JUDGMENT : RAKESH TIWARI, J. 1. This appeal has been preferred challenging the correctness and validity of the judgment and order dated 13th June, 2016, passed in W.P. No. 24999(W) of 2015, on the ground that the impugned judgment and order is bad in law since the Writ Court could not appreciate that ex-parte award, appended as Annexure P-15, has been passed in violation of the provisions of sub-rule (5) of Rule 20-B of the West Bengal Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 1958 Rules) and, as such, the award itself is unsustainable in law. 2. The order impugned has also been assailed on the ground that the Writ Court failed to consider that the Tribunal, being a creature of statute has to perform its statutory functions, as provided in sub-rule (5) of Rule 20-B of the 1958 Rules which reads: "Statement of case or written statement. (5) A copy of the statement of case or the written statement shall be served on the first party or the second party, as the case may be, by the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court within seven days from the date on which copies of the statement of case or the written statement, as the case may be, are filed by making it over to the party concerned or to its authorised representative in the Office of the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court on a date and time fixed for the purpose and intimated to the party concerned by the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court." 3. It is sought to be argued on the basis of Rule 20-B of the Rules as amended applicable in State of West Bengal the Tribunal ought to have discharged its statutory duty by supplying the representative of the employer with a copy of the claim or written statement filed on behalf of the union and non-compliance of the provisions of law renders the award a nullity, being in violation of not only the principles of natural justice but also in violation of the statutory rules, as no person having knowledge of the statutory provisions could have acted in the manner in which the Tribunal had acted. 4. 4. It is prayed that in the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the award dated 13th April, 2007 may be set aside as it suffers from errors apparent on the face of record and law and the order impugned should also be set aside for the reason that the learned Single Judge could not appreciate the second proviso of Rule 27(iii) of the 1958 Rules in its proper perspective which reads: "Rule 27(iii): For sufficient cause set aside after notice to the opposite party or parties as the case may be, the ex-parte award or an award on the footing that the industrial dispute under reference is no longer in existence either of its/his own motion or on the application of any of the parties : Provided further that no application for review under clause (iii) shall be entertained on the expiry of the 15th day from the date of the award." 5. According to learned counsel for the appellant the provisions contained in Rule 27(iii) and the second proviso aforesaid, are clear and unambiguous and for this reason the interpretation sought to be given by the learned Writ Court is nothing but a conscious endeavour to stretch the statutory provisions beyond the said Rule. It is submitted that a plain reading of Rule 27(iii), with the second proviso thereof, leave no room for any doubt that no interpretation was called for as there was no ambiguity in understanding the statutory provisions which is attracted to the extent for setting aside an ex-parte award and not beyond that and that in fact time frame prescribed in the second proviso is in no manner applicable for the reason that it relates to review of an award and not for setting aside an application for review. 6. It appears from the affidavit in opposition filed in Writ Court on behalf of the respondent Union that stand taken by the company was that it had entered appearance through a representative, and was served with the order of reference containing the issues of the matter in dispute. The show cause notice was issued on 26th May, 2014 by the Tribunal to the company as to why the case should not be proceeded ex-parte. 7. It is stated that the said notice, appended as Annexure P-3, has been served upon the company and yet in spite of it, the company did not appear. The show cause notice was issued on 26th May, 2014 by the Tribunal to the company as to why the case should not be proceeded ex-parte. 7. It is stated that the said notice, appended as Annexure P-3, has been served upon the company and yet in spite of it, the company did not appear. It is after service of the aforesaid notice that ex-parte award has been passed after expiry of more than two months time. The award was published on 25th August, 2014 which was communicated to the company on 17th September, 2014 and thereafter the company had filed the review application on 19th November, 2014 which has been rejected by the Tribunal on the ground that it had become functus officio as the application has been filed beyond 15 days after publication of the award as provided in second proviso of Rule 27(iii) of the 1958 Rules. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon a judgment of Single Judge of this Court in the case of Hindustan Motors Ltd. v. Ld. Fifth Industrial Tribunal, W.B. and Ors., reported in 2008 (2) LLN 886 (Cal) : 2008(1) CHN page 819. In paragraph 7 of the said judgment the Court held thus: "The Tribunal, in not complying with Rule 20B(5) of the 1958 Rules by not giving notice of intimation of the filing of the written statement to the company has also not complied with the mandatory provisions of law and has violated the basic principles of natural justice. The fixing of ex parte hearing, without service of notice, as postulated by Rule 21 of the 1958 Rules, has also rendered the award passed a nullity." 