JUDGMENT : A.S. CHANDURKAR, J. 1. The original defendant in Regular Civil Suit No. 1041 of 2014 is aggrieved by the order passed by the trial Court dated 3rd May, 2016 below Exh.18 whereby the Preliminary Issues have been answered in favour of the plaintiff after rejecting the objection raised by the defendant. 2. The Applicant and Non-applicant are sisters. It is the case of the Non-applicant-plaintiff that their father had constructed a huge bungalow on a plot admeasuring about 750 square meters. The father had executed a Will on 1st January, 1997, and subsequently another Will on 3rd August, 2000. According to the plaintiff, after the demise of her parents, she was residing in a portion of the said bungalow, while the applicant-defendant was residing in another part of the said bungalow. On the plaintiff getting knowledge, that the defendant was setting up a claim for the entire property, she lodged a police complaint and thereafter in August, 2014, filed a suit for declaration that she had legal right to reside in the suit property and that the alleged Will dated 30th December, 2004 said to have been executed by her father was invalid. Other ancillary reliefs were also sought in the suit. Along with the plaint, the plaintiff also filed an application for temporary injunction seeking to protect her possession and for restraining the defendant from alienating the same. 3. The defendant filed her Written Statement and raised an objection that the suit had been undervalued. It was further asserted that the suit was barred by limitation as the plaintiff was aware about the existence of the Will dated 30th December, 2004, executed by her father. The prayers as made in the plaint were also opposed. The defendant also filed her reply to the application for grant of temporary injunction. 4. The defendant thereafter moved two applications, one being under provisions of Order-VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short “the Code”) as well as an application under Section 9-A of the Code. These applications were opposed by the defendant and the trial Court by its order dated 13th July, 2015 rejected both these applications. 4. The defendant thereafter moved two applications, one being under provisions of Order-VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short “the Code”) as well as an application under Section 9-A of the Code. These applications were opposed by the defendant and the trial Court by its order dated 13th July, 2015 rejected both these applications. The plaintiff challenged the said order in Civil Revision Application No. 77 of 2015 and this Court by its judgment dated 26th October, 2015 set aside the order passed on the application under Section 9-A of the Code and directed the trial Court to decide the questions of valuation and limitation in accordance with law. The order passed on the application under provisions of Order-VII, Rule 11 of the Code was maintained. 5. Pursuant to the aforesaid directions, the trial Court framed Preliminary Issues below Exh.33. While the plaintiff did not lead any evidence, the defendant examined herself and two other witnesses. The trial Court by its order dated 3rd May, 2016 held that the plaintiff being a co-owner of the suit property, the claim had been properly valued under provisions of Section 6-A (iv) (j) of the Maharashtra Court Fees Act, 1959 (for short, “the Act of 1959”). It further held that the suit was filed within limitation, as, according to the plaintiff, the cause of action had arisen on 25th March, 2014 and the suit was filed on 3rd September, 2014. The defendant being aggrieved has filed the present Revision Application. 6. Shri S.Y. Deopujari, learned counsel for the applicant, submitted that the trial Court erred in deciding both the Preliminary Issues in favour of the plaintiff. It was submitted that the suit had not been properly valued, inasmuch as even according to the plaintiff, she had fifty per cent share in the suit property and even on that basis if the suit was appropriately valued, the same would take it beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the trial Court. He referred to the plaint averments and submitted that the plaintiff was not in possession of the portion of the suit property and she intended to obtain possession without paying the proper court fee. The suit as filed could not be treated to be a suit for declaration, but was, in fact, one for seeking possession and hence the claim was susceptible to monetary valuation. The suit as filed could not be treated to be a suit for declaration, but was, in fact, one for seeking possession and hence the claim was susceptible to monetary valuation. According to the learned counsel, the plaint ought to have been valued as per provisions of Section 6 (vii) of the Act of 1959. On the aspect of limitation, it was submitted that the plaintiff had full knowledge about the execution and existence of Will dated 30th December, 2004 by her father. He referred to various documents on record as well as the deposition of witnesses to indicate that as per communication dated 21st March, 2005 and the registered Lease-Deed signed by the plaintiff on 25th March, 2009, it was clear that the suit as filed was barred by limitation. He urged that the limitation as prescribed by Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short, “the Act of 1963”), was applicable and the trial Court, therefore, erred in holding that the suit was filed within limitation. The cause of action as mentioned in paragraph 14 of the plaint could not be accepted in the light of tacit knowledge of said Will immediately after its execution. He sought to draw support from the following decisions in support of his submissions:- (a) Samrat Furniture & Others vs. Bhaurao Natthuji Mankar, 2001 (3) Mh. L.J. 456 (b) Dr. G.V. Iyengar & Another vs. A.R. Sampathkumar & Others, 2008 (3) Mh. L.J. 621 (c) Ramchandra Babaji Thali & Others vs. Bhaskar Babaji Thali & Another, 2012 (5) Mh. L.J. 327 (d) L.C. Hanumanthappa (Since dead) Represented by his LRs. vs. H.B. Shivakumar, 2016 (4) Mh. L.J. 762 (e) Vinod Arjundas Sahani & Others vs. The Servants of Nagpur Homeless Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. Nagpur (Civil Revision Application No. 36/16; decided on 8th October, 2016 [Coram : S.B. Shukre, J.]