits and consequently unsustainable. The Rent Control Appellate Authority has correctly found the petition to be maintainable under the Act and the judgment does not suffer from any infirmity for that reason. The finding not being tainted with illegality, impropriety and incorrectness, interference to reverse is totally uncalled for. 18. The Rent Control Appellate Authority has correctly found the petition to be maintainable under the Act and the judgment does not suffer from any infirmity for that reason. The finding not being tainted with illegality, impropriety and incorrectness, interference to reverse is totally uncalled for. 18. Now, it is time to advert to the argument secondly advanced by the counsel for the revision petitioner that the original status of the parties under Ext.B2, either it be a mortgage or a lease arrangement would change by entering into an agreement for sale regarding the subject matter thereof. We have already found the original transaction among the parties to be a rental arrangement on the basis of Ext.B2 and therefore, there is no question now, of it being termed as a mortgage. A perusal of Ext.B3 gives an impression that the signatories thereto have entered into an agreement for sale in respect of the subject matter on 29.7.1991 on terms stipulated therein. The landlord disputed the genuineness of Ext.B3 and the specific contention based on it was a total denial of its execution by himself, his mother and sister. Ext.B3 having been marked in evidence by the court below, we are constrained to see whether any right has been conferred on the parties, on being signatories thereto and any transformation resulted thereby in their original status. The recitals of Ext.B3 are to the following effect:- ‘…………MALAYALAM’ 19. The gist of the extract is that the landlord, his mother Smt. Sarojini and sister Smt. Remadevi have agreed to sell the petition schedule shop rooms for a total sale consideration of Rs.4,00,000/-; a sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- was paid by the tenant towards advance sale consideration on the day itself and Rs. 1,50,000/- was agreed to be paid on 29.9.1991. It was further agreed among the parties to execute and register the sale deed on 20.1.1992, and to deliver possession of the property scheduled therein on getting the name of Smt. Ushadevi, another sister who has not signed Ext.B3, incorporated therein and after accepting the balance sale consideration of Rs. 1,00,000/-. The consequences of non­compliance of the terms are also specifically incorporated therein. 20. 1,00,000/-. The consequences of non­compliance of the terms are also specifically incorporated therein. 20. It can be deduced from the recitals in Ext.B3 that on payment of Rs.1,50,000/- on 29.9.1991 in addition to the initial advance payment of Rs, 1,50,000/-, the parties have agreed to execute the document (sale deed) and to register the same after incorporating the name of Smt. Ushadevi, another sister and co-owner of the tenanted premises, who evidently was not a signatory to Ext.B3. The recital goes on stating that the balance sale consideration of Rs. 1,00,000/- is required to be paid without interest within six months from the date of execution of the deed. 21. The specific stand taken by the tenant in his written objections and while tendering evidence as RW1 was that Rs.1,50,000/- was paid as advance towards the sale consideration of Rs.4,00,000/- on 29.7.1991, the very date of execution of Ext.B3, Rs.75,000/- on 4.10.1991, Rs.35,000/- thereafter and Rs.25,000/- on 19.1.1992. As per the recitals in Ext.B3, the parties have agreed among themselves that Rs. 1,50,000/- would be paid on 29.9.1991, i.e. after two months from the date of execution of Ext.B3. Therefore, as per the stipulations in Ext.B3, as on 29.9.1991, the tenant was to pay Rs.3,00,000/- towards the sale consideration and the balance sale consideration of Rs.1,00,000/- was to be paid within six months from the date of execution of the said document. The case of the tenant in his objections and in the box as a witness was that Rs. 1,35,000/- was paid in three instalments on different dates after the initial payment of Rs.1,50,000/-. Therefore, it cannot be said that the tenant has complied strictly with the specific terms in Ext.B3 regarding the second payment towards the total sale consideration on 29.9.1991. A scrutiny of the recitals would also reveal that it does not contain a term putting the tenant in possession of the property following performance by him of his part of the contract. 22. The argument of the learned counsel was that the tenant by making payment of a substantial sum towards the sale consideration has performed his part in accordance with the stipulation contained in the terms of Ext.B3 and therefore, his continuation in possession of the petition schedule premises can only be said to be that of a purchaser in part performance of the contract. Or in other words, he can be said to be taken possession of the property upon performing his part of the contract as stipulated by the terms in Ext.B3 and thereby, he was entitled to the protection from eviction under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (Act No.4 of 1882) (for short 'the Act 1882'). 23. In the backdrop, we are called upon to consider the crucial aspect, whether the tenant would be entitled to claim the legal protection under Section 53A of the Act 1882 in the light of the evidence available in the case on hand. For the purpose, the relevant section which provides for the doctrine of part performance needs to be examined. 