9. He has also relied upon a judgment rendered by the Apex Court in Anil Sood v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court II, reported in (2001) 2 LLN 611 (SC) : (2001) 10 SCC page 534. In paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 the Apex Court held thus: "6. The aspect that the party against whom award is to be made due opportunity to defend has to be given is a matter of procedure and not that of power in the sense in which the language is adopted in Section 11. In paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 the Apex Court held thus: "6. The aspect that the party against whom award is to be made due opportunity to defend has to be given is a matter of procedure and not that of power in the sense in which the language is adopted in Section 11. When matters are referred to the tribunal or court they have to be decided objectively and the tribunals/courts have to exercise their discretion in a judicial manner without arbitrariness by following the general principles of law and rules of natural justice. 7. The power to proceed ex parte is available under Rule 22 of the Central Rules which also includes the power to inquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there is sufficient cause shown which prevented a party from appearing, then if the party is visited with an award without a notice which is a nullity and therefore they Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set aside the ex parte award. 8. If this be the position in law, both the High Court and the Tribunal (sic Labour Court) fell into an error in stating that the Labour Court had become functus officio after making the award though ex parte. We set aside the order made and the award passed by the Labour Court and affirmed by the High Court in this regard, in view of the fact that the learned counsel for the respondent conceded that application filed by the appellant be allowed, set aside the ex parte award and restore the reference. To decide the matter afresh, the parties shall appear before the Labour Court on 11-12-2000 to take further directions as regards the proceedings. As the matter is very old, it would be appropriate for the Labour Court to dispose of this reference as expeditiously as possible but not later than six months from today." 10. To the same effect, another judgment of Apex Court in the case of Radhakrishna Mani Tripathi v. L.H. Patel and Anr. Reported in (2009) 1 SCC (L&S) page 358 = (2009) 2 SCC page 81 was relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant. To the same effect, another judgment of Apex Court in the case of Radhakrishna Mani Tripathi v. L.H. Patel and Anr. Reported in (2009) 1 SCC (L&S) page 358 = (2009) 2 SCC page 81 was relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant. The principle of rendering an award nullity for non-service of claim of written statement on the other side and also the Tribunal becoming functus officio has been dealt with in paragraphs 16 and 17 of the said judgment which reads: "16. Coming now to the submission based on Section 17-A of the Act the Court in para 14 of the decision held and observed as follows : (Grindlays Bank case, SCC pp. 425-26) "14. The contention that the Tribunal had become functus officio and, therefore, had no jurisdiction to set aside the ex parte award and that the Central Government alone could set it aside, does not commend to us. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act provides that the proceedings before the Tribunal would be deemed to continue till the date on which the award becomes enforceable under Section 17-A. Under Section 17-A of the Act, of the Act, an award becomes enforceable on the expiry of 30 days from the date of it publication under Section 17. The proceedings with regard to a reference under Section 10 of the Act are, therefore, not deemed to be concluded until the expiry of 30 days from the publication of the award. Till then the Tribunal retains jurisdiction over the dispute referred to it for adjudication and upto that date it has the power to entertain an application in connection with such dispute. That stage is not reached till the award becomes enforceable under Section 17-A. In the instant case, the Tribunal made the ex parte award on 9.12.1976. That award was published by the Central Government in the Gazette of India dated 25.12.1976. The application for setting aside the ex parte award was filed by the Respondent no. 3, acting on behalf of the Respondents 5 to 17 on 19.1.1977 i.e. before the expiry of 30 days of its publication and was, therefore, rightly entertained by the Tribunal. That award was published by the Central Government in the Gazette of India dated 25.12.1976. The application for setting aside the ex parte award was filed by the Respondent no. 3, acting on behalf of the Respondents 5 to 17 on 19.1.1977 i.e. before the expiry of 30 days of its publication and was, therefore, rightly entertained by the Tribunal. It has jurisdiction to entertain it and decide it on merits." From the above quotation it would appear that in Grindlays Bank the recall application was filed within 30 days from the date of publication of the award and hence, the objection raised on the basis of Section 17-A did not arise in this case. In Grindlays Bank this Court did not say that the Industrial Courts would have no jurisdiction to entertain an application for setting aside an award made after 30 days after its publication. Nevertheless, on the basis of the passage marked in italics in the above quotation Ms Issar strongly contended that is the true import of the judgment. 