JUDGMENT : Rajiv Sharma, J. This petition is instituted against the award dated 18.10.2010, rendered by learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Haridwar in Adjudication Case No.115 of 2009 (old adjudication No.10 of 2004). 2. Key facts, necessary for adjudication of this petition, are that the husband of respondent No.1 namely Bachan Lal was engaged as Chowkidar/IVth Class Employee with the petitioners’ department on 15.01.1978. He was terminated on 31.12.1980 without following the provisions of Section 6-N of U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. The workman raised an industrial dispute. Thereafter, the dispute was referred for adjudication before learned Labour Court, Haridwar by the State Government. The workman filed a claim petition under the U.P. Industrial Dispute Act, 1947. The employer/petitioners filed the written statement in the matter. 3. The workman died during the pendency of claim petition. His wife/respondent No.1 was substituted. Learned Labour Court answered the reference on 18.10.2010 and held that wife of the deceased workman Bachan Lal would be entitled to get 50% back wages from the date of termination of the workman upto the date of his death i.e. from 15.01.1978 to 08.06.2006. Hence, the present writ petition. 4. Mr. R.C. Arya, learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of the State/petitioners, has vehemently argued that there is delay in raising the industrial dispute. He also argued that the workman himself had abandoned the job and he had not completed 240 days in a calendar year. 5. Mr. Niranjan Bhatt, Advocate appearing on behalf of respondent No.1 supported the award dated 18.10.2010 passed by learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Haridwar. According to him, the workman had completed more than 240 days. In the claim petition, employer has not denied this fact. According to the Rule 12(9) of the U.P. Industrial Rules, 1957, if the affidavit accompanying the written statement of the Union or the Workman, is not rebutted by the employer, as the case may be, it shall be presumed that the contents of the affidavit are to be true. It is admitted by the employer that workman had worked from November, 1978 to December, 1980. Assistant Engineer had also issued a certificate that workman was engaged from January, 1978 to December, 1980. 6. The workman was also examined as W.W.1 before the Labour Court. In this statement, he stated that he had worked for more than 240 days. It is admitted by the employer that workman had worked from November, 1978 to December, 1980. Assistant Engineer had also issued a certificate that workman was engaged from January, 1978 to December, 1980. 6. The workman was also examined as W.W.1 before the Labour Court. In this statement, he stated that he had worked for more than 240 days. This averment of the workman has not been rebutted by the employer. The workman, in fact worked 02 years, 11 months and 15 days. Since, the workman had worked for more than 240 days. The workman could only be retrenched after following the procedure laid down in Section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. The workman died on 08.06.2006. Thereafter, his wife i.e. respondent No.1 was substituted on the basis of Pariwar register. 7. There is no substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the employer that workman himself had abandoned the job. The question of abandoning the job is required to be proved like any other fact, as held by their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in AIR 1979 SC 582 in the case of “G.T. Lad & others vs. Chemicals and Fibres India Ltd”, as under :- “6. From the connotations reproduced above it clearly follows that to constitute abandonment, there must be total or complete giving up of duties so as to indicate an intention not to resume the same. In Buckingham Co. v. Venkatiah and Ors. : (1964)4 SCR 265 : ( AIR 1964 SC 1272 ) it was observed by this Court that under common law an inference that an employee has abandoned or relinquished service is not easily drawn unless from the length of absence and from other surrounding circumstances an inference to that effect can be legitimately drawn and it can be assumed that the employee intended to abandon service. Abandonment or relinquishment of service is always a question of intention, and normally, such an intention cannot be attributed to an employee without adequate evidence in that behalf. Thus, whether there has been a voluntary abandonment of service or not is a question of fact which has to be determined in the light of the surrounding circumstances of each case. Abandonment or relinquishment of service is always a question of intention, and normally, such an intention cannot be attributed to an employee without adequate evidence in that behalf. Thus, whether there has been a voluntary abandonment of service or not is a question of fact which has to be determined in the light of the surrounding circumstances of each case. Re.