24. Section 53A of the Act 1882 deals with part performance. The provision is extracted hereunder:- "53A. Part performance.- Where any person contracts to transfer for consideration any immovable property by writing signed by him or on his behalf from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonably certainty, and the transferee has, in part performance of the contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof, or the transferee, being already in possession, continues in possession in part performance of the contract and has done some act in furtherance of the contract, and the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract, then, notwithstanding that where there is an instrument of transfer, that the transfer has not been completed in the manner prescribed therefor by the law for the time being in force, the transferor or any person claiming under him shall be debarred from enforcing against the transferee and persons claiming under him any right in respect of the property of which the transferee has taken or continued in possession, other than a right expressly provided by the terms of the contract; Provided that nothing in this section shall affect the rights of a transferee for consideration who has no notice of the contract or of the part performance thereof." 25. A contract for sale of immovable property is a contract in which the parties agree that a sale of such property shall take place on terms settled between them. The legal consequences that flow from the execution of a contract of sale are three fold. A contract for sale of immovable property is a contract in which the parties agree that a sale of such property shall take place on terms settled between them. The legal consequences that flow from the execution of a contract of sale are three fold. (I) It does not, of itself create any interest in or charge on the property contracted for sale. (II) The only right that accrues upon entering into a contract for sale is the right to enforce specific performance thereof not only against the vendor but also against a transferee from the vendor with notice of the contract. Contract for sale is only an executory contract and no right will accrue to the proposed purchaser until and unless it is put to execution by complying with the terms therein, A contract for sale, by any stretch of imagination would not confer any other right upon the proposed purchaser as contended by the counsel for the tenant/revision petitioner. (III) Unless and until the terms of the contract for sale are performed it cannot tantamount to a 'sale' and there cannot be any transformation of status of the parties. Their status would remain the same as they were prior to their entering into the agreement for sale. By merely entering into an agreement for sale a person will not acquire any interest in the subject matter agreed to be purchased. 26. The doctrine of part performance embodied in section 53A is an equitable doctrine. The object of the provision is to prevent a transferor or his successor in interest from taking any advantage on account of non-­registration of the document, provided the transferee has performed his part of the contract and in pursuance thereof has taken possession of some immovable property. 27. In his Commentary on the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (Act No.4 of 1882), Dr.Hari Singh Gour has described: "The doctrine of part performance' is stated 'to be' an equitable doctrine designed to relieve the rigour of the law and provide a remedy when a transfer or an agreement for transfer falls short of the requests laid down by the law", 28. The envisagement of the provision is clear that it applies only to a person who contracts to transfer immovable property in writing. The envisagement of the provision is clear that it applies only to a person who contracts to transfer immovable property in writing. The provision reads further that the proposed transferee in the agreement if has taken possession of the property or he continues to be in possession thereof being already in possession, in part performance of the contract and has also done some act in furtherance of the contract, the transferor shall be debarred from enforcing any right in respect of the property covered by such contract. 29. It is apposite to consider whether the legal protection as contemplated under Section 53A of the Act, 1882 could be availed by the tenant in the case on hand. It is not in dispute that the tenant was in possession of the property even prior to 7.7.1990 and continued the same even after the execution of Ext.B2 deed. The relevant aspect to be looked into contextually is whether the continuity in possession of the property by the tenant was in terms of Ext.B2 or by virtue of the change in status alleged by the tenant on account of the terms incorporated in Ext.B3, the agreement for sale executed by the parties on 29.7.1991. The respondent had filed a counter statement before the Rent Control Court. A contention was not taken to the effect that continuity of the possession of the shop rooms after 29.7.1991, the date of execution of Ext.B3 was based on the terms agreed upon by the parties thereto. Section 54 of the Act, 1882 is relevant in the context and apposite. It reads as follows:- "54. "Sale" defined.- "Sale" is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised to part-paid and part-promised. Sale how made.