. 7. Shri S.A. Kalbande, learned counsel for the non-applicant, supported the impugned order. According to him, the plaintiff’s right in the suit property was not disputed and that it was specifically pleaded in the plaint that she was in possession of part of the suit property. The plaintiff was only seeking the relief of enjoyment of joint family property. As share in the suit property was not being claimed, the suit had been properly valued under provisions of Section 6 (iv) (j) of the Act of 1959. The plaintiff was only seeking the relief of enjoyment of joint family property. As share in the suit property was not being claimed, the suit had been properly valued under provisions of Section 6 (iv) (j) of the Act of 1959. He also submitted that the Revision Application, in so far as challenge to the valuation is concerned, was not maintainable in view of the judgment in Sri Rathnavarmaraja vs. Smt. Vimla, AIR 1961 SC 1299 . On the question of limitation, it was submitted that the application filed under Section 9A of the Code did not contain any ground to indicate that the suit was barred by limitation. The application under provisions of Order-VII, Rule 11 of the Code filed on the same ground had already been dismissed. He then submitted that the suit as filed was within limitation and he referred to the averments in the plaint to indicate that the alleged documents sought to be relied by the plaintiff were signed under misconception. He referred to the provisions of Section 17 of the Act of 1963 and urged that the question of limitation was a mixed question of law and facts. The cause of action as pleaded was valid and the suit was filed within limitation in accordance with law. He, therefore, submitted that the trial Court did not commit any error when it passed the impugned order. He placed reliance upon the decisions in (1) National Textile Corporation Ltd. vs. Nareshkumar Badrikumar Jagad & Others, AIR 2012 SC 264 and (2) Sheila Devi & Others vs. Kishan Lal Kalra & Others, ILR 1974 Delhi 491. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and I have also gone through the documents placed on record. 9. Two-fold objections have been raised by the applicant, on the basis of which, it is sought to be urged that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Taking the objection with regard to the suit being filed beyond the period limitation, it is to be noted that initially the applicant had filed an application under provisions of Order-VII Rule 11 of the Code, stating therein that the plaint was liable to be rejected as the suit was filed beyond the period of limitation. Taking the objection with regard to the suit being filed beyond the period limitation, it is to be noted that initially the applicant had filed an application under provisions of Order-VII Rule 11 of the Code, stating therein that the plaint was liable to be rejected as the suit was filed beyond the period of limitation. This application was considered by the trial Court along with another application filed by the applicant under provisions of Section 9-A of the Code. By common order dated 13th July, 2015, both the objections were turned down. In Civil Revision Application No. 77 of 2015, this Court maintained the rejection of the application filed under provisions of Order-VII Rule 11 of the Code. It, however, directed the trial Court to frame Preliminary Issues on the aspect of valuation of the suit and limitation. Accordingly, these Preliminary Issues were framed on 4th February, 2016. Only the applicant led evidence in support of her objections. Though it was urged on behalf of the Non-applicant that this Court had directed the trial Court to frame appropriate issues while considering the objections under Section 9-A of the Code, as there were no averments made in the said application with regard to limitation, the applicant should not be heard on said objection. According to him, such objection without any sufficient averments did not deserve to be entertained. For said purpose, he placed reliance on the decision in National Textile Corporation Ltd. (supra). This submission cannot be accepted in view of the fact that as per the directions issued in Civil Revision Application No. 77 of 2015, the trial Court had framed Preliminary Issues. These Issues were, therefore, required to be decided by taking into consideration the pleadings of the parties. What was under consideration was the objection under Section 9-A of the Code and not one under provisions of Order-VII Rule 11 of the Code. For said reason, ratio of the decision relied upon by the learned counsel for non-applicant cannot be applied to the case in hand. 10. According to the applicant, as the non-applicant was well aware about the execution of Will dated 30th December, 2004 in view of her affidavit sworn in March, 2005 as well as authority letter dated 21st March, 2005 along with Lease-Deed dated 25th March, 2009, the suit as filed on 27th August, 2014 was barred by limitation. 