17. We are unable to accept. The position is made clear in the later decision in Anil Sood -vs Labour Court. In Anil Sood interestingly the Labour Court had rejected the recall application on the very same ground that upon making the award it became functus officio in the matter. The order of the Labour Court as challenged before the High Court but the High Court also took the same view. In appeal this Court noted that the award was made on 11.9.1995 and the application for its recall was filed on 6.11.1995. The Court referred to the earlier decision in Grindlays Bank and the provisions of Sub-sections (1) and (3) of Section 11 of the Act and in paras 6, 7 and 8 of the decision observed and held as follows: "6. The aspect that the party against whom award is to be made due opportunity to defend has to be given is a matter of procedure and not that of power in the sense in which the language is adopted in Section 11. When matters are referred to the tribunal or court they have to be decided objectively and the tribunals/courts have to exercise their discretion in a judicial manner without arbitrariness by following the general principles of law and rules of natural justice. 7. When matters are referred to the tribunal or court they have to be decided objectively and the tribunals/courts have to exercise their discretion in a judicial manner without arbitrariness by following the general principles of law and rules of natural justice. 7. The power to proceed ex parte is available under Rule 22 of the Central Rules which also includes the power to inquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there is sufficient cause shown which prevented a party from appearing, then if the party is visited with an award without a notice which is a nullity and therefore they Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set aside the ex parte award. 8. If this be the position in law, both the High Court and the Tribunal (sic Labour Court) fell into an error in stating that the Labour Court had become functus officio after making the award though ex parte. We set aside the order made and the award passed by the Labour Court and affirmed by the High Court in this regard, in view of the fact that the learned counsel for the respondent conceded that application filed by the appellant be allowed, set aside the ex parte award and restore the reference." 11. In rebuttal, learned counsel for the respondent union has relied upon a judgment of this Court in the case of Workmen represented by Raniganj Chemical Works Majdoor Sangh and Anr. v. Raniganj Chemical Works and Ors., reported in 1998 1 CLR page 1268. In paragraphs 5, 6, 11, 13 and 14 of the said judgment it has been held thus: 5. The appellant being aggrieved by the order of the learned Judge dated 2nd September, 1997 has preferred appeal before this Court. v. Raniganj Chemical Works and Ors., reported in 1998 1 CLR page 1268. In paragraphs 5, 6, 11, 13 and 14 of the said judgment it has been held thus: 5. The appellant being aggrieved by the order of the learned Judge dated 2nd September, 1997 has preferred appeal before this Court. in this appeal it is contended by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants/petitioners that under the provision of the Industrial Disputes Act there is no provision for 'No Dispute' Award, as the 'Award' mean some determination final or interim of any industrial dispute and in the absence of any determination made by the Tribunal the order passed by the learned Tribunal cannot be said to be an 'Award' and if there was no award in that event the Tribunal retains inherent jurisdiction to set aside any order passed by the Tribunal and in this connection referred to the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in AIR 1981 Supreme Court P. 606 (Grindlays Bank v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal,) wherein the Supreme Court has held that where a party is prevented from appearing at the hearing due to sufficient cause, and is faced with an ex parte award, it is as if the party is visited with an award without a notice of the proceedings. An Award without notice to a party is nothing but a nullity. In such circumstances, the Tribunal has not only the power but also the duty to set aside the ex parte award and to direct the matter to be heard afresh. In this case the Supreme Court also held that the contention that the Tribunal had become functus officio and, therefore, had no jurisdiction to set aside the ex parte award and that the Central Government alone could set it aside, does not commend to us. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act provides that the proceedings before the Tribunal would be deemed to continue till the date on which the award becomes enforceable under Section 17-A. Under Section 17-A of the Act, an award becomes enforceable on the expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication under Section 17-A. The proceedings with regard to a reference under Section 10 of the Act, are, therefore, not deemed to be concluded until the expiry of 30 days from the publication of the award. Till then the Tribunal retains jurisdiction over the dispute referred to it for adjudication and upto that date it has the power to entertain an application in connection with such dispute. In that case before the Supreme Court this stage did not reach and accordingly the Supreme Court held that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to entertain. At paragraph 6 of the said judgment the Supreme Court observed: "We are of the opinion that the Tribunal had the power to pass the impugned order if it thought fit in the interest of justice. it is true that there is no express provision in the Act or the rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to do so. But it is a well-known rule of statutory construction that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. in a case of this nature, we are of the view that the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the statue to the contrary. We do not find any such statutory prohibition. On the other hand, there are indications to the contrary". 