- Such transfer, in the case of tangible immovable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, or in the case of a reversion or other intangible thing, can be made only by a registered instrument. In the case of tangible immovable property of a value less than one hundred rupees, such transfer maybe made either by a registered instrument or by delivery of the property. Delivery of tangible immovable property takes place when the seller places the buyer, or such person as he directs, in possession of the property. In the case of tangible immovable property of a value less than one hundred rupees, such transfer maybe made either by a registered instrument or by delivery of the property. Delivery of tangible immovable property takes place when the seller places the buyer, or such person as he directs, in possession of the property. Contract for sale.- A contract for the sate of immovable property is a contract that a sale of such property shall take place on terms settled between the parties. It does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property." (underline supplied) Therefore, a contract for sale of immovable property is a contract that a sale of such property shall take place in terms settled between the parties. It does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property. In order that any interest in or charge on immovable property is created, the terms upon which the sale of such property was agreed to be taken place shall be complied with. Till the fulfilment of the terms of the contract of sale there cannot be any transformation in the original status of the parties and they would not be conferred with the rights and liabilities of a seller and purchaser with reference to the immovable property contracted to be sold. 30. The counsel for the petitioner invited our attention to the fact that even if the original transaction entered on the basis of Ext.B2 is considered as a lease arrangement, then also the status of the parties as such would cease and get transformed to that of seller-purchaser in terms of Ext.B3 executed by them. The contention of the learned counsel was that in such an event, the tenant being in possession of the premises can take shelter from eviction under Section 53A. According to him, on the very date of execution of Ext.B3 and on subsequent dates, the tenant had paid money towards sale consideration. The contention of the learned counsel was that in such an event, the tenant being in possession of the premises can take shelter from eviction under Section 53A. According to him, on the very date of execution of Ext.B3 and on subsequent dates, the tenant had paid money towards sale consideration. According to him, the tenant, who was already in possession on the basis of Ext.B2, has continued in possession and positive acts having been performed by him in the form of payments made towards the sale consideration in tune with the specific terms in Ext.B3, the original arrangement of lease if any, alleged as existing had come to an end and the tenant would be relegated to a realm of protection against eviction by the landlord (petitioner) as under Section 53A of the Act. 31. The judicial interpretation of the provision would be helpful in the context for a better understanding of the circumstances on hand. Our attention was drawn to certain judicial pronouncements of this Court as well as the Apex Court in the context. 32. A Division Bench of this Court in Assainkuttv Haii and Others v. K.P. Rajalakshmiamma and another, 2012(4) KHC 612 : 2012(4) KLT 674 : ILR 2012(4) Ker. 933 : 2013 (1) KLJ 123 held:- "16. .................. the change of jural relationship between the landlord and the tenant during the subsistence of tenancy shall take place only if the parties intended for such a transformation. What is most relevant is the intention of the parties. In both the cases, the evidence abundantly tend to indicate that the landlord and tenant had such an intention. 17. In the instant case, there was no surrender of possession on the basis of Ext.B7. What was proposed to be sold was 25.75 cents of land where the petition schedule building is housed. The sale consideration was fixed at Rs. 12,000/- per cent which comes to Rs.3,09,000/- for the entire extent. Out of that only a sum of Rs. 50,000/- was paid as advance. The positive assertion of the respondents/landlords that the rent was due only from January 1991 was not at all denied by the petitioners in their objections. The fact that the petitioners have paid rent subsequent to the execution ofExt.B7 would indicate that the parties never intended to put an end to the landlord-tenant relationship. 50,000/- was paid as advance. The positive assertion of the respondents/landlords that the rent was due only from January 1991 was not at all denied by the petitioners in their objections. The fact that the petitioners have paid rent subsequent to the execution ofExt.B7 would indicate that the parties never intended to put an end to the landlord-tenant relationship. Evidently and admittedly too the sale has not come through and Ext.B7 agreement has became time barred. The landlord-tenant relationship stood eclipsed while Ext.B7 agreement was alive. As soon as it became unenforceable, the parties stood relegated to their original position as landlord and tenant." In view of the above, the Division Bench concluded in paragraph 20 of the decision supra:- "Viewed in that profile, we are of the definite view that the relationship between the respondents and the petitioners in, this case continues to be that of a landlord and tenant." Another Division Bench of this Court in Safeena Salim v. Subair [2014(4) KIT 752] held as follows:- "The trump card plea of the tenants is that they had a contract of sale in their favour and therefore, the landlord's right does not continue