JUDGMENT : Sanjay Yadav, J. 1. Petitioner, by way of present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, calls in question correctness of order dated 6.10.2016 passed by the Appellate Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (for short 1972 Act'). 2. The Appellate Authority was in seisin with the appeal under sub-section (7) of Section 7 of 1972 Act, directed against the order-dated 17.2.2016 passed by Controlling Authority on an application preferred by the respondent-workman for grant of gratuity. The application culminated into an order whereby, respondent was held entitled for the gratuity to the tune of Rs.7,63,166/- (Rs.5,35,555/- plus Rs.2,27,611/- towards interest) by treating him to be in service from 9.7.1975 to 5.7.2011 (i.e. 36 years). 3. That, limitation of sixty days is provided under subsection (7) of Section 7 of 1972 Act of filing an appeal with a further grace of sixty days which can be condoned by the Appellate Authority. 4. In the case at hand, as is borne out from the impugned order-dated 6.10.2016 that the appeal was filed beyond a period of 120 days. 5. Since it was beyond the jurisdiction of the Appellate Authority to have entertained the appeal after expiry of 120 days, the impugned order cannot be faulted with. In this context, reference can be had of the decision in Noharlal Verma v. District Co-Operative Central Bank Limited, Jagdalpur AIR 2009 SC 664 wherein their Lordships were pleased to hold : - "17. Now, Section 55 of the Act empowers the Registrar to determine conditions of employment in societies. The said section, as it then stood, read as under; 55. Registrar's power to determine conditions of employment in societies. - (1) The Registrar may, from time to time, frame rules governing the terms and conditions of employment in a society or class of societies and the society or class of societies to which such terms and conditions of employment are applicable shall comply with the order that may be issued by the Registrar in this behalf. Provided that in the case of co-operative credit structure, the Registrar may frame rules governing the terms and conditions of employment on the basis of the guidelines specified by the National Bank. Provided that in the case of co-operative credit structure, the Registrar may frame rules governing the terms and conditions of employment on the basis of the guidelines specified by the National Bank. (2) Where a dispute, including a dispute regarding terms of employment working conditions and disciplinary action taken by a society, arises between a society and its employees, the Registrar or any officer appointed by him not below the rank of Assistant Registrar shall decide the dispute and his decision shall be binding on the society and its employees : Provided that the Registrar or the officer referred to above shall not entertain the dispute unless presented to him within thirty days from the date of order sought to be impugned : Provided further that in computing the period of limitation under the foregoing proviso, the time requisite for obtaining copy of the order shall be excluded. (Emphasis supplied) 18. Plain reading of the aforesaid provision makes it more than clear that when a dispute regarding terms of employment, working conditions and disciplinary action taken by a society and its employees arises, the officer specified therein will decide such dispute which shall be binding on the society and its employees. The first proviso to subsection (2) of the said section prohibits the Registrar from entertaining the dispute unless such dispute is presented to him within thirty days from the date of the order impugned. The second proviso declares that in computing the period of limitation, the time requisite for obtaining copy of the order would be excluded. It is thus clear that if an employee, aggrieved by any decision taken by the society intends to approach the Registrar, he must invoke provisions of Section 55 of the Act by filing an application within thirty days from the date of such order or action. … 27. Now, limitation goes to the root of the matter. If a suit, appeal or application is barred by limitation, a Court or an Adjudicating Authority has no jurisdiction, power or authority to entertain such suit, appeal or application and to decide it on merits. 28. Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 reads as under; (3) Bar of limitation. If a suit, appeal or application is barred by limitation, a Court or an Adjudicating Authority has no jurisdiction, power or authority to entertain such suit, appeal or application and to decide it on merits. 28. Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 reads as under; (3) Bar of limitation. - (1) Subject to the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed although limitation has not been set up as a defence. (Emphasis supplied) 29. Bare reading of the aforesaid provision leaves no room for doubt that if a suit is instituted, appeal is preferred or application is made after the prescribed period, it has to be dismissed even though no such plea has been raised or defence has been set up. In other words, even in absence of such plea by the defendant, respondent or opponent, the Court or Authority must dismiss such suit, appeal or application, if it is satisfied that the suit, appeal or application is barred by limitation. 30. As stated earlier, Section 55 allows an aggrieved party to approach the Registrar within a period of thirty days. There is no provision analogous to Section 5 of the Limitation act, 1963 allowing the Registrar to condone delay if "sufficient cause" is shown. In view of this fact, in our opinion, the contention of the learned counsel for the Bank is well founded that the application submitted by the appellant was barred by time." 6. In view whereof, petition fails and is dismissed. No