-Question No. 2 : This takes us to the consideration of the second question, namely, whether in the circumstances of the instant case, it could be said that the appellants had voluntarily abandoned the service of the Company. It may be recalled that the appellants had along with 229 other workmen gone on indefinite and peaceful strike which ended on October 22, 1972) in response to the strike notice given by the union to the Company to press its demand for re-instatement of its three dismissed leaders and had not only by their letters dated September 21, 1972 and September 26, 1972 unequivocally intimated to the Company that they did not intend to abandon the service but had also returned the cheques sent to them by the Company on account of their leave salary gratuity etc. The appellants stand that the letter of the Company dated September 7, 1972 was received by them on September 20, 1972 and not earlier was never denied or refuted by the Company in the correspondence that passed between the parties. Thus, there was nothing in the surrounding circumstances or the conduct of the appellants indicating or suggesting an intention on their part to abandon service which in view of the ratio of Gopal Chandra Misra's case (1978) 2 SCC 301 : ( AIR 1978 SC 548 ), can be legitimately said to mean to detach, unfasten, undo or untie the binding knot or link which holds one to the office and the obligations and privileges that go with it. Their absence from duty was purely temporary and could by no stretch of imagination be construed as voluntary abandonment by them of the Company's service. In Express Newspaper (P) Limited v. Michael Mark (1963) 3 SCR 405 : ( AIR 1963 SC 1141 ) which is on all fours with the present case, it was held that if the employees absent themselves from the work because of strike in enforcement of their demands, there can be no question of abandonment of employment by them. In Express Newspaper (P) Limited v. Michael Mark (1963) 3 SCR 405 : ( AIR 1963 SC 1141 ) which is on all fours with the present case, it was held that if the employees absent themselves from the work because of strike in enforcement of their demands, there can be no question of abandonment of employment by them. In the present case also the appellant's absence from duty was because of their peaceful strike to enforce their demand. Accordingly, we are of the view that there was no abandonment of service on the part of the appellants. Re.-Question No. 3: Let us now advert to the last but the most crucial question, namely, whether the action of the Company in removing the names of the appellants from its rolls during the pendency of the proceedings before the Labour Court in respect of the industrial dispute on the presumption that they had abandoned Company's service constituted an alteration in the conditions of service applicable to them immediately before the commencement of the said proceedings which pre-judiciously affected them. Although the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent has taken us through the certified standing orders as applicable to the appellants, he has not been able to point out anything therein to indicate that the company could terminate the services of the appellants on the ground of abandonment of service because of their going on strike in enforcement of their demands. Thus, their being no provision in the certified standing orders by virtue of which the Company would have terminated the services of the appellants in the aforesaid circumstances, the impugned action on the part of the Company clearly amounted to a change in the condition of service of the appellants during the admitted pendency of the industrial dispute before the Labour Court which adversely affected them and could not be countenanced. We are fortified in this view by the aforesaid decision of this Court in Express Newspapers (P) Limited v. Michael Mark and Anr. (Supra) where repelling an identical contention to the effect that the failure of the workmen to return to work by a notified date clearly implied abandonment of their employment, it was held that the management cannot by imposing a new term of employment unilaterally convert the absence of work into abandonment of employment. (Supra) where repelling an identical contention to the effect that the failure of the workmen to return to work by a notified date clearly implied abandonment of their employment, it was held that the management cannot by imposing a new term of employment unilaterally convert the absence of work into abandonment of employment. It was further held in that decision that if the strike was in fact illegal, the management could take disciplinary action against the employees under the standing orders and dismiss them. If that were done, the strikers would not have been entitled to any compensation under standing orders but that was not what the appellants purported to do and the respondents were, therefore, entitled to relief.” 8. Since, the workman had completed 240 days at the time of his retrenchment, the employer was required to issue a notice and pay the compensation under Section 6-N of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 to the workman. The employer has not complied with Section 6-N of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Dispute Act, 1947. 9. Mr. R.C. Arya, learned Standing Counsel for the State, has also argued that there is delay in raising the industrial dispute. However, the fact of the matter is that the employer/petitioners had not challenged the reference made by the State Government to the Labour Court. Moreover, the question of delay can be seen at the time of moulding the relief. 10. Learned Labour court has correctly held that termination of the workman by the employer was illegal and also held that the wife of the deceased i.e. respondent No.1 would be entitled to get 50% back wages from the date of termination of the workman up to the date of his death. 11. Accordingly, there is no merit in the petition and the same is hereby dismissed.