to be what it was as between the landlord and tenants. It is submitted that, as of now, the suit for specific performance of that contract of sale is pending trial. Suffice it for us to say, that it is trite law that a contract of sale does not create any interest in immovable property. Nor does a decree or order under the Specific Relief Act directing specific performance of a contract of sale by itself amount to create an interest in immovable property either by way of charge or otherwise. It is trite law that even such a decree or order has to undergo the process of execution of enforcement through the competent court, resulting in transfer of property, either voluntarily or by intervention of court. It is only then that the transferee under the contract of sale can claim that the said contract has got transformed into a real right in the property. This is the law. That being so. It is only then that the transferee under the contract of sale can claim that the said contract has got transformed into a real right in the property. This is the law. That being so. we are unable to conceive that merely because a tenant in possession obtains a contract of sale, there could be any transmutation of the rights and the characteristics of parties for a court to assume that the possession of a building tenant under Act 2 of 1965 should be treated as one who has been put to be in continuing possession in part performance of the contract of sale." (underline supplied) The decision of the Apex Court in Hamzabi and others v. Syed Karimuddin and others, (2001) 1 SCC 414 is also relevant in the context and the dictum reads:- “4. Section 53-A provides for another equitable principle viz., the doctrine of part performance …………….. Section 53-A similarly protects the possession of persons who may have acted on a contract of sale but in whose favour no legally valid sale deed may have been executed or registered. 33. Section 53-A provides for another equitable principle viz., the doctrine of part performance …………….. Section 53-A similarly protects the possession of persons who may have acted on a contract of sale but in whose favour no legally valid sale deed may have been executed or registered. 33. The Apex Court in Nathulal v. Phoolchand [ (1969) 3 SCC 120 ] has found the requirements for getting protection under Section 53Aof the Act, 1882 as quadruplicate and those are extracted hereinbelow:- "(1) that the transferor has contracted to transfer for consideration any immovable property by writing signed by him or on his behalf from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty; (2) that the transferee, has, in part-performance of the contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof or the transferee, being already in possession continues in possession in part-performance of the contract; (3) that the transferee has done some act in furtherance of the contract; and (4) that the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract.” The Apex Court goes on observing that - "notwithstanding that the contract, though required to be registered, has not been registered, or, where there is an instrument of transfer, that the transfer has not been completed in the manner prescribed therefor by the law for the time being in force, the transferor or any person claiming under him is debarred from enforcing against the transferee any right in respect of the property of which, the transferee has taken or continued in possession, other than a right expressly provided by the terms of the contract.'' The Apex Court in Ranchhoddas Chhaganlal v. Devaji Supdu Dorik and others, (1977) 3 SCC 584 held as follows:- "10..................... The respondent has never been ready and willing to perform the agreement alleged by the appellant. The respondent relied on the doctrine of part performance. One of the limbs of part performance is that the transferee has in the part performance of the contract take possession of the property. The most important consideration here is the contract. The respondent has never been ready and willing to perform the agreement alleged by the appellant. The respondent relied on the doctrine of part performance. One of the limbs of part performance is that the transferee has in the part performance of the contract take possession of the property. The most important consideration here is the contract. The true principle of the operation of the act of part performance seems to require that the acts in question must be referred to some contract and must be referred to the alleged one; that they prove the existence of some contract, and are consistent with the contract alleged. The doctrine of part performance is a defence. It is a shield and not a sword. It is a right to protect his possession against any challenge to it by the transferor contrary to the terms of the contract. The appellant is right in the contention that there was never any performance in part by the respondent of the contract between the parties." 11...................................... 