6. Reference was also made to the decision of a learned single Judge of this Court in the case of Ganesh Chandra Sarkar v. State of West Bengal & Ors. reported in (1988) II CLR 39, where the learned Judge had held that if the dispute cannot be settled in the absence of both the parties there would be no materials before it to decide such dispute. In such event, no award is possible to be made by the authority concerned and as such the provision has been made under Rule 22 to submit a suitable report to the State Government and to put an end to the proceeding before the Tribunal. When both the parties fail to appear nothing remains pending before the authority concerned to whom the dispute is referred although the dispute remains outstanding and not adjudicated. In such event, Section 20(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act which provides for the termination of the proceedings cannot be attracted because no final or any award can be made whereby the dispute can be resolved. In such event, Section 20(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act which provides for the termination of the proceedings cannot be attracted because no final or any award can be made whereby the dispute can be resolved. Reference was also made to another decision reported in 1997 II CLR 319, in the case of M./s. Eagle Wood Agencies (P) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, wherein the learned Judge has held that there is another aspect of the matter that is to say the meaning of the 2nd proviso to R. 27 which provides that no application for review under Clause (iii) shall be entertained on the expiry of the 15th day from the date of the award. Obviously there is some mistake in the proviso itself for the simple reason that review is dealt with in clause (ii) of R. 27 and not in clause (iii) which deals with setting aside of an award. It may be remembered in this connection once again that the application on which the impugned order was passed was one for setting aside the award and not for review as would appear from the prayer portion of the said application. But for reasons to be stated hereinafter it may not be necessary to consider that aspect of the matter. 11. It is also submitted that a Rule has been framed by the State of West Bengal in exercise of the power conferred under Section 38 of the Industrial Disputes Act which is known as West Bengal Industrial Disputes Rule and Rules 27(iii) of the said Rules provides that the Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or Arbitrator may for sufficient cause set aside after notice to the opposite party or parties as the case may be, the ex parte award or an award on the footing that the industrial dispute under reference is no longer in existence either of its/his own motion or on the application of any of the parties. Second proviso to Rule 27 provides that no application for review under Clause (iii) shall be entertained on the expiry of the 15th day from the date of the award. It is significant to note that clause (iii) of Rule 27 and the second proviso have been brought into existence by the notification dated 5th June, 1976. Second proviso to Rule 27 provides that no application for review under Clause (iii) shall be entertained on the expiry of the 15th day from the date of the award. It is significant to note that clause (iii) of Rule 27 and the second proviso have been brought into existence by the notification dated 5th June, 1976. So, it appears that when a power was conferred upon the Tribunal for setting aside an ex parte award or awards made on the footing that the industrial disputes under reference was no longer in existence, the Tribunal could set aside the same on its own motion or on the application of the parties and at the same time under the second proviso if 15 days period of limitation starting from the date of the award was also incorporated, the power was conferred for setting aside an ex parte award with the specific condition that such a power could only exercised upto a period of 15 days from the date of the award. There is a statutory provision so far as West Bengal is concerned and by that provision an ex parte award or awards or no-dispute award could only be set aside if an application is failed by the party or the Tribunal on its own motion suo motu within a period of 15 days from the date of the award can do so. From the language used in the second proviso it appears that no application of such nature shall be entertained on the expiry of 15th day from the date of the award. 13. Grindlays Bank's decision is an authority for the proposition that the power of the Industrial Tribunal to set aside an ex parte award or order could not be exercised after it becomes enforceable under Section 17-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. This question was decided by the Supreme Court in case when there was no express provision, this way or other, in that connection the Supreme Court observed that a statutory construction is that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge the functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. such a power was held to be inherent but the period of limitation according to the Supreme Court judgment is that the power would only be exercised upto the date on which it becomes enforceable under Section 17-A of the Act. In the instant case, after the award was enforceable under Section 17-A of the Act, an application was filed by the Union representing the workmen to set aside an ex parte award passed in exercise of the power conferred under Rule 22 of the Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958. It was allowed by the Tribunal but the learned Trial Judge had set aside the same on the basis of the case laws on this point. We are of the view that the decision of the Single Bench of this Court in Ganesh Sarkar's case was rendered without considering the second part of Rule 22 which conferred power upon the Tribunal to submit an award to the State Government on the footing that industrial dispute is no longer in existence and accordingly the said decision cannot be said to be an authority for the proposition that in the absence of both