10. According to the applicant, as the non-applicant was well aware about the execution of Will dated 30th December, 2004 in view of her affidavit sworn in March, 2005 as well as authority letter dated 21st March, 2005 along with Lease-Deed dated 25th March, 2009, the suit as filed on 27th August, 2014 was barred by limitation. He had relied upon provisions of Article 58 of the Act of 1963. In the plaint, it has been pleaded that on the basis of alleged Will dated 30th December, 2004, the applicant was seeking to assert her rights and that there was a threat to her possession. Reference is then made to lodging of an FIR by her on 25th March, 2014. If the plaint is examined in its entirety, it can be gathered that the applicant sought to assert her rights on the basis of said Will dated 30th December, 2004 in the month of March, 2014. The Non-applicant, therefore, lodged a First Information Report and thereafter filed the present suit. 11. Under Article 58 of the Act of 1963, the limitation begins to run when the right to sue first accrues. It is well settled and requires no reiteration that unless there is a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe the right of a party by the defendant against whom the suit is instituted, there would be no right to sue. Reference in that regard can be made to the decision in Mst. Rukhamabai vs. Lala Laxminarayan & Others, AIR 1960 SC 335 , where it has been held that every threat by a party to such right, however, ineffective and innocuous it may be, cannot be considered to be a clear and unequivocal threat so as to compel him to file a suit. This decision has been referred in L.C. Hanumanthappa (supra) which was relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant. The facts on record indicate that though the non-applicant was aware of execution of Will dated 30th December, 2004 when she signed various documents in the years 2005 and 2009, a clear and unequivocal threat to her legal rights was given by the applicant only in March, 2014 which led her to lodge a report. Hence, mere knowledge of execution of said Will in the present facts cannot be held to be giving rise to the right to sue. Hence, mere knowledge of execution of said Will in the present facts cannot be held to be giving rise to the right to sue. On reading the plaint in its entirety, I find that the suit has been filed within a period of three years when the right to sue first accrued in March, 2014. Hence, finding recorded by the trial Court holding the suit to have been filed within limitation does not deserve to be interfered with. 12. As regards the objection to the valuation of the suit, it was submitted on behalf of the non-applicant that a Civil Revision Application challenging the adjudication on the question of court fees was not maintainable. He had relied upon the decision in Sri Rathnavarmaraja (supra). It has been held in aforesaid decision that a Revision Application on the question of court fee at the instance of the defendant should not be entertained when no question of jurisdiction is involved. In the present case, the objection to the pecuniary jurisdiction has been directed to be considered in the light of provisions of Section 9-A of the Code. Provisions of Section 9-A of the Code permit consideration of such jurisdictional issue. If the objection of the applicant is accepted, the trial Court would not have pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the suit. In other words, a question of jurisdiction is involved and, therefore, the present case falls within the exception carved out in the aforesaid decision of the Honourable Supreme Court. Hence, said objection raised by the non-applicant cannot be accepted. 13. According to the applicant, the suit ought to have been valued under provisions of Section 6 (iv) (d) of the Act of 1959. Reference was also made to the provisions of Section 6 (vii) of the Act of 1959. The suit has been valued in terms of provisions of Section 6 (iv) (j) of the Act of 1959. If the plaint is read in its entirety along with reliefs sought therein, it is clear that the non-applicant was not claiming any share in the property that was owned by her father. She was neither claiming possession of any portion thereof as, according to her, she was already in possession of portion of the suit property. Validity of the Will dated 30th December, 2004 was in question along with other ancillary reliefs. She was neither claiming possession of any portion thereof as, according to her, she was already in possession of portion of the suit property. Validity of the Will dated 30th December, 2004 was in question along with other ancillary reliefs. The subject matter of dispute was, therefore, the validity of said Will which, in turn, cannot be said to be susceptible to monetary valuation. The trial Court has rightly considered this aspect and has held the suit to be properly valued. The decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant are clearly distinguishable. In Vinod Arjundas Sahani & Others (supra), declaration of ownership had been sought and it was found that this issue was sought to be adjudicated. In Samrat Furniture & Others (supra), the issue of ownership was sought to be got adjudicated without properly valuing the suit. Similarly, in G.V. Iyengar (supra), declaration that the plaintiff was the legal heir of the original owner of the property was sought. In Ramchandra Babaji Thali & Others (supra), adjudication of share in the plots allotted by virtue of joint family property was sought. It is, therefore, clear that the aforesaid decisions do not assist the case of the applicant considering the nature of reliefs sought by the non-applicant. It can be said that non-applicant was seeking enjoyment of joint family property. The suit was, thus, properly valued under provisions of Section 6 (iv) (j) of the Act of 1959. Hence, said objection raised by the applicant does not have merit. 14. As a result of aforesaid discussion, I do not find that the trial Court has committed any jurisdictional error that would require interdiction by this Court under Section 115 of the Code. The Civil Revision Application is, therefore, dismissed with no order as to costs.