12.................... Section 53-A requires a positive act of readiness and willingness on part of the transferee to perform the agreement." (underline supplied) The Apex Court in K. Kanthimathi and another v. Beatrice Xavier (MRS) (2000 KHC 1503) considered the question of part performance in the context of the recital in an agreement of sale which is extracted hereinbelow:- "I, the aforesaid, Mrs. Beatrice Xavier hereby agree out of my own free will, to sell, convey and transfer the property to you Mrs. R. Kanthimathi, wife of Mr. S. Ramaswami 435 Trichy Road, Coimbatore for a mutually agreed sale consideration ofRs.25,000/-. I shall be proceeding to Coimbatore and shall execute the sale deed and present the same for admission and registration before the registration authority, accepting and acknowledge payment of the balance of consideration of Rs.5000 (Rupees Five thousand only) at the time of registration and shall complete the transaction of sale and conveyance as the property demised has already been surrendered to your possession. " Rejecting the contention raised by the respondent in the case that the words "already been surrendered" therein, only refer to the existing possession of the tenant and nothing more" the court held: "................. So far as this submission for the respondent is concerned we have no hesitation to reject the same. The reference of the words "already been surrendered" has been incorporated with consciousness. So far as this submission for the respondent is concerned we have no hesitation to reject the same. The reference of the words "already been surrendered" has been incorporated with consciousness. This is to be construed in the background of the landlady having received a major amount of sale consideration and as normally, if a substantial sum is received by the seller, the purchaser is put in possession of the property hence to fall in the same lines the said words were used to confirm this possession in this context. There could be no other reason to record therein as such. Even if it be said to refer to the possession as a tenant the reassertion in the agreement of sale is only for the purpose of denoting possession given in pursuance of this agreement of sale. 6. Any jural relationship between two persons could be created through agreement and similarly could be changed through agreement subject to the limitations under the law. Earlier when the appellants were inducted into tenancy it only means both agreed that their relationship was to be that of landlord and tenant. Later when the landlord decided to sell this property to the tenant and the tenant agreed by entering into agreement, they by their positive act changed their relationship as purchaser and seller. When the seller landlord accepts the sum he actually acts under this agreement. This acceptance preceded by agreement of sale changes their relationship. This is how they intended. Once accepting such a change, their relationship of landlord tenant ceases." 34. Therefore, it is clear that only when possession of the property already held in pursuance of a separate transaction is stipulated by the terms incorporated in the contract of sale later entered among them as continued with and some positive acts have been performed by the parties in furtherance of the terms so agreed therein or expressed his readiness to perform his part, then alone he would be entitled to seek the defence under the doctrine of part performance. 35. In Sardar Govindrao Mahadik and another v. Devi Sahai and Others [ AIR 1982 SC 989 : (1982) 1 SCC 237 : (1982)1 Scale 191 : 1982 (2) SCR 186 ], the Apex Court held as follows:­ "............................... 35. In Sardar Govindrao Mahadik and another v. Devi Sahai and Others [ AIR 1982 SC 989 : (1982) 1 SCC 237 : (1982)1 Scale 191 : 1982 (2) SCR 186 ], the Apex Court held as follows:­ "............................... To qualify for the protection of the doctrine of part performance it must be shown that there is a contract to transfer immovable property for consideration and the contract is evidenced by a writing signed by the person sought to be bound by it and from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty These are prerequisites to invoke then equitable doctrine of part performance. After establishing the aforementioned circumstances, it must be further shown that a transferee had in part performance of the contract either taken possession of the property or any part thereof or the transferee being already in possession, continues in possession in part performance of the contract and had done some act in furtherance of the contract. The acts claimed to be in part performance must be unequivocally referable to the pre-existing contract and the acts of part performance must unequivocally point at the direction of the existence of contract and evidencing implementation or performance of contract. There must be a real nexus between the contract and the acts done in pursuance of the contract or in furtherance of the contract and must be unequivocally referable to the contract. When series of acts are done in part performance one such may be payment of consideration. Any one act by itself may or may not be of such a conclusive nature as to conclude the point one way or the other but when taken with many others, payment or part of the consideration or the whole of the consideration may as well be shown to be in furtherance of the contract" The Apex Court further observed in the decision cited supra as follows:- "Even for invoking the equitable doctrine of part performance there has to be a contract in writing from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty. Therefore the correct view would be, look at that writing that is offered as a contract for transfer for consideration of any immovable property, and then examine the acts said to have been done in furtherance of the contract and find out whether there is a real nexus between the contract and the acts pleaded as in part performance so that to refuse relief would be perpetuating the fraud of the party who, after having taken advantage or benefit of the contract, backs out and pleads non-registration as defence, a