the parties there will be no material before it to decide such dispute and in that view even if no award is possible that cannot be said to be correct. The said judgment was rendered without looking into the second part of the provisions of Rule 22. It is now well-settled principle that if any judgment is rendered in ignoring the statuary provisions, the same should be treated as per incurium and cannot have any persuasive value even. With regard to the language used in Rule 22 of the said Rules is concerned, we cannot agree with the view expressed by the learned single Judge in M/s. Eagle Wood Agencies Pvt. Ltd. (supra) that second proviso to Rule 22 has to be ignored because of the error apparent on the said Rules. It cannot be said that in the second proviso the period of limitation is only for review as contemplated under Section 27(ii). When the second proviso made it clear that no application for review under Clause (iii) shall be entertained on the expiry of 15th day from the date of the award and Clause (iii) of Rule 27 and the second proviso were incorporated by the same notification on the same day. When the second proviso made it clear that no application for review under Clause (iii) shall be entertained on the expiry of 15th day from the date of the award and Clause (iii) of Rule 27 and the second proviso were incorporated by the same notification on the same day. Accordingly, it is clear to us that the Rule making authority when decided to confer power upon the Tribunal to set aside an ex parte award, the rule making authority thought it fit to impose a period of limitation and accordingly the same was done. Ordinarily there was no clause (iii) of Rule 27 and there was no second proviso. Second proviso was introduced with Rule 27(iii) of the said Rules. Accordingly, we have to hold that the power under Rule 27(iii) is controlled by the period of limitation as provided under second proviso to that rule. 14. The High Court sitting in writ jurisdiction had not been conferred with any power to make any correction in respect of a legislation. Power of review of the High Court in Article 226 of the Constitution does not extend to sit over any judgment, over any law or Rules framed by the Rule making authority and to correct and/or to make it clear or remove any ambiguity if it appears even on the face of it, but reading the provisions of Rule 27(iii) and the second proviso to that Rule, which were introduced on the same day, by the same notification, we have no doubt in our mind that the intention of the rule making authority was clear that the power under Section 27(iii) could be exercised within the aforesaid period and that is why the period of limitation was fixed. In any event, when Rule 22 provides that the Tribunal has the power to submit an award to the State Government on the footing that the industrial dispute under reference is no longer in existence and when the Tribunal exercised that power in view of the decision made in the Grindlays Bank's case (supra), the Tribunal has the jurisdiction till the date on which the award become enforceable under Section 17-A of the Act and not thereafter. This cut-off date is very significant and accordingly, it cannot be said that on any count the Tribunal retains its jurisdiction to set aside the ex-parte award even after the same had become enforceable under Section 17-A of the Act as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank's case." 12. Learned counsel for the respondent has also placed reliance on another judgment of Apex Court in the case of Sangham Tape Co. v. Hans Raj, reported in (2005) 9 SCC page 331. In paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 it has been held thus: 6. An industrial adjudication is governed by the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") and the Rules framed thereunder. The Rules framed under the Act may provide for applicability of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. Once the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are made applicable to the industrial adjudication, indisputably the provisions of Order 9, Rule 13 thereof would be attracted. But unlike an ordinary civil court, the Industrial Tribunals and the Labour Courts have limited jurisdiction in that behalf. An award made by an Industrial Court becomes enforceable under Section 17-A of the Act on the expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication. Once the award becomes enforceable, the Industrial Tribunal and/or Labour Court becomes functus officio. 7. This Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal held that the Tribunal does not become functus officio provided an application for setting aside the award is filed within thirty days of publication of award having regard to the provisions contained in Section 11 of the Act and Rules 22 and 24 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957 stating: (SCC pp. 425, para 14) "14. The contention that the Tribunal had become functus officio and, therefore, had no jurisdiction to set aside the ex parte award and that the Central Government alone could set it aside, does not commend to us. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act provides that the proceedings before the Tribunal would be deemed to continue till the date on which the award becomes enforceable under Section 17-A. Under Section 17-A of the Act, an award becomes enforceable on the expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication under Section 17. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act provides that the proceedings before the Tribunal would be deemed to continue till the date on which the award becomes enforceable under Section 17-A. Under Section 17-A of the Act, an award becomes enforceable on the expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication under Section 17. The proceedings with regard to a reference under Section 10 of the Act are, therefore, not deemed to be concluded until the expiry of 30 days from the publication of the award. Till then the Tribunal retains jurisdiction over the dispute referred to it for adjudication and up to that date it has the power to entertain an application in connection with such dispute. That stage is not reached till the award becomes enforceable under Section 17-A. In the instant case, the Tribunal made the ex parte award on 9-12-1976. That award was published by the Central Government in the Gazette of India dated 25-12-1976. The application for setting aside the ex parte award was filed by Respondent 3, acting on behalf of respondents 5 to 17 on 19-1-1977 i.e. before the expiry of 30 days of its publication and was, therefore, rightly entertained by the Tribunal." 8. The said decision is, therefore, an authority for the proposition that while an Industrial Court will have jurisdiction to set aside an ex parte award, but having regard to the provision contained in Section 17-A of the Act, an application therefor must be filed before the expiry of 30 days from the publication thereof. Till then the Tribunal retains jurisdiction over the dispute referred to it for adjudication, and only up to that date, it has the power to entertain an application in connection with such dispute. 13. According to learned counsel for the respondent, nullity has been defined by Apex Court in its judgment rendered in the case of Hiralal Moolchand Doshi v. Barot Raman Lal Ranchhoddas (Dead) by LRS, reported in (1993) 2 SCC page 458. In paragraph 8 it has been held thus: "8. It may be noticed that we are dealing with the question of nullity of a decree because the executing court is bound to execute the decree and cannot go behind the same unless the decree passed by it is a nullity. In paragraph 8 it has been held thus: "8. It may be noticed that we are dealing with the question of nullity of a decree because the executing court is bound to execute the decree and cannot go behind the same unless the decree passed by it is a nullity. It appears, there is a lot of confusion as to what is meant by "decree being null and void". In the context which we are dealing, a decree is said to be a nullity if it is passed by a court having no inherent jurisdiction. Merely because a court erroneously passes a decree or there is an error while passing the decree, the decree cannot be called a nullity. The decree to be called a nullity is to be understood in the sense that it is ultra vires the powers of the court passing the decree and not merely voidable decree." 14. The case of Sangham Tape Co. (supra) is clearly distinguishable as it does not deal with the mandatory provision of Rule 20-B of the 1958 Rules which provides that it is the duty of the Tribunal to provide a copy of the written statement filed by one side to the other party. The case of Hiralal Moolchand Doshi (supra) is also distuiguishable as the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure do not apply in this case. 15. The moot question involved in this matter is a legal one as to whether in terms of Rule 20-B as amended in the State of West Bengal the non supply of written statement of the workman to employer by the Tribunal would render the ex parte award a nullity and whether the Tribunal in the facts and circumstances of this case had become functus officio? 16. In our opinion, in common parlance nullity means something which is legally void. The word 'void' has a wide meaning i.e. which has no legal effect. In Black's Law Dictionary, 10th Edition, 'nullity' and 'void' has been defined as: "Nullity: Something that is legally void. Void: Of no legal effect; to null." 17. Even otherwise, the Apex Court has consistently held that an ex-parte award is not an award on merit. The dispute is referred to the Labour Court for decision on evidence. Also for this reason, a judgment in absence of evidence is not a judgment. 18. Void: Of no legal effect; to null." 17. Even otherwise, the Apex Court has consistently held that an ex-parte award is not an award on merit. The dispute is referred to the Labour Court for decision on evidence. Also for this reason, a judgment in absence of evidence is not a judgment. 18. In our considered opinion, even though a notice of dispute may have been served, as noted by us earlier but provisions of Rule 20-B have not been complied with by the Tribunal which is conferred with a statutory duty of providing written statement filed by one side upon the other. Admittedly, no written statement was provided to the appellant employer by the Tribunal which failed in its statutory duty therefore, this non-compliance of statutory rules framed under the Act, would render the award a nullity and void. We are inclined to follow the judgment of the Apex Court in Anil Sood (supra) and Radhakrishna Mani Tripathi (supra) in holding that the Tribunal would not become functus officio and the Tribunal and the learned Single Judge committed a mistake in holding so. 19. For the reasons aforesaid, the judgment and order under appeal is set aside. Consequently, the award impugned is also set aside and quashed. The matter is remanded to the Tribunal for re-consideration. Either of the parties may approach the Tribunal within 15 days from the date of receipt of copy of this order. Upon receipt of the copy, the Tribunal shall provide copy of the written statement filed by the respondent Union to the employer and only thereafter shall proceed to determine the matter in accordance with law de-novo. As the matter is an old and a hotly contested one, we direct the Tribunal to hear and decide the matter within four months from the date of service of written statement upon the company. 20. The appeal is, thus, allowed. Application for stay, being CAN 8468 of 2016 stands disposed of. 21. There will be no order as to costs. 22. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be furnished on priority basis. Appeal Allowed - C.A.N. Disposed of - No. Cost.