defence analogous to Section 4 of the Statute of Frauds." The Apex Court has also dealt with the words 'in furtherance of the contract' in the said decision to the following effect:- "We may recall here that the acts preliminary to the contract would be hardly of any assistance in ascertaining whether they were in furtherance of the contract. Anything done in furtherance of the contract postulates the pre-existing contract and the acts done in furtherance thereof Therefore. the acts anterior to the contract or merely incidental to the contract would hardly provide any; evidence of part performance." (underline supplied) 36. The factual matrix when viewed in the backdrop of the legal requirements embodied under Section 53A, it is clear that the doctrine of part performance has no relevance contextually. We have already found that the transaction entered into by the parties as per Ext.B2 was a rental arrangement. Therefore, possession of the petition scheduled rooms was already handed over to the petitioner/tenant herein from the date Ext.B2 bears. Ext.B3 was executed by the parties only on 29.7.1991. The recitals in Ext.B3 are already extracted supra. Petitioner was enjoying possession of the scheduled shop rooms as per Ext.B2 at the time when Ext B3 was executed. It is true, he continued with the possession. In the absence of any specific stipulation in Ext.B3 putting him in possession or permitting his continuation of possession, he can only be said to be enjoying possession in his original capacity as a tenant in accordance with the stipulation in Ext.B2, The intention of the parties to ExtJB3 is relevant in the context The intention of the parties could only be gathered from the terms which have been subscribed by them as per Ext.B3. 37. 37. It is pertinent in this connection to have a look at the third limb of Section 53A once again which reads:- "……. and the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract." Therefore, the transferee to be eligible for protection under Section 53A of the Act has also to satisfy the third limb by establishing that he has already performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract. What is elicited from the pleadings and the evidence adduced by the parties do not convince us that the tenant had either performed or expressed his willingness to perform his part of the contract. It is pertinent to note that Ext.B3 is not admitted by the landlord as a genuine document and its execution is denied in stout terms. Even if Ext.B3 is admitted to be a genuine document, it being a contract of sale, it does not create any interest in immovable property. In the case on hand, the parties appear to have entered into a contract of sale in the year 1990. The sale deed is not executed. Therefore, the relationship that remains can only be that of 'landlord-tenant’. As evidence reveals, the time for execution of the contract was extended till 1992. It is pertinent to note that even after the said period got expired, there was no case for the tenant that he had taken any steps for getting the contract specifically performed. In the box as RW1, the respondent has deposed that he had not taken any legal action seeking a decree for specific performance of Ext.B3. Evidently, he is incapacitated to pursue with any legal action on account of Ext.B3 being not signed by one among the co-owners. 38. Therefore, the recitals in Ext.B3 would speak about what the parties to it intended. A scrutiny of the recital is already done and discussion of it is made supra. Truly, the recitals of Ext.B3 do not contain any term evidencing that the parties to it intended a transformation from the original jural relationship of landlord tenant to that of seller purchaser. As the judicial pronouncements point out, the payment in part of the sale consideration is one form of manifestation of the intention of the parties to change the relationship. But, apart from the payment of Rs. As the judicial pronouncements point out, the payment in part of the sale consideration is one form of manifestation of the intention of the parties to change the relationship. But, apart from the payment of Rs. 1,50,000/- effected at the time of execution of Ext.B3 as evidenced from the recitals, no materials are forthcoming in evidence to establish that payments as stipulated by the terms have been made by the tenant on future dates. Therefore, he cannot be heard to say that positive acts have been done by him following the execution of Ext.B3, in furtherance of the terms agreed thereto. 39. Another important point relevant in the context is lack of any specific term in Ext.B3 to justify the tenant's contention that there was cessation of landlord tenant relationship from the moment of execution of the agreement for sale and that he was put in possession or continued with the possession in the new capacity as a purchaser. 40. The further relevant part was the legality of Ext.B3. As clear from the recitals therein, the property in respect of which the contract for sale was executed is a joint family property with the landlord, his mother and two sisters as owners in common. The recitals also make it clear that only one sister was signatory to Ext.B3 and the execution of the sale deed could only be materialised on making the payments of entire sale consideration and after procuring the signature of the other sister also. Then the question comes, whether Ext.B3 as it stands is a valid and executable document. In this connection, it is pertinent to note that a suit for specific performance could possibly be filed if the right of the joint owners in the property are severable. In the case on hand, the landlord has no case that his right is severable. 41. The specific case put forth by the learned counsel on behalf of the tenant was that as per Ext.B3 agreement for sale, the landlord his mother and sister Remadevi agreed to sell the petition schedule shoprooms for a total sale consideration of Rs.4 lakhs; the tenant paid a sum of Rs.1,50,000/- as advance; Rs.75,000/- was paid on 4.10.1991; a sum of Rs.35,000/- was paid and a sum of Rs.25,000/- was paid on 19.1.1992. Accordingly, the tenant claimed to have paid a sum of Rs.2,85,000/- to the landlord towards sale consideration. Accordingly, the tenant claimed to have paid a sum of Rs.2,85,000/- to the landlord towards sale consideration. Admittedly of the tenant, the landlord's sister Ushadevi is not a party to the agreement. The reason for not procuring the signature was also stated by the tenant as the failure of the landlord to obtain her signature. 42. Therefore, it turns out that Ext.B3 in the form in which it exists is not an executable agreement and as such admittedly, the tenant could not get it specifically performed through a court of law. 43. The conclusion that follows from the discussion hereinabove made of the legal flaws is that, the parties never intended to change their jural relationship of landlord tenant, but only permitted occupation of the premises as tenant, without it being unaffected by the performance of any positive act in furtherance of the terms of Ext.B3 which is totally an unenforceable document. 44. It is necessary to notice that the tenant has not approached a court of law seeking the relief of specific performance of Ext.B3. Even if a joint holder of property had omitted to sign Ext.B3, there is no difficulty to obtain a decree of specific performance in respect of the respective share of the party who is a party to the agreement, if the shares are severable and specific. But, in the case on hand, the petitioner has not applied for getting a decree for specific performance. Therefore, he cannot be said to have obtained the right of a transferee for valid consideration. Unless and until the agreement for sale is executed, there cannot be any change of status of parties. The original status of landlord-tenant would continue and there is no bar for the landlord to apply for eviction under the Act and the Rent Control Court to consider the same as per the provisions of the Act. 45. The next question that arises for consideration is the legality, propriety and correctness of the finding of the appellate authority that the landlord is entitled to an order eviction under section 11(4)(iii) of the Act. 46. 45. The next question that arises for consideration is the legality, propriety and correctness of the finding of the appellate authority that the landlord is entitled to an order eviction under section 11(4)(iii) of the Act. 46. The argument of the learned counsel for the tenant was that the issue of maintainability alone was considered and answered affirmatively by the Rent control Court in the judgment and when the judgment was assailed before it, the appellate authority went on considering all issues on merits and passed an order of eviction under Section 11(4)(iii) of the Act. The counsel urged that by doing so, the appellate authority had exceeded its jurisdiction and thereby deprived the tenant of the opportunity to contest the case based on those issues on merit. To contend specifically, the tenant was not granted with opportunity to establish that the shop rooms cited as possessed by him are not in fact possessed by him or that the rooms are insufficient to suit the purpose. 47. A perusal of the records of the case reveals that the Rent Control Court failed to consider the issue of maintainability of the rent control petition as a preliminary issue at the inception of the proceedings, even though a specific contention in that respect was taken by the tenant in his counter statement. It had framed the issues and directed the parties to face trial. Accordingly, landlord was examined as PW1 and documents got marked as Exts.A1 to A5. Tenant got himself examined as RW1. A witness gave oral evidence as RW2. Documents were also got marked on his side as Exts.B1 to B10. 48. As the first issue regarding landlord-tenant relationship of the parties was found in the negative, the Rent Control Court did not venture to decide on other issues raised by it. Since the claim of the petitioner for eviction was found to be not maintainable, it would only have been a futile exercise to answer the other issues. 49. The Rent Control Appellate Authority while exercising the appellate jurisdiction found the Rent Control Court to have erred in finding that landlord-tenant relationship did not exist among the parties and reversed the same. It was in such a circumstance that the other issues raised were answered by the appellate authority. There is nothing wrong in doing so. 49. The Rent Control Appellate Authority while exercising the appellate jurisdiction found the Rent Control Court to have erred in finding that landlord-tenant relationship did not exist among the parties and reversed the same. It was in such a circumstance that the other issues raised were answered by the appellate authority. There is nothing wrong in doing so. An elaborate trial was conducted before the Rent Control Court on all issues and parties had availed of enough opportunity to contest their rival claims. There is no question of any prejudice being caused to the tenant. Therefore, there is absolutely no merit in contending that opportunity was denied to the tenant. 50. It is now turn to look into the sufficiency of evidence to sustain the order of eviction under Section 11(4)(iii) passed in favour of the landlord. The learned counsel for the landlord contended that the tenant has got several buildings of his own in his possession and the business carried on by the tenant being one in vegetables, there is no reason to doubt about the sufficiency of space to accommodate the same. 51. The said averment of the landlord was refuted by the tenant contending precisely that the buildings owned by him were not in his possession. To substantiate the averments, the landlord has relied on Exts.A3 to A5. Ext.A5 makes it clear that buildings bearing Nos.16/599 and 25/404 stand in the joint names of the tenant and his wife, buildings bearing Nos.30/631 and 30/632 stand in the name of himself and his two sons, and building No.31/401 stands in his exclusive ownership. The question for determination in a petition for eviction under Section 11(4)(iii) of the Act is to see reasonable sufficiency of the building acquired by the tenant to suit his requirement. In the case on hand, the tenant is doing business in vegetables and therefore, there is no scope to doubt about the reasonable sufficiency of any of those rooms to accommodate the same. It is true, there was a stout denial of those established facts by the tenant. But, the matter denied was not established by cogent evidence. Records of the case evidence that not even an attempt was made by the tenant in the trial court to substantiate his case. It is true, there was a stout denial of those established facts by the tenant. But, the matter denied was not established by cogent evidence. Records of the case evidence that not even an attempt was made by the tenant in the trial court to substantiate his case. Therefore, the appellate authority was justified in ordering eviction under Section 11(4)(iii) of the Act and there is no room for questioning the finding of the appellate authority. Interference is absolutely uncalled for. 52. The tenant did not succeed to point out to us of any instance wherein opportunity was denied by the trial court to adduce evidence. Going by the evidence available on record, we are convinced about the failure of the tenant to Jet in evidence regarding the non-suitability of the building, proved prima facie to be in his possession by the landlord. The argument of the learned counsel seeking a remand of the case to the appellate authority on the ground of non-affording of opportunity to let in evidence will not hold good contextually and is discarded. This Court is not liable to exercise the jurisdictional authority to remand a case for enabling a party to fill up the lacuna occurred while letting in evidence during the trial. Doing so would only lead the litigation to an endless process. To conclude, we see no grounds to interfere with the impugned judgment of the Rent Control Appellate Authority in R.C.A.No.4/2014 originated from the judgment of the Rent Control Court in R.C.R No.31/2012. 53. As a last submission, learned counsel for the tenant sought for some time to vacate the premises. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we are satisfied that, it is necessary to grant time to the petitioner till 31.05.2017, to surrender vacant possession of the premises. However, in order to avail the benefit of the above, the tenant has to file an affidavit before the Rent Control Court (Additional Munsiff), Palakkad in R.C.P. No. 31/2012, within a period of two weeks of the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment, undertaking to surrender vacant possession of the premises, on or before 31.05.2017. However, in order to avail the benefit of the above, the tenant has to file an affidavit before the Rent Control Court (Additional Munsiff), Palakkad in R.C.P. No. 31/2012, within a period of two weeks of the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment, undertaking to surrender vacant possession of the premises, on or before 31.05.2017. There shall be a further condition that, the tenant shall pay the entire arrears of rent, if any remaining unpaid and shall continue to pay the rent in respect of the premises, without any delay or default, until vacant possession is surrendered to the landlord. It is made clear that, in the event of the tenant committing default in complying with any of the above conditions, the benefit of the directions contained in this order shall be forfeited and the landlord shall be at liberty to pursue further proceedings, in accordance with law, for obtaining vacant possession of the premises. In the result, i. The Rent Control Revision is dismissed. ii. The tenant is granted time upto 31.05.2017 to surrender vacant possession of the premises to the landlord, on condition that he files an affidavit before the execution court in R.C.P. No.31/2012, within a period of two weeks of the date of receipt of a copy of this order, undertaking to surrender vacant possession of the premises, on or before 31.05.2017. It shall be a further condition that, the tenant shall pay the entire arrears of rent, if any remaining unpaid and shall continue to pay the rent in respect of the premises, without any delay or default, until vacant possession is surrendered to the landlord. It is made clear that, in the event of the tenant committing default in complying with any of the above conditions, the benefit of the directions contained in this order shall be forfeited and the landlord shall be at liberty to pursue further proceedings, in accordance with law, for obtaining vacant possession of the premises.